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authorLennart Poettering <lennart@poettering.net>2018-01-04 20:00:28 +0100
committerSven Eden <yamakuzure@gmx.net>2018-05-30 07:50:08 +0200
commit941f374947c8db8311bbde1bba478749d455be43 (patch)
treee3da7023270163af0924169d33d1c42ca8c19f21 /src/test/test-fs-util.c
parente2c4475028606343176752bd0974df2c5ed6a520 (diff)
fs-util: add new chase_symlinks() flag CHASE_OPEN
The new flag returns the O_PATH fd of the final component, which may be converted into a proper fd by open()ing it again through the /proc/self/fd/xyz path. Together with O_SAFE this provides us with a somewhat safe way to open() files in directories potentially owned by unprivileged code, where we want to refuse operation if any symlink tricks are played pointing to privileged files.
Diffstat (limited to 'src/test/test-fs-util.c')
-rw-r--r--src/test/test-fs-util.c28
1 files changed, 27 insertions, 1 deletions
diff --git a/src/test/test-fs-util.c b/src/test/test-fs-util.c
index 1c453e11a..22aa64f4c 100644
--- a/src/test/test-fs-util.c
+++ b/src/test/test-fs-util.c
@@ -22,12 +22,15 @@
#include "alloc-util.h"
#include "fd-util.h"
+//#include "fd-util.h"
#include "fileio.h"
#include "fs-util.h"
+//#include "id128-util.h"
#include "macro.h"
#include "mkdir.h"
#include "path-util.h"
#include "rm-rf.h"
+//#include "stdio-util.h"
#include "string-util.h"
#include "strv.h"
//#include "user-util.h"
@@ -37,7 +40,7 @@ static void test_chase_symlinks(void) {
_cleanup_free_ char *result = NULL;
char temp[] = "/tmp/test-chase.XXXXXX";
const char *top, *p, *pslash, *q, *qslash;
- int r;
+ int r, pfd;
assert_se(mkdtemp(temp));
@@ -262,6 +265,29 @@ static void test_chase_symlinks(void) {
assert_se(chase_symlinks(q, NULL, CHASE_SAFE, NULL) >= 0);
}
+ p = strjoina(temp, "/machine-id-test");
+ assert_se(symlink("/usr/../etc/./machine-id", p) >= 0);
+
+ pfd = chase_symlinks(p, NULL, CHASE_OPEN, NULL);
+ if (pfd != -ENOENT) {
+ char procfs[STRLEN("/proc/self/fd/") + DECIMAL_STR_MAX(pfd) + 1];
+ _cleanup_close_ int fd = -1;
+ sd_id128_t a, b;
+
+ assert_se(pfd >= 0);
+
+ xsprintf(procfs, "/proc/self/fd/%i", pfd);
+
+ fd = open(procfs, O_RDONLY|O_CLOEXEC);
+ assert_se(fd >= 0);
+
+ safe_close(pfd);
+
+ assert_se(id128_read_fd(fd, ID128_PLAIN, &a) >= 0);
+ assert_se(sd_id128_get_machine(&b) >= 0);
+ assert_se(sd_id128_equal(a, b));
+ }
+
assert_se(rm_rf(temp, REMOVE_ROOT|REMOVE_PHYSICAL) >= 0);
}