| Commit message (Collapse) | Author | Age |
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Not that it matters IRL, but let's make this less surprising to read...
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When we compare two size values, let's make sure we cast from the
smaller to the bigger type first, if both types differ, rather than the
reverse in order to not run into overflows.
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During early boot, we'd call getrandom(), and immediately fall back to
reading from /dev/urandom unless we got the full requested number of bytes.
Those two sources are the same, so the most likely result is /dev/urandom
producing some pseudorandom numbers for us, complaining widely on the way.
Let's change our behaviour to be more conservative:
- if the numbers are only used to initialize a hash table, a short read is OK,
we don't really care if we get the first part of the seed truly random and
then some pseudorandom bytes. So just do that and return "success".
- if getrandom() returns -EAGAIN, fall back to rand() instead of querying
/dev/urandom again.
The idea with those two changes is to avoid generating a warning about
reading from an /dev/urandom when the kernel doesn't have enough entropy.
- only in the cases where we really need to make the best effort possible
(sd_id128_randomize and firstboot password hashing), fall back to
/dev/urandom.
When calling getrandom(), drop the checks whether the argument fits in an int —
getrandom() should do that for us already, and we call it with small arguments
only anyway.
Note that this does not really change the (relatively high) number of random
bytes we request from the kernel. On my laptop, during boot, PID 1 and all
other processes using this code through libelogind request:
74780 bytes with high_quality_required == false
464 bytes with high_quality_required == true
and it does not eliminate reads from /dev/urandom completely. If the kernel was
short on entropy and getrandom() would fail, we would fall back to /dev/urandom
for those 464 bytes.
When falling back to /dev/urandom, don't lose the short read we already got,
and just read the remaining bytes.
If getrandom() syscall is not available, we fall back to /dev/urandom same
as before.
Fixes #4167 (possibly partially, let's see).
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There's some confusion: older man pages specify that linux/random.h
contains getrandom, but newer glibc has it in sys/random.h. Detect if
the newer header is available and include it. We still need the older
header for the flags.
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Let's make sure we read it in a way compatible with non-aligned memory.
Fixes: https://bugs.debian.org/cgi-bin/bugreport.cgi?bug=812928
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Apply remaining fixes and the performed move of utility functions
into their own foo-util.[hc] files on libbasic.
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This commit replays the moving around of source files that have been
done between systemd-219 and systemd-221.
Further the Makefile.am is synchronized with the upstream version and
then "re-cleaned".
A lot of functions, that are not used anywhere in elogind have been
coated into #if 0/#endif directives to further shorten the list of
dependencies.
All unneeded files have been removed.
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