| Commit message (Collapse) | Author | Age |
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These lines are generally out-of-date, incomplete and unnecessary. With
SPDX and git repository much more accurate and fine grained information
about licensing and authorship is available, hence let's drop the
per-file copyright notice. Of course, removing copyright lines of others
is problematic, hence this commit only removes my own lines and leaves
all others untouched. It might be nicer if sooner or later those could
go away too, making git the only and accurate source of authorship
information.
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This part of the copyright blurb stems from the GPL use recommendations:
https://www.gnu.org/licenses/gpl-howto.en.html
The concept appears to originate in times where version control was per
file, instead of per tree, and was a way to glue the files together.
Ultimately, we nowadays don't live in that world anymore, and this
information is entirely useless anyway, as people are very welcome to
copy these files into any projects they like, and they shouldn't have to
change bits that are part of our copyright header for that.
hence, let's just get rid of this old cruft, and shorten our codebase a
bit.
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We currently return -ENOMEDIUM when /etc/machine-id is empty, and -EINVAL when
it is all zeros. But -EINVAL is also used for invalid args. The distinction
between empty and all-zero is not very important, let's use the same return
code.
Also document -ENOENT and -ENOMEDIUM since they can be a bit surprising.
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Files which are installed as-is (any .service and other unit files, .conf
files, .policy files, etc), are left as is. My assumption is that SPDX
identifiers are not yet that well known, so it's better to retain the
extended header to avoid any doubt.
I also kept any copyright lines. We can probably remove them, but it'd nice to
obtain explicit acks from all involved authors before doing that.
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src/libelogind (3/6)
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Let's make use this at various places we call fsync(), to make things
fully reliable, as the kernel devs suggest to first fsync() files and
then fsync() the directories they are located in.
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log.h really should only include the bare minimum of other headers, as
it is really pulled into pretty much everything else and already in
itself one of the most basic pieces of code we have.
Let's hence drop inclusion of:
1. sd-id128.h because it's entirely unneeded in current log.h
2. errno.h, dito.
3. sys/signalfd.h which we can replace by a simple struct forward
declaration
4. process-util.h which was needed for getpid_cached() which we now hide
in a funciton log_emergency_level() instead, which nicely abstracts
the details away.
5. sys/socket.h which was needed for struct iovec, but a simple struct
forward declaration suffices for that too.
Ultimately this actually makes our source tree larger (since users of
the functionality above must now include it themselves, log.h won't do
that for them), but I think it helps to untangle our web of includes a
tiny bit.
(Background: I'd like to isolate the generic bits of src/basic/ enough
so that we can do a git submodule import into casync for it)
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Distcc removes comments, making the comment silencing
not work.
I know there was a decision against a macro in commit
ec251fe7d5bc24b5d38b0853bc5969f3a0ba06e2
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Upstream thinks, that the auto tools are too 'legacy', or that they
are at least no longer fitting.
We follow, as the classic auto tools files have been removed, so no
other choice here...
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During early boot, we'd call getrandom(), and immediately fall back to
reading from /dev/urandom unless we got the full requested number of bytes.
Those two sources are the same, so the most likely result is /dev/urandom
producing some pseudorandom numbers for us, complaining widely on the way.
Let's change our behaviour to be more conservative:
- if the numbers are only used to initialize a hash table, a short read is OK,
we don't really care if we get the first part of the seed truly random and
then some pseudorandom bytes. So just do that and return "success".
- if getrandom() returns -EAGAIN, fall back to rand() instead of querying
/dev/urandom again.
The idea with those two changes is to avoid generating a warning about
reading from an /dev/urandom when the kernel doesn't have enough entropy.
- only in the cases where we really need to make the best effort possible
(sd_id128_randomize and firstboot password hashing), fall back to
/dev/urandom.
When calling getrandom(), drop the checks whether the argument fits in an int —
getrandom() should do that for us already, and we call it with small arguments
only anyway.
Note that this does not really change the (relatively high) number of random
bytes we request from the kernel. On my laptop, during boot, PID 1 and all
other processes using this code through libelogind request:
74780 bytes with high_quality_required == false
464 bytes with high_quality_required == true
and it does not eliminate reads from /dev/urandom completely. If the kernel was
short on entropy and getrandom() would fail, we would fall back to /dev/urandom
for those 464 bytes.
When falling back to /dev/urandom, don't lose the short read we already got,
and just read the remaining bytes.
If getrandom() syscall is not available, we fall back to /dev/urandom same
as before.
Fixes #4167 (possibly partially, let's see).
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These functions, although not used by elogind itself, are mostly tiny
and crucial for important tests to work.
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Let's store the invocation ID in the per-service keyring as a root-owned key,
with strict access rights. This has the advantage over the environment-based ID
passing that it also works from SUID binaries (as they key cannot be overidden
by unprivileged code starting them), in contrast to the secure_getenv() based
mode.
The invocation ID is now passed in three different ways to a service:
- As environment variable $INVOCATION_ID. This is easy to use, but may be
overriden by unprivileged code (which might be a bad or a good thing), which
means it's incompatible with SUID code (see above).
- As extended attribute on the service cgroup. This cannot be overriden by
unprivileged code, and may be queried safely from "outside" of a service.
However, it is incompatible with containers right now, as unprivileged
containers generally cannot set xattrs on cgroupfs.
- As "invocation_id" key in the kernel keyring. This has the benefit that the
key cannot be changed by unprivileged service code, and thus is safe to
access from SUID code (see above). But do note that service code can replace
the session keyring with a fresh one that lacks the key. However in that case
the key will not be owned by root, which is easily detectable. The keyring is
also incompatible with containers right now, as it is not properly namespace
aware (but this is being worked on), and thus most container managers mask
the keyring-related system calls.
Ideally we'd only have one way to pass the invocation ID, but the different
ways all have limitations. The invocation ID hookup in journald is currently
only available on the host but not in containers, due to the mentioned
limitations.
How to verify the new invocation ID in the keyring:
# elogind-run -t /bin/sh
Running as unit: run-rd917366c04f847b480d486017f7239d6.service
Press ^] three times within 1s to disconnect TTY.
# keyctl show
Session Keyring
680208392 --alswrv 0 0 keyring: _ses
250926536 ----s-rv 0 0 \_ user: invocation_id
# keyctl request user invocation_id
250926536
# keyctl read 250926536
16 bytes of data in key:
9c96317c ac64495a a42b9cd7 4f3ff96b
# echo $INVOCATION_ID
9c96317cac64495aa42b9cd74f3ff96b
# ^D
This creates a new transient service runnint a shell. Then verifies the
contents of the keyring, requests the invocation ID key, and reads its payload.
For comparison the invocation ID as passed via the environment variable is also
displayed.
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This adds an API for retrieving an app-specific machine ID to sd-id128.
Internally it calculates HMAC-SHA256 with an 128bit app-specific ID as payload
and the machine ID as key.
(An alternative would have been to use siphash for this, which is also
cryptographically strong. However, as it only generates 64bit hashes it's not
an obvious choice for generating 128bit IDs.)
Fixes: #4667
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installed by elogind, and therefore must not be masked.
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This adds a new invocation ID concept to the service manager. The invocation ID
identifies each runtime cycle of a unit uniquely. A new randomized 128bit ID is
generated each time a unit moves from and inactive to an activating or active
state.
The primary usecase for this concept is to connect the runtime data PID 1
maintains about a service with the offline data the journal stores about it.
Previously we'd use the unit name plus start/stop times, which however is
highly racy since the journal will generally process log data after the service
already ended.
The "invocation ID" kinda matches the "boot ID" concept of the Linux kernel,
except that it applies to an individual unit instead of the whole system.
The invocation ID is passed to the activated processes as environment variable.
It is additionally stored as extended attribute on the cgroup of the unit. The
latter is used by journald to automatically retrieve it for each log logged
message and attach it to the log entry. The environment variable is very easily
accessible, even for unprivileged services. OTOH the extended attribute is only
accessible to privileged processes (this is because cgroupfs only supports the
"trusted." xattr namespace, not "user."). The environment variable may be
altered by services, the extended attribute may not be, hence is the better
choice for the journal.
Note that reading the invocation ID off the extended attribute from journald is
racy, similar to the way reading the unit name for a logging process is.
This patch adds APIs to read the invocation ID to sd-id128:
sd_id128_get_invocation() may be used in a similar fashion to
sd_id128_get_boot().
PID1's own logging is updated to always include the invocation ID when it logs
information about a unit.
A new bus call GetUnitByInvocationID() is added that allows retrieving a bus
path to a unit by its invocation ID. The bus path is built using the invocation
ID, thus providing a path for referring to a unit that is valid only for the
current runtime cycleof it.
Outlook for the future: should the kernel eventually allow passing of cgroup
information along AF_UNIX/SOCK_DGRAM messages via a unique cgroup id, then we
can alter the invocation ID to be generated as hash from that rather than
entirely randomly. This way we can derive the invocation race-freely from the
messages.
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If the return parameter is NULL, simply validate the string, and return no
error.
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We currently have code to read and write files containing UUIDs at various
places. Unify this in id128-util.[ch], and move some other stuff there too.
The new files are located in src/libelogind/sd-id128/ (instead of src/shared/),
because they are actually the backend of sd_id128_get_machine() and
sd_id128_get_boot().
In follow-up patches we can use this reduce the code in nspawn and
machine-id-setup by adopted the common implementation.
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Apply remaining fixes and the performed move of utility functions
into their own foo-util.[hc] files on the rest of elogind.
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The patching of elogind in several steps with only partly rebasing on
a common commit with upstream, left the tree in a state, that was
unmergeable with master. By rebasing on master and manually cleaning
up all commits, this merge is now possible.
However, this process left some orphans, that are cleanup now.
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