| Commit message (Collapse) | Author | Age |
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Per some discussion with Gnome folks, they would prefer this name
as it's more descriptive of what's happening.
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This adds new method calls Halt() and CanHalt() to the logind bus APIs.
They aren't overly useful (as the whole concept of halting isn't really
too useful), however they clean up one major asymmetry: currently, using
the "shutdown" legacy commands it is possibly to enqueue a "halt"
operation through logind, while logind officially doesn't actually
support this. Moreover, the path through "shutdown" currently ultimately
fails, since the referenced "halt" action isn't actually defined in
PolicyKit.
Finally, the current logic results in an unexpected asymmetry in
systemctl: "systemctl poweroff", "systemctl reboot" are currently
asynchronous (due to the logind involvement) while "systemctl halt"
isnt. Let's clean this up, and make all three APIs implemented by
logind natively, and all three hence asynchronous in "systemctl".
Moreover, let's add the missing PK action.
Fixes: #6957
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Desktop environments can keep this property up to date to allow
applications to easily track session's Lock status.
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The patching of elogind in several steps with only partly rebasing on
a common commit with upstream, left the tree in a state, that was
unmergeable with master. By rebasing on master and manually cleaning
up all commits, this merge is now possible.
However, this process left some orphans, that are cleanup now.
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version.
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A while back we opened up all of logind's bus calls to unprivileged
users, via PK. However, the dbus1 policy wasn't updated accordingly.
With this change, the dbus1 policy is opened up for all bus calls that
should be available to unprivileged clients.
(also rearranges some calls in the vtable, to make more sense, and be in
line with the order in the bus policy file)
Fixes #471.
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Introduces a new concept of "trusted" vs. "untrusted" busses. For the
latter libsystemd-bus will automatically do per-method access control,
for the former all access is automatically granted. Per-method access
control is encoded in the vtables: by default all methods are only
accessible to privileged clients. If the SD_BUS_VTABLE_UNPRIVILEGED flag
is set for a method it is accessible to unprivileged clients too. By
default whether a client is privileged is determined via checking for
its CAP_SYS_ADMIN capability, but this can be altered via the
SD_BUS_VTABLE_CAPABILITY() macro that can be ORed into the flags field
of the method.
Writable properties are also subject to SD_BUS_VTABLE_UNPRIVILEGED and
SD_BUS_VTABLE_CAPABILITY() for controlling write access to them. Note
however that read access is unrestricted, as PropertiesChanged messages
might send out the values anyway as an unrestricted broadcast.
By default the system bus is set to "untrusted" and the user bus is
"trusted" since per-method access control on the latter is unnecessary.
On dbus1 busses we check the UID of the caller rather than the
configured capability since the capability cannot be determined without
race. On kdbus the capability is checked if possible from the attached
meta-data of a message and otherwise queried from the sending peer.
This also decorates the vtables of the various daemons we ship with
these flags.
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The session-device/control API was introduced for unprivileged device
access from within a session. Add the required dbus policy to the default
logind policies.
Note: logind validates that only root and the user of a session can
use the API. Furthermore, only a single API user gets access at a time.
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We finally got the OK from all contributors with non-trivial commits to
relicense systemd from GPL2+ to LGPL2.1+.
Some udev bits continue to be GPL2+ for now, but we are looking into
relicensing them too, to allow free copy/paste of all code within
systemd.
The bits that used to be MIT continue to be MIT.
The big benefit of the relicensing is that closed source code may now
link against libsystemd-login.so and friends.
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