- djm@cvs.openbsd.org 2004/12/22 02:13:19

     [cipher-ctr.c cipher.c]
     remove fallback AES support for old OpenSSL, as OpenBSD has had it for
     many years now; ok deraadt@
     (Id sync only: Portable will continue to support older OpenSSLs)

1 files changed, 16 insertions, 10 deletions

diff --git a/auth-pam.c b/auth-pam.c
index 996964fcd..5bffe338f 100644
--- a/auth-pam.c
+++ b/auth-pam.c
@@ -47,7 +47,7 @@
 
 /* Based on $FreeBSD: src/crypto/openssh/auth2-pam-freebsd.c,v 1.11 2003/03/31 13:48:18 des Exp $ */
 #include "includes.h"
-RCSID("$Id: auth-pam.c,v 1.119 2005/01/20 01:43:39 dtucker Exp $");
+RCSID("$Id: auth-pam.c,v 1.120 2005/01/20 02:27:56 dtucker Exp $");
 
 #ifdef USE_PAM
 #if defined(HAVE_SECURITY_PAM_APPL_H)
@@ -245,6 +245,17 @@ sshpam_password_change_required(int reqd)
 	}
 }
 
+/* Check ssh internal flags in addition to PAM */
+
+static int
+sshpam_login_allowed(Authctxt *ctxt)
+{
+	if (ctxt->valid && (ctxt->pw->pw_uid != 0 ||
+	    options.permit_root_login == PERMIT_YES))
+		return 1;
+	return 0;
+}
+
 /* Import regular and PAM environment from subprocess */
 static void
 import_environments(Buffer *b)
@@ -702,9 +713,7 @@ sshpam_query(void *ctx, char **name, char **info,
 				**prompts = NULL;
 			}
 			if (type == PAM_SUCCESS) {
-				if (!sshpam_authctxt->valid ||
-				    (sshpam_authctxt->pw->pw_uid == 0 &&
-				    options.permit_root_login != PERMIT_YES))
+				if (!sshpam_login_allowed(sshpam_authctxt))
 					fatal("Internal error: PAM auth "
 					    "succeeded when it should have "
 					    "failed");
@@ -753,9 +762,7 @@ sshpam_respond(void *ctx, u_int num, char **resp)
 		return (-1);
 	}
 	buffer_init(&buffer);
-	if (sshpam_authctxt->valid &&
-	    (sshpam_authctxt->pw->pw_uid != 0 ||
-	     options.permit_root_login == PERMIT_YES))
+	if (sshpam_login_allowed(sshpam_authctxt))
 		buffer_put_cstring(&buffer, *resp);
 	else
 		buffer_put_cstring(&buffer, badpw);
@@ -1118,8 +1125,7 @@ sshpam_auth_passwd(Authctxt *authctxt, const char *password)
 	 * by PermitRootLogin, use an invalid password to prevent leaking
 	 * information via timing (eg if the PAM config has a delay on fail).
 	 */
-	if (!authctxt->valid || (authctxt->pw->pw_uid == 0 &&
-	     options.permit_root_login != PERMIT_YES))
+	if (!sshpam_login_allowed(authctxt))
 		sshpam_password = badpw;
 
 	sshpam_err = pam_set_item(sshpam_handle, PAM_CONV,
@@ -1130,7 +1136,7 @@ sshpam_auth_passwd(Authctxt *authctxt, const char *password)
 
 	sshpam_err = pam_authenticate(sshpam_handle, flags);
 	sshpam_password = NULL;
-	if (sshpam_err == PAM_SUCCESS && authctxt->valid) {
+	if (sshpam_err == PAM_SUCCESS && sshpam_login_allowed(authctxt)) {
 		debug("PAM: password authentication accepted for %.100s",
 		    authctxt->user);
                return 1;