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authorColin Watson <cjwatson@debian.org>2005-03-10 00:24:57 +0000
committerColin Watson <cjwatson@debian.org>2005-03-10 00:24:57 +0000
commit5d05471f6657646d1d6500c7c43134462c407ee6 (patch)
treec142ff8a5b1fcb1c671ba8c6f023746191124d39 /ssh.0
parent485bab886137bbf8b7ec8df82bd66dc6e5654371 (diff)
parentebd2ce335af5861020c79fddb1ae35c03bf036cf (diff)
Import OpenSSH 4.0p1.
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+SSH(1) OpenBSD Reference Manual SSH(1)
+
+NAME
+ ssh - OpenSSH SSH client (remote login program)
+
+SYNOPSIS
+ ssh [-1246AaCfgkMNnqsTtVvXxY] [-b bind_address] [-c cipher_spec]
+ [-D port] [-e escape_char] [-F configfile] [-i identity_file]
+ [-L [bind_address:]port:host:hostport] [-l login_name] [-m mac_spec]
+ [-O ctl_cmd] [-o option] [-p port]
+ [-R [bind_address:]port:host:hostport] [-S ctl_path] [user@]hostname
+ [command]
+
+DESCRIPTION
+ ssh (SSH client) is a program for logging into a remote machine and for
+ executing commands on a remote machine. It is intended to replace rlogin
+ and rsh, and provide secure encrypted communications between two untrust-
+ ed hosts over an insecure network. X11 connections and arbitrary TCP/IP
+ ports can also be forwarded over the secure channel.
+
+ ssh connects and logs into the specified hostname (with optional user
+ name). The user must prove his/her identity to the remote machine using
+ one of several methods depending on the protocol version used.
+
+ If command is specified, command is executed on the remote host instead
+ of a login shell.
+
+ SSH protocol version 1
+ The first authentication method is the rhosts or hosts.equiv method com-
+ bined with RSA-based host authentication. If the machine the user logs
+ in from is listed in /etc/hosts.equiv or /etc/shosts.equiv on the remote
+ machine, and the user names are the same on both sides, or if the files
+ $HOME/.rhosts or $HOME/.shosts exist in the user's home directory on the
+ remote machine and contain a line containing the name of the client ma-
+ chine and the name of the user on that machine, the user is considered
+ for log in. Additionally, if the server can verify the client's host key
+ (see /etc/ssh/ssh_known_hosts and $HOME/.ssh/known_hosts in the FILES
+ section), only then is login permitted. This authentication method clos-
+ es security holes due to IP spoofing, DNS spoofing and routing spoofing.
+ [Note to the administrator: /etc/hosts.equiv, $HOME/.rhosts, and the
+ rlogin/rsh protocol in general, are inherently insecure and should be
+ disabled if security is desired.]
+
+ As a second authentication method, ssh supports RSA based authentication.
+ The scheme is based on public-key cryptography: there are cryptosystems
+ where encryption and decryption are done using separate keys, and it is
+ not possible to derive the decryption key from the encryption key. RSA
+ is one such system. The idea is that each user creates a public/private
+ key pair for authentication purposes. The server knows the public key,
+ and only the user knows the private key.
+
+ The file $HOME/.ssh/authorized_keys lists the public keys that are per-
+ mitted for logging in. When the user logs in, the ssh program tells the
+ server which key pair it would like to use for authentication. The serv-
+ er checks if this key is permitted, and if so, sends the user (actually
+ the ssh program running on behalf of the user) a challenge, a random num-
+ ber, encrypted by the user's public key. The challenge can only be de-
+ crypted using the proper private key. The user's client then decrypts
+ the challenge using the private key, proving that he/she knows the pri-
+ vate key but without disclosing it to the server.
+
+ ssh implements the RSA authentication protocol automatically. The user
+ creates his/her RSA key pair by running ssh-keygen(1). This stores the
+ private key in $HOME/.ssh/identity and stores the public key in
+ $HOME/.ssh/identity.pub in the user's home directory. The user should
+ then copy the identity.pub to $HOME/.ssh/authorized_keys in his/her home
+ directory on the remote machine (the authorized_keys file corresponds to
+ the conventional $HOME/.rhosts file, and has one key per line, though the
+ lines can be very long). After this, the user can log in without giving
+ the password.
+
+ The most convenient way to use RSA authentication may be with an authen-
+ tication agent. See ssh-agent(1) for more information.
+
+ If other authentication methods fail, ssh prompts the user for a pass-
+ word. The password is sent to the remote host for checking; however,
+ since all communications are encrypted, the password cannot be seen by
+ someone listening on the network.
+
+ SSH protocol version 2
+ When a user connects using protocol version 2, similar authentication
+ methods are available. Using the default values for
+ PreferredAuthentications, the client will try to authenticate first using
+ the hostbased method; if this method fails, public key authentication is
+ attempted, and finally if this method fails, keyboard-interactive and
+ password authentication are tried.
+
+ The public key method is similar to RSA authentication described in the
+ previous section and allows the RSA or DSA algorithm to be used: The
+ client uses his private key, $HOME/.ssh/id_dsa or $HOME/.ssh/id_rsa, to
+ sign the session identifier and sends the result to the server. The
+ server checks whether the matching public key is listed in
+ $HOME/.ssh/authorized_keys and grants access if both the key is found and
+ the signature is correct. The session identifier is derived from a
+ shared Diffie-Hellman value and is only known to the client and the serv-
+ er.
+
+ If public key authentication fails or is not available, a password can be
+ sent encrypted to the remote host to prove the user's identity.
+
+ Additionally, ssh supports hostbased or challenge response authentica-
+ tion.
+
+ Protocol 2 provides additional mechanisms for confidentiality (the traf-
+ fic is encrypted using AES, 3DES, Blowfish, CAST128 or Arcfour) and in-
+ tegrity (hmac-md5, hmac-sha1, hmac-ripemd160). Note that protocol 1
+ lacks a strong mechanism for ensuring the integrity of the connection.
+
+ Login session and remote execution
+ When the user's identity has been accepted by the server, the server ei-
+ ther executes the given command, or logs into the machine and gives the
+ user a normal shell on the remote machine. All communication with the
+ remote command or shell will be automatically encrypted.
+
+ If a pseudo-terminal has been allocated (normal login session), the user
+ may use the escape characters noted below.
+
+ If no pseudo-tty has been allocated, the session is transparent and can
+ be used to reliably transfer binary data. On most systems, setting the
+ escape character to ``none'' will also make the session transparent even
+ if a tty is used.
+
+ The session terminates when the command or shell on the remote machine
+ exits and all X11 and TCP/IP connections have been closed. The exit sta-
+ tus of the remote program is returned as the exit status of ssh.
+
+ Escape Characters
+ When a pseudo-terminal has been requested, ssh supports a number of func-
+ tions through the use of an escape character.
+
+ A single tilde character can be sent as ~~ or by following the tilde by a
+ character other than those described below. The escape character must
+ always follow a newline to be interpreted as special. The escape charac-
+ ter can be changed in configuration files using the EscapeChar configura-
+ tion directive or on the command line by the -e option.
+
+ The supported escapes (assuming the default `~') are:
+
+ ~. Disconnect.
+
+ ~^Z Background ssh.
+
+ ~# List forwarded connections.
+
+ ~& Background ssh at logout when waiting for forwarded connection /
+ X11 sessions to terminate.
+
+ ~? Display a list of escape characters.
+
+ ~B Send a BREAK to the remote system (only useful for SSH protocol
+ version 2 and if the peer supports it).
+
+ ~C Open command line. Currently this allows the addition of port
+ forwardings using the -L and -R options (see below). It also al-
+ lows the cancellation of existing remote port-forwardings using
+ -KR hostport. Basic help is available, using the -h option.
+
+ ~R Request rekeying of the connection (only useful for SSH protocol
+ version 2 and if the peer supports it).
+
+ X11 and TCP forwarding
+ If the ForwardX11 variable is set to ``yes'' (or see the description of
+ the -X and -x options described later) and the user is using X11 (the
+ DISPLAY environment variable is set), the connection to the X11 display
+ is automatically forwarded to the remote side in such a way that any X11
+ programs started from the shell (or command) will go through the encrypt-
+ ed channel, and the connection to the real X server will be made from the
+ local machine. The user should not manually set DISPLAY. Forwarding of
+ X11 connections can be configured on the command line or in configuration
+ files.
+
+ The DISPLAY value set by ssh will point to the server machine, but with a
+ display number greater than zero. This is normal, and happens because
+ ssh creates a ``proxy'' X server on the server machine for forwarding the
+ connections over the encrypted channel.
+
+ ssh will also automatically set up Xauthority data on the server machine.
+ For this purpose, it will generate a random authorization cookie, store
+ it in Xauthority on the server, and verify that any forwarded connections
+ carry this cookie and replace it by the real cookie when the connection
+ is opened. The real authentication cookie is never sent to the server
+ machine (and no cookies are sent in the plain).
+
+ If the ForwardAgent variable is set to ``yes'' (or see the description of
+ the -A and -a options described later) and the user is using an authenti-
+ cation agent, the connection to the agent is automatically forwarded to
+ the remote side.
+
+ Forwarding of arbitrary TCP/IP connections over the secure channel can be
+ specified either on the command line or in a configuration file. One
+ possible application of TCP/IP forwarding is a secure connection to an
+ electronic purse; another is going through firewalls.
+
+ Server authentication
+ ssh automatically maintains and checks a database containing identifica-
+ tions for all hosts it has ever been used with. Host keys are stored in
+ $HOME/.ssh/known_hosts in the user's home directory. Additionally, the
+ file /etc/ssh/ssh_known_hosts is automatically checked for known hosts.
+ Any new hosts are automatically added to the user's file. If a host's
+ identification ever changes, ssh warns about this and disables password
+ authentication to prevent a trojan horse from getting the user's pass-
+ word. Another purpose of this mechanism is to prevent man-in-the-middle
+ attacks which could otherwise be used to circumvent the encryption. The
+ StrictHostKeyChecking option can be used to prevent logins to machines
+ whose host key is not known or has changed.
+
+ ssh can be configured to verify host identification using fingerprint re-
+ source records (SSHFP) published in DNS. The VerifyHostKeyDNS option can
+ be used to control how DNS lookups are performed. SSHFP resource records
+ can be generated using ssh-keygen(1).
+
+ The options are as follows:
+
+ -1 Forces ssh to try protocol version 1 only.
+
+ -2 Forces ssh to try protocol version 2 only.
+
+ -4 Forces ssh to use IPv4 addresses only.
+
+ -6 Forces ssh to use IPv6 addresses only.
+
+ -A Enables forwarding of the authentication agent connection. This
+ can also be specified on a per-host basis in a configuration
+ file.
+
+ Agent forwarding should be enabled with caution. Users with the
+ ability to bypass file permissions on the remote host (for the
+ agent's Unix-domain socket) can access the local agent through
+ the forwarded connection. An attacker cannot obtain key material
+ from the agent, however they can perform operations on the keys
+ that enable them to authenticate using the identities loaded into
+ the agent.
+
+ -a Disables forwarding of the authentication agent connection.
+
+ -b bind_address
+ Specify the interface to transmit from on machines with multiple
+ interfaces or aliased addresses.
+
+ -C Requests compression of all data (including stdin, stdout,
+ stderr, and data for forwarded X11 and TCP/IP connections). The
+ compression algorithm is the same used by gzip(1), and the
+ ``level'' can be controlled by the CompressionLevel option for
+ protocol version 1. Compression is desirable on modem lines and
+ other slow connections, but will only slow down things on fast
+ networks. The default value can be set on a host-by-host basis
+ in the configuration files; see the Compression option.
+
+ -c cipher_spec
+ Selects the cipher specification for encrypting the session.
+
+ Protocol version 1 allows specification of a single cipher. The
+ suported values are ``3des'', ``blowfish'' and ``des''. 3des
+ (triple-des) is an encrypt-decrypt-encrypt triple with three dif-
+ ferent keys. It is believed to be secure. blowfish is a fast
+ block cipher; it appears very secure and is much faster than
+ 3des. des is only supported in the ssh client for interoperabil-
+ ity with legacy protocol 1 implementations that do not support
+ the 3des cipher. Its use is strongly discouraged due to crypto-
+ graphic weaknesses. The default is ``3des''.
+
+ For protocol version 2 cipher_spec is a comma-separated list of
+ ciphers listed in order of preference. The supported ciphers are
+ ``3des-cbc'', ``aes128-cbc'', ``aes192-cbc'', ``aes256-cbc'',
+ ``aes128-ctr'', ``aes192-ctr'', ``aes256-ctr'', ``arcfour'',
+ ``blowfish-cbc'', and ``cast128-cbc''. The default is
+
+ ``aes128-cbc,3des-cbc,blowfish-cbc,cast128-cbc,arcfour,
+ aes192-cbc,aes256-cbc''
+
+ -D port
+ Specifies a local ``dynamic'' application-level port forwarding.
+ This works by allocating a socket to listen to port on the local
+ side, and whenever a connection is made to this port, the connec-
+ tion is forwarded over the secure channel, and the application
+ protocol is then used to determine where to connect to from the
+ remote machine. Currently the SOCKS4 and SOCKS5 protocols are
+ supported, and ssh will act as a SOCKS server. Only root can
+ forward privileged ports. Dynamic port forwardings can also be
+ specified in the configuration file.
+
+ -e ch | ^ch | none
+ Sets the escape character for sessions with a pty (default: `~').
+ The escape character is only recognized at the beginning of a
+ line. The escape character followed by a dot (`.') closes the
+ connection; followed by control-Z suspends the connection; and
+ followed by itself sends the escape character once. Setting the
+ character to ``none'' disables any escapes and makes the session
+ fully transparent.
+
+ -F configfile
+ Specifies an alternative per-user configuration file. If a con-
+ figuration file is given on the command line, the system-wide
+ configuration file (/etc/ssh/ssh_config) will be ignored. The
+ default for the per-user configuration file is $HOME/.ssh/config.
+
+ -f Requests ssh to go to background just before command execution.
+ This is useful if ssh is going to ask for passwords or passphras-
+ es, but the user wants it in the background. This implies -n.
+ The recommended way to start X11 programs at a remote site is
+ with something like ssh -f host xterm.
+
+ -g Allows remote hosts to connect to local forwarded ports.
+
+ -I smartcard_device
+ Specifies which smartcard device to use. The argument is the de-
+ vice ssh should use to communicate with a smartcard used for
+ storing the user's private RSA key.
+
+ -i identity_file
+ Selects a file from which the identity (private key) for RSA or
+ DSA authentication is read. The default is $HOME/.ssh/identity
+ for protocol version 1, and $HOME/.ssh/id_rsa and
+ $HOME/.ssh/id_dsa for protocol version 2. Identity files may al-
+ so be specified on a per-host basis in the configuration file.
+ It is possible to have multiple -i options (and multiple identi-
+ ties specified in configuration files).
+
+ -k Disables forwarding (delegation) of GSSAPI credentials to the
+ server.
+
+ -L [bind_address:]port:host:hostport
+ Specifies that the given port on the local (client) host is to be
+ forwarded to the given host and port on the remote side. This
+ works by allocating a socket to listen to port on the local side,
+ optionally bound to the specified bind_address. Whenever a con-
+ nection is made to this port, the connection is forwarded over
+ the secure channel, and a connection is made to host port
+ hostport from the remote machine. Port forwardings can also be
+ specified in the configuration file. IPv6 addresses can be spec-
+ ified with an alternative syntax: [bind_address/]port/host/host-
+ port or by enclosing the address in square brackets. Only the
+ superuser can forward privileged ports. By default, the local
+ port is bound in accordance with the GatewayPorts setting. How-
+ ever, an explicit bind_address may be used to bind the connection
+ to a specific address. The bind_address of ``localhost'' indi-
+ cates that the listening port be bound for local use only, while
+ an empty address or `*' indicates that the port should be avail-
+ able from all interfaces.
+
+ -l login_name
+ Specifies the user to log in as on the remote machine. This also
+ may be specified on a per-host basis in the configuration file.
+
+ -M Places the ssh client into ``master'' mode for connection shar-
+ ing. Refer to the description of ControlMaster in ssh_config(5)
+ for details.
+
+ -m mac_spec
+ Additionally, for protocol version 2 a comma-separated list of
+ MAC (message authentication code) algorithms can be specified in
+ order of preference. See the MACs keyword for more information.
+
+ -N Do not execute a remote command. This is useful for just for-
+ warding ports (protocol version 2 only).
+
+ -n Redirects stdin from /dev/null (actually, prevents reading from
+ stdin). This must be used when ssh is run in the background. A
+ common trick is to use this to run X11 programs on a remote ma-
+ chine. For example, ssh -n shadows.cs.hut.fi emacs & will start
+ an emacs on shadows.cs.hut.fi, and the X11 connection will be au-
+ tomatically forwarded over an encrypted channel. The ssh program
+ will be put in the background. (This does not work if ssh needs
+ to ask for a password or passphrase; see also the -f option.)
+
+ -O ctl_cmd
+ Control an active connection multiplexing master process. When
+ the -O option is specified, the ctl_cmd argument is interpreted
+ and passed to the master process. Valid commands are: ``check''
+ (check that the master process is running) and ``exit'' (request
+ the master to exit).
+
+ -o option
+ Can be used to give options in the format used in the configura-
+ tion file. This is useful for specifying options for which there
+ is no separate command-line flag. For full details of the op-
+ tions listed below, and their possible values, see ssh_config(5).
+
+ AddressFamily
+ BatchMode
+ BindAddress
+ ChallengeResponseAuthentication
+ CheckHostIP
+ Cipher
+ Ciphers
+ ClearAllForwardings
+ Compression
+ CompressionLevel
+ ConnectionAttempts
+ ConnectTimeout
+ ControlMaster
+ ControlPath
+ DynamicForward
+ EscapeChar
+ ForwardAgent
+ ForwardX11
+ ForwardX11Trusted
+ GatewayPorts
+ GlobalKnownHostsFile
+ GSSAPIAuthentication
+ GSSAPIDelegateCredentials
+ HashKnownHosts
+ Host
+ HostbasedAuthentication
+ HostKeyAlgorithms
+ HostKeyAlias
+ HostName
+ IdentityFile
+ IdentitiesOnly
+ KbdInteractiveDevices
+ LocalForward
+ LogLevel
+ MACs
+ NoHostAuthenticationForLocalhost
+ NumberOfPasswordPrompts
+ PasswordAuthentication
+ Port
+ PreferredAuthentications
+ Protocol
+ ProxyCommand
+ PubkeyAuthentication
+ RemoteForward
+ RhostsRSAAuthentication
+ RSAAuthentication
+ SendEnv
+ ServerAliveInterval
+ ServerAliveCountMax
+ SmartcardDevice
+ StrictHostKeyChecking
+ TCPKeepAlive
+ UsePrivilegedPort
+ User
+ UserKnownHostsFile
+ VerifyHostKeyDNS
+ XAuthLocation
+
+ -p port
+ Port to connect to on the remote host. This can be specified on
+ a per-host basis in the configuration file.
+
+ -q Quiet mode. Causes all warning and diagnostic messages to be
+ suppressed.
+
+ -R [bind_address:]port:host:hostport
+ Specifies that the given port on the remote (server) host is to
+ be forwarded to the given host and port on the local side. This
+ works by allocating a socket to listen to port on the remote
+ side, and whenever a connection is made to this port, the connec-
+ tion is forwarded over the secure channel, and a connection is
+ made to host port hostport from the local machine.
+
+ Port forwardings can also be specified in the configuration file.
+ Privileged ports can be forwarded only when logging in as root on
+ the remote machine. IPv6 addresses can be specified by enclosing
+ the address in square braces or using an alternative syntax:
+ [bind_address/]host/port/hostport.
+
+ By default, the listening socket on the server will be bound to
+ the loopback interface only. This may be overriden by specifying
+ a bind_address. An empty bind_address, or the address `*', indi-
+ cates that the remote socket should listen on all interfaces.
+ Specifying a remote bind_address will only succeed if the serv-
+ er's GatewayPorts option is enabled (see sshd_config(5)).
+
+ -S ctl_path
+ Specifies the location of a control socket for connection shar-
+ ing. Refer to the description of ControlPath and ControlMaster
+ in ssh_config(5) for details.
+
+ -s May be used to request invocation of a subsystem on the remote
+ system. Subsystems are a feature of the SSH2 protocol which fa-
+ cilitate the use of SSH as a secure transport for other applica-
+ tions (eg. sftp(1)). The subsystem is specified as the remote
+ command.
+
+ -T Disable pseudo-tty allocation.
+
+ -t Force pseudo-tty allocation. This can be used to execute arbi-
+ trary screen-based programs on a remote machine, which can be
+ very useful, e.g., when implementing menu services. Multiple -t
+ options force tty allocation, even if ssh has no local tty.
+
+ -V Display the version number and exit.
+
+ -v Verbose mode. Causes ssh to print debugging messages about its
+ progress. This is helpful in debugging connection, authentica-
+ tion, and configuration problems. Multiple -v options increase
+ the verbosity. The maximum is 3.
+
+ -X Enables X11 forwarding. This can also be specified on a per-host
+ basis in a configuration file.
+
+ X11 forwarding should be enabled with caution. Users with the
+ ability to bypass file permissions on the remote host (for the
+ user's X authorization database) can access the local X11 display
+ through the forwarded connection. An attacker may then be able
+ to perform activities such as keystroke monitoring.
+
+ For this reason, X11 forwarding is subjected to X11 SECURITY ex-
+ tension restrictions by default. Please refer to the ssh -Y op-
+ tion and the ForwardX11Trusted directive in ssh_config(5) for
+ more information.
+
+ -x Disables X11 forwarding.
+
+ -Y Enables trusted X11 forwarding. Trusted X11 forwardings are not
+ subjected to the X11 SECURITY extension controls.
+
+CONFIGURATION FILES
+ ssh may additionally obtain configuration data from a per-user configura-
+ tion file and a system-wide configuration file. The file format and con-
+ figuration options are described in ssh_config(5).
+
+ENVIRONMENT
+ ssh will normally set the following environment variables:
+
+ DISPLAY The DISPLAY variable indicates the location of the X11 server.
+ It is automatically set by ssh to point to a value of the form
+ ``hostname:n'' where hostname indicates the host where the shell
+ runs, and n is an integer >= 1. ssh uses this special value to
+ forward X11 connections over the secure channel. The user
+ should normally not set DISPLAY explicitly, as that will render
+ the X11 connection insecure (and will require the user to manu-
+ ally copy any required authorization cookies).
+
+ HOME Set to the path of the user's home directory.
+
+ LOGNAME Synonym for USER; set for compatibility with systems that use
+ this variable.
+
+ MAIL Set to the path of the user's mailbox.
+
+ PATH Set to the default PATH, as specified when compiling ssh.
+
+ SSH_ASKPASS
+ If ssh needs a passphrase, it will read the passphrase from the
+ current terminal if it was run from a terminal. If ssh does not
+ have a terminal associated with it but DISPLAY and SSH_ASKPASS
+ are set, it will execute the program specified by SSH_ASKPASS
+ and open an X11 window to read the passphrase. This is particu-
+ larly useful when calling ssh from a .xsession or related
+ script. (Note that on some machines it may be necessary to
+ redirect the input from /dev/null to make this work.)
+
+ SSH_AUTH_SOCK
+ Identifies the path of a unix-domain socket used to communicate
+ with the agent.
+
+ SSH_CONNECTION
+ Identifies the client and server ends of the connection. The
+ variable contains four space-separated values: client ip-ad-
+ dress, client port number, server ip-address and server port
+ number.
+
+ SSH_ORIGINAL_COMMAND
+ The variable contains the original command line if a forced com-
+ mand is executed. It can be used to extract the original argu-
+ ments.
+
+ SSH_TTY This is set to the name of the tty (path to the device) associ-
+ ated with the current shell or command. If the current session
+ has no tty, this variable is not set.
+
+ TZ The timezone variable is set to indicate the present timezone if
+ it was set when the daemon was started (i.e., the daemon passes
+ the value on to new connections).
+
+ USER Set to the name of the user logging in.
+
+ Additionally, ssh reads $HOME/.ssh/environment, and adds lines of the
+ format ``VARNAME=value'' to the environment if the file exists and if
+ users are allowed to change their environment. For more information, see
+ the PermitUserEnvironment option in sshd_config(5).
+
+FILES
+ $HOME/.ssh/known_hosts
+ Records host keys for all hosts the user has logged into that are
+ not in /etc/ssh/ssh_known_hosts. See sshd(8).
+
+ $HOME/.ssh/identity, $HOME/.ssh/id_dsa, $HOME/.ssh/id_rsa
+ Contains the authentication identity of the user. They are for
+ protocol 1 RSA, protocol 2 DSA, and protocol 2 RSA, respectively.
+ These files contain sensitive data and should be readable by the
+ user but not accessible by others (read/write/execute). Note
+ that ssh ignores a private key file if it is accessible by oth-
+ ers. It is possible to specify a passphrase when generating the
+ key; the passphrase will be used to encrypt the sensitive part of
+ this file using 3DES.
+
+ $HOME/.ssh/identity.pub, $HOME/.ssh/id_dsa.pub, $HOME/.ssh/id_rsa.pub
+ Contains the public key for authentication (public part of the
+ identity file in human-readable form). The contents of the
+ $HOME/.ssh/identity.pub file should be added to the file
+ $HOME/.ssh/authorized_keys on all machines where the user wishes
+ to log in using protocol version 1 RSA authentication. The con-
+ tents of the $HOME/.ssh/id_dsa.pub and $HOME/.ssh/id_rsa.pub file
+ should be added to $HOME/.ssh/authorized_keys on all machines
+ where the user wishes to log in using protocol version 2 DSA/RSA
+ authentication. These files are not sensitive and can (but need
+ not) be readable by anyone. These files are never used automati-
+ cally and are not necessary; they are only provided for the con-
+ venience of the user.
+
+ $HOME/.ssh/config
+ This is the per-user configuration file. The file format and
+ configuration options are described in ssh_config(5). Because of
+ the potential for abuse, this file must have strict permissions:
+ read/write for the user, and not accessible by others.
+
+ $HOME/.ssh/authorized_keys
+ Lists the public keys (RSA/DSA) that can be used for logging in
+ as this user. The format of this file is described in the
+ sshd(8) manual page. In the simplest form the format is the same
+ as the .pub identity files. This file is not highly sensitive,
+ but the recommended permissions are read/write for the user, and
+ not accessible by others.
+
+ /etc/ssh/ssh_known_hosts
+ Systemwide list of known host keys. This file should be prepared
+ by the system administrator to contain the public host keys of
+ all machines in the organization. This file should be world-
+ readable. This file contains public keys, one per line, in the
+ following format (fields separated by spaces): system name, pub-
+ lic key and optional comment field. When different names are
+ used for the same machine, all such names should be listed, sepa-
+ rated by commas. The format is described in the sshd(8) manual
+ page.
+
+ The canonical system name (as returned by name servers) is used
+ by sshd(8) to verify the client host when logging in; other names
+ are needed because ssh does not convert the user-supplied name to
+ a canonical name before checking the key, because someone with
+ access to the name servers would then be able to fool host au-
+ thentication.
+
+ /etc/ssh/ssh_config
+ Systemwide configuration file. The file format and configuration
+ options are described in ssh_config(5).
+
+ /etc/ssh/ssh_host_key, /etc/ssh/ssh_host_dsa_key,
+ /etc/ssh/ssh_host_rsa_key
+ These three files contain the private parts of the host keys and
+ are used for RhostsRSAAuthentication and HostbasedAuthentication.
+ If the protocol version 1 RhostsRSAAuthentication method is used,
+ ssh must be setuid root, since the host key is readable only by
+ root. For protocol version 2, ssh uses ssh-keysign(8) to access
+ the host keys for HostbasedAuthentication. This eliminates the
+ requirement that ssh be setuid root when that authentication
+ method is used. By default ssh is not setuid root.
+
+ $HOME/.rhosts
+ This file is used in RhostsRSAAuthentication and
+ HostbasedAuthentication authentication to list the host/user
+ pairs that are permitted to log in. (Note that this file is also
+ used by rlogin and rsh, which makes using this file insecure.)
+ Each line of the file contains a host name (in the canonical form
+ returned by name servers), and then a user name on that host,
+ separated by a space. On some machines this file may need to be
+ world-readable if the user's home directory is on a NFS parti-
+ tion, because sshd(8) reads it as root. Additionally, this file
+ must be owned by the user, and must not have write permissions
+ for anyone else. The recommended permission for most machines is
+ read/write for the user, and not accessible by others.
+
+ Note that sshd(8) allows authentication only in combination with
+ client host key authentication before permitting log in. If the
+ server machine does not have the client's host key in
+ /etc/ssh/ssh_known_hosts, it can be stored in
+ $HOME/.ssh/known_hosts. The easiest way to do this is to connect
+ back to the client from the server machine using ssh; this will
+ automatically add the host key to $HOME/.ssh/known_hosts.
+
+ $HOME/.shosts
+ This file is used exactly the same way as .rhosts. The purpose
+ for having this file is to be able to use RhostsRSAAuthentication
+ and HostbasedAuthentication authentication without permitting lo-
+ gin with rlogin or rsh(1).
+
+ /etc/hosts.equiv
+ This file is used during RhostsRSAAuthentication and
+ HostbasedAuthentication authentication. It contains canonical
+ hosts names, one per line (the full format is described in the
+ sshd(8) manual page). If the client host is found in this file,
+ login is automatically permitted provided client and server user
+ names are the same. Additionally, successful client host key au-
+ thentication is required. This file should only be writable by
+ root.
+
+ /etc/shosts.equiv
+ This file is processed exactly as /etc/hosts.equiv. This file
+ may be useful to permit logins using ssh but not using
+ rsh/rlogin.
+
+ /etc/ssh/sshrc
+ Commands in this file are executed by ssh when the user logs in
+ just before the user's shell (or command) is started. See the
+ sshd(8) manual page for more information.
+
+ $HOME/.ssh/rc
+ Commands in this file are executed by ssh when the user logs in
+ just before the user's shell (or command) is started. See the
+ sshd(8) manual page for more information.
+
+ $HOME/.ssh/environment
+ Contains additional definitions for environment variables, see
+ section ENVIRONMENT above.
+
+DIAGNOSTICS
+ ssh exits with the exit status of the remote command or with 255 if an
+ error occurred.
+
+SEE ALSO
+ gzip(1), rsh(1), scp(1), sftp(1), ssh-add(1), ssh-agent(1),
+ ssh-keygen(1), telnet(1), hosts.equiv(5), ssh_config(5), ssh-keysign(8),
+ sshd(8)
+
+ T. Ylonen, T. Kivinen, M. Saarinen, T. Rinne, and S. Lehtinen, SSH
+ Protocol Architecture, draft-ietf-secsh-architecture-12.txt, January
+ 2002, work in progress material.
+
+AUTHORS
+ OpenSSH is a derivative of the original and free ssh 1.2.12 release by
+ Tatu Ylonen. Aaron Campbell, Bob Beck, Markus Friedl, Niels Provos, Theo
+ de Raadt and Dug Song removed many bugs, re-added newer features and
+ created OpenSSH. Markus Friedl contributed the support for SSH protocol
+ versions 1.5 and 2.0.
+
+OpenBSD 3.6 September 25, 1999 11