summaryrefslogtreecommitdiff
diff options
context:
space:
mode:
authorTomas Mraz <tm@t8m.info>2008-01-23 15:35:12 +0000
committerTomas Mraz <tm@t8m.info>2008-01-23 15:35:12 +0000
commit459e97431e99fa2c32e30e957993f95794b98dd0 (patch)
treedcf013e6644eba5ee5bdbaf6b2f78999bf43dc9b
parentca2cb12dd3165ab006c674d673a2d596d642c875 (diff)
Relevant BUGIDs:
Purpose of commit: cleanup, new feature Commit summary: --------------- Merging the the refactorization pam_unix_ref branch into the trunk. Added support for sha256 and sha512 password hashes to pam_unix when the libcrypt supports them.
-rw-r--r--ChangeLog63
-rw-r--r--NEWS4
-rw-r--r--configure.in11
-rw-r--r--modules/pam_unix/.cvsignore3
-rw-r--r--modules/pam_unix/Makefile.am17
-rw-r--r--modules/pam_unix/pam_unix.8.xml37
-rw-r--r--modules/pam_unix/pam_unix_acct.c221
-rw-r--r--modules/pam_unix/pam_unix_auth.c2
-rw-r--r--modules/pam_unix/pam_unix_passwd.c704
-rw-r--r--modules/pam_unix/pam_unix_sess.c4
-rw-r--r--modules/pam_unix/passverify.c970
-rw-r--r--modules/pam_unix/passverify.h83
-rw-r--r--modules/pam_unix/support.c216
-rw-r--r--modules/pam_unix/support.h16
-rw-r--r--modules/pam_unix/unix_chkpwd.880
-rw-r--r--modules/pam_unix/unix_chkpwd.8.xml67
-rw-r--r--modules/pam_unix/unix_chkpwd.c395
-rw-r--r--modules/pam_unix/unix_update.8.xml67
-rw-r--r--modules/pam_unix/unix_update.c194
19 files changed, 1779 insertions, 1375 deletions
diff --git a/ChangeLog b/ChangeLog
index 4198a142..a1fee209 100644
--- a/ChangeLog
+++ b/ChangeLog
@@ -1,3 +1,66 @@
+2008-01-23 Tomas Mraz <t8m@centrum.cz>
+
+ * modules/pam_unix/Makefile.am: Add unix_update.8 manpage generated from
+ XML, generate also unix_chkpwd.8 from XML.
+ * modules/pam_unix/pam_unix_acct.c: Add rounds parameter to _set_ctrl().
+ * modules/pam_unix/pam_unix_auth.c: Likewise.
+ * modules/pam_unix/pam_unix_sess.c: Likewise.
+ * modules/pam_unix/pam_unix_passwd.c: Likewise.
+ * modules/pam_unix/support.c(_set_ctrl): Likewise.
+ * modules/pam_unix/support.h: Likewise. Add UNIX_SHA256_PASS,
+ UNIX_SHA512_PASS, and UNIX_ALGO_ROUNDS ctrls.
+ (pam_sm_chauthtok): Refactor out new password encryption.
+ * modules/pam_unix/passverify.c(crypt_make_salt): New function.
+ (crypt_md5_wrapper): Call crypt_make_salt().
+ (create_password_hash): New function refactored out of
+ pam_sm_chauthtok(). Support for new password hashes.
+ * modules/pam_unix/passverify.h: Drop ascii_to_bin() and bin_to_ascii()
+ macros. Add prototype for create_password_hash().
+ * modules/pam_unix/unix_update.8.xml: New file.
+ * modules/pam_unix/unix_chkpwd.8.xml: Likewise.
+
+ * modules/pam_unix/Makefile.am: Add unix_update helper.
+ * modules/pam_unix/pam_unix_passwd.c: Move functions i64c(),
+ crypt_md5_wrapper(), save_old_password(), _update_passwd() and
+ _update_shadow() to passverify.c file. Rename _unix_run_shadow_binary()
+ to _unix_run_update_binary(), which also verifies old password and
+ does all writing.
+ (_do_setpass, pam_sm_chauthtok): lckpwdf()->lock_pwdf(), the same for unlock.
+ Call _unix_run_update_binary() appropriately.
+ _update_passwd()->unix_update_passwd(), the same for shadow.
+ * modules/pam_unix/passverify.c: Add new functions moved from
+ pam_unix_passwd.c and unix_chkpwd.c.
+ * modules/pam_unix/passverify.h: Likewise.
+ * modules/pam_unix/unix_chkpwd.c: Remove SELinux checks. Move
+ su_sighandler(), setup_signals(), getuidname() to passverify.c.
+ (main): Remove 'shadow' option. Refactor out read_passwords() and
+ call it. More strict checking how the binary is called.
+ * modules/pam_unix/unix_update.c: New helper binary - non-setuid,
+ called from SELinux confined apps only.
+
+ * modules/pam_unix/pam_unix_acct.c (_unix_run_verify_binary): Return
+ status and daysleft instead of fake shadow entry.
+ (pam_sm_acct_mgmt): Call _unix_run_verify_binary() appropriately.
+ * modules/pam_unix/pam_unix_passwd.c (_unix_verify_shadow): Call
+ get_account_info() and check_shadow_expiry().
+ * modules/pam_unix/support.h: Adjust _unix_run_verify_binary()
+ prototype.
+ * modules/pam_unix/support.c (_unix_run_helper_binary): Remove check
+ on selinux enabled/disabled.
+ * modules/pam_unix/unix_chkpwd.c (_verify_account): Rename to
+ _check_expiry(), now checks shadow expiry info.
+ (main): Remove check on selinux enabled/disabled. Check shadow
+ expiry through _check_expiry().
+
+ * modules/pam_unix/pam_unix_acct.c (pam_sm_acct_mgmt): Call
+ get_account_info() and check_shadow_expiry().
+ * modules/pam_unix/passverify.c: Add get_account_info() to
+ obtain shadow and passwd entry. Add check_shadow_expiry() to
+ for shadow password expiry check.
+ (get_pwd_hash): Call get_account_info().
+ * modules/pam_unix/passverify.h: Add prototypes for get_account_info()
+ and check_shadow_expiry().
+
2008-01-08 Thorsten Kukuk <kukuk@thkukuk.de>
* doc/man/Makefile.am: Fix manual page dependencies,
diff --git a/NEWS b/NEWS
index e794525e..44e93d5a 100644
--- a/NEWS
+++ b/NEWS
@@ -4,6 +4,10 @@ Linux-PAM NEWS -- history of user-visible changes.
* New module pam_tty_audit.so for enabling and disabling tty
auditing.
* New PAM items PAM_XDISPLAY and PAM_XAUTHDATA.
+* Auditing login denials based by origin (pam_access), time (pam_time),
+ and number of sessions (pam_limits) to the Linux audit subsystem.
+* Support sha256 and sha512 algorithms in pam_unix when they are supported
+ by crypt().
Release 0.99.9.0
* misc_conv no longer blocks SIGINT; applications that don't want
diff --git a/configure.in b/configure.in
index 146e177a..cd92f80a 100644
--- a/configure.in
+++ b/configure.in
@@ -352,9 +352,20 @@ AM_CONDITIONAL([HAVE_AUDIT_TTY_STATUS],
BACKUP_LIBS=$LIBS
AC_SEARCH_LIBS([crypt],[xcrypt crypt], LIBCRYPT="-l$ac_lib", LIBCRYPT="")
+AC_CHECK_FUNCS(crypt_r)
LIBS=$BACKUP_LIBS
AC_SUBST(LIBCRYPT)
+AC_ARG_WITH([randomdev], AC_HELP_STRING([--with-randomdev=(<path>|yes|no)], [use specified random device instead of /dev/urandom or 'no' to disable]), opt_randomdev=$withval)
+if test "$opt_randomdev" = yes -o -z "$opt_randomdev"; then
+ opt_randomdev="/dev/urandom"
+elif test "$opt_randomdev" = no; then
+ opt_randomdev=
+fi
+if test -n "$opt_randomdev"; then
+ AC_DEFINE_UNQUOTED(PAM_PATH_RANDOMDEV, "$opt_randomdev", [Random device path.])
+fi
+
dnl check for libdb or libndbm as fallback. Some libndbm compat
dnl libraries are unuseable, so try libdb first.
AC_ARG_ENABLE([db],
diff --git a/modules/pam_unix/.cvsignore b/modules/pam_unix/.cvsignore
index 905ba473..01819c28 100644
--- a/modules/pam_unix/.cvsignore
+++ b/modules/pam_unix/.cvsignore
@@ -7,5 +7,8 @@ Makefile
Makefile.in
bigcrypt
unix_chkpwd
+unix_update
README
pam_unix.8
+unix_chkpwd.8
+unix_update.8
diff --git a/modules/pam_unix/Makefile.am b/modules/pam_unix/Makefile.am
index a74d9762..4d2c58b8 100644
--- a/modules/pam_unix/Makefile.am
+++ b/modules/pam_unix/Makefile.am
@@ -7,8 +7,8 @@ CLEANFILES = *~
EXTRA_DIST = README md5.c md5_crypt.c lckpwdf.-c $(MANS) CHANGELOG \
tst-pam_unix $(XMLS)
-man_MANS = pam_unix.8 unix_chkpwd.8
-XMLS = README.xml pam_unix.8.xml
+man_MANS = pam_unix.8 unix_chkpwd.8 unix_update.8
+XMLS = README.xml pam_unix.8.xml unix_chkpwd.8.xml unix_update.8.xml
TESTS = tst-pam_unix
@@ -16,7 +16,8 @@ securelibdir = $(SECUREDIR)
secureconfdir = $(SCONFIGDIR)
AM_CFLAGS = -I$(top_srcdir)/libpam/include -I$(top_srcdir)/libpamc/include \
- -DCHKPWD_HELPER=\"$(sbindir)/unix_chkpwd\"
+ -DCHKPWD_HELPER=\"$(sbindir)/unix_chkpwd\" \
+ -DUPDATE_HELPER=\"$(sbindir)/unix_update\"
if HAVE_LIBSELINUX
AM_CFLAGS += -D"WITH_SELINUX"
@@ -36,7 +37,7 @@ securelib_LTLIBRARIES = pam_unix.la
noinst_HEADERS = md5.h support.h yppasswd.h bigcrypt.h passverify.h
-sbin_PROGRAMS = unix_chkpwd
+sbin_PROGRAMS = unix_chkpwd unix_update
noinst_PROGRAMS = bigcrypt
@@ -50,10 +51,16 @@ bigcrypt_LDADD = @LIBCRYPT@
unix_chkpwd_SOURCES = unix_chkpwd.c md5_good.c md5_broken.c bigcrypt.c \
passverify.c
-unix_chkpwd_CFLAGS = $(AM_CFLAGS) @PIE_CFLAGS@
+unix_chkpwd_CFLAGS = $(AM_CFLAGS) @PIE_CFLAGS@ -DHELPER_COMPILE=\"unix_chkpwd\"
unix_chkpwd_LDFLAGS = @PIE_LDFLAGS@
unix_chkpwd_LDADD = @LIBCRYPT@ @LIBSELINUX@
+unix_update_SOURCES = unix_update.c md5_good.c md5_broken.c bigcrypt.c \
+ passverify.c
+unix_update_CFLAGS = $(AM_CFLAGS) @PIE_CFLAGS@ -DHELPER_COMPILE=\"unix_update\"
+unix_update_LDFLAGS = @PIE_LDFLAGS@
+unix_update_LDADD = @LIBCRYPT@ @LIBSELINUX@
+
if ENABLE_REGENERATE_MAN
noinst_DATA = README
README: pam_unix.8.xml
diff --git a/modules/pam_unix/pam_unix.8.xml b/modules/pam_unix/pam_unix.8.xml
index 41757977..290cb2b9 100644
--- a/modules/pam_unix/pam_unix.8.xml
+++ b/modules/pam_unix/pam_unix.8.xml
@@ -260,6 +260,43 @@
</varlistentry>
<varlistentry>
<term>
+ <option>sha256</option>
+ </term>
+ <listitem>
+ <para>
+ When a user changes their password next,
+ encrypt it with the SHA256 algorithm. If the
+ SHA256 algorithm is not known to the libcrypt,
+ fall back to MD5.
+ </para>
+ </listitem>
+ </varlistentry>
+ <varlistentry>
+ <term>
+ <option>sha512</option>
+ </term>
+ <listitem>
+ <para>
+ When a user changes their password next,
+ encrypt it with the SHA512 algorithm. If the
+ SHA512 algorithm is not known to the libcrypt,
+ fall back to MD5.
+ </para>
+ </listitem>
+ </varlistentry>
+ <varlistentry>
+ <term>
+ <option>rounds=<replaceable>n</replaceable></option>
+ </term>
+ <listitem>
+ <para>
+ Set the optional number of rounds of the SHA256 and SHA512
+ password hashing algorithms to <replaceable>n</replaceable>.
+ </para>
+ </listitem>
+ </varlistentry>
+ <varlistentry>
+ <term>
<option>broken_shadow</option>
</term>
<listitem>
diff --git a/modules/pam_unix/pam_unix_acct.c b/modules/pam_unix/pam_unix_acct.c
index aeecb132..c09bc175 100644
--- a/modules/pam_unix/pam_unix_acct.c
+++ b/modules/pam_unix/pam_unix_acct.c
@@ -47,10 +47,6 @@
#include <time.h> /* for time() */
#include <errno.h>
#include <sys/wait.h>
-#ifdef WITH_SELINUX
-#include <selinux/selinux.h>
-#define SELINUX_ENABLED is_selinux_enabled()>0
-#endif
#include <security/_pam_macros.h>
@@ -65,11 +61,8 @@
#include "support.h"
#include "passverify.h"
-#ifdef WITH_SELINUX
-
-struct spwd spwd;
-
-struct spwd *_unix_run_verify_binary(pam_handle_t *pamh, unsigned int ctrl, const char *user)
+int _unix_run_verify_binary(pam_handle_t *pamh, unsigned int ctrl,
+ const char *user, int *daysleft)
{
int retval=0, child, fds[2];
void (*sighandler)(int) = NULL;
@@ -79,7 +72,7 @@ struct spwd *_unix_run_verify_binary(pam_handle_t *pamh, unsigned int ctrl, cons
if (pipe(fds) != 0) {
D(("could not make pipe"));
pam_syslog(pamh, LOG_ERR, "Could not make pipe: %m");
- return NULL;
+ return PAM_AUTH_ERR;
}
D(("called."));
@@ -118,7 +111,7 @@ struct spwd *_unix_run_verify_binary(pam_handle_t *pamh, unsigned int ctrl, cons
}
}
- if (SELINUX_ENABLED && geteuid() == 0) {
+ if (geteuid() == 0) {
/* must set the real uid to 0 so the helper will not error
out if pam is called from setuid binary (su, sudo...) */
setuid(0);
@@ -127,7 +120,7 @@ struct spwd *_unix_run_verify_binary(pam_handle_t *pamh, unsigned int ctrl, cons
/* exec binary helper */
args[0] = x_strdup(CHKPWD_HELPER);
args[1] = x_strdup(user);
- args[2] = x_strdup("verify");
+ args[2] = x_strdup("chkexpiry");
execve(CHKPWD_HELPER, args, envp);
@@ -135,11 +128,12 @@ struct spwd *_unix_run_verify_binary(pam_handle_t *pamh, unsigned int ctrl, cons
/* should not get here: exit with error */
close (fds[1]);
D(("helper binary is not available"));
+ printf("-1\n");
exit(PAM_AUTHINFO_UNAVAIL);
} else {
close(fds[1]);
if (child > 0) {
- char buf[1024];
+ char buf[32];
int rc=0;
rc=waitpid(child, &retval, 0); /* wait for helper to complete */
if (rc<0) {
@@ -147,22 +141,16 @@ struct spwd *_unix_run_verify_binary(pam_handle_t *pamh, unsigned int ctrl, cons
retval = PAM_AUTH_ERR;
} else {
retval = WEXITSTATUS(retval);
- if (retval != PAM_AUTHINFO_UNAVAIL) {
- rc = pam_modutil_read(fds[0], buf, sizeof(buf) - 1);
- if(rc > 0) {
+ rc = pam_modutil_read(fds[0], buf, sizeof(buf) - 1);
+ if(rc > 0) {
buf[rc] = '\0';
- if (sscanf(buf,"%ld:%ld:%ld:%ld:%ld:%ld",
- &spwd.sp_lstchg, /* last password change */
- &spwd.sp_min, /* days until change allowed. */
- &spwd.sp_max, /* days before change required */
- &spwd.sp_warn, /* days warning for expiration */
- &spwd.sp_inact, /* days before account inactive */
- &spwd.sp_expire) /* date when account expires */ != 6 ) retval = PAM_AUTH_ERR;
+ if (sscanf(buf,"%d", daysleft) != 1 )
+ retval = PAM_AUTH_ERR;
}
- else {
- pam_syslog(pamh, LOG_ERR, " ERROR %d: %m", rc); retval = PAM_AUTH_ERR;
+ else {
+ pam_syslog(pamh, LOG_ERR, "read unix_chkpwd output error %d: %m", rc);
+ retval = PAM_AUTH_ERR;
}
- }
}
} else {
pam_syslog(pamh, LOG_ERR, "Fork failed: %m");
@@ -175,15 +163,9 @@ struct spwd *_unix_run_verify_binary(pam_handle_t *pamh, unsigned int ctrl, cons
(void) signal(SIGCHLD, sighandler); /* restore old signal handler */
}
D(("Returning %d",retval));
- if (retval != PAM_SUCCESS) {
- return NULL;
- }
- return &spwd;
+ return retval;
}
-#endif
-
-
/*
* PAM framework looks for this entry-point to pass control to the
* account management module.
@@ -196,14 +178,13 @@ PAM_EXTERN int pam_sm_acct_mgmt(pam_handle_t * pamh, int flags,
const void *void_uname;
const char *uname;
int retval, daysleft;
- time_t curdays;
struct spwd *spent;
struct passwd *pwent;
char buf[256];
D(("called."));
- ctrl = _set_ctrl(pamh, flags, NULL, argc, argv);
+ ctrl = _set_ctrl(pamh, flags, NULL, NULL, argc, argv);
retval = pam_get_item(pamh, PAM_USER, &void_uname);
uname = void_uname;
@@ -215,134 +196,90 @@ PAM_EXTERN int pam_sm_acct_mgmt(pam_handle_t * pamh, int flags,
return PAM_USER_UNKNOWN;
}
- pwent = pam_modutil_getpwnam(pamh, uname);
- if (!pwent) {
+ retval = get_account_info(pamh, uname, &pwent, &spent);
+ if (retval == PAM_USER_UNKNOWN) {
pam_syslog(pamh, LOG_ALERT,
"could not identify user (from getpwnam(%s))",
uname);
- return PAM_USER_UNKNOWN;
+ return retval;
}
- if (!strcmp( pwent->pw_passwd, "*NP*" )) { /* NIS+ */
- uid_t save_euid, save_uid;
-
- save_euid = geteuid();
- save_uid = getuid();
- if (save_uid == pwent->pw_uid)
- setreuid( save_euid, save_uid );
- else {
- setreuid( 0, -1 );
- if (setreuid( -1, pwent->pw_uid ) == -1) {
- setreuid( -1, 0 );
- setreuid( 0, -1 );
- if(setreuid( -1, pwent->pw_uid ) == -1)
- return PAM_CRED_INSUFFICIENT;
- }
- }
- spent = pam_modutil_getspnam (pamh, uname);
- if (save_uid == pwent->pw_uid)
- setreuid( save_uid, save_euid );
- else {
- if (setreuid( -1, 0 ) == -1)
- setreuid( save_uid, -1 );
- setreuid( -1, save_euid );
- }
-
- } else if (_unix_shadowed (pwent))
- spent = pam_modutil_getspnam (pamh, uname);
- else
+ if (retval == PAM_SUCCESS && spent == NULL)
return PAM_SUCCESS;
-#ifdef WITH_SELINUX
- if (!spent && SELINUX_ENABLED )
- spent = _unix_run_verify_binary(pamh, ctrl, uname);
-#endif
-
- if (!spent)
+ if (retval == PAM_UNIX_RUN_HELPER) {
+ retval = _unix_run_verify_binary(pamh, ctrl, uname, &daysleft);
+ if (retval == PAM_AUTHINFO_UNAVAIL &&
+ on(UNIX_BROKEN_SHADOW, ctrl))
+ return PAM_SUCCESS;
+ } else if (retval != PAM_SUCCESS) {
if (on(UNIX_BROKEN_SHADOW,ctrl))
return PAM_SUCCESS;
+ else
+ return retval;
+ } else
+ retval = check_shadow_expiry(pamh, spent, &daysleft);
- if (!spent)
- return PAM_AUTHINFO_UNAVAIL; /* Couldn't get username from shadow */
-
- curdays = time(NULL) / (60 * 60 * 24);
- D(("today is %d, last change %d", curdays, spent->sp_lstchg));
- if ((curdays > spent->sp_expire) && (spent->sp_expire != -1)) {
+ switch (retval) {
+ case PAM_ACCT_EXPIRED:
pam_syslog(pamh, LOG_NOTICE,
- "account %s has expired (account expired)",
- uname);
+ "account %s has expired (account expired)",
+ uname);
_make_remark(pamh, ctrl, PAM_ERROR_MSG,
- _("Your account has expired; please contact your system administrator"));
- D(("account expired"));
- return PAM_ACCT_EXPIRED;
- }
- if (spent->sp_lstchg == 0) {
- pam_syslog(pamh, LOG_NOTICE,
- "expired password for user %s (root enforced)",
- uname);
- _make_remark(pamh, ctrl, PAM_ERROR_MSG,
- _("You are required to change your password immediately (root enforced)"));
- D(("need a new password"));
- return PAM_NEW_AUTHTOK_REQD;
- }
- if (curdays < spent->sp_lstchg) {
- pam_syslog(pamh, LOG_DEBUG,
- "account %s has password changed in future",
- uname);
- return PAM_SUCCESS;
- }
- if ((curdays - spent->sp_lstchg > spent->sp_max)
- && (curdays - spent->sp_lstchg > spent->sp_inact)
- && (curdays - spent->sp_lstchg > spent->sp_max + spent->sp_inact)
- && (spent->sp_max != -1) && (spent->sp_inact != -1)) {
+ _("Your account has expired; please contact your system administrator"));
+ break;
+ case PAM_NEW_AUTHTOK_REQD:
+ if (daysleft == 0) {
+ pam_syslog(pamh, LOG_NOTICE,
+ "expired password for user %s (root enforced)",
+ uname);
+ _make_remark(pamh, ctrl, PAM_ERROR_MSG,
+ _("You are required to change your password immediately (root enforced)"));
+ } else {
+ pam_syslog(pamh, LOG_DEBUG,
+ "expired password for user %s (password aged)",
+ uname);
+ _make_remark(pamh, ctrl, PAM_ERROR_MSG,
+ _("You are required to change your password immediately (password aged)"));
+ }
+ break;
+ case PAM_AUTHTOK_EXPIRED:
pam_syslog(pamh, LOG_NOTICE,
- "account %s has expired (failed to change password)",
- uname);
- _make_remark(pamh, ctrl, PAM_ERROR_MSG,
- _("Your account has expired; please contact your system administrator"));
- D(("account expired 2"));
- return PAM_ACCT_EXPIRED;
- }
- if ((curdays - spent->sp_lstchg > spent->sp_max) && (spent->sp_max != -1)) {
- pam_syslog(pamh, LOG_DEBUG,
- "expired password for user %s (password aged)",
- uname);
+ "account %s has expired (failed to change password)",
+ uname);
_make_remark(pamh, ctrl, PAM_ERROR_MSG,
- _("You are required to change your password immediately (password aged)"));
- D(("need a new password 2"));
- return PAM_NEW_AUTHTOK_REQD;
- }
- if ((curdays - spent->sp_lstchg > spent->sp_max - spent->sp_warn)
- && (spent->sp_max != -1) && (spent->sp_warn != -1)) {
- daysleft = (spent->sp_lstchg + spent->sp_max) - curdays;
- pam_syslog(pamh, LOG_DEBUG,
- "password for user %s will expire in %d days",
- uname, daysleft);
+ _("Your account has expired; please contact your system administrator"));
+ break;
+ case PAM_SUCCESS:
+ if (daysleft >= 0) {
+ pam_syslog(pamh, LOG_DEBUG,
+ "password for user %s will expire in %d days",
+ uname, daysleft);
#if defined HAVE_DNGETTEXT && defined ENABLE_NLS
- snprintf (buf, sizeof (buf),
- dngettext(PACKAGE,
- "Warning: your password will expire in %d day",
- "Warning: your password will expire in %d days",
- daysleft),
- daysleft);
+ snprintf (buf, sizeof (buf),
+ dngettext(PACKAGE,
+ "Warning: your password will expire in %d day",
+ "Warning: your password will expire in %d days",
+ daysleft),
+ daysleft);
#else
- if (daysleft == 1)
- snprintf(buf, sizeof (buf),
- _("Warning: your password will expire in %d day"),
- daysleft);
- else
- snprintf(buf, sizeof (buf),
- /* TRANSLATORS: only used if dngettext is not support
-ed */
- _("Warning: your password will expire in %d days"),
- daysleft);
+ if (daysleft == 1)
+ snprintf(buf, sizeof (buf),
+ _("Warning: your password will expire in %d day"),
+ daysleft);
+ else
+ snprintf(buf, sizeof (buf),
+ /* TRANSLATORS: only used if dngettext is not supported */
+ _("Warning: your password will expire in %d days"),
+ daysleft);
#endif
- _make_remark(pamh, ctrl, PAM_TEXT_INFO, buf);
+ _make_remark(pamh, ctrl, PAM_TEXT_INFO, buf);
+ }
}
D(("all done"));
- return PAM_SUCCESS;
+ return retval;
}
diff --git a/modules/pam_unix/pam_unix_auth.c b/modules/pam_unix/pam_unix_auth.c
index 3004bee8..dfedd608 100644
--- a/modules/pam_unix/pam_unix_auth.c
+++ b/modules/pam_unix/pam_unix_auth.c
@@ -111,7 +111,7 @@ PAM_EXTERN int pam_sm_authenticate(pam_handle_t * pamh, int flags
D(("called."));
- ctrl = _set_ctrl(pamh, flags, NULL, argc, argv);
+ ctrl = _set_ctrl(pamh, flags, NULL, NULL, argc, argv);
/* Get a few bytes so we can pass our return value to
pam_sm_setcred(). */
diff --git a/modules/pam_unix/pam_unix_passwd.c b/modules/pam_unix/pam_unix_passwd.c
index 3a61925e..432f687f 100644
--- a/modules/pam_unix/pam_unix_passwd.c
+++ b/modules/pam_unix/pam_unix_passwd.c
@@ -2,6 +2,7 @@
* Main coding by Elliot Lee <sopwith@redhat.com>, Red Hat Software.
* Copyright (C) 1996.
* Copyright (c) Jan RÍkorajski, 1999.
+ * Copyright (c) Red Hat, Inc., 2007, 2008.
*
* Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
* modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
@@ -63,7 +64,6 @@
#ifdef WITH_SELINUX
static int selinux_enabled=-1;
#include <selinux/selinux.h>
-static security_context_t prev_context=NULL;
#define SELINUX_ENABLED (selinux_enabled!=-1 ? selinux_enabled : (selinux_enabled=is_selinux_enabled()>0))
#endif
@@ -93,15 +93,6 @@ extern int getrpcport(const char *host, unsigned long prognum,
#endif /* GNU libc 2.1 */
/*
- * PAM framework looks for these entry-points to pass control to the
- * password changing module.
- */
-
-#if defined(USE_LCKPWDF) && !defined(HAVE_LCKPWDF)
-# include "./lckpwdf.-c"
-#endif
-
-/*
How it works:
Gets in username (has to be done) from the calling program
Does authentication of user (only if we are not running as root)
@@ -109,82 +100,15 @@ extern int getrpcport(const char *host, unsigned long prognum,
Sets it.
*/
-/* passwd/salt conversion macros */
-
-#define ascii_to_bin(c) ((c)>='a'?(c-59):(c)>='A'?((c)-53):(c)-'.')
-#define bin_to_ascii(c) ((c)>=38?((c)-38+'a'):(c)>=12?((c)-12+'A'):(c)+'.')
-
/* data tokens */
#define _UNIX_OLD_AUTHTOK "-UN*X-OLD-PASS"
#define _UNIX_NEW_AUTHTOK "-UN*X-NEW-PASS"
#define MAX_PASSWD_TRIES 3
-#define PW_TMPFILE "/etc/npasswd"
-#define SH_TMPFILE "/etc/nshadow"
#ifndef CRACKLIB_DICTS
#define CRACKLIB_DICTS NULL
#endif
-#define OPW_TMPFILE "/etc/security/nopasswd"
-#define OLD_PASSWORDS_FILE "/etc/security/opasswd"
-
-/*
- * i64c - convert an integer to a radix 64 character
- */
-static int i64c(int i)
-{
- if (i < 0)
- return ('.');
- else if (i > 63)
- return ('z');
- if (i == 0)
- return ('.');
- if (i == 1)
- return ('/');
- if (i >= 2 && i <= 11)
- return ('0' - 2 + i);
- if (i >= 12 && i <= 37)
- return ('A' - 12 + i);
- if (i >= 38 && i <= 63)
- return ('a' - 38 + i);
- return ('\0');
-}
-
-static char *crypt_md5_wrapper(const char *pass_new)
-{
- /*
- * Code lifted from Marek Michalkiewicz's shadow suite. (CG)
- * removed use of static variables (AGM)
- */
-
- struct timeval tv;
- MD5_CTX ctx;
- unsigned char result[16];
- char *cp = (char *) result;
- unsigned char tmp[16];
- int i;
- char *x = NULL;
-
- GoodMD5Init(&ctx);
- gettimeofday(&tv, (struct timezone *) 0);
- GoodMD5Update(&ctx, (void *) &tv, sizeof tv);
- i = getpid();
- GoodMD5Update(&ctx, (void *) &i, sizeof i);
- i = clock();
- GoodMD5Update(&ctx, (void *) &i, sizeof i);
- GoodMD5Update(&ctx, result, sizeof result);
- GoodMD5Final(tmp, &ctx);
- strcpy(cp, "$1$"); /* magic for the MD5 */
- cp += strlen(cp);
- for (i = 0; i < 8; i++)
- *cp++ = i64c(tmp[i] & 077);
- *cp = '\0';
-
- /* no longer need cleartext */
- x = Goodcrypt_md5(pass_new, (const char *) result);
-
- return x;
-}
static char *getNISserver(pam_handle_t *pamh)
{
@@ -218,7 +142,8 @@ static char *getNISserver(pam_handle_t *pamh)
#ifdef WITH_SELINUX
-static int _unix_run_shadow_binary(pam_handle_t *pamh, unsigned int ctrl, const char *user, const char *fromwhat, const char *towhat)
+static int _unix_run_update_binary(pam_handle_t *pamh, unsigned int ctrl, const char *user,
+ const char *fromwhat, const char *towhat, int remember)
{
int retval, child, fds[2];
void (*sighandler)(int) = NULL;
@@ -248,7 +173,8 @@ static int _unix_run_shadow_binary(pam_handle_t *pamh, unsigned int ctrl, const
size_t i=0;
struct rlimit rlim;
static char *envp[] = { NULL };
- char *args[] = { NULL, NULL, NULL, NULL };
+ char *args[] = { NULL, NULL, NULL, NULL, NULL, NULL };
+ char buffer[16];
/* XXX - should really tidy up PAM here too */
@@ -271,11 +197,18 @@ static int _unix_run_shadow_binary(pam_handle_t *pamh, unsigned int ctrl, const
}
/* exec binary helper */
- args[0] = x_strdup(CHKPWD_HELPER);
+ args[0] = x_strdup(UPDATE_HELPER);
args[1] = x_strdup(user);
- args[2] = x_strdup("shadow");
+ args[2] = x_strdup("update");
+ if (on(UNIX_SHADOW, ctrl))
+ args[3] = x_strdup("1");
+ else
+ args[3] = x_strdup("0");
- execve(CHKPWD_HELPER, args, envp);
+ snprintf(buffer, sizeof(buffer), "%d", remember);
+ args[4] = x_strdup(buffer);
+
+ execve(UPDATE_HELPER, args, envp);
/* should not get here: exit with error */
D(("helper binary is not available"));
@@ -298,7 +231,7 @@ static int _unix_run_shadow_binary(pam_handle_t *pamh, unsigned int ctrl, const
close(fds[1]);
rc=waitpid(child, &retval, 0); /* wait for helper to complete */
if (rc<0) {
- pam_syslog(pamh, LOG_ERR, "unix_chkpwd waitpid returned %d: %m", rc);
+ pam_syslog(pamh, LOG_ERR, "unix_update waitpid failed: %m");
retval = PAM_AUTH_ERR;
} else {
retval = WEXITSTATUS(retval);
@@ -355,393 +288,6 @@ static int check_old_password(const char *forwho, const char *newpass)
return retval;
}
-static int save_old_password(pam_handle_t *pamh,
- const char *forwho, const char *oldpass,
- int howmany)
-{
- static char buf[16384];
- static char nbuf[16384];
- char *s_luser, *s_uid, *s_npas, *s_pas, *pass;
- int npas;
- FILE *pwfile, *opwfile;
- int err = 0;
- int oldmask;
- int found = 0;
- struct passwd *pwd = NULL;
- struct stat st;
-
- if (howmany < 0) {
- return PAM_SUCCESS;
- }
-
- if (oldpass == NULL) {
- return PAM_SUCCESS;
- }
-
- oldmask = umask(077);
-
-#ifdef WITH_SELINUX
- if (SELINUX_ENABLED) {
- security_context_t passwd_context=NULL;
- if (getfilecon("/etc/passwd",&passwd_context)<0) {
- return PAM_AUTHTOK_ERR;
- };
- if (getfscreatecon(&prev_context)<0) {
- freecon(passwd_context);
- return PAM_AUTHTOK_ERR;
- }
- if (setfscreatecon(passwd_context)) {
- freecon(passwd_context);
- freecon(prev_context);
- return PAM_AUTHTOK_ERR;
- }
- freecon(passwd_context);
- }
-#endif
- pwfile = fopen(OPW_TMPFILE, "w");
- umask(oldmask);
- if (pwfile == NULL) {
- err = 1;
- goto done;
- }
-
- opwfile = fopen(OLD_PASSWORDS_FILE, "r");
- if (opwfile == NULL) {
- fclose(pwfile);
- err = 1;
- goto done;
- }
-
- if (fstat(fileno(opwfile), &st) == -1) {
- fclose(opwfile);
- fclose(pwfile);
- err = 1;
- goto done;
- }
-
- if (fchown(fileno(pwfile), st.st_uid, st.st_gid) == -1) {
- fclose(opwfile);
- fclose(pwfile);
- err = 1;
- goto done;
- }
- if (fchmod(fileno(pwfile), st.st_mode) == -1) {
- fclose(opwfile);
- fclose(pwfile);
- err = 1;
- goto done;
- }
-
- while (fgets(buf, 16380, opwfile)) {
- if (!strncmp(buf, forwho, strlen(forwho))) {
- char *sptr;
- buf[strlen(buf) - 1] = '\0';
- s_luser = strtok_r(buf, ":", &sptr);
- s_uid = strtok_r(NULL, ":", &sptr);
- s_npas = strtok_r(NULL, ":", &sptr);
- s_pas = strtok_r(NULL, ":", &sptr);
- npas = strtol(s_npas, NULL, 10) + 1;
- while (npas > howmany) {
- s_pas = strpbrk(s_pas, ",");
- if (s_pas != NULL)
- s_pas++;
- npas--;
- }
- pass = crypt_md5_wrapper(oldpass);
- if (s_pas == NULL)
- snprintf(nbuf, sizeof(nbuf), "%s:%s:%d:%s\n",
- s_luser, s_uid, npas, pass);
- else
- snprintf(nbuf, sizeof(nbuf),"%s:%s:%d:%s,%s\n",
- s_luser, s_uid, npas, s_pas, pass);
- _pam_delete(pass);
- if (fputs(nbuf, pwfile) < 0) {
- err = 1;
- break;
- }
- found = 1;
- } else if (fputs(buf, pwfile) < 0) {
- err = 1;
- break;
- }
- }
- fclose(opwfile);
-
- if (!found) {
- pwd = pam_modutil_getpwnam(pamh, forwho);
- if (pwd == NULL) {
- err = 1;
- } else {
- pass = crypt_md5_wrapper(oldpass);
- snprintf(nbuf, sizeof(nbuf), "%s:%lu:1:%s\n",
- forwho, (unsigned long)pwd->pw_uid, pass);
- _pam_delete(pass);
- if (fputs(nbuf, pwfile) < 0) {
- err = 1;
- }
- }
- }
-
- if (fclose(pwfile)) {
- D(("error writing entries to old passwords file: %m"));
- err = 1;
- }
-
-done:
- if (!err) {
- if (rename(OPW_TMPFILE, OLD_PASSWORDS_FILE))
- err = 1;
- }
-#ifdef WITH_SELINUX
- if (SELINUX_ENABLED) {
- if (setfscreatecon(prev_context)) {
- err = 1;
- }
- if (prev_context)
- freecon(prev_context);
- prev_context=NULL;
- }
-#endif
- if (!err) {
- return PAM_SUCCESS;
- } else {
- unlink(OPW_TMPFILE);
- return PAM_AUTHTOK_ERR;
- }
-}
-
-static int _update_passwd(pam_handle_t *pamh,
- const char *forwho, const char *towhat)
-{
- struct passwd *tmpent = NULL;
- struct stat st;
- FILE *pwfile, *opwfile;
- int err = 1;
- int oldmask;
-
- oldmask = umask(077);
-#ifdef WITH_SELINUX
- if (SELINUX_ENABLED) {
- security_context_t passwd_context=NULL;
- if (getfilecon("/etc/passwd",&passwd_context)<0) {
- return PAM_AUTHTOK_ERR;
- };
- if (getfscreatecon(&prev_context)<0) {
- freecon(passwd_context);
- return PAM_AUTHTOK_ERR;
- }
- if (setfscreatecon(passwd_context)) {
- freecon(passwd_context);
- freecon(prev_context);
- return PAM_AUTHTOK_ERR;
- }
- freecon(passwd_context);
- }
-#endif
- pwfile = fopen(PW_TMPFILE, "w");
- umask(oldmask);
- if (pwfile == NULL) {
- err = 1;
- goto done;
- }
-
- opwfile = fopen("/etc/passwd", "r");
- if (opwfile == NULL) {
- fclose(pwfile);
- err = 1;
- goto done;
- }
-
- if (fstat(fileno(opwfile), &st) == -1) {
- fclose(opwfile);
- fclose(pwfile);
- err = 1;
- goto done;
- }
-
- if (fchown(fileno(pwfile), st.st_uid, st.st_gid) == -1) {
- fclose(opwfile);
- fclose(pwfile);
- err = 1;
- goto done;
- }
- if (fchmod(fileno(pwfile), st.st_mode) == -1) {
- fclose(opwfile);
- fclose(pwfile);
- err = 1;
- goto done;
- }
-
- tmpent = fgetpwent(opwfile);
- while (tmpent) {
- if (!strcmp(tmpent->pw_name, forwho)) {
- /* To shut gcc up */
- union {
- const char *const_charp;
- char *charp;
- } assigned_passwd;
- assigned_passwd.const_charp = towhat;
-
- tmpent->pw_passwd = assigned_passwd.charp;
- err = 0;
- }
- if (putpwent(tmpent, pwfile)) {
- D(("error writing entry to password file: %m"));
- err = 1;
- break;
- }
- tmpent = fgetpwent(opwfile);
- }
- fclose(opwfile);
-
- if (fclose(pwfile)) {
- D(("error writing entries to password file: %m"));
- err = 1;
- }
-
-done:
- if (!err) {
- if (!rename(PW_TMPFILE, "/etc/passwd"))
- pam_syslog(pamh, LOG_NOTICE, "password changed for %s", forwho);
- else
- err = 1;
- }
-#ifdef WITH_SELINUX
- if (SELINUX_ENABLED) {
- if (setfscreatecon(prev_context)) {
- err = 1;
- }
- if (prev_context)
- freecon(prev_context);
- prev_context=NULL;
- }
-#endif
- if (!err) {
- return PAM_SUCCESS;
- } else {
- unlink(PW_TMPFILE);
- return PAM_AUTHTOK_ERR;
- }
-}
-
-static int _update_shadow(pam_handle_t *pamh, const char *forwho, char *towhat)
-{
- struct spwd *spwdent = NULL, *stmpent = NULL;
- struct stat st;
- FILE *pwfile, *opwfile;
- int err = 1;
- int oldmask;
-
- spwdent = getspnam(forwho);
- if (spwdent == NULL) {
- return PAM_USER_UNKNOWN;
- }
- oldmask = umask(077);
-
-#ifdef WITH_SELINUX
- if (SELINUX_ENABLED) {
- security_context_t shadow_context=NULL;
- if (getfilecon("/etc/shadow",&shadow_context)<0) {
- return PAM_AUTHTOK_ERR;
- };
- if (getfscreatecon(&prev_context)<0) {
- freecon(shadow_context);
- return PAM_AUTHTOK_ERR;
- }
- if (setfscreatecon(shadow_context)) {
- freecon(shadow_context);
- freecon(prev_context);
- return PAM_AUTHTOK_ERR;
- }
- freecon(shadow_context);
- }
-#endif
- pwfile = fopen(SH_TMPFILE, "w");
- umask(oldmask);
- if (pwfile == NULL) {
- err = 1;
- goto done;
- }
-
- opwfile = fopen("/etc/shadow", "r");
- if (opwfile == NULL) {
- fclose(pwfile);
- err = 1;
- goto done;
- }
-
- if (fstat(fileno(opwfile), &st) == -1) {
- fclose(opwfile);
- fclose(pwfile);
- err = 1;
- goto done;
- }
-
- if (fchown(fileno(pwfile), st.st_uid, st.st_gid) == -1) {
- fclose(opwfile);
- fclose(pwfile);
- err = 1;
- goto done;
- }
- if (fchmod(fileno(pwfile), st.st_mode) == -1) {
- fclose(opwfile);
- fclose(pwfile);
- err = 1;
- goto done;
- }
-
- stmpent = fgetspent(opwfile);
- while (stmpent) {
-
- if (!strcmp(stmpent->sp_namp, forwho)) {
- stmpent->sp_pwdp = towhat;
- stmpent->sp_lstchg = time(NULL) / (60 * 60 * 24);
- err = 0;
- D(("Set password %s for %s", stmpent->sp_pwdp, forwho));
- }
-
- if (putspent(stmpent, pwfile)) {
- D(("error writing entry to shadow file: %m"));
- err = 1;
- break;
- }
-
- stmpent = fgetspent(opwfile);
- }
- fclose(opwfile);
-
- if (fclose(pwfile)) {
- D(("error writing entries to shadow file: %m"));
- err = 1;
- }
-
- done:
- if (!err) {
- if (!rename(SH_TMPFILE, "/etc/shadow"))
- pam_syslog(pamh, LOG_NOTICE, "password changed for %s", forwho);
- else
- err = 1;
- }
-
-#ifdef WITH_SELINUX
- if (SELINUX_ENABLED) {
- if (setfscreatecon(prev_context)) {
- err = 1;
- }
- if (prev_context)
- freecon(prev_context);
- prev_context=NULL;
- }
-#endif
-
- if (!err) {
- return PAM_SUCCESS;
- } else {
- unlink(SH_TMPFILE);
- return PAM_AUTHTOK_ERR;
- }
-}
-
static int _do_setpass(pam_handle_t* pamh, const char *forwho,
const char *fromwhat,
char *towhat, unsigned int ctrl, int remember)
@@ -769,9 +315,7 @@ static int _do_setpass(pam_handle_t* pamh, const char *forwho,
enum clnt_stat err;
/* Unlock passwd file to avoid deadlock */
-#ifdef USE_LCKPWDF
- ulckpwdf();
-#endif
+ unlock_pwdf();
unlocked = 1;
/* Initialize password information */
@@ -831,129 +375,63 @@ static int _do_setpass(pam_handle_t* pamh, const char *forwho,
}
if (_unix_comesfromsource(pamh, forwho, 1, 0)) {
-#ifdef USE_LCKPWDF
if(unlocked) {
- int i = 0;
- /* These values for the number of attempts and the sleep time
- are, of course, completely arbitrary.
- My reading of the PAM docs is that, once pam_chauthtok() has been
- called with PAM_UPDATE_AUTHTOK, we are obliged to take any
- reasonable steps to make sure the token is updated; so retrying
- for 1/10 sec. isn't overdoing it. */
- while((retval = lckpwdf()) != 0 && i < 100) {
- usleep(1000);
- i++;
- }
- if(retval != 0) {
+ if (lock_pwdf() != PAM_SUCCESS) {
return PAM_AUTHTOK_LOCK_BUSY;
}
}
+#ifdef WITH_SELINUX
+ if (unix_selinux_confined())
+ return _unix_run_update_binary(pamh, ctrl, forwho, fromwhat, towhat, remember);
#endif
/* first, save old password */
- if (save_old_password(pamh, forwho, fromwhat, remember)) {
+ if (save_old_password(forwho, fromwhat, remember)) {
retval = PAM_AUTHTOK_ERR;
goto done;
}
- if (on(UNIX_SHADOW, ctrl) || _unix_shadowed(pwd)) {
- retval = _update_shadow(pamh, forwho, towhat);
-#ifdef WITH_SELINUX
- if (retval != PAM_SUCCESS && SELINUX_ENABLED)
- retval = _unix_run_shadow_binary(pamh, ctrl, forwho, fromwhat, towhat);
-#endif
+ if (on(UNIX_SHADOW, ctrl) || is_pwd_shadowed(pwd)) {
+ retval = unix_update_shadow(pamh, forwho, towhat);
if (retval == PAM_SUCCESS)
- if (!_unix_shadowed(pwd))
- retval = _update_passwd(pamh, forwho, "x");
+ if (!is_pwd_shadowed(pwd))
+ retval = unix_update_passwd(pamh, forwho, "x");
} else {
- retval = _update_passwd(pamh, forwho, towhat);
+ retval = unix_update_passwd(pamh, forwho, towhat);
}
}
done:
-#ifdef USE_LCKPWDF
- ulckpwdf();
-#endif
+ unlock_pwdf();
return retval;
}
static int _unix_verify_shadow(pam_handle_t *pamh, const char *user, unsigned int ctrl)
{
- struct passwd *pwd = NULL; /* Password and shadow password */
- struct spwd *spwdent = NULL; /* file entries for the user */
- time_t curdays;
- int retval = PAM_SUCCESS;
+ struct passwd *pwent = NULL; /* Password and shadow password */
+ struct spwd *spent = NULL; /* file entries for the user */
+ int daysleft;
+ int retval;
- /* UNIX passwords area */
- pwd = getpwnam(user); /* Get password file entry... */
- if (pwd == NULL)
- return PAM_AUTHINFO_UNAVAIL; /* We don't need to do the rest... */
+ retval = get_account_info(pamh, user, &pwent, &spent);
+ if (retval == PAM_USER_UNKNOWN) {
+ return retval;
+ }
- if (_unix_shadowed(pwd)) {
- /* ...and shadow password file entry for this user, if shadowing
- is enabled */
- setspent();
- spwdent = getspnam(user);
- endspent();
+ if (retval == PAM_SUCCESS && spent == NULL)
+ return PAM_SUCCESS;
-#ifdef WITH_SELINUX
- if (spwdent == NULL && SELINUX_ENABLED )
- spwdent = _unix_run_verify_binary(pamh, ctrl, user);
-#endif
- if (spwdent == NULL)
- return PAM_AUTHINFO_UNAVAIL;
- } else {
- if (strcmp(pwd->pw_passwd,"*NP*") == 0) { /* NIS+ */
- uid_t save_uid;
-
- save_uid = geteuid();
- seteuid (pwd->pw_uid);
- spwdent = getspnam( user );
- seteuid (save_uid);
-
- if (spwdent == NULL)
- return PAM_AUTHINFO_UNAVAIL;
- } else
- spwdent = NULL;
+ if (retval == PAM_UNIX_RUN_HELPER) {
+ retval = _unix_run_verify_binary(pamh, ctrl, user, &daysleft);
+ if (retval == PAM_AUTH_ERR || retval == PAM_USER_UNKNOWN)
+ return retval;
}
+ else if (retval == PAM_SUCCESS)
+ retval = check_shadow_expiry(pamh, spent, &daysleft);
+
+ if (on(UNIX__IAMROOT, ctrl) || retval == PAM_NEW_AUTHTOK_REQD)
+ return PAM_SUCCESS;
- if (spwdent != NULL) {
- /* We have the user's information, now let's check if their account
- has expired (60 * 60 * 24 = number of seconds in a day) */
-
- if (off(UNIX__IAMROOT, ctrl)) {
- /* Get the current number of days since 1970 */
- curdays = time(NULL) / (60 * 60 * 24);
- if (curdays < spwdent->sp_lstchg) {
- pam_syslog(pamh, LOG_DEBUG,
- "account %s has password changed in future",
- user);
- curdays = spwdent->sp_lstchg;
- }
- if ((curdays - spwdent->sp_lstchg < spwdent->sp_min)
- && (spwdent->sp_min != -1))
- /*
- * The last password change was too recent.
- */
- retval = PAM_AUTHTOK_ERR;
- else if ((curdays - spwdent->sp_lstchg > spwdent->sp_max)
- && (curdays - spwdent->sp_lstchg > spwdent->sp_inact)
- && (curdays - spwdent->sp_lstchg >
- spwdent->sp_max + spwdent->sp_inact)
- && (spwdent->sp_max != -1) && (spwdent->sp_inact != -1)
- && (spwdent->sp_lstchg != 0))
- /*
- * Their password change has been put off too long,
- */
- retval = PAM_ACCT_EXPIRED;
- else if ((curdays > spwdent->sp_expire) && (spwdent->sp_expire != -1)
- && (spwdent->sp_lstchg != 0))
- /*
- * OR their account has just plain expired
- */
- retval = PAM_ACCT_EXPIRED;
- }
- }
return retval;
}
@@ -1021,8 +499,9 @@ PAM_EXTERN int pam_sm_chauthtok(pam_handle_t * pamh, int flags,
int argc, const char **argv)
{
unsigned int ctrl, lctrl;
- int retval, i;
+ int retval;
int remember = -1;
+ int rounds = -1;
/* <DO NOT free() THESE> */
const char *user;
@@ -1031,7 +510,7 @@ PAM_EXTERN int pam_sm_chauthtok(pam_handle_t * pamh, int flags,
D(("called."));
- ctrl = _set_ctrl(pamh, flags, &remember, argc, argv);
+ ctrl = _set_ctrl(pamh, flags, &remember, &rounds, argc, argv);
/*
* First get the name of a user
@@ -1240,40 +719,23 @@ PAM_EXTERN int pam_sm_chauthtok(pam_handle_t * pamh, int flags,
pass_new = pass_old = NULL; /* tidy up */
return retval;
}
-#ifdef USE_LCKPWDF
- /* These values for the number of attempts and the sleep time
- are, of course, completely arbitrary.
- My reading of the PAM docs is that, once pam_chauthtok() has been
- called with PAM_UPDATE_AUTHTOK, we are obliged to take any
- reasonable steps to make sure the token is updated; so retrying
- for 1/10 sec. isn't overdoing it. */
- i=0;
- while((retval = lckpwdf()) != 0 && i < 100) {
- usleep(1000);
- i++;
- }
- if(retval != 0) {
+ if (lock_pwdf() != PAM_SUCCESS) {
return PAM_AUTHTOK_LOCK_BUSY;
}
-#endif
if (pass_old) {
retval = _unix_verify_password(pamh, user, pass_old, ctrl);
if (retval != PAM_SUCCESS) {
pam_syslog(pamh, LOG_NOTICE, "user password changed by another process");
-#ifdef USE_LCKPWDF
- ulckpwdf();
-#endif
+ unlock_pwdf();
return retval;
}
}
retval = _unix_verify_shadow(pamh, user, ctrl);
if (retval != PAM_SUCCESS) {
- pam_syslog(pamh, LOG_NOTICE, "user not authenticated 2");
-#ifdef USE_LCKPWDF
- ulckpwdf();
-#endif
+ pam_syslog(pamh, LOG_NOTICE, "user shadow entry expired");
+ unlock_pwdf();
return retval;
}
@@ -1282,9 +744,7 @@ PAM_EXTERN int pam_sm_chauthtok(pam_handle_t * pamh, int flags,
pam_syslog(pamh, LOG_NOTICE,
"new password not acceptable 2");
pass_new = pass_old = NULL; /* tidy up */
-#ifdef USE_LCKPWDF
- ulckpwdf();
-#endif
+ unlock_pwdf();
return retval;
}
@@ -1297,51 +757,13 @@ PAM_EXTERN int pam_sm_chauthtok(pam_handle_t * pamh, int flags,
* First we encrypt the new password.
*/
- if (on(UNIX_MD5_PASS, ctrl)) {
- tpass = crypt_md5_wrapper(pass_new);
- } else {
- /*
- * Salt manipulation is stolen from Rick Faith's passwd
- * program. Sorry Rick :) -- alex
- */
-
- time_t tm;
- char salt[3];
-
- time(&tm);
- salt[0] = bin_to_ascii(tm & 0x3f);
- salt[1] = bin_to_ascii((tm >> 6) & 0x3f);
- salt[2] = '\0';
-
- if (off(UNIX_BIGCRYPT, ctrl) && strlen(pass_new) > 8) {
- /*
- * to avoid using the _extensions_ of the bigcrypt()
- * function we truncate the newly entered password
- * [Problems that followed from this are fixed as per
- * Bug 521314.]
- */
- char *temp = malloc(9);
-
- if (temp == NULL) {
- pam_syslog(pamh, LOG_CRIT,
- "out of memory for password");
- pass_new = pass_old = NULL; /* tidy up */
-#ifdef USE_LCKPWDF
- ulckpwdf();
-#endif
- return PAM_BUF_ERR;
- }
- /* copy first 8 bytes of password */
- strncpy(temp, pass_new, 8);
- temp[8] = '\0';
-
- /* no longer need cleartext */
- tpass = bigcrypt(temp, salt);
-
- _pam_delete(temp); /* tidy up */
- } else {
- tpass = bigcrypt(pass_new, salt);
- }
+ tpass = create_password_hash(pass_new, ctrl, rounds);
+ if (tpass == NULL) {
+ pam_syslog(pamh, LOG_CRIT,
+ "out of memory for password");
+ pass_new = pass_old = NULL; /* tidy up */
+ unlock_pwdf();
+ return PAM_BUF_ERR;
}
D(("password processed"));
@@ -1350,7 +772,7 @@ PAM_EXTERN int pam_sm_chauthtok(pam_handle_t * pamh, int flags,
retval = _do_setpass(pamh, user, pass_old, tpass, ctrl,
remember);
- /* _do_setpass has called ulckpwdf for us */
+ /* _do_setpass has called unlock_pwdf for us */
_pam_delete(tpass);
pass_old = pass_new = NULL;
diff --git a/modules/pam_unix/pam_unix_sess.c b/modules/pam_unix/pam_unix_sess.c
index d8d96687..e984578c 100644
--- a/modules/pam_unix/pam_unix_sess.c
+++ b/modules/pam_unix/pam_unix_sess.c
@@ -73,7 +73,7 @@ PAM_EXTERN int pam_sm_open_session(pam_handle_t * pamh, int flags,
D(("called."));
- ctrl = _set_ctrl(pamh, flags, NULL, argc, argv);
+ ctrl = _set_ctrl(pamh, flags, NULL, NULL, argc, argv);
retval = pam_get_item(pamh, PAM_USER, (void *) &user_name);
if (user_name == NULL || *user_name == '\0' || retval != PAM_SUCCESS) {
@@ -107,7 +107,7 @@ PAM_EXTERN int pam_sm_close_session(pam_handle_t * pamh, int flags,
D(("called."));
- ctrl = _set_ctrl(pamh, flags, NULL, argc, argv);
+ ctrl = _set_ctrl(pamh, flags, NULL, NULL, argc, argv);
retval = pam_get_item(pamh, PAM_USER, (void *) &user_name);
if (user_name == NULL || *user_name == '\0' || retval != PAM_SUCCESS) {
diff --git a/modules/pam_unix/passverify.c b/modules/pam_unix/passverify.c
index 6587bace..6fc4dcce 100644
--- a/modules/pam_unix/passverify.c
+++ b/modules/pam_unix/passverify.c
@@ -7,12 +7,43 @@
#include "support.h"
#include <stdio.h>
#include <string.h>
+#include <sys/types.h>
#include <unistd.h>
+#include <pwd.h>
+#include <shadow.h>
+#include <syslog.h>
+#include <stdarg.h>
+#include <signal.h>
+#include <errno.h>
+#include <time.h>
+#include <sys/time.h>
+#include <sys/stat.h>
+#include <fcntl.h>
#include "md5.h"
#include "bigcrypt.h"
#include "passverify.h"
+#ifdef WITH_SELINUX
+#include <selinux/selinux.h>
+#define SELINUX_ENABLED is_selinux_enabled()>0
+#else
+#define SELINUX_ENABLED 0
+#endif
+
+#ifdef HELPER_COMPILE
+#define pam_modutil_getpwnam(h,n) getpwnam(n)
+#define pam_modutil_getspnam(h,n) getspnam(n)
+#define pam_syslog(h,a,b,c) helper_log_err(a,b,c)
+#else
+#include <security/pam_modutil.h>
+#include <security/pam_ext.h>
+#endif
+
+#if defined(USE_LCKPWDF) && !defined(HAVE_LCKPWDF)
+# include "./lckpwdf.-c"
+#endif
+
int
verify_pwd_hash(const char *p, const char *hash, unsigned int nullok)
{
@@ -70,7 +101,8 @@ verify_pwd_hash(const char *p, const char *hash, unsigned int nullok)
return retval;
}
-int _unix_shadowed(const struct passwd *pwd)
+int
+is_pwd_shadowed(const struct passwd *pwd)
{
if (pwd != NULL) {
if (strcmp(pwd->pw_passwd, "x") == 0) {
@@ -85,12 +117,946 @@ int _unix_shadowed(const struct passwd *pwd)
return 0;
}
+#ifdef HELPER_COMPILE
+int
+get_account_info(const char *name,
+ struct passwd **pwd, struct spwd **spwdent)
+#else
+int
+get_account_info(pam_handle_t *pamh, const char *name,
+ struct passwd **pwd, struct spwd **spwdent)
+#endif
+{
+ /* UNIX passwords area */
+ *pwd = pam_modutil_getpwnam(pamh, name); /* Get password file entry... */
+ *spwdent = NULL;
+
+ if (*pwd != NULL) {
+ if (strcmp((*pwd)->pw_passwd, "*NP*") == 0)
+ { /* NIS+ */
+#ifdef HELPER_COMPILE
+ uid_t save_euid, save_uid;
+
+ save_euid = geteuid();
+ save_uid = getuid();
+ if (save_uid == (*pwd)->pw_uid)
+ setreuid(save_euid, save_uid);
+ else {
+ setreuid(0, -1);
+ if (setreuid(-1, (*pwd)->pw_uid) == -1) {
+ setreuid(-1, 0);
+ setreuid(0, -1);
+ if(setreuid(-1, (*pwd)->pw_uid) == -1)
+ return PAM_CRED_INSUFFICIENT;
+ }
+ }
+
+ *spwdent = pam_modutil_getspnam(pamh, name);
+ if (save_uid == (*pwd)->pw_uid)
+ setreuid(save_uid, save_euid);
+ else {
+ setreuid(-1, 0);
+ setreuid(save_uid, -1);
+ setreuid(-1, save_euid);
+ }
+
+ if (*spwdent == NULL || (*spwdent)->sp_pwdp == NULL)
+ return PAM_AUTHINFO_UNAVAIL;
+#else
+ /* we must run helper for NIS+ passwords */
+ return PAM_UNIX_RUN_HELPER;
+#endif
+ } else if (is_pwd_shadowed(*pwd)) {
+ /*
+ * ...and shadow password file entry for this user,
+ * if shadowing is enabled
+ */
+#ifndef HELPER_COMPILE
+ if (geteuid() || SELINUX_ENABLED)
+ return PAM_UNIX_RUN_HELPER;
+#endif
+ *spwdent = pam_modutil_getspnam(pamh, name);
+ if (*spwdent == NULL || (*spwdent)->sp_pwdp == NULL)
+ return PAM_AUTHINFO_UNAVAIL;
+ }
+ } else {
+ return PAM_USER_UNKNOWN;
+ }
+ return PAM_SUCCESS;
+}
+
+#ifdef HELPER_COMPILE
+int
+get_pwd_hash(const char *name,
+ struct passwd **pwd, char **hash)
+#else
+int
+get_pwd_hash(pam_handle_t *pamh, const char *name,
+ struct passwd **pwd, char **hash)
+#endif
+{
+ int retval;
+ struct spwd *spwdent = NULL;
+
+#ifdef HELPER_COMPILE
+ retval = get_account_info(name, pwd, &spwdent);
+#else
+ retval = get_account_info(pamh, name, pwd, &spwdent);
+#endif
+ if (retval != PAM_SUCCESS) {
+ return retval;
+ }
+
+ if (spwdent)
+ *hash = x_strdup(spwdent->sp_pwdp);
+ else
+ *hash = x_strdup((*pwd)->pw_passwd);
+ if (*hash == NULL)
+ return PAM_BUF_ERR;
+
+ return PAM_SUCCESS;
+}
+
+#ifdef HELPER_COMPILE
+int
+check_shadow_expiry(struct spwd *spent, int *daysleft)
+#else
+int
+check_shadow_expiry(pam_handle_t *pamh, struct spwd *spent, int *daysleft)
+#endif
+{
+ long int curdays;
+ *daysleft = -1;
+ curdays = (long int)(time(NULL) / (60 * 60 * 24));
+ D(("today is %d, last change %d", curdays, spent->sp_lstchg));
+ if ((curdays > spent->sp_expire) && (spent->sp_expire != -1)) {
+ D(("account expired"));
+ return PAM_ACCT_EXPIRED;
+ }
+ if (spent->sp_lstchg == 0) {
+ D(("need a new password"));
+ *daysleft = 0;
+ return PAM_NEW_AUTHTOK_REQD;
+ }
+ if (curdays < spent->sp_lstchg) {
+ pam_syslog(pamh, LOG_DEBUG,
+ "account %s has password changed in future",
+ spent->sp_namp);
+ return PAM_SUCCESS;
+ }
+ if ((curdays - spent->sp_lstchg > spent->sp_max)
+ && (curdays - spent->sp_lstchg > spent->sp_inact)
+ && (curdays - spent->sp_lstchg > spent->sp_max + spent->sp_inact)
+ && (spent->sp_max != -1) && (spent->sp_inact != -1)) {
+ *daysleft = (int)((spent->sp_lstchg + spent->sp_max) - curdays);
+ D(("authtok expired"));
+ return PAM_AUTHTOK_EXPIRED;
+ }
+ if ((curdays - spent->sp_lstchg > spent->sp_max) && (spent->sp_max != -1)) {
+ D(("need a new password 2"));
+ return PAM_NEW_AUTHTOK_REQD;
+ }
+ if ((curdays - spent->sp_lstchg > spent->sp_max - spent->sp_warn)
+ && (spent->sp_max != -1) && (spent->sp_warn != -1)) {
+ *daysleft = (int)((spent->sp_lstchg + spent->sp_max) - curdays);
+ D(("warn before expiry"));
+ }
+ return PAM_SUCCESS;
+
+}
+
+/* passwd/salt conversion macros */
+
+#define PW_TMPFILE "/etc/npasswd"
+#define SH_TMPFILE "/etc/nshadow"
+#define OPW_TMPFILE "/etc/security/nopasswd"
+
+/*
+ * i64c - convert an integer to a radix 64 character
+ */
+static int
+i64c(int i)
+{
+ if (i < 0)
+ return ('.');
+ else if (i > 63)
+ return ('z');
+ if (i == 0)
+ return ('.');
+ if (i == 1)
+ return ('/');
+ if (i >= 2 && i <= 11)
+ return ('0' - 2 + i);
+ if (i >= 12 && i <= 37)
+ return ('A' - 12 + i);
+ if (i >= 38 && i <= 63)
+ return ('a' - 38 + i);
+ return ('\0');
+}
+
+/* <where> must point to a buffer of at least <length>+1 length */
+static void
+crypt_make_salt(char *where, int length)
+{
+ struct timeval tv;
+ MD5_CTX ctx;
+ unsigned char tmp[16];
+ unsigned char *src = (unsigned char *)where;
+ int i;
+#ifdef PAM_PATH_RANDOMDEV
+ int fd;
+ int rv;
+
+ if ((rv = fd = open(PAM_PATH_RANDOMDEV, O_RDONLY)) != -1) {
+ while ((rv = read(fd, where, length)) != length && errno == EINTR);
+ close (fd);
+ }
+ if (rv != length) {
+#endif
+ /*
+ * Code lifted from Marek Michalkiewicz's shadow suite. (CG)
+ * removed use of static variables (AGM)
+ *
+ * will work correctly only for length <= 16 */
+ src = tmp;
+ GoodMD5Init(&ctx);
+ gettimeofday(&tv, (struct timezone *) 0);
+ GoodMD5Update(&ctx, (void *) &tv, sizeof tv);
+ i = getpid();
+ GoodMD5Update(&ctx, (void *) &i, sizeof i);
+ i = clock();
+ GoodMD5Update(&ctx, (void *) &i, sizeof i);
+ GoodMD5Update(&ctx, src, length);
+ GoodMD5Final(tmp, &ctx);
+#ifdef PAM_PATH_RANDOMDEV
+ }
+#endif
+ for (i = 0; i < length; i++)
+ *where++ = i64c(src[i] & 077);
+ *where = '\0';
+}
+
+char *
+crypt_md5_wrapper(const char *pass_new)
+{
+ unsigned char result[16];
+ char *cp = (char *) result;
+
+ cp = stpcpy(cp, "$1$"); /* magic for the MD5 */
+ crypt_make_salt(cp, 8);
+
+ /* no longer need cleartext */
+ cp = Goodcrypt_md5(pass_new, (const char *) result);
+ pass_new = NULL;
+
+ return cp;
+}
+
+char *
+create_password_hash(const char *password, unsigned int ctrl, int rounds)
+{
+ const char *algoid;
+ char salt[64]; /* contains rounds number + max 16 bytes of salt + algo id */
+ char *sp;
+
+ if (on(UNIX_MD5_PASS, ctrl)) {
+ return crypt_md5_wrapper(password);
+ }
+ if (on(UNIX_SHA256_PASS, ctrl)) {
+ algoid = "$5$";
+ } else if (on(UNIX_SHA512_PASS, ctrl)) {
+ algoid = "$6$";
+ } else { /* must be crypt/bigcrypt */
+ char tmppass[9];
+ char *crypted;
+
+ crypt_make_salt(salt, 2);
+ if (off(UNIX_BIGCRYPT, ctrl) && strlen(password) > 8) {
+ strncpy(tmppass, password, sizeof(tmppass)-1);
+ tmppass[sizeof(tmppass)-1] = '\0';
+ password = tmppass;
+ }
+ crypted = bigcrypt(password, salt);
+ memset(tmppass, '\0', sizeof(tmppass));
+ password = NULL;
+ return crypted;
+ }
+
+ sp = stpcpy(salt, algoid);
+ if (on(UNIX_ALGO_ROUNDS, ctrl)) {
+ sp += snprintf(sp, sizeof(salt) - 3, "rounds=%u$", rounds);
+ }
+ crypt_make_salt(sp, 8);
+ /* For now be conservative so the resulting hashes
+ * are not too long. 8 bytes of salt prevents dictionary
+ * attacks well enough. */
+ sp = crypt(password, salt);
+ if (strncmp(algoid, sp, strlen(algoid)) != 0) {
+ /* libc doesn't know the algorithm, use MD5 */
+ memset(sp, '\0', strlen(sp));
+ return crypt_md5_wrapper(password);
+ }
+
+ return x_strdup(sp);
+}
+
+#ifdef WITH_SELINUX
+int
+unix_selinux_confined(void)
+{
+ static int confined = -1;
+ int fd;
+ char tempfile[]="/etc/.pwdXXXXXX";
+
+ if (confined != -1)
+ return confined;
+
+ /* cannot be confined without SELinux enabled */
+ if (!SELINUX_ENABLED){
+ confined = 0;
+ return confined;
+ }
+
+ /* let's try opening shadow read only */
+ if ((fd=open("/etc/shadow", O_RDONLY)) != -1) {
+ close(fd);
+ confined = 0;
+ return confined;
+ }
+
+ if (errno == EACCES) {
+ confined = 1;
+ return confined;
+ }
+
+ /* shadow opening failed because of other reasons let's try
+ creating a file in /etc */
+ if ((fd=mkstemp(tempfile)) != -1) {
+ unlink(tempfile);
+ close(fd);
+ confined = 0;
+ return confined;
+ }
+
+ confined = 1;
+ return confined;
+}
+
+#else
+int
+unix_selinux_confined(void)
+{
+ return 0;
+}
+#endif
+
+#ifdef USE_LCKPWDF
+int
+lock_pwdf(void)
+{
+ int i;
+ int retval;
+
+#ifndef HELPER_COMPILE
+ if (unix_selinux_confined()) {
+ return PAM_SUCCESS;
+ }
+#endif
+ /* These values for the number of attempts and the sleep time
+ are, of course, completely arbitrary.
+ My reading of the PAM docs is that, once pam_chauthtok() has been
+ called with PAM_UPDATE_AUTHTOK, we are obliged to take any
+ reasonable steps to make sure the token is updated; so retrying
+ for 1/10 sec. isn't overdoing it. */
+ i=0;
+ while((retval = lckpwdf()) != 0 && i < 100) {
+ usleep(1000);
+ i++;
+ }
+ if(retval != 0) {
+ return PAM_AUTHTOK_LOCK_BUSY;
+ }
+ return PAM_SUCCESS;
+}
+
+void
+unlock_pwdf(void)
+{
+#ifndef HELPER_COMPILE
+ if (unix_selinux_confined()) {
+ return;
+ }
+#endif
+ ulckpwdf();
+}
+#else
+int
+lock_pwdf(void)
+{
+ return PAM_SUCCESS;
+}
+
+void
+unlock_pwdf(void)
+{
+ return;
+}
+#endif
+
+int
+save_old_password(const char *forwho, const char *oldpass,
+ int howmany)
+{
+ static char buf[16384];
+ static char nbuf[16384];
+ char *s_luser, *s_uid, *s_npas, *s_pas, *pass;
+ int npas;
+ FILE *pwfile, *opwfile;
+ int err = 0;
+ int oldmask;
+ int found = 0;
+ struct passwd *pwd = NULL;
+ struct stat st;
+ security_context_t prev_context=NULL;
+
+ if (howmany < 0) {
+ return PAM_SUCCESS;
+ }
+
+ if (oldpass == NULL) {
+ return PAM_SUCCESS;
+ }
+
+ oldmask = umask(077);
+
+#ifdef WITH_SELINUX
+ if (SELINUX_ENABLED) {
+ security_context_t passwd_context=NULL;
+ if (getfilecon("/etc/passwd",&passwd_context)<0) {
+ return PAM_AUTHTOK_ERR;
+ };
+ if (getfscreatecon(&prev_context)<0) {
+ freecon(passwd_context);
+ return PAM_AUTHTOK_ERR;
+ }
+ if (setfscreatecon(passwd_context)) {
+ freecon(passwd_context);
+ freecon(prev_context);
+ return PAM_AUTHTOK_ERR;
+ }
+ freecon(passwd_context);
+ }
+#endif
+ pwfile = fopen(OPW_TMPFILE, "w");
+ umask(oldmask);
+ if (pwfile == NULL) {
+ err = 1;
+ goto done;
+ }
+
+ opwfile = fopen(OLD_PASSWORDS_FILE, "r");
+ if (opwfile == NULL) {
+ fclose(pwfile);
+ err = 1;
+ goto done;
+ }
+
+ if (fstat(fileno(opwfile), &st) == -1) {
+ fclose(opwfile);
+ fclose(pwfile);
+ err = 1;
+ goto done;
+ }
+
+ if (fchown(fileno(pwfile), st.st_uid, st.st_gid) == -1) {
+ fclose(opwfile);
+ fclose(pwfile);
+ err = 1;
+ goto done;
+ }
+ if (fchmod(fileno(pwfile), st.st_mode) == -1) {
+ fclose(opwfile);
+ fclose(pwfile);
+ err = 1;
+ goto done;
+ }
+
+ while (fgets(buf, 16380, opwfile)) {
+ if (!strncmp(buf, forwho, strlen(forwho))) {
+ char *sptr = NULL;
+ found = 1;
+ if (howmany == 0)
+ continue;
+ buf[strlen(buf) - 1] = '\0';
+ s_luser = strtok_r(buf, ":", &sptr);
+ s_uid = strtok_r(NULL, ":", &sptr);
+ s_npas = strtok_r(NULL, ":", &sptr);
+ s_pas = strtok_r(NULL, ":", &sptr);
+ npas = strtol(s_npas, NULL, 10) + 1;
+ while (npas > howmany) {
+ s_pas = strpbrk(s_pas, ",");
+ if (s_pas != NULL)
+ s_pas++;
+ npas--;
+ }
+ pass = crypt_md5_wrapper(oldpass);
+ if (s_pas == NULL)
+ snprintf(nbuf, sizeof(nbuf), "%s:%s:%d:%s\n",
+ s_luser, s_uid, npas, pass);
+ else
+ snprintf(nbuf, sizeof(nbuf),"%s:%s:%d:%s,%s\n",
+ s_luser, s_uid, npas, s_pas, pass);
+ _pam_delete(pass);
+ if (fputs(nbuf, pwfile) < 0) {
+ err = 1;
+ break;
+ }
+ } else if (fputs(buf, pwfile) < 0) {
+ err = 1;
+ break;
+ }
+ }
+ fclose(opwfile);
+
+ if (!found) {
+ pwd = getpwnam(forwho);
+ if (pwd == NULL) {
+ err = 1;
+ } else {
+ pass = crypt_md5_wrapper(oldpass);
+ snprintf(nbuf, sizeof(nbuf), "%s:%lu:1:%s\n",
+ forwho, (unsigned long)pwd->pw_uid, pass);
+ _pam_delete(pass);
+ if (fputs(nbuf, pwfile) < 0) {
+ err = 1;
+ }
+ }
+ }
+
+ if (fclose(pwfile)) {
+ D(("error writing entries to old passwords file: %m"));
+ err = 1;
+ }
+
+done:
+ if (!err) {
+ if (rename(OPW_TMPFILE, OLD_PASSWORDS_FILE))
+ err = 1;
+ }
+#ifdef WITH_SELINUX
+ if (SELINUX_ENABLED) {
+ if (setfscreatecon(prev_context)) {
+ err = 1;
+ }
+ if (prev_context)
+ freecon(prev_context);
+ prev_context=NULL;
+ }
+#endif
+ if (!err) {
+ return PAM_SUCCESS;
+ } else {
+ unlink(OPW_TMPFILE);
+ return PAM_AUTHTOK_ERR;
+ }
+}
+
+#ifdef HELPER_COMPILE
+int
+unix_update_passwd(const char *forwho, const char *towhat)
+#else
+int
+unix_update_passwd(pam_handle_t *pamh, const char *forwho, const char *towhat)
+#endif
+{
+ struct passwd *tmpent = NULL;
+ struct stat st;
+ FILE *pwfile, *opwfile;
+ int err = 1;
+ int oldmask;
+ security_context_t prev_context=NULL;
+
+ oldmask = umask(077);
+#ifdef WITH_SELINUX
+ if (SELINUX_ENABLED) {
+ security_context_t passwd_context=NULL;
+ if (getfilecon("/etc/passwd",&passwd_context)<0) {
+ return PAM_AUTHTOK_ERR;
+ };
+ if (getfscreatecon(&prev_context)<0) {
+ freecon(passwd_context);
+ return PAM_AUTHTOK_ERR;
+ }
+ if (setfscreatecon(passwd_context)) {
+ freecon(passwd_context);
+ freecon(prev_context);
+ return PAM_AUTHTOK_ERR;
+ }
+ freecon(passwd_context);
+ }
+#endif
+ pwfile = fopen(PW_TMPFILE, "w");
+ umask(oldmask);
+ if (pwfile == NULL) {
+ err = 1;
+ goto done;
+ }
+
+ opwfile = fopen("/etc/passwd", "r");
+ if (opwfile == NULL) {
+ fclose(pwfile);
+ err = 1;
+ goto done;
+ }
+
+ if (fstat(fileno(opwfile), &st) == -1) {
+ fclose(opwfile);
+ fclose(pwfile);
+ err = 1;
+ goto done;
+ }
+
+ if (fchown(fileno(pwfile), st.st_uid, st.st_gid) == -1) {
+ fclose(opwfile);
+ fclose(pwfile);
+ err = 1;
+ goto done;
+ }
+ if (fchmod(fileno(pwfile), st.st_mode) == -1) {
+ fclose(opwfile);
+ fclose(pwfile);
+ err = 1;
+ goto done;
+ }
+
+ tmpent = fgetpwent(opwfile);
+ while (tmpent) {
+ if (!strcmp(tmpent->pw_name, forwho)) {
+ /* To shut gcc up */
+ union {
+ const char *const_charp;
+ char *charp;
+ } assigned_passwd;
+ assigned_passwd.const_charp = towhat;
+
+ tmpent->pw_passwd = assigned_passwd.charp;
+ err = 0;
+ }
+ if (putpwent(tmpent, pwfile)) {
+ D(("error writing entry to password file: %m"));
+ err = 1;
+ break;
+ }
+ tmpent = fgetpwent(opwfile);
+ }
+ fclose(opwfile);
+
+ if (fclose(pwfile)) {
+ D(("error writing entries to password file: %m"));
+ err = 1;
+ }
+
+done:
+ if (!err) {
+ if (!rename(PW_TMPFILE, "/etc/passwd"))
+#ifdef HELPER_COMPILE
+ helper_log_err(
+#else
+ pam_syslog(pamh,
+#endif
+ LOG_NOTICE, "password changed for %s", forwho);
+ else
+ err = 1;
+ }
+#ifdef WITH_SELINUX
+ if (SELINUX_ENABLED) {
+ if (setfscreatecon(prev_context)) {
+ err = 1;
+ }
+ if (prev_context)
+ freecon(prev_context);
+ prev_context=NULL;
+ }
+#endif
+ if (!err) {
+ return PAM_SUCCESS;
+ } else {
+ unlink(PW_TMPFILE);
+ return PAM_AUTHTOK_ERR;
+ }
+}
+
+#ifdef HELPER_COMPILE
+int
+unix_update_shadow(const char *forwho, char *towhat)
+#else
+int
+unix_update_shadow(pam_handle_t *pamh, const char *forwho, char *towhat)
+#endif
+{
+ struct spwd *spwdent = NULL, *stmpent = NULL;
+ struct stat st;
+ FILE *pwfile, *opwfile;
+ int err = 1;
+ int oldmask;
+ security_context_t prev_context=NULL;
+
+ spwdent = getspnam(forwho);
+ if (spwdent == NULL) {
+ return PAM_USER_UNKNOWN;
+ }
+ oldmask = umask(077);
+
+#ifdef WITH_SELINUX
+ if (SELINUX_ENABLED) {
+ security_context_t shadow_context=NULL;
+ if (getfilecon("/etc/shadow",&shadow_context)<0) {
+ return PAM_AUTHTOK_ERR;
+ };
+ if (getfscreatecon(&prev_context)<0) {
+ freecon(shadow_context);
+ return PAM_AUTHTOK_ERR;
+ }
+ if (setfscreatecon(shadow_context)) {
+ freecon(shadow_context);
+ freecon(prev_context);
+ return PAM_AUTHTOK_ERR;
+ }
+ freecon(shadow_context);
+ }
+#endif
+ pwfile = fopen(SH_TMPFILE, "w");
+ umask(oldmask);
+ if (pwfile == NULL) {
+ err = 1;
+ goto done;
+ }
+
+ opwfile = fopen("/etc/shadow", "r");
+ if (opwfile == NULL) {
+ fclose(pwfile);
+ err = 1;
+ goto done;
+ }
+
+ if (fstat(fileno(opwfile), &st) == -1) {
+ fclose(opwfile);
+ fclose(pwfile);
+ err = 1;
+ goto done;
+ }
+
+ if (fchown(fileno(pwfile), st.st_uid, st.st_gid) == -1) {
+ fclose(opwfile);
+ fclose(pwfile);
+ err = 1;
+ goto done;
+ }
+ if (fchmod(fileno(pwfile), st.st_mode) == -1) {
+ fclose(opwfile);
+ fclose(pwfile);
+ err = 1;
+ goto done;
+ }
+
+ stmpent = fgetspent(opwfile);
+ while (stmpent) {
+
+ if (!strcmp(stmpent->sp_namp, forwho)) {
+ stmpent->sp_pwdp = towhat;
+ stmpent->sp_lstchg = time(NULL) / (60 * 60 * 24);
+ err = 0;
+ D(("Set password %s for %s", stmpent->sp_pwdp, forwho));
+ }
+
+ if (putspent(stmpent, pwfile)) {
+ D(("error writing entry to shadow file: %m"));
+ err = 1;
+ break;
+ }
+
+ stmpent = fgetspent(opwfile);
+ }
+ fclose(opwfile);
+
+ if (fclose(pwfile)) {
+ D(("error writing entries to shadow file: %m"));
+ err = 1;
+ }
+
+ done:
+ if (!err) {
+ if (!rename(SH_TMPFILE, "/etc/shadow"))
+#ifdef HELPER_COMPILE
+ helper_log_err(
+#else
+ pam_syslog(pamh,
+#endif
+ LOG_NOTICE, "password changed for %s", forwho);
+ else
+ err = 1;
+ }
+
+#ifdef WITH_SELINUX
+ if (SELINUX_ENABLED) {
+ if (setfscreatecon(prev_context)) {
+ err = 1;
+ }
+ if (prev_context)
+ freecon(prev_context);
+ prev_context=NULL;
+ }
+#endif
+
+ if (!err) {
+ return PAM_SUCCESS;
+ } else {
+ unlink(SH_TMPFILE);
+ return PAM_AUTHTOK_ERR;
+ }
+}
+
+#ifdef HELPER_COMPILE
+
+int
+helper_verify_password(const char *name, const char *p, int nullok)
+{
+ struct passwd *pwd = NULL;
+ char *salt = NULL;
+ int retval;
+
+ retval = get_pwd_hash(name, &pwd, &salt);
+
+ if (pwd == NULL || salt == NULL) {
+ helper_log_err(LOG_WARNING, "check pass; user unknown");
+ retval = PAM_USER_UNKNOWN;
+ } else {
+ retval = verify_pwd_hash(p, salt, nullok);
+ }
+
+ if (salt) {
+ _pam_overwrite(salt);
+ _pam_drop(salt);
+ }
+
+ p = NULL; /* no longer needed here */
+
+ return retval;
+}
+
+void
+helper_log_err(int err, const char *format, ...)
+{
+ va_list args;
+
+ va_start(args, format);
+ openlog(HELPER_COMPILE, LOG_CONS | LOG_PID, LOG_AUTHPRIV);
+ vsyslog(err, format, args);
+ va_end(args);
+ closelog();
+}
+
+static void
+su_sighandler(int sig)
+{
+#ifndef SA_RESETHAND
+ /* emulate the behaviour of the SA_RESETHAND flag */
+ if ( sig == SIGILL || sig == SIGTRAP || sig == SIGBUS || sig = SIGSERV )
+ signal(sig, SIG_DFL);
+#endif
+ if (sig > 0) {
+ _exit(sig);
+ }
+}
+
+void
+setup_signals(void)
+{
+ struct sigaction action; /* posix signal structure */
+
+ /*
+ * Setup signal handlers
+ */
+ (void) memset((void *) &action, 0, sizeof(action));
+ action.sa_handler = su_sighandler;
+#ifdef SA_RESETHAND
+ action.sa_flags = SA_RESETHAND;
+#endif
+ (void) sigaction(SIGILL, &action, NULL);
+ (void) sigaction(SIGTRAP, &action, NULL);
+ (void) sigaction(SIGBUS, &action, NULL);
+ (void) sigaction(SIGSEGV, &action, NULL);
+ action.sa_handler = SIG_IGN;
+ action.sa_flags = 0;
+ (void) sigaction(SIGTERM, &action, NULL);
+ (void) sigaction(SIGHUP, &action, NULL);
+ (void) sigaction(SIGINT, &action, NULL);
+ (void) sigaction(SIGQUIT, &action, NULL);
+}
+
+char *
+getuidname(uid_t uid)
+{
+ struct passwd *pw;
+ static char username[256];
+
+ pw = getpwuid(uid);
+ if (pw == NULL)
+ return NULL;
+
+ strncpy(username, pw->pw_name, sizeof(username));
+ username[sizeof(username) - 1] = '\0';
+
+ return username;
+}
+
+int
+read_passwords(int fd, int npass, char **passwords)
+{
+ int rbytes = 0;
+ int offset = 0;
+ int i = 0;
+ char *pptr;
+ while (npass > 0) {
+ rbytes = read(fd, passwords[i]+offset, MAXPASS-offset);
+
+ if (rbytes < 0) {
+ if (errno == EINTR) continue;
+ break;
+ }
+ if (rbytes == 0)
+ break;
+
+ while (npass > 0 && (pptr=memchr(passwords[i]+offset, '\0', rbytes))
+ != NULL) {
+ rbytes -= pptr - (passwords[i]+offset) + 1;
+ i++;
+ offset = 0;
+ npass--;
+ if (rbytes > 0) {
+ if (npass > 0)
+ memcpy(passwords[i], pptr+1, rbytes);
+ memset(pptr+1, '\0', rbytes);
+ }
+ }
+ offset += rbytes;
+ }
+
+ /* clear up */
+ if (offset > 0 && npass > 0) {
+ memset(passwords[i], '\0', offset);
+ }
+
+ return i;
+}
+
+#endif
/* ****************************************************************** *
* Copyright (c) Jan Rêkorajski 1999.
* Copyright (c) Andrew G. Morgan 1996-8.
* Copyright (c) Alex O. Yuriev, 1996.
* Copyright (c) Cristian Gafton 1996.
- * Copyright (c) Red Hat, Inc. 2007.
+ * Copyright (c) Red Hat, Inc. 1996, 2007, 2008.
*
* Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
* modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
diff --git a/modules/pam_unix/passverify.h b/modules/pam_unix/passverify.h
index a3ae9210..196e0e33 100644
--- a/modules/pam_unix/passverify.h
+++ b/modules/pam_unix/passverify.h
@@ -1,11 +1,92 @@
/*
* Copyright information at end of file.
*/
+
+#include <sys/types.h>
+#include <pwd.h>
+#include <security/pam_modules.h>
+
+#define PAM_UNIX_RUN_HELPER PAM_CRED_INSUFFICIENT
+
+#define MAXPASS 200 /* the maximum length of a password */
+
+#define OLD_PASSWORDS_FILE "/etc/security/opasswd"
+
int
verify_pwd_hash(const char *p, const char *hash, unsigned int nullok);
int
-_unix_shadowed(const struct passwd *pwd);
+is_pwd_shadowed(const struct passwd *pwd);
+
+char *
+crypt_md5_wrapper(const char *pass_new);
+
+char *
+create_password_hash(const char *password, unsigned int ctrl, int rounds);
+
+int
+unix_selinux_confined(void);
+
+int
+lock_pwdf(void);
+
+void
+unlock_pwdf(void);
+
+int
+save_old_password(const char *forwho, const char *oldpass,
+ int howmany);
+
+#ifdef HELPER_COMPILE
+void
+helper_log_err(int err, const char *format,...);
+
+int
+helper_verify_password(const char *name, const char *p, int nullok);
+
+void
+setup_signals(void);
+
+char *
+getuidname(uid_t uid);
+
+int
+read_passwords(int fd, int npass, char **passwords);
+
+int
+get_account_info(const char *name,
+ struct passwd **pwd, struct spwd **spwdent);
+
+int
+get_pwd_hash(const char *name,
+ struct passwd **pwd, char **hash);
+
+int
+check_shadow_expiry(struct spwd *spent, int *daysleft);
+
+int
+unix_update_passwd(const char *forwho, const char *towhat);
+
+int
+unix_update_shadow(const char *forwho, char *towhat);
+#else
+int
+get_account_info(pam_handle_t *pamh, const char *name,
+ struct passwd **pwd, struct spwd **spwdent);
+
+int
+get_pwd_hash(pam_handle_t *pamh, const char *name,
+ struct passwd **pwd, char **hash);
+
+int
+check_shadow_expiry(pam_handle_t *pamh, struct spwd *spent, int *daysleft);
+
+int
+unix_update_passwd(pam_handle_t *pamh, const char *forwho, const char *towhat);
+
+int
+unix_update_shadow(pam_handle_t *pamh, const char *forwho, char *towhat);
+#endif
/* ****************************************************************** *
* Copyright (c) Red Hat, Inc. 2007.
diff --git a/modules/pam_unix/support.c b/modules/pam_unix/support.c
index 60acc958..b82cad26 100644
--- a/modules/pam_unix/support.c
+++ b/modules/pam_unix/support.c
@@ -52,8 +52,8 @@ int _make_remark(pam_handle_t * pamh, unsigned int ctrl,
* set the control flags for the UNIX module.
*/
-int _set_ctrl(pam_handle_t *pamh, int flags, int *remember, int argc,
- const char **argv)
+int _set_ctrl(pam_handle_t *pamh, int flags, int *remember, int *rounds,
+ int argc, const char **argv)
{
unsigned int ctrl;
@@ -109,6 +109,16 @@ int _set_ctrl(pam_handle_t *pamh, int flags, int *remember, int argc,
*remember = 400;
}
}
+ if (rounds != NULL) {
+ if (j == UNIX_ALGO_ROUNDS) {
+ *rounds = strtol(*argv + 7, NULL, 10);
+ if ((*rounds < 1000) || (*rounds == INT_MAX))
+ /* don't care about bogus values */
+ unset(UNIX_ALGO_ROUNDS, ctrl);
+ if (*rounds >= 10000000)
+ *rounds = 9999999;
+ }
+ }
}
++argv; /* step to next argument */
@@ -376,95 +386,6 @@ int _unix_comesfromsource(pam_handle_t *pamh,
}
/*
- * _unix_blankpasswd() is a quick check for a blank password
- *
- * returns TRUE if user does not have a password
- * - to avoid prompting for one in such cases (CG)
- */
-
-int
-_unix_blankpasswd (pam_handle_t *pamh, unsigned int ctrl, const char *name)
-{
- struct passwd *pwd = NULL;
- struct spwd *spwdent = NULL;
- char *salt = NULL;
- int retval;
-
- D(("called"));
-
- /*
- * This function does not have to be too smart if something goes
- * wrong, return FALSE and let this case to be treated somewhere
- * else (CG)
- */
-
- if (on(UNIX__NONULL, ctrl))
- return 0; /* will fail but don't let on yet */
-
- /* UNIX passwords area */
-
- /* Get password file entry... */
- pwd = pam_modutil_getpwnam (pamh, name);
-
- if (pwd != NULL) {
- if (strcmp( pwd->pw_passwd, "*NP*" ) == 0)
- { /* NIS+ */
- uid_t save_euid, save_uid;
-
- save_euid = geteuid();
- save_uid = getuid();
- if (save_uid == pwd->pw_uid)
- setreuid( save_euid, save_uid );
- else {
- setreuid( 0, -1 );
- if (setreuid( -1, pwd->pw_uid ) == -1) {
- setreuid( -1, 0 );
- setreuid( 0, -1 );
- if(setreuid( -1, pwd->pw_uid ) == -1)
- /* Will fail elsewhere. */
- return 0;
- }
- }
-
- spwdent = pam_modutil_getspnam (pamh, name);
- if (save_uid == pwd->pw_uid)
- setreuid( save_uid, save_euid );
- else {
- if (setreuid( -1, 0 ) == -1)
- setreuid( save_uid, -1 );
- setreuid( -1, save_euid );
- }
- } else if (_unix_shadowed(pwd)) {
- /*
- * ...and shadow password file entry for this user,
- * if shadowing is enabled
- */
- spwdent = pam_modutil_getspnam(pamh, name);
- }
- if (spwdent)
- salt = x_strdup(spwdent->sp_pwdp);
- else
- salt = x_strdup(pwd->pw_passwd);
- }
- /* Does this user have a password? */
- if (salt == NULL) {
- retval = 0;
- } else {
- if (strlen(salt) == 0)
- retval = 1;
- else
- retval = 0;
- }
-
- /* tidy up */
-
- if (salt)
- _pam_delete(salt);
-
- return retval;
-}
-
-/*
* verify the password of a user
*/
@@ -518,7 +439,7 @@ static int _unix_run_helper_binary(pam_handle_t *pamh, const char *passwd,
}
}
- if (SELINUX_ENABLED && geteuid() == 0) {
+ if (geteuid() == 0) {
/* must set the real uid to 0 so the helper will not error
out if pam is called from setuid binary (su, sudo...) */
setuid(0);
@@ -572,11 +493,65 @@ static int _unix_run_helper_binary(pam_handle_t *pamh, const char *passwd,
return retval;
}
+/*
+ * _unix_blankpasswd() is a quick check for a blank password
+ *
+ * returns TRUE if user does not have a password
+ * - to avoid prompting for one in such cases (CG)
+ */
+
+int
+_unix_blankpasswd (pam_handle_t *pamh, unsigned int ctrl, const char *name)
+{
+ struct passwd *pwd = NULL;
+ char *salt = NULL;
+ int retval;
+
+ D(("called"));
+
+ /*
+ * This function does not have to be too smart if something goes
+ * wrong, return FALSE and let this case to be treated somewhere
+ * else (CG)
+ */
+
+ if (on(UNIX__NONULL, ctrl))
+ return 0; /* will fail but don't let on yet */
+
+ /* UNIX passwords area */
+
+ retval = get_pwd_hash(pamh, name, &pwd, &salt);
+
+ if (retval == PAM_UNIX_RUN_HELPER) {
+ /* salt will not be set here so we can return immediately */
+ if (_unix_run_helper_binary(pamh, NULL, ctrl, name) == PAM_SUCCESS)
+ return 1;
+ else
+ return 0;
+ }
+
+ /* Does this user have a password? */
+ if (salt == NULL) {
+ retval = 0;
+ } else {
+ if (strlen(salt) == 0)
+ retval = 1;
+ else
+ retval = 0;
+ }
+
+ /* tidy up */
+
+ if (salt)
+ _pam_delete(salt);
+
+ return retval;
+}
+
int _unix_verify_password(pam_handle_t * pamh, const char *name
,const char *p, unsigned int ctrl)
{
struct passwd *pwd = NULL;
- struct spwd *spwdent = NULL;
char *salt = NULL;
char *data_name;
int retval;
@@ -595,48 +570,7 @@ int _unix_verify_password(pam_handle_t * pamh, const char *name
D(("locating user's record"));
- /* UNIX passwords area */
- pwd = pam_modutil_getpwnam (pamh, name); /* Get password file entry... */
-
- if (pwd != NULL) {
- if (strcmp( pwd->pw_passwd, "*NP*" ) == 0)
- { /* NIS+ */
- uid_t save_euid, save_uid;
-
- save_euid = geteuid();
- save_uid = getuid();
- if (save_uid == pwd->pw_uid)
- setreuid( save_euid, save_uid );
- else {
- setreuid( 0, -1 );
- if (setreuid( -1, pwd->pw_uid ) == -1) {
- setreuid( -1, 0 );
- setreuid( 0, -1 );
- if(setreuid( -1, pwd->pw_uid ) == -1)
- return PAM_CRED_INSUFFICIENT;
- }
- }
-
- spwdent = pam_modutil_getspnam (pamh, name);
- if (save_uid == pwd->pw_uid)
- setreuid( save_uid, save_euid );
- else {
- if (setreuid( -1, 0 ) == -1)
- setreuid( save_uid, -1 );
- setreuid( -1, save_euid );
- }
- } else if (_unix_shadowed(pwd)) {
- /*
- * ...and shadow password file entry for this user,
- * if shadowing is enabled
- */
- spwdent = pam_modutil_getspnam (pamh, name);
- }
- if (spwdent)
- salt = x_strdup(spwdent->sp_pwdp);
- else
- salt = x_strdup(pwd->pw_passwd);
- }
+ retval = get_pwd_hash(pamh, name, &pwd, &salt);
data_name = (char *) malloc(sizeof(FAIL_PREFIX) + strlen(name));
if (data_name == NULL) {
@@ -646,20 +580,13 @@ int _unix_verify_password(pam_handle_t * pamh, const char *name
strcpy(data_name + sizeof(FAIL_PREFIX) - 1, name);
}
- retval = PAM_SUCCESS;
- if (pwd == NULL || salt == NULL || !strcmp(salt, "x") || ((salt[0] == '#') && (salt[1] == '#') && !strcmp(salt + 2, name))) {
-
- if (pwd != NULL && (geteuid() || SELINUX_ENABLED)) {
- /* we are not root perhaps this is the reason? Run helper */
+ if (retval != PAM_SUCCESS) {
+ if (retval == PAM_UNIX_RUN_HELPER) {
D(("running helper binary"));
retval = _unix_run_helper_binary(pamh, p, ctrl, name);
} else {
D(("user's record unavailable"));
p = NULL;
- if (pwd == NULL)
- retval = PAM_USER_UNKNOWN;
- else
- retval = PAM_AUTHINFO_UNAVAIL;
if (on(UNIX_AUDIT, ctrl)) {
/* this might be a typo and the user has given a password
instead of a username. Careful with this. */
@@ -931,6 +858,7 @@ int _unix_read_password(pam_handle_t * pamh
* Copyright (c) Andrew G. Morgan 1996-8.
* Copyright (c) Alex O. Yuriev, 1996.
* Copyright (c) Cristian Gafton 1996.
+ * Copyright (c) Red Hat, Inc. 2007.
*
* Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
* modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
diff --git a/modules/pam_unix/support.h b/modules/pam_unix/support.h
index 94a9b393..9d4f8b85 100644
--- a/modules/pam_unix/support.h
+++ b/modules/pam_unix/support.h
@@ -84,8 +84,12 @@ typedef struct {
#define UNIX_NOREAP 21 /* don't reap child process */
#define UNIX_BROKEN_SHADOW 22 /* ignore errors reading password aging
* information during acct management */
+#define UNIX_SHA256_PASS 23 /* new password hashes will use SHA256 */
+#define UNIX_SHA512_PASS 24 /* new password hashes will use SHA512 */
+#define UNIX_ALGO_ROUNDS 25 /* optional number of rounds for new
+ password hash algorithms */
/* -------------- */
-#define UNIX_CTRLS_ 23 /* number of ctrl arguments defined */
+#define UNIX_CTRLS_ 26 /* number of ctrl arguments defined */
static const UNIX_Ctrls unix_args[UNIX_CTRLS_] =
@@ -116,6 +120,9 @@ static const UNIX_Ctrls unix_args[UNIX_CTRLS_] =
/* UNIX_REMEMBER_PASSWD */ {"remember=", _ALL_ON_, 02000000},
/* UNIX_NOREAP */ {"noreap", _ALL_ON_, 04000000},
/* UNIX_BROKEN_SHADOW */ {"broken_shadow", _ALL_ON_, 010000000},
+/* UNIX_SHA256_PASS */ {"sha256", _ALL_ON_^(040420000), 020000000},
+/* UNIX_SHA512_PASS */ {"sha512", _ALL_ON_^(020420000), 040000000},
+/* UNIX_ALGO_ROUNDS */ {"rounds=", _ALL_ON_, 0100000000},
};
#define UNIX_DEFAULTS (unix_args[UNIX__NONULL].flag)
@@ -131,8 +138,8 @@ static const UNIX_Ctrls unix_args[UNIX_CTRLS_] =
extern int _make_remark(pam_handle_t * pamh, unsigned int ctrl
,int type, const char *text);
-extern int _set_ctrl(pam_handle_t * pamh, int flags, int *remember, int argc,
- const char **argv);
+extern int _set_ctrl(pam_handle_t * pamh, int flags, int *remember, int *rounds,
+ int argc, const char **argv);
extern int _unix_getpwnam (pam_handle_t *pamh,
const char *name, int files, int nis,
struct passwd **ret);
@@ -150,5 +157,6 @@ extern int _unix_read_password(pam_handle_t * pamh
,const char *data_name
,const void **pass);
-extern struct spwd *_unix_run_verify_binary(pam_handle_t *pamh, unsigned int ctrl, const char *user);
+extern int _unix_run_verify_binary(pam_handle_t *pamh,
+ unsigned int ctrl, const char *user, int *daysleft);
#endif /* _PAM_UNIX_SUPPORT_H */
diff --git a/modules/pam_unix/unix_chkpwd.8 b/modules/pam_unix/unix_chkpwd.8
deleted file mode 100644
index 02ccfe4a..00000000
--- a/modules/pam_unix/unix_chkpwd.8
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1,80 +0,0 @@
-.\" Copyright (C) 2003 International Business Machines Corporation
-.\" This file is distributed according to the GNU General Public License.
-.\" See the file COPYING in the top level source directory for details.
-.\"
-.de Sh \" Subsection
-.br
-.if t .Sp
-.ne 5
-.PP
-\fB\\$1\fR
-.PP
-..
-.de Sp \" Vertical space (when we can't use .PP)
-.if t .sp .5v
-.if n .sp
-..
-.de Ip \" List item
-.br
-.ie \\n(.$>=3 .ne \\$3
-.el .ne 3
-.IP "\\$1" \\$2
-..
-.TH "UNIX_CHKPWD" 8 "2003-03-21" "Linux-PAM 0.76" "Linux-PAM Manual"
-.SH NAME
-unix_chkpwd \- helper binary that verifies the password of the current user
-.SH "SYNOPSIS"
-.ad l
-.hy 0
-
-/sbin/unix_chkpwd [\fIusername\fR]
-.sp
-.ad
-.hy
-.SH "DESCRIPTION"
-.PP
-\fBunix_chkpwd\fR is a helper program for the pam_unix module that verifies
-the password of the current user. It is not intended to be run directly from
-the command line and logs a security violation if done so.
-
-It is typically installed setuid root or setgid shadow.
-
-.SH "OPTIONS"
-.PP
-unix_pwdchk optionally takes the following argument:
-.TP
-\fIusername\fR
-The username of the user whose password you want to check: this must match the current user id.
-
-.SH "INPUTS"
-.PP
-unix_pwdchk expects the following inputs via stdin:
-.TP
-\fIoption\fR
-Either nullok or nonull, depending on whether the user can have an empty password.
-.TP
-\fIpassword\fR
-The password to verify.
-
-.SH "RETURN CODES"
-.PP
-\fBunix_chkpwd\fR has the following return codes:
-.TP
-1
-unix_chkpwd was inappropriately called from the command line or the password is incorrect.
-
-.TP
-0
-The password is correct.
-
-.SH "HISTORY"
-Written by Andrew Morgan
-
-.SH "SEE ALSO"
-
-.PP
-\fBpam\fR(8)
-
-.SH AUTHOR
-Emily Ratliff.
-
diff --git a/modules/pam_unix/unix_chkpwd.8.xml b/modules/pam_unix/unix_chkpwd.8.xml
new file mode 100644
index 00000000..a10dbe33
--- /dev/null
+++ b/modules/pam_unix/unix_chkpwd.8.xml
@@ -0,0 +1,67 @@
+<?xml version="1.0" encoding='UTF-8'?>
+<!DOCTYPE refentry PUBLIC "-//OASIS//DTD DocBook XML V4.3//EN"
+ "http://www.oasis-open.org/docbook/xml/4.3/docbookx.dtd">
+
+<refentry id="unix_chkpwd">
+
+ <refmeta>
+ <refentrytitle>unix_chkpwd</refentrytitle>
+ <manvolnum>8</manvolnum>
+ <refmiscinfo class="sectdesc">Linux-PAM Manual</refmiscinfo>
+ </refmeta>
+
+ <refnamediv id="unix_chkpwd-name">
+ <refname>unix_chkpwd</refname>
+ <refpurpose>Helper binary that verifies the password of the current user</refpurpose>
+ </refnamediv>
+
+ <refsynopsisdiv>
+ <cmdsynopsis id="unix_chkpwd-cmdsynopsis">
+ <command>unix_chkpwd</command>
+ <arg choice="opt">
+ ...
+ </arg>
+ </cmdsynopsis>
+ </refsynopsisdiv>
+
+ <refsect1 id="unix_chkpwd-description">
+
+ <title>DESCRIPTION</title>
+
+ <para>
+ <emphasis>unix_chkpwd</emphasis> is a helper program for the
+ <emphasis>pam_unix</emphasis> module that verifies the
+ password of the current user. It also checks password and account
+ expiration dates in <emphasis>shadow</emphasis>. It is not intended to
+ be run directly from the command line and logs a security violation if
+ done so.
+ </para>
+
+ <para>
+ It is typically installed setuid root or setgid shadow.
+ </para>
+
+ <para>
+ The interface of the helper - command line options, and input/output
+ data format are internal to the <emphasis>pam_unix</emphasis>
+ module and it should not be called directly from applications.
+ </para>
+ </refsect1>
+
+ <refsect1 id='unix_chkpwd-see_also'>
+ <title>SEE ALSO</title>
+ <para>
+ <citerefentry>
+ <refentrytitle>pam_unix</refentrytitle><manvolnum>8</manvolnum>
+ </citerefentry>
+ </para>
+ </refsect1>
+
+ <refsect1 id='unix_chkpwd-author'>
+ <title>AUTHOR</title>
+ <para>
+ Written by Andrew Morgan and other various people.
+ </para>
+ </refsect1>
+
+</refentry>
diff --git a/modules/pam_unix/unix_chkpwd.c b/modules/pam_unix/unix_chkpwd.c
index 1e8944e9..11ac3aac 100644
--- a/modules/pam_unix/unix_chkpwd.c
+++ b/modules/pam_unix/unix_chkpwd.c
@@ -13,7 +13,6 @@
#include "config.h"
-#include <stdarg.h>
#include <stdio.h>
#include <stdlib.h>
#include <string.h>
@@ -25,329 +24,34 @@
#include <shadow.h>
#include <signal.h>
#include <time.h>
-#ifdef WITH_SELINUX
-#include <selinux/selinux.h>
-#define SELINUX_ENABLED (selinux_enabled!=-1 ? selinux_enabled : (selinux_enabled=is_selinux_enabled()>0))
-static security_context_t prev_context=NULL;
-static int selinux_enabled=-1;
-#else
-#define SELINUX_ENABLED 0
-#endif
-
-#define MAXPASS 200 /* the maximum length of a password */
#include <security/_pam_types.h>
#include <security/_pam_macros.h>
#include "passverify.h"
-/* syslogging function for errors and other information */
-
-static void _log_err(int err, const char *format,...)
-{
- va_list args;
-
- va_start(args, format);
- openlog("unix_chkpwd", LOG_CONS | LOG_PID, LOG_AUTHPRIV);
- vsyslog(err, format, args);
- va_end(args);
- closelog();
-}
-
-static void su_sighandler(int sig)
-{
-#ifndef SA_RESETHAND
- /* emulate the behaviour of the SA_RESETHAND flag */
- if ( sig == SIGILL || sig == SIGTRAP || sig == SIGBUS || sig = SIGSERV )
- signal(sig, SIG_DFL);
-#endif
- if (sig > 0) {
- _log_err(LOG_NOTICE, "caught signal %d.", sig);
- exit(sig);
- }
-}
-
-static void setup_signals(void)
-{
- struct sigaction action; /* posix signal structure */
-
- /*
- * Setup signal handlers
- */
- (void) memset((void *) &action, 0, sizeof(action));
- action.sa_handler = su_sighandler;
-#ifdef SA_RESETHAND
- action.sa_flags = SA_RESETHAND;
-#endif
- (void) sigaction(SIGILL, &action, NULL);
- (void) sigaction(SIGTRAP, &action, NULL);
- (void) sigaction(SIGBUS, &action, NULL);
- (void) sigaction(SIGSEGV, &action, NULL);
- action.sa_handler = SIG_IGN;
- action.sa_flags = 0;
- (void) sigaction(SIGTERM, &action, NULL);
- (void) sigaction(SIGHUP, &action, NULL);
- (void) sigaction(SIGINT, &action, NULL);
- (void) sigaction(SIGQUIT, &action, NULL);
-}
-
-static int _verify_account(const char * const uname)
+static int _check_expiry(const char *uname)
{
struct spwd *spent;
struct passwd *pwent;
-
- pwent = getpwnam(uname);
- if (!pwent) {
- _log_err(LOG_ALERT, "could not identify user (from getpwnam(%s))", uname);
- return PAM_USER_UNKNOWN;
- }
-
- spent = getspnam( uname );
- if (!spent) {
- _log_err(LOG_ALERT, "could not get username from shadow (%s))", uname);
- return PAM_AUTHINFO_UNAVAIL; /* Couldn't get username from shadow */
- }
- printf("%ld:%ld:%ld:%ld:%ld:%ld",
- spent->sp_lstchg, /* last password change */
- spent->sp_min, /* days until change allowed. */
- spent->sp_max, /* days before change required */
- spent->sp_warn, /* days warning for expiration */
- spent->sp_inact, /* days before account inactive */
- spent->sp_expire); /* date when account expires */
-
- return PAM_SUCCESS;
-}
-
-static int _unix_verify_password(const char *name, const char *p, int nullok)
-{
- struct passwd *pwd = NULL;
- struct spwd *spwdent = NULL;
- char *salt = NULL;
- int retval = PAM_AUTH_ERR;
-
- /* UNIX passwords area */
- setpwent();
- pwd = getpwnam(name); /* Get password file entry... */
- endpwent();
- if (pwd != NULL) {
- if (_unix_shadowed(pwd)) {
- /*
- * ...and shadow password file entry for this user,
- * if shadowing is enabled
- */
- setspent();
- spwdent = getspnam(name);
- endspent();
- if (spwdent != NULL)
- salt = x_strdup(spwdent->sp_pwdp);
- else
- pwd = NULL;
- } else {
- if (strcmp(pwd->pw_passwd, "*NP*") == 0) { /* NIS+ */
- uid_t save_uid;
-
- save_uid = geteuid();
- seteuid(pwd->pw_uid);
- spwdent = getspnam(name);
- seteuid(save_uid);
-
- salt = x_strdup(spwdent->sp_pwdp);
- } else {
- salt = x_strdup(pwd->pw_passwd);
- }
- }
+ int retval;
+ int daysleft;
+
+ retval = get_account_info(uname, &pwent, &spent);
+ if (retval != PAM_SUCCESS) {
+ helper_log_err(LOG_ALERT, "could not obtain user info (%s)", uname);
+ printf("-1\n");
+ return retval;
}
- if (pwd == NULL || salt == NULL) {
- _log_err(LOG_WARNING, "check pass; user unknown");
- retval = PAM_USER_UNKNOWN;
- } else {
- retval = verify_pwd_hash(p, salt, nullok);
- }
-
- if (salt) {
- _pam_overwrite(salt);
- _pam_drop(salt);
+
+ if (spent == NULL) {
+ printf("-1\n");
+ return retval;
}
- p = NULL; /* no longer needed here */
-
- return retval;
-}
-
-static char *getuidname(uid_t uid)
-{
- struct passwd *pw;
- static char username[32];
-
- pw = getpwuid(uid);
- if (pw == NULL)
- return NULL;
-
- strncpy(username, pw->pw_name, sizeof(username));
- username[sizeof(username) - 1] = '\0';
-
- return username;
-}
-
-#define SH_TMPFILE "/etc/nshadow"
-static int _update_shadow(const char *forwho)
-{
- struct spwd *spwdent = NULL, *stmpent = NULL;
- FILE *pwfile, *opwfile;
- int err = 1;
- int oldmask;
- struct stat st;
- char pass[MAXPASS + 1];
- char towhat[MAXPASS + 1];
- int npass=0;
-
- /* read the password from stdin (a pipe from the pam_unix module) */
-
- npass = read(STDIN_FILENO, pass, MAXPASS);
-
- if (npass < 0) { /* is it a valid password? */
-
- _log_err(LOG_DEBUG, "no password supplied");
- return PAM_AUTHTOK_ERR;
-
- } else if (npass >= MAXPASS) {
-
- _log_err(LOG_DEBUG, "password too long");
- return PAM_AUTHTOK_ERR;
-
- } else {
- /* does pass agree with the official one? */
- int retval=0;
- pass[npass] = '\0'; /* NUL terminate */
- retval = _unix_verify_password(forwho, pass, 0);
- if (retval != PAM_SUCCESS) {
+ retval = check_shadow_expiry(spent, &daysleft);
+ printf("%d\n", daysleft);
return retval;
- }
- }
-
- /* read the password from stdin (a pipe from the pam_unix module) */
-
- npass = read(STDIN_FILENO, towhat, MAXPASS);
-
- if (npass < 0) { /* is it a valid password? */
-
- _log_err(LOG_DEBUG, "no new password supplied");
- return PAM_AUTHTOK_ERR;
-
- } else if (npass >= MAXPASS) {
-
- _log_err(LOG_DEBUG, "new password too long");
- return PAM_AUTHTOK_ERR;
-
- }
-
- towhat[npass] = '\0'; /* NUL terminate */
- spwdent = getspnam(forwho);
- if (spwdent == NULL) {
- return PAM_USER_UNKNOWN;
- }
- oldmask = umask(077);
-
-#ifdef WITH_SELINUX
- if (SELINUX_ENABLED) {
- security_context_t shadow_context=NULL;
- if (getfilecon("/etc/shadow",&shadow_context)<0) {
- return PAM_AUTHTOK_ERR;
- };
- if (getfscreatecon(&prev_context)<0) {
- freecon(shadow_context);
- return PAM_AUTHTOK_ERR;
- }
- if (setfscreatecon(shadow_context)) {
- freecon(shadow_context);
- freecon(prev_context);
- return PAM_AUTHTOK_ERR;
- }
- freecon(shadow_context);
- }
-#endif
- pwfile = fopen(SH_TMPFILE, "w");
- umask(oldmask);
- if (pwfile == NULL) {
- err = 1;
- goto done;
- }
-
- opwfile = fopen("/etc/shadow", "r");
- if (opwfile == NULL) {
- fclose(pwfile);
- err = 1;
- goto done;
- }
-
- if (fstat(fileno(opwfile), &st) == -1) {
- fclose(opwfile);
- fclose(pwfile);
- err = 1;
- goto done;
- }
-
- if (fchown(fileno(pwfile), st.st_uid, st.st_gid) == -1) {
- fclose(opwfile);
- fclose(pwfile);
- err = 1;
- goto done;
- }
- if (fchmod(fileno(pwfile), st.st_mode) == -1) {
- fclose(opwfile);
- fclose(pwfile);
- err = 1;
- goto done;
- }
-
- stmpent = fgetspent(opwfile);
- while (stmpent) {
-
- if (!strcmp(stmpent->sp_namp, forwho)) {
- stmpent->sp_pwdp = towhat;
- stmpent->sp_lstchg = time(NULL) / (60 * 60 * 24);
- err = 0;
- D(("Set password %s for %s", stmpent->sp_pwdp, forwho));
- }
-
- if (putspent(stmpent, pwfile)) {
- D(("error writing entry to shadow file: %m"));
- err = 1;
- break;
- }
-
- stmpent = fgetspent(opwfile);
- }
- fclose(opwfile);
-
- if (fclose(pwfile)) {
- D(("error writing entries to shadow file: %m"));
- err = 1;
- }
-
- done:
- if (!err) {
- if (rename(SH_TMPFILE, "/etc/shadow"))
- err = 1;
- }
-
-#ifdef WITH_SELINUX
- if (SELINUX_ENABLED) {
- if (setfscreatecon(prev_context)) {
- err = 1;
- }
- if (prev_context)
- freecon(prev_context);
- prev_context=NULL;
- }
-#endif
-
- if (!err) {
- return PAM_SUCCESS;
- } else {
- unlink(SH_TMPFILE);
- return PAM_AUTHTOK_ERR;
- }
}
int main(int argc, char *argv[])
@@ -355,9 +59,10 @@ int main(int argc, char *argv[])
char pass[MAXPASS + 1];
char *option;
int npass, nullok;
- int force_failure = 0;
+ int blankpass = 0;
int retval = PAM_AUTH_ERR;
char *user;
+ char *passwords[] = { pass };
/*
* Catch or ignore as many signal as possible.
@@ -374,7 +79,7 @@ int main(int argc, char *argv[])
*/
if (isatty(STDIN_FILENO) || argc != 3 ) {
- _log_err(LOG_NOTICE
+ helper_log_err(LOG_NOTICE
,"inappropriate use of Unix helper binary [UID=%d]"
,getuid());
fprintf(stderr
@@ -386,11 +91,9 @@ int main(int argc, char *argv[])
/*
* Determine what the current user's name is.
- * On a SELinux enabled system with a strict policy leaving the
- * existing check prevents shadow password authentication from working.
* We must thus skip the check if the real uid is 0.
*/
- if (SELINUX_ENABLED && getuid() == 0) {
+ if (getuid() == 0) {
user=argv[1];
}
else {
@@ -404,63 +107,49 @@ int main(int argc, char *argv[])
option=argv[2];
- if (strncmp(argv[2], "verify", 8) == 0) {
- /* Get the account information from the shadow file */
- return _verify_account(argv[1]);
- }
-
- if (strncmp(option, "shadow", 8) == 0) {
- /* Attempting to change the password */
- return _update_shadow(argv[1]);
- }
-
+ if (strcmp(option, "chkexpiry") == 0)
+ /* Check account information from the shadow file */
+ return _check_expiry(argv[1]);
/* read the nullok/nonull option */
- if (strncmp(option, "nullok", 8) == 0)
+ else if (strcmp(option, "nullok") == 0)
nullok = 1;
- else
+ else if (strcmp(option, "nonull") == 0)
nullok = 0;
+ else
+ return PAM_SYSTEM_ERR;
/* read the password from stdin (a pipe from the pam_unix module) */
- npass = read(STDIN_FILENO, pass, MAXPASS);
+ npass = read_passwords(STDIN_FILENO, 1, passwords);
- if (npass < 0) { /* is it a valid password? */
-
- _log_err(LOG_DEBUG, "no password supplied");
-
- } else if (npass >= MAXPASS) {
-
- _log_err(LOG_DEBUG, "password too long");
-
- } else {
- if (npass == 0) {
- /* the password is NULL */
-
- retval = _unix_verify_password(user, NULL, nullok);
-
- } else {
- /* does pass agree with the official one? */
-
- pass[npass] = '\0'; /* NUL terminate */
- retval = _unix_verify_password(user, pass, nullok);
+ if (npass != 1) { /* is it a valid password? */
+ helper_log_err(LOG_DEBUG, "no password supplied");
+ *pass = '\0';
+ }
- }
+ if (*pass == '\0') {
+ blankpass = 1;
}
+ retval = helper_verify_password(user, pass, nullok);
+
memset(pass, '\0', MAXPASS); /* clear memory of the password */
/* return pass or fail */
- if ((retval != PAM_SUCCESS) || force_failure) {
- _log_err(LOG_NOTICE, "password check failed for user (%s)", user);
- return PAM_AUTH_ERR;
+ if (retval != PAM_SUCCESS) {
+ if (!nullok || !blankpass)
+ /* no need to log blank pass test */
+ helper_log_err(LOG_NOTICE, "password check failed for user (%s)", user);
+ return PAM_AUTH_ERR;
} else {
- return PAM_SUCCESS;
+ return PAM_SUCCESS;
}
}
/*
* Copyright (c) Andrew G. Morgan, 1996. All rights reserved
+ * Copyright (c) Red Hat, Inc., 2007,2008. All rights reserved
*
* Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
* modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
diff --git a/modules/pam_unix/unix_update.8.xml b/modules/pam_unix/unix_update.8.xml
new file mode 100644
index 00000000..07695951
--- /dev/null
+++ b/modules/pam_unix/unix_update.8.xml
@@ -0,0 +1,67 @@
+<?xml version="1.0" encoding='UTF-8'?>
+<!DOCTYPE refentry PUBLIC "-//OASIS//DTD DocBook XML V4.3//EN"
+ "http://www.oasis-open.org/docbook/xml/4.3/docbookx.dtd">
+
+<refentry id="unix_update">
+
+ <refmeta>
+ <refentrytitle>unix_update</refentrytitle>
+ <manvolnum>8</manvolnum>
+ <refmiscinfo class="sectdesc">Linux-PAM Manual</refmiscinfo>
+ </refmeta>
+
+ <refnamediv id="unix_update-name">
+ <refname>unix_update</refname>
+ <refpurpose>Helper binary that updates the password of a given user</refpurpose>
+ </refnamediv>
+
+ <refsynopsisdiv>
+ <cmdsynopsis id="unix_update-cmdsynopsis">
+ <command>unix_update</command>
+ <arg choice="opt">
+ ...
+ </arg>
+ </cmdsynopsis>
+ </refsynopsisdiv>
+
+ <refsect1 id="unix_update-description">
+
+ <title>DESCRIPTION</title>
+
+ <para>
+ <emphasis>unix_update</emphasis> is a helper program for the
+ <emphasis>pam_unix</emphasis> module that updates the
+ password of a given user. It is not intended to be run directly
+ from the command line and logs a security violation if done so.
+ </para>
+
+ <para>
+ The purpose of the helper is to enable tighter confinement of
+ login and password changing services. The helper is thus called only
+ when SELinux is enabled and in the enforcing mode on the system.
+ </para>
+
+ <para>
+ The interface of the helper - command line options, and input/output
+ data format are internal to the <emphasis>pam_unix</emphasis>
+ module and it should not be called directly from applications.
+ </para>
+ </refsect1>
+
+ <refsect1 id='unix_update-see_also'>
+ <title>SEE ALSO</title>
+ <para>
+ <citerefentry>
+ <refentrytitle>pam_unix</refentrytitle><manvolnum>8</manvolnum>
+ </citerefentry>
+ </para>
+ </refsect1>
+
+ <refsect1 id='unix_update-author'>
+ <title>AUTHOR</title>
+ <para>
+ Written by Tomas Mraz and other various people.
+ </para>
+ </refsect1>
+
+</refentry>
diff --git a/modules/pam_unix/unix_update.c b/modules/pam_unix/unix_update.c
new file mode 100644
index 00000000..6dc8ace4
--- /dev/null
+++ b/modules/pam_unix/unix_update.c
@@ -0,0 +1,194 @@
+/*
+ * This program is designed to run setuid(root) or with sufficient
+ * privilege to read all of the unix password databases. It is designed
+ * to provide a mechanism for the current user (defined by this
+ * process' uid) to verify their own password.
+ *
+ * The password is read from the standard input. The exit status of
+ * this program indicates whether the user is authenticated or not.
+ *
+ * Copyright information is located at the end of the file.
+ *
+ */
+
+#include "config.h"
+
+#include <stdarg.h>
+#include <stdio.h>
+#include <stdlib.h>
+#include <string.h>
+#include <syslog.h>
+#include <unistd.h>
+#include <sys/types.h>
+#include <sys/stat.h>
+#include <pwd.h>
+#include <shadow.h>
+#include <signal.h>
+#include <time.h>
+#include <sys/time.h>
+#ifdef WITH_SELINUX
+#include <selinux/selinux.h>
+#define SELINUX_ENABLED (selinux_enabled!=-1 ? selinux_enabled : (selinux_enabled=is_selinux_enabled()>0))
+static int selinux_enabled=-1;
+#else
+#define SELINUX_ENABLED 0
+#endif
+
+#include <security/_pam_types.h>
+#include <security/_pam_macros.h>
+
+#include "passverify.h"
+
+static int
+set_password(const char *forwho, const char *shadow, const char *remember)
+{
+ struct passwd *pwd = NULL;
+ int retval;
+ char pass[MAXPASS + 1];
+ char towhat[MAXPASS + 1];
+ int npass = 0;
+ /* we don't care about number format errors because the helper
+ should be called internally only */
+ int doshadow = atoi(shadow);
+ int nremember = atoi(remember);
+ char *passwords[] = { pass, towhat };
+
+ /* read the password from stdin (a pipe from the pam_unix module) */
+
+ npass = read_passwords(STDIN_FILENO, 2, passwords);
+
+ if (npass != 2) { /* is it a valid password? */
+ if (npass == 1) {
+ helper_log_err(LOG_DEBUG, "no new password supplied");
+ memset(pass, '\0', MAXPASS);
+ } else {
+ helper_log_err(LOG_DEBUG, "no valid passwords supplied");
+ }
+ return PAM_AUTHTOK_ERR;
+ }
+
+ if (lock_pwdf() != PAM_SUCCESS)
+ return PAM_AUTHTOK_LOCK_BUSY;
+
+ pwd = getpwnam(forwho);
+
+ if (pwd == NULL) {
+ retval = PAM_USER_UNKNOWN;
+ goto done;
+ }
+
+ /* does pass agree with the official one?
+ we always allow change from null pass */
+ retval = helper_verify_password(forwho, pass, 1);
+ if (retval != PAM_SUCCESS) {
+ goto done;
+ }
+
+ /* first, save old password */
+ if (save_old_password(forwho, pass, nremember)) {
+ retval = PAM_AUTHTOK_ERR;
+ goto done;
+ }
+
+ if (doshadow || is_pwd_shadowed(pwd)) {
+ retval = unix_update_shadow(forwho, towhat);
+ if (retval == PAM_SUCCESS)
+ if (!is_pwd_shadowed(pwd))
+ retval = unix_update_passwd(forwho, "x");
+ } else {
+ retval = unix_update_passwd(forwho, towhat);
+ }
+
+done:
+ memset(pass, '\0', MAXPASS);
+ memset(towhat, '\0', MAXPASS);
+
+ unlock_pwdf();
+
+ if (retval == PAM_SUCCESS) {
+ return PAM_SUCCESS;
+ } else {
+ return PAM_AUTHTOK_ERR;
+ }
+}
+
+int main(int argc, char *argv[])
+{
+ char *option;
+
+ /*
+ * Catch or ignore as many signal as possible.
+ */
+ setup_signals();
+
+ /*
+ * we establish that this program is running with non-tty stdin.
+ * this is to discourage casual use. It does *NOT* prevent an
+ * intruder from repeatadly running this program to determine the
+ * password of the current user (brute force attack, but one for
+ * which the attacker must already have gained access to the user's
+ * account).
+ */
+
+ if (isatty(STDIN_FILENO) || argc != 5 ) {
+ helper_log_err(LOG_NOTICE
+ ,"inappropriate use of Unix helper binary [UID=%d]"
+ ,getuid());
+ fprintf(stderr
+ ,"This binary is not designed for running in this way\n"
+ "-- the system administrator has been informed\n");
+ sleep(10); /* this should discourage/annoy the user */
+ return PAM_SYSTEM_ERR;
+ }
+
+ /* We must be root to read/update shadow.
+ */
+ if (geteuid() != 0) {
+ return PAM_CRED_INSUFFICIENT;
+ }
+
+ option = argv[2];
+
+ if (strcmp(option, "update") == 0) {
+ /* Attempting to change the password */
+ return set_password(argv[1], argv[3], argv[4]);
+ }
+
+ return PAM_SYSTEM_ERR;
+}
+
+/*
+ * Copyright (c) Andrew G. Morgan, 1996. All rights reserved
+ * Copyright (c) Red Hat, Inc., 2007, 2008. All rights reserved
+ *
+ * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
+ * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
+ * are met:
+ * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
+ * notice, and the entire permission notice in its entirety,
+ * including the disclaimer of warranties.
+ * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
+ * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
+ * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
+ * 3. The name of the author may not be used to endorse or promote
+ * products derived from this software without specific prior
+ * written permission.
+ *
+ * ALTERNATIVELY, this product may be distributed under the terms of
+ * the GNU Public License, in which case the provisions of the GPL are
+ * required INSTEAD OF the above restrictions. (This clause is
+ * necessary due to a potential bad interaction between the GPL and
+ * the restrictions contained in a BSD-style copyright.)
+ *
+ * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED ``AS IS'' AND ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED
+ * WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES
+ * OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE ARE
+ * DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT,
+ * INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES
+ * (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR
+ * SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION)
+ * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT,
+ * STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE)
+ * ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED
+ * OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.
+ */