New upstream version 1.0.1

33 files changed, 7064 insertions, 0 deletions

diff --git a/modules/pam_unix/CHANGELOG b/modules/pam_unix/CHANGELOG
new file mode 100644
index 00000000..509ce0a3
--- /dev/null
+++ b/modules/pam_unix/CHANGELOG
@@ -0,0 +1,55 @@
+$Id: CHANGELOG,v 1.1.1.1 2000/06/20 22:12:01 agmorgan Exp $
+
+* Mon Aug 16 1999 Jan R�korajski <baggins@pld.org.pl>
+- fixed reentrancy problems
+
+* Sun Jul  4 21:03:42 PDT 1999
+
+- temporarily removed the crypt16 stuff. I'm really paranoid about
+  crypto stuff and exporting it, and there are a few too many 's-box'
+  references in the code for my liking..
+ 
+* Wed Jun 30 1999 Steve Langasek <vorlon@netexpress.net>
+- further NIS+ fixes
+
+* Sun Jun 27 1999 Steve Langasek <vorlon@netexpress.net>
+- fix to uid-handling code for NIS+
+
+* Sat Jun 26 1999 Jan R�korajski <baggins@mimuw.edu.pl>
+- merged MD5 fix and early failure syslog
+  by Andrey Vladimirovich Savochkin <saw@msu.ru>
+- minor fixes
+- added signal handler to unix_chkpwd
+
+* Fri Jun 25 1999 Stephen Langasek <vorlon@netexpress.net>
+- reorganized the code to let it build as separate C files
+
+* Sun Jun 20 1999 Jan R�korajski <baggins@mimuw.edu.pl>
+- fixes in pam_unix_auth, it incorrectly saved and restored return
+  value when likeauth option was used
+
+* Tue Jun 15 1999 Jan R�korajski <baggins@mimuw.edu.pl>
+- added NIS+ support
+
+* Mon Jun 14 1999 Jan R�korajski <baggins@mimuw.edu.pl>
+- total rewrite based on pam_pwdb module, now there is ONE pam_unix.so
+  module, it accepts the same options as pam_pwdb - all of them correctly ;)
+  (pam_pwdb dosn't understand what DISALLOW_NULL_AUTHTOK means)
+
+* Tue Apr 20 1999 Jan R�korajski <baggins@mimuw.edu.pl>
+- Arghhh, pam_unix_passwd was not updating /etc/shadow when used with
+  pam_cracklib.
+
+* Mon Apr 19 1999 Jan R�korajski <baggins@mimuw.edu.pl>
+- added "remember=XXX" option that means 'remember XXX old passwords'
+  Old passwords are stored in /etc/security/opasswd, there can be
+  maximum of 400 passwords per user.
+
+* Sat Mar 27 1999 Jan R�korajski <baggins@mimuw.edu.pl>
+- added crypt16 to pam_unix_auth and pam_unix_passwd (check only, this algorithm
+  is too lame to use it in real life)
+
+* Sun Mar 21 1999 Jan R�korajski <baggins@mimuw.edu.pl>
+- pam_unix_auth now correctly behave when user has NULL AUTHTOK 
+- pam_unix_auth returns PAM_PERM_DENIED when seteuid fails
+
diff --git a/modules/pam_unix/Makefile.am b/modules/pam_unix/Makefile.am
new file mode 100644
index 00000000..61a3b0ce
--- /dev/null
+++ b/modules/pam_unix/Makefile.am
@@ -0,0 +1,66 @@
+#
+# Copyright (c) 2005, 2006 Thorsten Kukuk <kukuk@suse.de>
+#
+
+CLEANFILES = *~
+
+EXTRA_DIST = README md5.c md5_crypt.c lckpwdf.-c $(MANS) CHANGELOG \
+		tst-pam_unix $(XMLS) 
+
+man_MANS = pam_unix.8 unix_chkpwd.8 unix_update.8
+XMLS = README.xml pam_unix.8.xml unix_chkpwd.8.xml unix_update.8.xml
+
+TESTS = tst-pam_unix
+
+securelibdir = $(SECUREDIR)
+secureconfdir = $(SCONFIGDIR)
+
+AM_CFLAGS = -I$(top_srcdir)/libpam/include -I$(top_srcdir)/libpamc/include \
+	-DCHKPWD_HELPER=\"$(sbindir)/unix_chkpwd\" \
+	-DUPDATE_HELPER=\"$(sbindir)/unix_update\"
+
+if HAVE_LIBSELINUX
+  AM_CFLAGS += -D"WITH_SELINUX"
+endif
+
+pam_unix_la_LDFLAGS = -no-undefined -avoid-version -module
+if HAVE_VERSIONING
+  pam_unix_la_LDFLAGS += -Wl,--version-script=$(srcdir)/../modules.map
+endif
+pam_unix_la_LIBADD = @LIBNSL@ -L$(top_builddir)/libpam -lpam \
+	@LIBCRYPT@ @LIBSELINUX@
+
+securelib_LTLIBRARIES = pam_unix.la
+
+noinst_HEADERS = md5.h support.h yppasswd.h bigcrypt.h passverify.h
+
+sbin_PROGRAMS = unix_chkpwd unix_update
+
+noinst_PROGRAMS = bigcrypt
+
+pam_unix_la_SOURCES = bigcrypt.c pam_unix_acct.c \
+	pam_unix_auth.c pam_unix_passwd.c pam_unix_sess.c support.c \
+	passverify.c yppasswd_xdr.c md5_good.c md5_broken.c
+
+bigcrypt_SOURCES = bigcrypt.c bigcrypt_main.c
+bigcrypt_CFLAGS = $(AM_CFLAGS)
+bigcrypt_LDADD = @LIBCRYPT@
+
+unix_chkpwd_SOURCES = unix_chkpwd.c md5_good.c md5_broken.c bigcrypt.c \
+	passverify.c
+unix_chkpwd_CFLAGS = $(AM_CFLAGS) @PIE_CFLAGS@ -DHELPER_COMPILE=\"unix_chkpwd\"
+unix_chkpwd_LDFLAGS = @PIE_LDFLAGS@ 
+unix_chkpwd_LDADD = @LIBCRYPT@ @LIBSELINUX@
+
+unix_update_SOURCES = unix_update.c md5_good.c md5_broken.c bigcrypt.c \
+	passverify.c
+unix_update_CFLAGS = $(AM_CFLAGS) @PIE_CFLAGS@ -DHELPER_COMPILE=\"unix_update\"
+unix_update_LDFLAGS = @PIE_LDFLAGS@ 
+unix_update_LDADD = @LIBCRYPT@ @LIBSELINUX@
+
+if ENABLE_REGENERATE_MAN
+noinst_DATA = README
+README: pam_unix.8.xml
+-include $(top_srcdir)/Make.xml.rules
+endif
+
diff --git a/modules/pam_unix/Makefile.in b/modules/pam_unix/Makefile.in
new file mode 100644
index 00000000..200a72b6
--- /dev/null
+++ b/modules/pam_unix/Makefile.in
@@ -0,0 +1,974 @@
+# Makefile.in generated by automake 1.10.1 from Makefile.am.
+# @configure_input@
+
+# Copyright (C) 1994, 1995, 1996, 1997, 1998, 1999, 2000, 2001, 2002,
+# 2003, 2004, 2005, 2006, 2007, 2008  Free Software Foundation, Inc.
+# This Makefile.in is free software; the Free Software Foundation
+# gives unlimited permission to copy and/or distribute it,
+# with or without modifications, as long as this notice is preserved.
+
+# This program is distributed in the hope that it will be useful,
+# but WITHOUT ANY WARRANTY, to the extent permitted by law; without
+# even the implied warranty of MERCHANTABILITY or FITNESS FOR A
+# PARTICULAR PURPOSE.
+
+@SET_MAKE@
+
+#
+# Copyright (c) 2005, 2006 Thorsten Kukuk <kukuk@suse.de>
+#
+
+
+
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+EXTRA_DIST = README md5.c md5_crypt.c lckpwdf.-c $(MANS) CHANGELOG \
+		tst-pam_unix $(XMLS) 
+
+man_MANS = pam_unix.8 unix_chkpwd.8 unix_update.8
+XMLS = README.xml pam_unix.8.xml unix_chkpwd.8.xml unix_update.8.xml
+TESTS = tst-pam_unix
+securelibdir = $(SECUREDIR)
+secureconfdir = $(SCONFIGDIR)
+AM_CFLAGS = -I$(top_srcdir)/libpam/include \
+	-I$(top_srcdir)/libpamc/include \
+	-DCHKPWD_HELPER=\"$(sbindir)/unix_chkpwd\" \
+	-DUPDATE_HELPER=\"$(sbindir)/unix_update\" $(am__append_1)
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+	$(am__append_2)
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+	@LIBCRYPT@ @LIBSELINUX@
+
+securelib_LTLIBRARIES = pam_unix.la
+noinst_HEADERS = md5.h support.h yppasswd.h bigcrypt.h passverify.h
+pam_unix_la_SOURCES = bigcrypt.c pam_unix_acct.c \
+	pam_unix_auth.c pam_unix_passwd.c pam_unix_sess.c support.c \
+	passverify.c yppasswd_xdr.c md5_good.c md5_broken.c
+
+bigcrypt_SOURCES = bigcrypt.c bigcrypt_main.c
+bigcrypt_CFLAGS = $(AM_CFLAGS)
+bigcrypt_LDADD = @LIBCRYPT@
+unix_chkpwd_SOURCES = unix_chkpwd.c md5_good.c md5_broken.c bigcrypt.c \
+	passverify.c
+
+unix_chkpwd_CFLAGS = $(AM_CFLAGS) @PIE_CFLAGS@ -DHELPER_COMPILE=\"unix_chkpwd\"
+unix_chkpwd_LDFLAGS = @PIE_LDFLAGS@ 
+unix_chkpwd_LDADD = @LIBCRYPT@ @LIBSELINUX@
+unix_update_SOURCES = unix_update.c md5_good.c md5_broken.c bigcrypt.c \
+	passverify.c
+
+unix_update_CFLAGS = $(AM_CFLAGS) @PIE_CFLAGS@ -DHELPER_COMPILE=\"unix_update\"
+unix_update_LDFLAGS = @PIE_LDFLAGS@ 
+unix_update_LDADD = @LIBCRYPT@ @LIBSELINUX@
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+install-securelibLTLIBRARIES: $(securelib_LTLIBRARIES)
+	@$(NORMAL_INSTALL)
+	test -z "$(securelibdir)" || $(MKDIR_P) "$(DESTDIR)$(securelibdir)"
+	@list='$(securelib_LTLIBRARIES)'; for p in $$list; do \
+	  if test -f $$p; then \
+	    f=$(am__strip_dir) \
+	    echo " $(LIBTOOL) $(AM_LIBTOOLFLAGS) $(LIBTOOLFLAGS) --mode=install $(securelibLTLIBRARIES_INSTALL) $(INSTALL_STRIP_FLAG) '$$p' '$(DESTDIR)$(securelibdir)/$$f'"; \
+	    $(LIBTOOL) $(AM_LIBTOOLFLAGS) $(LIBTOOLFLAGS) --mode=install $(securelibLTLIBRARIES_INSTALL) $(INSTALL_STRIP_FLAG) "$$p" "$(DESTDIR)$(securelibdir)/$$f"; \
+	  else :; fi; \
+	done
+
+uninstall-securelibLTLIBRARIES:
+	@$(NORMAL_UNINSTALL)
+	@list='$(securelib_LTLIBRARIES)'; for p in $$list; do \
+	  p=$(am__strip_dir) \
+	  echo " $(LIBTOOL) $(AM_LIBTOOLFLAGS) $(LIBTOOLFLAGS) --mode=uninstall rm -f '$(DESTDIR)$(securelibdir)/$$p'"; \
+	  $(LIBTOOL) $(AM_LIBTOOLFLAGS) $(LIBTOOLFLAGS) --mode=uninstall rm -f "$(DESTDIR)$(securelibdir)/$$p"; \
+	done
+
+clean-securelibLTLIBRARIES:
+	-test -z "$(securelib_LTLIBRARIES)" || rm -f $(securelib_LTLIBRARIES)
+	@list='$(securelib_LTLIBRARIES)'; for p in $$list; do \
+	  dir="`echo $$p | sed -e 's|/[^/]*$$||'`"; \
+	  test "$$dir" != "$$p" || dir=.; \
+	  echo "rm -f \"$${dir}/so_locations\""; \
+	  rm -f "$${dir}/so_locations"; \
+	done
+pam_unix.la: $(pam_unix_la_OBJECTS) $(pam_unix_la_DEPENDENCIES) 
+	$(pam_unix_la_LINK) -rpath $(securelibdir) $(pam_unix_la_OBJECTS) $(pam_unix_la_LIBADD) $(LIBS)
+
+clean-noinstPROGRAMS:
+	@list='$(noinst_PROGRAMS)'; for p in $$list; do \
+	  f=`echo $$p|sed 's/$(EXEEXT)$$//'`; \
+	  echo " rm -f $$p $$f"; \
+	  rm -f $$p $$f ; \
+	done
+install-sbinPROGRAMS: $(sbin_PROGRAMS)
+	@$(NORMAL_INSTALL)
+	test -z "$(sbindir)" || $(MKDIR_P) "$(DESTDIR)$(sbindir)"
+	@list='$(sbin_PROGRAMS)'; for p in $$list; do \
+	  p1=`echo $$p|sed 's/$(EXEEXT)$$//'`; \
+	  if test -f $$p \
+	     || test -f $$p1 \
+	  ; then \
+	    f=`echo "$$p1" | sed 's,^.*/,,;$(transform);s/$$/$(EXEEXT)/'`; \
+	   echo " $(INSTALL_PROGRAM_ENV) $(LIBTOOL) $(AM_LIBTOOLFLAGS) $(LIBTOOLFLAGS) --mode=install $(sbinPROGRAMS_INSTALL) '$$p' '$(DESTDIR)$(sbindir)/$$f'"; \
+	   $(INSTALL_PROGRAM_ENV) $(LIBTOOL) $(AM_LIBTOOLFLAGS) $(LIBTOOLFLAGS) --mode=install $(sbinPROGRAMS_INSTALL) "$$p" "$(DESTDIR)$(sbindir)/$$f" || exit 1; \
+	  else :; fi; \
+	done
+
+uninstall-sbinPROGRAMS:
+	@$(NORMAL_UNINSTALL)
+	@list='$(sbin_PROGRAMS)'; for p in $$list; do \
+	  f=`echo "$$p" | sed 's,^.*/,,;s/$(EXEEXT)$$//;$(transform);s/$$/$(EXEEXT)/'`; \
+	  echo " rm -f '$(DESTDIR)$(sbindir)/$$f'"; \
+	  rm -f "$(DESTDIR)$(sbindir)/$$f"; \
+	done
+
+clean-sbinPROGRAMS:
+	@list='$(sbin_PROGRAMS)'; for p in $$list; do \
+	  f=`echo $$p|sed 's/$(EXEEXT)$$//'`; \
+	  echo " rm -f $$p $$f"; \
+	  rm -f $$p $$f ; \
+	done
+bigcrypt$(EXEEXT): $(bigcrypt_OBJECTS) $(bigcrypt_DEPENDENCIES) 
+	@rm -f bigcrypt$(EXEEXT)
+	$(bigcrypt_LINK) $(bigcrypt_OBJECTS) $(bigcrypt_LDADD) $(LIBS)
+unix_chkpwd$(EXEEXT): $(unix_chkpwd_OBJECTS) $(unix_chkpwd_DEPENDENCIES) 
+	@rm -f unix_chkpwd$(EXEEXT)
+	$(unix_chkpwd_LINK) $(unix_chkpwd_OBJECTS) $(unix_chkpwd_LDADD) $(LIBS)
+unix_update$(EXEEXT): $(unix_update_OBJECTS) $(unix_update_DEPENDENCIES) 
+	@rm -f unix_update$(EXEEXT)
+	$(unix_update_LINK) $(unix_update_OBJECTS) $(unix_update_LDADD) $(LIBS)
+
+mostlyclean-compile:
+	-rm -f *.$(OBJEXT)
+
+distclean-compile:
+	-rm -f *.tab.c
+
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+
+.c.o:
+@am__fastdepCC_TRUE@	$(COMPILE) -MT $@ -MD -MP -MF $(DEPDIR)/$*.Tpo -c -o $@ $<
+@am__fastdepCC_TRUE@	mv -f $(DEPDIR)/$*.Tpo $(DEPDIR)/$*.Po
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+@am__fastdepCC_FALSE@	$(COMPILE) -c $<
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+.c.obj:
+@am__fastdepCC_TRUE@	$(COMPILE) -MT $@ -MD -MP -MF $(DEPDIR)/$*.Tpo -c -o $@ `$(CYGPATH_W) '$<'`
+@am__fastdepCC_TRUE@	mv -f $(DEPDIR)/$*.Tpo $(DEPDIR)/$*.Po
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+
+.c.lo:
+@am__fastdepCC_TRUE@	$(LTCOMPILE) -MT $@ -MD -MP -MF $(DEPDIR)/$*.Tpo -c -o $@ $<
+@am__fastdepCC_TRUE@	mv -f $(DEPDIR)/$*.Tpo $(DEPDIR)/$*.Plo
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+bigcrypt-bigcrypt.o: bigcrypt.c
+@am__fastdepCC_TRUE@	$(CC) $(DEFS) $(DEFAULT_INCLUDES) $(INCLUDES) $(AM_CPPFLAGS) $(CPPFLAGS) $(bigcrypt_CFLAGS) $(CFLAGS) -MT bigcrypt-bigcrypt.o -MD -MP -MF $(DEPDIR)/bigcrypt-bigcrypt.Tpo -c -o bigcrypt-bigcrypt.o `test -f 'bigcrypt.c' || echo '$(srcdir)/'`bigcrypt.c
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+
+bigcrypt-bigcrypt.obj: bigcrypt.c
+@am__fastdepCC_TRUE@	$(CC) $(DEFS) $(DEFAULT_INCLUDES) $(INCLUDES) $(AM_CPPFLAGS) $(CPPFLAGS) $(bigcrypt_CFLAGS) $(CFLAGS) -MT bigcrypt-bigcrypt.obj -MD -MP -MF $(DEPDIR)/bigcrypt-bigcrypt.Tpo -c -o bigcrypt-bigcrypt.obj `if test -f 'bigcrypt.c'; then $(CYGPATH_W) 'bigcrypt.c'; else $(CYGPATH_W) '$(srcdir)/bigcrypt.c'; fi`
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+bigcrypt-bigcrypt_main.o: bigcrypt_main.c
+@am__fastdepCC_TRUE@	$(CC) $(DEFS) $(DEFAULT_INCLUDES) $(INCLUDES) $(AM_CPPFLAGS) $(CPPFLAGS) $(bigcrypt_CFLAGS) $(CFLAGS) -MT bigcrypt-bigcrypt_main.o -MD -MP -MF $(DEPDIR)/bigcrypt-bigcrypt_main.Tpo -c -o bigcrypt-bigcrypt_main.o `test -f 'bigcrypt_main.c' || echo '$(srcdir)/'`bigcrypt_main.c
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+
+bigcrypt-bigcrypt_main.obj: bigcrypt_main.c
+@am__fastdepCC_TRUE@	$(CC) $(DEFS) $(DEFAULT_INCLUDES) $(INCLUDES) $(AM_CPPFLAGS) $(CPPFLAGS) $(bigcrypt_CFLAGS) $(CFLAGS) -MT bigcrypt-bigcrypt_main.obj -MD -MP -MF $(DEPDIR)/bigcrypt-bigcrypt_main.Tpo -c -o bigcrypt-bigcrypt_main.obj `if test -f 'bigcrypt_main.c'; then $(CYGPATH_W) 'bigcrypt_main.c'; else $(CYGPATH_W) '$(srcdir)/bigcrypt_main.c'; fi`
+@am__fastdepCC_TRUE@	mv -f $(DEPDIR)/bigcrypt-bigcrypt_main.Tpo $(DEPDIR)/bigcrypt-bigcrypt_main.Po
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+
+unix_chkpwd-unix_chkpwd.o: unix_chkpwd.c
+@am__fastdepCC_TRUE@	$(CC) $(DEFS) $(DEFAULT_INCLUDES) $(INCLUDES) $(AM_CPPFLAGS) $(CPPFLAGS) $(unix_chkpwd_CFLAGS) $(CFLAGS) -MT unix_chkpwd-unix_chkpwd.o -MD -MP -MF $(DEPDIR)/unix_chkpwd-unix_chkpwd.Tpo -c -o unix_chkpwd-unix_chkpwd.o `test -f 'unix_chkpwd.c' || echo '$(srcdir)/'`unix_chkpwd.c
+@am__fastdepCC_TRUE@	mv -f $(DEPDIR)/unix_chkpwd-unix_chkpwd.Tpo $(DEPDIR)/unix_chkpwd-unix_chkpwd.Po
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+
+unix_chkpwd-unix_chkpwd.obj: unix_chkpwd.c
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+	for file in $$dist_files; do \
+	  if test -f $$file || test -d $$file; then d=.; else d=$(srcdir); fi; \
+	  if test -d $$d/$$file; then \
+	    dir=`echo "/$$file" | sed -e 's,/[^/]*$$,,'`; \
+	    if test -d $(srcdir)/$$file && test $$d != $(srcdir); then \
+	      cp -pR $(srcdir)/$$file $(distdir)$$dir || exit 1; \
+	    fi; \
+	    cp -pR $$d/$$file $(distdir)$$dir || exit 1; \
+	  else \
+	    test -f $(distdir)/$$file \
+	    || cp -p $$d/$$file $(distdir)/$$file \
+	    || exit 1; \
+	  fi; \
+	done
+check-am: all-am
+	$(MAKE) $(AM_MAKEFLAGS) check-TESTS
+check: check-am
+all-am: Makefile $(LTLIBRARIES) $(PROGRAMS) $(MANS) $(DATA) $(HEADERS)
+installdirs:
+	for dir in "$(DESTDIR)$(securelibdir)" "$(DESTDIR)$(sbindir)" "$(DESTDIR)$(man8dir)"; do \
+	  test -z "$$dir" || $(MKDIR_P) "$$dir"; \
+	done
+install: install-am
+install-exec: install-exec-am
+install-data: install-data-am
+uninstall: uninstall-am
+
+install-am: all-am
+	@$(MAKE) $(AM_MAKEFLAGS) install-exec-am install-data-am
+
+installcheck: installcheck-am
+install-strip:
+	$(MAKE) $(AM_MAKEFLAGS) INSTALL_PROGRAM="$(INSTALL_STRIP_PROGRAM)" \
+	  install_sh_PROGRAM="$(INSTALL_STRIP_PROGRAM)" INSTALL_STRIP_FLAG=-s \
+	  `test -z '$(STRIP)' || \
+	    echo "INSTALL_PROGRAM_ENV=STRIPPROG='$(STRIP)'"` install
+mostlyclean-generic:
+
+clean-generic:
+	-test -z "$(CLEANFILES)" || rm -f $(CLEANFILES)
+
+distclean-generic:
+	-test -z "$(CONFIG_CLEAN_FILES)" || rm -f $(CONFIG_CLEAN_FILES)
+
+maintainer-clean-generic:
+	@echo "This command is intended for maintainers to use"
+	@echo "it deletes files that may require special tools to rebuild."
+clean: clean-am
+
+clean-am: clean-generic clean-libtool clean-noinstPROGRAMS \
+	clean-sbinPROGRAMS clean-securelibLTLIBRARIES mostlyclean-am
+
+distclean: distclean-am
+	-rm -rf ./$(DEPDIR)
+	-rm -f Makefile
+distclean-am: clean-am distclean-compile distclean-generic \
+	distclean-tags
+
+dvi: dvi-am
+
+dvi-am:
+
+html: html-am
+
+info: info-am
+
+info-am:
+
+install-data-am: install-man install-securelibLTLIBRARIES
+
+install-dvi: install-dvi-am
+
+install-exec-am: install-sbinPROGRAMS
+
+install-html: install-html-am
+
+install-info: install-info-am
+
+install-man: install-man8
+
+install-pdf: install-pdf-am
+
+install-ps: install-ps-am
+
+installcheck-am:
+
+maintainer-clean: maintainer-clean-am
+	-rm -rf ./$(DEPDIR)
+	-rm -f Makefile
+maintainer-clean-am: distclean-am maintainer-clean-generic
+
+mostlyclean: mostlyclean-am
+
+mostlyclean-am: mostlyclean-compile mostlyclean-generic \
+	mostlyclean-libtool
+
+pdf: pdf-am
+
+pdf-am:
+
+ps: ps-am
+
+ps-am:
+
+uninstall-am: uninstall-man uninstall-sbinPROGRAMS \
+	uninstall-securelibLTLIBRARIES
+
+uninstall-man: uninstall-man8
+
+.MAKE: install-am install-strip
+
+.PHONY: CTAGS GTAGS all all-am check check-TESTS check-am clean \
+	clean-generic clean-libtool clean-noinstPROGRAMS \
+	clean-sbinPROGRAMS clean-securelibLTLIBRARIES ctags distclean \
+	distclean-compile distclean-generic distclean-libtool \
+	distclean-tags distdir dvi dvi-am html html-am info info-am \
+	install install-am install-data install-data-am install-dvi \
+	install-dvi-am install-exec install-exec-am install-html \
+	install-html-am install-info install-info-am install-man \
+	install-man8 install-pdf install-pdf-am install-ps \
+	install-ps-am install-sbinPROGRAMS \
+	install-securelibLTLIBRARIES install-strip installcheck \
+	installcheck-am installdirs maintainer-clean \
+	maintainer-clean-generic mostlyclean mostlyclean-compile \
+	mostlyclean-generic mostlyclean-libtool pdf pdf-am ps ps-am \
+	tags uninstall uninstall-am uninstall-man uninstall-man8 \
+	uninstall-sbinPROGRAMS uninstall-securelibLTLIBRARIES
+
+@ENABLE_REGENERATE_MAN_TRUE@README: pam_unix.8.xml
+@ENABLE_REGENERATE_MAN_TRUE@-include $(top_srcdir)/Make.xml.rules
+# Tell versions [3.59,3.63) of GNU make to not export all variables.
+# Otherwise a system limit (for SysV at least) may be exceeded.
+.NOEXPORT:
diff --git a/modules/pam_unix/README b/modules/pam_unix/README
new file mode 100644
index 00000000..fb2efab4
--- /dev/null
+++ b/modules/pam_unix/README
@@ -0,0 +1,159 @@
+pam_unix — Module for traditional password authentication
+
+━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━
+
+DESCRIPTION
+
+This is the standard Unix authentication module. It uses standard calls from
+the system's libraries to retrieve and set account information as well as
+authentication. Usually this is obtained from the /etc/passwd and the /etc/
+shadow file as well if shadow is enabled.
+
+The account component performs the task of establishing the status of the
+user's account and password based on the following shadow elements: expire,
+last_change, max_change, min_change, warn_change. In the case of the latter, it
+may offer advice to the user on changing their password or, through the
+PAM_AUTHTOKEN_REQD return, delay giving service to the user until they have
+established a new password. The entries listed above are documented in the
+shadow(5) manual page. Should the user's record not contain one or more of
+these entries, the corresponding shadow check is not performed.
+
+The authentication component performs the task of checking the users
+credentials (password). The default action of this module is to not permit the
+user access to a service if their official password is blank.
+
+A helper binary, unix_chkpwd(8), is provided to check the user's password when
+it is stored in a read protected database. This binary is very simple and will
+only check the password of the user invoking it. It is called transparently on
+behalf of the user by the authenticating component of this module. In this way
+it is possible for applications like xlock(1) to work without being
+setuid-root. The module, by default, will temporarily turn off SIGCHLD handling
+for the duration of execution of the helper binary. This is generally the right
+thing to do, as many applications are not prepared to handle this signal from a
+child they didn't know was fork()d. The noreap module argument can be used to
+suppress this temporary shielding and may be needed for use with certain
+applications.
+
+The password component of this module performs the task of updating the user's
+password.
+
+The session component of this module logs when a user logins or leave the
+system.
+
+Remaining arguments, supported by others functions of this module, are silently
+ignored. Other arguments are logged as errors through syslog(3).
+
+OPTIONS
+
+debug
+
+    Turns on debugging via syslog(3).
+
+audit
+
+    A little more extreme than debug.
+
+nullok
+
+    The default action of this module is to not permit the user access to a
+    service if their official password is blank. The nullok argument overrides
+    this default.
+
+try_first_pass
+
+    Before prompting the user for their password, the module first tries the
+    previous stacked module's password in case that satisfies this module as
+    well.
+
+use_first_pass
+
+    The argument use_first_pass forces the module to use a previous stacked
+    modules password and will never prompt the user - if no password is
+    available or the password is not appropriate, the user will be denied
+    access.
+
+nodelay
+
+    This argument can be used to discourage the authentication component from
+    requesting a delay should the authentication as a whole fail. The default
+    action is for the module to request a delay-on-failure of the order of two
+    second.
+
+use_authtok
+
+    When password changing enforce the module to set the new password to the
+    one provided by a previously stacked password module (this is used in the
+    example of the stacking of the pam_cracklib module documented above).
+
+not_set_pass
+
+    This argument is used to inform the module that it is not to pay attention
+    to/make available the old or new passwords from/to other (stacked) password
+    modules.
+
+nis
+
+    NIS RPC is used for setting new passwords.
+
+remember=n
+
+    The last n passwords for each user are saved in /etc/security/opasswd in
+    order to force password change history and keep the user from alternating
+    between the same password too frequently.
+
+shadow
+
+    Try to maintain a shadow based system.
+
+md5
+
+    When a user changes their password next, encrypt it with the MD5 algorithm.
+
+bigcrypt
+
+    When a user changes their password next, encrypt it with the DEC C2
+    algorithm.
+
+sha256
+
+    When a user changes their password next, encrypt it with the SHA256
+    algorithm. If the SHA256 algorithm is not known to the libcrypt, fall back
+    to MD5.
+
+sha512
+
+    When a user changes their password next, encrypt it with the SHA512
+    algorithm. If the SHA512 algorithm is not known to the libcrypt, fall back
+    to MD5.
+
+rounds=n
+
+    Set the optional number of rounds of the SHA256 and SHA512 password hashing
+    algorithms to n.
+
+broken_shadow
+
+    Ignore errors reading shadow inforation for users in the account management
+    module.
+
+Invalid arguments are logged with syslog(3).
+
+EXAMPLES
+
+An example usage for /etc/pam.d/login would be:
+
+# Authenticate the user
+auth       required   pam_unix.so
+# Ensure users account and password are still active
+account    required   pam_unix.so
+# Change the users password, but at first check the strength
+# with pam_cracklib(8)
+password   required   pam_cracklib.so retry=3 minlen=6 difok=3
+password   required   pam_unix.so use_authtok nullok md5
+session    required   pam_unix.so
+
+
+AUTHOR
+
+pam_unix was written by various people.
+
diff --git a/modules/pam_unix/README.xml b/modules/pam_unix/README.xml
new file mode 100644
index 00000000..7fd340b3
--- /dev/null
+++ b/modules/pam_unix/README.xml
@@ -0,0 +1,41 @@
+<?xml version="1.0" encoding='UTF-8'?>
+<!DOCTYPE article PUBLIC "-//OASIS//DTD DocBook XML V4.3//EN"
+"http://www.docbook.org/xml/4.3/docbookx.dtd"
+[
+<!--
+<!ENTITY pamaccess SYSTEM "pam_unix.8.xml">
+-->
+]>
+
+<article>
+
+  <articleinfo>
+
+    <title>
+      <xi:include xmlns:xi="http://www.w3.org/2001/XInclude"
+      href="pam_unix.8.xml" xpointer='xpointer(//refnamediv[@id = "pam_unix-name"]/*)'/>
+    </title>
+
+  </articleinfo>
+
+  <section>
+    <xi:include xmlns:xi="http://www.w3.org/2001/XInclude"
+      href="pam_unix.8.xml" xpointer='xpointer(//refsect1[@id = "pam_unix-description"]/*)'/>
+  </section>
+
+  <section>
+    <xi:include xmlns:xi="http://www.w3.org/2001/XInclude"
+      href="pam_unix.8.xml" xpointer='xpointer(//refsect1[@id = "pam_unix-options"]/*)'/>
+  </section>
+
+  <section>
+    <xi:include xmlns:xi="http://www.w3.org/2001/XInclude"
+      href="pam_unix.8.xml" xpointer='xpointer(//refsect1[@id = "pam_unix-examples"]/*)'/>
+  </section>
+
+  <section>
+    <xi:include xmlns:xi="http://www.w3.org/2001/XInclude"
+      href="pam_unix.8.xml" xpointer='xpointer(//refsect1[@id = "pam_unix-author"]/*)'/>
+  </section>
+
+</article>
diff --git a/modules/pam_unix/bigcrypt.c b/modules/pam_unix/bigcrypt.c
new file mode 100644
index 00000000..9cd55384
--- /dev/null
+++ b/modules/pam_unix/bigcrypt.c
@@ -0,0 +1,148 @@
+/*
+ * This function implements the "bigcrypt" algorithm specifically for
+ * Linux-PAM.
+ *  
+ * This algorithm is algorithm 0 (default) shipped with the C2 secure
+ * implementation of Digital UNIX.
+ * 
+ * Disclaimer: This work is not based on the source code to Digital
+ * UNIX, nor am I connected to Digital Equipment Corp, in any way
+ * other than as a customer. This code is based on published
+ * interfaces and reasonable guesswork.
+ * 
+ * Description: The cleartext is divided into blocks of SEGMENT_SIZE=8
+ * characters or less. Each block is encrypted using the standard UNIX
+ * libc crypt function. The result of the encryption for one block
+ * provides the salt for the suceeding block.
+ * 
+ * Restrictions: The buffer used to hold the encrypted result is
+ * statically allocated. (see MAX_PASS_LEN below).  This is necessary,
+ * as the returned pointer points to "static data that are overwritten
+ * by each call", (XPG3: XSI System Interface + Headers pg 109), and
+ * this is a drop in replacement for crypt();
+ *
+ * Andy Phillips <atp@mssl.ucl.ac.uk>
+ */
+
+#include "config.h"
+
+#include <string.h>
+#include <stdlib.h>
+#include <security/_pam_macros.h>
+#ifdef HAVE_CRYPT_H
+#include <crypt.h>
+#endif
+
+#include "bigcrypt.h"
+
+/*
+ * Max cleartext password length in segments of 8 characters this
+ * function can deal with (16 segments of 8 chars= max 128 character
+ * password).
+ */
+
+#define MAX_PASS_LEN       16
+#define SEGMENT_SIZE       8
+#define SALT_SIZE          2
+#define KEYBUF_SIZE        ((MAX_PASS_LEN*SEGMENT_SIZE)+SALT_SIZE)
+#define ESEGMENT_SIZE      11
+#define CBUF_SIZE          ((MAX_PASS_LEN*ESEGMENT_SIZE)+SALT_SIZE+1)
+
+char *bigcrypt(const char *key, const char *salt)
+{
+	char *dec_c2_cryptbuf;
+#ifdef HAVE_CRYPT_R
+	struct crypt_data *cdata;
+#endif
+	unsigned long int keylen, n_seg, j;
+	char *cipher_ptr, *plaintext_ptr, *tmp_ptr, *salt_ptr;
+	char keybuf[KEYBUF_SIZE + 1];
+
+	D(("called with key='%s', salt='%s'.", key, salt));
+
+	/* reset arrays */
+	dec_c2_cryptbuf = malloc(CBUF_SIZE);
+	if (!dec_c2_cryptbuf) {
+		return NULL;
+	}
+#ifdef HAVE_CRYPT_R
+	cdata = malloc(sizeof(*cdata));
+	if(!cdata) {
+		free(dec_c2_cryptbuf);
+		return NULL;
+	}
+	cdata->initialized = 0;
+#endif
+	memset(keybuf, 0, KEYBUF_SIZE + 1);
+	memset(dec_c2_cryptbuf, 0, CBUF_SIZE);
+
+	/* fill KEYBUF_SIZE with key */
+	strncpy(keybuf, key, KEYBUF_SIZE);
+
+	/* deal with case that we are doing a password check for a
+	   conventially encrypted password: the salt will be
+	   SALT_SIZE+ESEGMENT_SIZE long. */
+	if (strlen(salt) == (SALT_SIZE + ESEGMENT_SIZE))
+		keybuf[SEGMENT_SIZE] = '\0';	/* terminate password early(?) */
+
+	keylen = strlen(keybuf);
+
+	if (!keylen) {
+		n_seg = 1;
+	} else {
+		/* work out how many segments */
+		n_seg = 1 + ((keylen - 1) / SEGMENT_SIZE);
+	}
+
+	if (n_seg > MAX_PASS_LEN)
+		n_seg = MAX_PASS_LEN;	/* truncate at max length */
+
+	/* set up some pointers */
+	cipher_ptr = dec_c2_cryptbuf;
+	plaintext_ptr = keybuf;
+
+	/* do the first block with supplied salt */
+#ifdef HAVE_CRYPT_R
+	tmp_ptr = crypt_r(plaintext_ptr, salt, cdata);	/* libc crypt_r() */
+#else
+	tmp_ptr = crypt(plaintext_ptr, salt);	/* libc crypt() */
+#endif
+	/* and place in the static area */
+	strncpy(cipher_ptr, tmp_ptr, 13);
+	cipher_ptr += ESEGMENT_SIZE + SALT_SIZE;
+	plaintext_ptr += SEGMENT_SIZE;	/* first block of SEGMENT_SIZE */
+
+	/* change the salt (1st 2 chars of previous block) - this was found
+	   by dowsing */
+
+	salt_ptr = cipher_ptr - ESEGMENT_SIZE;
+
+	/* so far this is identical to "return crypt(key, salt);", if
+	   there is more than one block encrypt them... */
+
+	if (n_seg > 1) {
+		for (j = 2; j <= n_seg; j++) {
+
+#ifdef HAVE_CRYPT_R
+			tmp_ptr = crypt_r(plaintext_ptr, salt_ptr, cdata);
+#else
+			tmp_ptr = crypt(plaintext_ptr, salt_ptr);
+#endif
+
+			/* skip the salt for seg!=0 */
+			strncpy(cipher_ptr, (tmp_ptr + SALT_SIZE), ESEGMENT_SIZE);
+
+			cipher_ptr += ESEGMENT_SIZE;
+			plaintext_ptr += SEGMENT_SIZE;
+			salt_ptr = cipher_ptr - ESEGMENT_SIZE;
+		}
+	}
+	D(("key=|%s|, salt=|%s|\nbuf=|%s|\n", key, salt, dec_c2_cryptbuf));
+
+#ifdef HAVE_CRYPT_R
+	free(cdata);
+#endif
+
+	/* this is the <NUL> terminated encrypted password */
+	return dec_c2_cryptbuf;
+}
diff --git a/modules/pam_unix/bigcrypt.h b/modules/pam_unix/bigcrypt.h
new file mode 100644
index 00000000..a66a96e6
--- /dev/null
+++ b/modules/pam_unix/bigcrypt.h
@@ -0,0 +1 @@
+extern char *bigcrypt(const char *key, const char *salt);
diff --git a/modules/pam_unix/bigcrypt_main.c b/modules/pam_unix/bigcrypt_main.c
new file mode 100644
index 00000000..fab212d9
--- /dev/null
+++ b/modules/pam_unix/bigcrypt_main.c
@@ -0,0 +1,18 @@
+#include <stdio.h>
+#include <string.h>
+
+#include "bigcrypt.h"
+
+int
+main(int argc, char **argv)
+{
+	if (argc < 3) {
+		fprintf(stderr, "Usage: %s password salt\n",
+			strchr(argv[0], '/') ?
+			(strchr(argv[0], '/') + 1) :
+			argv[0]);
+		return 0;
+	}
+	fprintf(stdout, "%s\n", bigcrypt(argv[1], argv[2]));
+	return 0;
+}
diff --git a/modules/pam_unix/lckpwdf.-c b/modules/pam_unix/lckpwdf.-c
new file mode 100644
index 00000000..7145617e
--- /dev/null
+++ b/modules/pam_unix/lckpwdf.-c
@@ -0,0 +1,142 @@
+/*
+ * This is a hack, but until libc and glibc both include this function
+ * by default (libc only includes it if nys is not being used, at the
+ * moment, and glibc doesn't appear to have it at all) we need to have
+ * it here, too.  :-(
+ *
+ * This should not become an official part of PAM.
+ *
+ * BEGIN_HACK
+ */
+
+/*
+ * lckpwdf.c -- prevent simultaneous updates of password files
+ *
+ * Before modifying any of the password files, call lckpwdf().  It may block
+ * for up to 15 seconds trying to get the lock.  Return value is 0 on success
+ * or -1 on failure.  When you are done, call ulckpwdf() to release the lock.
+ * The lock is also released automatically when the process exits.  Only one
+ * process at a time may hold the lock.
+ *
+ * These functions are supposed to be conformant with AT&T SVID Issue 3.
+ *
+ * Written by Marek Michalkiewicz <marekm@i17linuxb.ists.pwr.wroc.pl>,
+ * public domain.
+ */
+
+#include <fcntl.h>
+#include <signal.h>
+#ifdef WITH_SELINUX
+#include <selinux/selinux.h>
+#endif
+
+#define LOCKFILE "/etc/.pwd.lock"
+#define TIMEOUT 15
+
+static int lockfd = -1;
+
+static int set_close_on_exec(int fd)
+{
+	int flags = fcntl(fd, F_GETFD, 0);
+	if (flags == -1)
+		return -1;
+	flags |= FD_CLOEXEC;
+	return fcntl(fd, F_SETFD, flags);
+}
+
+static int do_lock(int fd)
+{
+	struct flock fl;
+
+	memset(&fl, 0, sizeof fl);
+	fl.l_type = F_WRLCK;
+	fl.l_whence = SEEK_SET;
+	return fcntl(fd, F_SETLKW, &fl);
+}
+
+static void alarm_catch(int sig)
+{
+/* does nothing, but fcntl F_SETLKW will fail with EINTR */
+}
+
+static int lckpwdf(void)
+{
+	struct sigaction act, oldact;
+	sigset_t set, oldset;
+
+	if (lockfd != -1)
+		return -1;
+
+#ifdef WITH_SELINUX
+	if(is_selinux_enabled()>0)
+	{
+		lockfd = open(LOCKFILE, O_WRONLY);
+		if(lockfd == -1 && errno == ENOENT)
+		{
+			security_context_t create_context;
+			int rc;
+
+			if(getfilecon("/etc/passwd", &create_context))
+				return -1;
+			rc = setfscreatecon(create_context);
+			freecon(create_context);
+			if(rc)
+				return -1;
+			lockfd = open(LOCKFILE, O_CREAT | O_WRONLY, 0600);
+			if(setfscreatecon(NULL))
+				return -1;
+		}
+	}
+	else
+#endif
+	lockfd = open(LOCKFILE, O_CREAT | O_WRONLY, 0600);
+	if (lockfd == -1)
+		return -1;
+	if (set_close_on_exec(lockfd) == -1)
+		goto cleanup_fd;
+
+	memset(&act, 0, sizeof act);
+	act.sa_handler = alarm_catch;
+	act.sa_flags = 0;
+	sigfillset(&act.sa_mask);
+	if (sigaction(SIGALRM, &act, &oldact) == -1)
+		goto cleanup_fd;
+
+	sigemptyset(&set);
+	sigaddset(&set, SIGALRM);
+	if (sigprocmask(SIG_UNBLOCK, &set, &oldset) == -1)
+		goto cleanup_sig;
+
+	alarm(TIMEOUT);
+	if (do_lock(lockfd) == -1)
+		goto cleanup_alarm;
+	alarm(0);
+	sigprocmask(SIG_SETMASK, &oldset, NULL);
+	sigaction(SIGALRM, &oldact, NULL);
+	return 0;
+
+      cleanup_alarm:
+	alarm(0);
+	sigprocmask(SIG_SETMASK, &oldset, NULL);
+      cleanup_sig:
+	sigaction(SIGALRM, &oldact, NULL);
+      cleanup_fd:
+	close(lockfd);
+	lockfd = -1;
+	return -1;
+}
+
+static int ulckpwdf(void)
+{
+	unlink(LOCKFILE);
+	if (lockfd == -1)
+		return -1;
+
+	if (close(lockfd) == -1) {
+		lockfd = -1;
+		return -1;
+	}
+	lockfd = -1;
+	return 0;
+}
+/* END_HACK */
diff --git a/modules/pam_unix/md5.c b/modules/pam_unix/md5.c
new file mode 100644
index 00000000..7ee9ed00
--- /dev/null
+++ b/modules/pam_unix/md5.c
@@ -0,0 +1,256 @@
+/*
+ * $Id: md5.c,v 1.1.1.1 2000/06/20 22:12:03 agmorgan Exp $
+ *
+ * This code implements the MD5 message-digest algorithm.
+ * The algorithm is due to Ron Rivest.  This code was
+ * written by Colin Plumb in 1993, no copyright is claimed.
+ * This code is in the public domain; do with it what you wish.
+ *
+ * Equivalent code is available from RSA Data Security, Inc.
+ * This code has been tested against that, and is equivalent,
+ * except that you don't need to include two pages of legalese
+ * with every copy.
+ *
+ * To compute the message digest of a chunk of bytes, declare an
+ * MD5Context structure, pass it to MD5Init, call MD5Update as
+ * needed on buffers full of bytes, and then call MD5Final, which
+ * will fill a supplied 16-byte array with the digest.
+ *
+ */
+
+#include <string.h>
+#include "md5.h"
+
+#ifndef HIGHFIRST
+#define byteReverse(buf, len)	/* Nothing */
+#else
+static void byteReverse(unsigned char *buf, unsigned longs);
+
+#ifndef ASM_MD5
+/*
+ * Note: this code is harmless on little-endian machines.
+ */
+static void byteReverse(unsigned char *buf, unsigned longs)
+{
+	uint32 t;
+	do {
+		t = (uint32) ((unsigned) buf[3] << 8 | buf[2]) << 16 |
+		    ((unsigned) buf[1] << 8 | buf[0]);
+		*(uint32 *) buf = t;
+		buf += 4;
+	} while (--longs);
+}
+#endif
+#endif
+
+/*
+ * Start MD5 accumulation.  Set bit count to 0 and buffer to mysterious
+ * initialization constants.
+ */
+void MD5Name(MD5Init)(struct MD5Context *ctx)
+{
+	ctx->buf[0] = 0x67452301U;
+	ctx->buf[1] = 0xefcdab89U;
+	ctx->buf[2] = 0x98badcfeU;
+	ctx->buf[3] = 0x10325476U;
+
+	ctx->bits[0] = 0;
+	ctx->bits[1] = 0;
+}
+
+/*
+ * Update context to reflect the concatenation of another buffer full
+ * of bytes.
+ */
+void MD5Name(MD5Update)(struct MD5Context *ctx, unsigned const char *buf, unsigned len)
+{
+	uint32 t;
+
+	/* Update bitcount */
+
+	t = ctx->bits[0];
+	if ((ctx->bits[0] = t + ((uint32) len << 3)) < t)
+		ctx->bits[1]++;	/* Carry from low to high */
+	ctx->bits[1] += len >> 29;
+
+	t = (t >> 3) & 0x3f;	/* Bytes already in shsInfo->data */
+
+	/* Handle any leading odd-sized chunks */
+
+	if (t) {
+		unsigned char *p = (unsigned char *) ctx->in + t;
+
+		t = 64 - t;
+		if (len < t) {
+			memcpy(p, buf, len);
+			return;
+		}
+		memcpy(p, buf, t);
+		byteReverse(ctx->in, 16);
+		MD5Name(MD5Transform)(ctx->buf, (uint32 *) ctx->in);
+		buf += t;
+		len -= t;
+	}
+	/* Process data in 64-byte chunks */
+
+	while (len >= 64) {
+		memcpy(ctx->in, buf, 64);
+		byteReverse(ctx->in, 16);
+		MD5Name(MD5Transform)(ctx->buf, (uint32 *) ctx->in);
+		buf += 64;
+		len -= 64;
+	}
+
+	/* Handle any remaining bytes of data. */
+
+	memcpy(ctx->in, buf, len);
+}
+
+/*
+ * Final wrapup - pad to 64-byte boundary with the bit pattern 
+ * 1 0* (64-bit count of bits processed, MSB-first)
+ */
+void MD5Name(MD5Final)(unsigned char digest[16], struct MD5Context *ctx)
+{
+	unsigned count;
+	unsigned char *p;
+
+	/* Compute number of bytes mod 64 */
+	count = (ctx->bits[0] >> 3) & 0x3F;
+
+	/* Set the first char of padding to 0x80.  This is safe since there is
+	   always at least one byte free */
+	p = ctx->in + count;
+	*p++ = 0x80;
+
+	/* Bytes of padding needed to make 64 bytes */
+	count = 64 - 1 - count;
+
+	/* Pad out to 56 mod 64 */
+	if (count < 8) {
+		/* Two lots of padding:  Pad the first block to 64 bytes */
+		memset(p, 0, count);
+		byteReverse(ctx->in, 16);
+		MD5Name(MD5Transform)(ctx->buf, (uint32 *) ctx->in);
+
+		/* Now fill the next block with 56 bytes */
+		memset(ctx->in, 0, 56);
+	} else {
+		/* Pad block to 56 bytes */
+		memset(p, 0, count - 8);
+	}
+	byteReverse(ctx->in, 14);
+
+	/* Append length in bits and transform */
+	((uint32 *) ctx->in)[14] = ctx->bits[0];
+	((uint32 *) ctx->in)[15] = ctx->bits[1];
+
+	MD5Name(MD5Transform)(ctx->buf, (uint32 *) ctx->in);
+	byteReverse((unsigned char *) ctx->buf, 4);
+	memcpy(digest, ctx->buf, 16);
+	memset(ctx, 0, sizeof(ctx));	/* In case it's sensitive */
+}
+
+#ifndef ASM_MD5
+
+/* The four core functions - F1 is optimized somewhat */
+
+/* #define F1(x, y, z) (x & y | ~x & z) */
+#define F1(x, y, z) (z ^ (x & (y ^ z)))
+#define F2(x, y, z) F1(z, x, y)
+#define F3(x, y, z) (x ^ y ^ z)
+#define F4(x, y, z) (y ^ (x | ~z))
+
+/* This is the central step in the MD5 algorithm. */
+#define MD5STEP(f, w, x, y, z, data, s) \
+	( w += f(x, y, z) + data,  w = w<<s | w>>(32-s),  w += x )
+
+/*
+ * The core of the MD5 algorithm, this alters an existing MD5 hash to
+ * reflect the addition of 16 longwords of new data.  MD5Update blocks
+ * the data and converts bytes into longwords for this routine.
+ */
+void MD5Name(MD5Transform)(uint32 buf[4], uint32 const in[16])
+{
+	register uint32 a, b, c, d;
+
+	a = buf[0];
+	b = buf[1];
+	c = buf[2];
+	d = buf[3];
+
+	MD5STEP(F1, a, b, c, d, in[0] + 0xd76aa478U, 7);
+	MD5STEP(F1, d, a, b, c, in[1] + 0xe8c7b756U, 12);
+	MD5STEP(F1, c, d, a, b, in[2] + 0x242070dbU, 17);
+	MD5STEP(F1, b, c, d, a, in[3] + 0xc1bdceeeU, 22);
+	MD5STEP(F1, a, b, c, d, in[4] + 0xf57c0fafU, 7);
+	MD5STEP(F1, d, a, b, c, in[5] + 0x4787c62aU, 12);
+	MD5STEP(F1, c, d, a, b, in[6] + 0xa8304613U, 17);
+	MD5STEP(F1, b, c, d, a, in[7] + 0xfd469501U, 22);
+	MD5STEP(F1, a, b, c, d, in[8] + 0x698098d8U, 7);
+	MD5STEP(F1, d, a, b, c, in[9] + 0x8b44f7afU, 12);
+	MD5STEP(F1, c, d, a, b, in[10] + 0xffff5bb1U, 17);
+	MD5STEP(F1, b, c, d, a, in[11] + 0x895cd7beU, 22);
+	MD5STEP(F1, a, b, c, d, in[12] + 0x6b901122U, 7);
+	MD5STEP(F1, d, a, b, c, in[13] + 0xfd987193U, 12);
+	MD5STEP(F1, c, d, a, b, in[14] + 0xa679438eU, 17);
+	MD5STEP(F1, b, c, d, a, in[15] + 0x49b40821U, 22);
+
+	MD5STEP(F2, a, b, c, d, in[1] + 0xf61e2562U, 5);
+	MD5STEP(F2, d, a, b, c, in[6] + 0xc040b340U, 9);
+	MD5STEP(F2, c, d, a, b, in[11] + 0x265e5a51U, 14);
+	MD5STEP(F2, b, c, d, a, in[0] + 0xe9b6c7aaU, 20);
+	MD5STEP(F2, a, b, c, d, in[5] + 0xd62f105dU, 5);
+	MD5STEP(F2, d, a, b, c, in[10] + 0x02441453U, 9);
+	MD5STEP(F2, c, d, a, b, in[15] + 0xd8a1e681U, 14);
+	MD5STEP(F2, b, c, d, a, in[4] + 0xe7d3fbc8U, 20);
+	MD5STEP(F2, a, b, c, d, in[9] + 0x21e1cde6U, 5);
+	MD5STEP(F2, d, a, b, c, in[14] + 0xc33707d6U, 9);
+	MD5STEP(F2, c, d, a, b, in[3] + 0xf4d50d87U, 14);
+	MD5STEP(F2, b, c, d, a, in[8] + 0x455a14edU, 20);
+	MD5STEP(F2, a, b, c, d, in[13] + 0xa9e3e905U, 5);
+	MD5STEP(F2, d, a, b, c, in[2] + 0xfcefa3f8U, 9);
+	MD5STEP(F2, c, d, a, b, in[7] + 0x676f02d9U, 14);
+	MD5STEP(F2, b, c, d, a, in[12] + 0x8d2a4c8aU, 20);
+
+	MD5STEP(F3, a, b, c, d, in[5] + 0xfffa3942U, 4);
+	MD5STEP(F3, d, a, b, c, in[8] + 0x8771f681U, 11);
+	MD5STEP(F3, c, d, a, b, in[11] + 0x6d9d6122U, 16);
+	MD5STEP(F3, b, c, d, a, in[14] + 0xfde5380cU, 23);
+	MD5STEP(F3, a, b, c, d, in[1] + 0xa4beea44U, 4);
+	MD5STEP(F3, d, a, b, c, in[4] + 0x4bdecfa9U, 11);
+	MD5STEP(F3, c, d, a, b, in[7] + 0xf6bb4b60U, 16);
+	MD5STEP(F3, b, c, d, a, in[10] + 0xbebfbc70U, 23);
+	MD5STEP(F3, a, b, c, d, in[13] + 0x289b7ec6U, 4);
+	MD5STEP(F3, d, a, b, c, in[0] + 0xeaa127faU, 11);
+	MD5STEP(F3, c, d, a, b, in[3] + 0xd4ef3085U, 16);
+	MD5STEP(F3, b, c, d, a, in[6] + 0x04881d05U, 23);
+	MD5STEP(F3, a, b, c, d, in[9] + 0xd9d4d039U, 4);
+	MD5STEP(F3, d, a, b, c, in[12] + 0xe6db99e5U, 11);
+	MD5STEP(F3, c, d, a, b, in[15] + 0x1fa27cf8U, 16);
+	MD5STEP(F3, b, c, d, a, in[2] + 0xc4ac5665U, 23);
+
+	MD5STEP(F4, a, b, c, d, in[0] + 0xf4292244U, 6);
+	MD5STEP(F4, d, a, b, c, in[7] + 0x432aff97U, 10);
+	MD5STEP(F4, c, d, a, b, in[14] + 0xab9423a7U, 15);
+	MD5STEP(F4, b, c, d, a, in[5] + 0xfc93a039U, 21);
+	MD5STEP(F4, a, b, c, d, in[12] + 0x655b59c3U, 6);
+	MD5STEP(F4, d, a, b, c, in[3] + 0x8f0ccc92U, 10);
+	MD5STEP(F4, c, d, a, b, in[10] + 0xffeff47dU, 15);
+	MD5STEP(F4, b, c, d, a, in[1] + 0x85845dd1U, 21);
+	MD5STEP(F4, a, b, c, d, in[8] + 0x6fa87e4fU, 6);
+	MD5STEP(F4, d, a, b, c, in[15] + 0xfe2ce6e0U, 10);
+	MD5STEP(F4, c, d, a, b, in[6] + 0xa3014314U, 15);
+	MD5STEP(F4, b, c, d, a, in[13] + 0x4e0811a1U, 21);
+	MD5STEP(F4, a, b, c, d, in[4] + 0xf7537e82U, 6);
+	MD5STEP(F4, d, a, b, c, in[11] + 0xbd3af235U, 10);
+	MD5STEP(F4, c, d, a, b, in[2] + 0x2ad7d2bbU, 15);
+	MD5STEP(F4, b, c, d, a, in[9] + 0xeb86d391U, 21);
+
+	buf[0] += a;
+	buf[1] += b;
+	buf[2] += c;
+	buf[3] += d;
+}
+
+#endif
diff --git a/modules/pam_unix/md5.h b/modules/pam_unix/md5.h
new file mode 100644
index 00000000..103f168a
--- /dev/null
+++ b/modules/pam_unix/md5.h
@@ -0,0 +1,31 @@
+
+#ifndef MD5_H
+#define MD5_H
+
+typedef unsigned int uint32;
+
+struct MD5Context {
+	uint32 buf[4];
+	uint32 bits[2];
+	unsigned char in[64];
+};
+
+void GoodMD5Init(struct MD5Context *);
+void GoodMD5Update(struct MD5Context *, unsigned const char *, unsigned);
+void GoodMD5Final(unsigned char digest[16], struct MD5Context *);
+void GoodMD5Transform(uint32 buf[4], uint32 const in[16]);
+void BrokenMD5Init(struct MD5Context *);
+void BrokenMD5Update(struct MD5Context *, unsigned const char *, unsigned);
+void BrokenMD5Final(unsigned char digest[16], struct MD5Context *);
+void BrokenMD5Transform(uint32 buf[4], uint32 const in[16]);
+
+char *Goodcrypt_md5(const char *pw, const char *salt);
+char *Brokencrypt_md5(const char *pw, const char *salt);
+
+/*
+ * This is needed to make RSAREF happy on some MS-DOS compilers.
+ */
+
+typedef struct MD5Context MD5_CTX;
+
+#endif				/* MD5_H */
diff --git a/modules/pam_unix/md5_broken.c b/modules/pam_unix/md5_broken.c
new file mode 100644
index 00000000..193daebb
--- /dev/null
+++ b/modules/pam_unix/md5_broken.c
@@ -0,0 +1,4 @@
+#define MD5Name(x) Broken##x
+
+#include "md5.c"
+#include "md5_crypt.c"
diff --git a/modules/pam_unix/md5_crypt.c b/modules/pam_unix/md5_crypt.c
new file mode 100644
index 00000000..8b7bc66b
--- /dev/null
+++ b/modules/pam_unix/md5_crypt.c
@@ -0,0 +1,154 @@
+/*
+ * $Id: md5_crypt.c,v 1.2 2001/07/10 20:24:16 vorlon Exp $
+ *
+ * ----------------------------------------------------------------------------
+ * "THE BEER-WARE LICENSE" (Revision 42):
+ * <phk@login.dknet.dk> wrote this file.  As long as you retain this notice you
+ * can do whatever you want with this stuff. If we meet some day, and you think
+ * this stuff is worth it, you can buy me a beer in return.   Poul-Henning Kamp
+ * ----------------------------------------------------------------------------
+ *
+ * Origin: Id: crypt.c,v 1.3 1995/05/30 05:42:22 rgrimes Exp
+ *
+ */
+
+#include <string.h>
+#include <stdlib.h>
+#include "md5.h"
+
+static unsigned char itoa64[] =	/* 0 ... 63 => ascii - 64 */
+"./0123456789ABCDEFGHIJKLMNOPQRSTUVWXYZabcdefghijklmnopqrstuvwxyz";
+
+static void to64(char *s, unsigned long v, int n)
+{
+	while (--n >= 0) {
+		*s++ = itoa64[v & 0x3f];
+		v >>= 6;
+	}
+}
+
+/*
+ * UNIX password
+ *
+ * Use MD5 for what it is best at...
+ */
+
+char *MD5Name(crypt_md5)(const char *pw, const char *salt)
+{
+	const char *magic = "$1$";
+	/* This string is magic for this algorithm.  Having
+	 * it this way, we can get get better later on */
+	char *passwd, *p;
+	const char *sp, *ep;
+	unsigned char final[16];
+	int sl, pl, i, j;
+	MD5_CTX ctx, ctx1;
+	unsigned long l;
+
+	/* Refine the Salt first */
+	sp = salt;
+
+	/* TODO: now that we're using malloc'ed memory, get rid of the
+	   strange constant buffer size. */
+	passwd = malloc(120);
+
+	/* If it starts with the magic string, then skip that */
+	if (!strncmp(sp, magic, strlen(magic)))
+		sp += strlen(magic);
+
+	/* It stops at the first '$', max 8 chars */
+	for (ep = sp; *ep && *ep != '$' && ep < (sp + 8); ep++)
+		continue;
+
+	/* get the length of the true salt */
+	sl = ep - sp;
+
+	MD5Name(MD5Init)(&ctx);
+
+	/* The password first, since that is what is most unknown */
+	MD5Name(MD5Update)(&ctx,(unsigned const char *)pw,strlen(pw));
+
+	/* Then our magic string */
+	MD5Name(MD5Update)(&ctx,(unsigned const char *)magic,strlen(magic));
+
+	/* Then the raw salt */
+	MD5Name(MD5Update)(&ctx,(unsigned const char *)sp,sl);
+
+	/* Then just as many characters of the MD5(pw,salt,pw) */
+	MD5Name(MD5Init)(&ctx1);
+	MD5Name(MD5Update)(&ctx1,(unsigned const char *)pw,strlen(pw));
+	MD5Name(MD5Update)(&ctx1,(unsigned const char *)sp,sl);
+	MD5Name(MD5Update)(&ctx1,(unsigned const char *)pw,strlen(pw));
+	MD5Name(MD5Final)(final,&ctx1);
+	for (pl = strlen(pw); pl > 0; pl -= 16)
+		MD5Name(MD5Update)(&ctx,(unsigned const char *)final,pl>16 ? 16 : pl);
+
+	/* Don't leave anything around in vm they could use. */
+	memset(final, 0, sizeof final);
+
+	/* Then something really weird... */
+	for (j = 0, i = strlen(pw); i; i >>= 1)
+		if (i & 1)
+			MD5Name(MD5Update)(&ctx, (unsigned const char *)final+j, 1);
+		else
+			MD5Name(MD5Update)(&ctx, (unsigned const char *)pw+j, 1);
+
+	/* Now make the output string */
+	strcpy(passwd, magic);
+	strncat(passwd, sp, sl);
+	strcat(passwd, "$");
+
+	MD5Name(MD5Final)(final,&ctx);
+
+	/*
+	 * and now, just to make sure things don't run too fast
+	 * On a 60 Mhz Pentium this takes 34 msec, so you would
+	 * need 30 seconds to build a 1000 entry dictionary...
+	 */
+	for (i = 0; i < 1000; i++) {
+		MD5Name(MD5Init)(&ctx1);
+		if (i & 1)
+			MD5Name(MD5Update)(&ctx1,(unsigned const char *)pw,strlen(pw));
+		else
+			MD5Name(MD5Update)(&ctx1,(unsigned const char *)final,16);
+
+		if (i % 3)
+			MD5Name(MD5Update)(&ctx1,(unsigned const char *)sp,sl);
+
+		if (i % 7)
+			MD5Name(MD5Update)(&ctx1,(unsigned const char *)pw,strlen(pw));
+
+		if (i & 1)
+			MD5Name(MD5Update)(&ctx1,(unsigned const char *)final,16);
+		else
+			MD5Name(MD5Update)(&ctx1,(unsigned const char *)pw,strlen(pw));
+		MD5Name(MD5Final)(final,&ctx1);
+	}
+
+	p = passwd + strlen(passwd);
+
+	l = (final[0] << 16) | (final[6] << 8) | final[12];
+	to64(p, l, 4);
+	p += 4;
+	l = (final[1] << 16) | (final[7] << 8) | final[13];
+	to64(p, l, 4);
+	p += 4;
+	l = (final[2] << 16) | (final[8] << 8) | final[14];
+	to64(p, l, 4);
+	p += 4;
+	l = (final[3] << 16) | (final[9] << 8) | final[15];
+	to64(p, l, 4);
+	p += 4;
+	l = (final[4] << 16) | (final[10] << 8) | final[5];
+	to64(p, l, 4);
+	p += 4;
+	l = final[11];
+	to64(p, l, 2);
+	p += 2;
+	*p = '\0';
+
+	/* Don't leave anything around in vm they could use. */
+	memset(final, 0, sizeof final);
+
+	return passwd;
+}
diff --git a/modules/pam_unix/md5_good.c b/modules/pam_unix/md5_good.c
new file mode 100644
index 00000000..131e4516
--- /dev/null
+++ b/modules/pam_unix/md5_good.c
@@ -0,0 +1,5 @@
+#define HIGHFIRST
+#define MD5Name(x) Good##x
+
+#include "md5.c"
+#include "md5_crypt.c"
diff --git a/modules/pam_unix/pam_unix.8 b/modules/pam_unix/pam_unix.8
new file mode 100644
index 00000000..2f0d0008
--- /dev/null
+++ b/modules/pam_unix/pam_unix.8
@@ -0,0 +1,189 @@
+.\"     Title: pam_unix
+.\"    Author: 
+.\" Generator: DocBook XSL Stylesheets v1.73.1 <http://docbook.sf.net/>
+.\"      Date: 04/16/2008
+.\"    Manual: Linux-PAM Manual
+.\"    Source: Linux-PAM Manual
+.\"
+.TH "PAM_UNIX" "8" "04/16/2008" "Linux-PAM Manual" "Linux\-PAM Manual"
+.\" disable hyphenation
+.nh
+.\" disable justification (adjust text to left margin only)
+.ad l
+.SH "NAME"
+pam_unix - Module for traditional password authentication
+.SH "SYNOPSIS"
+.HP 12
+\fBpam_unix\.so\fR [\.\.\.]
+.SH "DESCRIPTION"
+.PP
+This is the standard Unix authentication module\. It uses standard calls from the system\'s libraries to retrieve and set account information as well as authentication\. Usually this is obtained from the /etc/passwd and the /etc/shadow file as well if shadow is enabled\.
+.PP
+The account component performs the task of establishing the status of the user\'s account and password based on the following
+\fIshadow\fR
+elements: expire, last_change, max_change, min_change, warn_change\. In the case of the latter, it may offer advice to the user on changing their password or, through the
+\fBPAM_AUTHTOKEN_REQD\fR
+return, delay giving service to the user until they have established a new password\. The entries listed above are documented in the
+\fBshadow\fR(5)
+manual page\. Should the user\'s record not contain one or more of these entries, the corresponding
+\fIshadow\fR
+check is not performed\.
+.PP
+The authentication component performs the task of checking the users credentials (password)\. The default action of this module is to not permit the user access to a service if their official password is blank\.
+.PP
+A helper binary,
+\fBunix_chkpwd\fR(8), is provided to check the user\'s password when it is stored in a read protected database\. This binary is very simple and will only check the password of the user invoking it\. It is called transparently on behalf of the user by the authenticating component of this module\. In this way it is possible for applications like
+\fBxlock\fR(1)
+to work without being setuid\-root\. The module, by default, will temporarily turn off SIGCHLD handling for the duration of execution of the helper binary\. This is generally the right thing to do, as many applications are not prepared to handle this signal from a child they didn\'t know was
+\fBfork()\fRd\. The
+\fBnoreap\fR
+module argument can be used to suppress this temporary shielding and may be needed for use with certain applications\.
+.PP
+The password component of this module performs the task of updating the user\'s password\.
+.PP
+The session component of this module logs when a user logins or leave the system\.
+.PP
+Remaining arguments, supported by others functions of this module, are silently ignored\. Other arguments are logged as errors through
+\fBsyslog\fR(3)\.
+.SH "OPTIONS"
+.PP
+\fBdebug\fR
+.RS 4
+Turns on debugging via
+\fBsyslog\fR(3)\.
+.RE
+.PP
+\fBaudit\fR
+.RS 4
+A little more extreme than debug\.
+.RE
+.PP
+\fBnullok\fR
+.RS 4
+The default action of this module is to not permit the user access to a service if their official password is blank\. The
+\fBnullok\fR
+argument overrides this default\.
+.RE
+.PP
+\fBtry_first_pass\fR
+.RS 4
+Before prompting the user for their password, the module first tries the previous stacked module\'s password in case that satisfies this module as well\.
+.RE
+.PP
+\fBuse_first_pass\fR
+.RS 4
+The argument
+\fBuse_first_pass\fR
+forces the module to use a previous stacked modules password and will never prompt the user \- if no password is available or the password is not appropriate, the user will be denied access\.
+.RE
+.PP
+\fBnodelay\fR
+.RS 4
+This argument can be used to discourage the authentication component from requesting a delay should the authentication as a whole fail\. The default action is for the module to request a delay\-on\-failure of the order of two second\.
+.RE
+.PP
+\fBuse_authtok\fR
+.RS 4
+When password changing enforce the module to set the new password to the one provided by a previously stacked
+\fBpassword\fR
+module (this is used in the example of the stacking of the
+\fBpam_cracklib\fR
+module documented above)\.
+.RE
+.PP
+\fBnot_set_pass\fR
+.RS 4
+This argument is used to inform the module that it is not to pay attention to/make available the old or new passwords from/to other (stacked) password modules\.
+.RE
+.PP
+\fBnis\fR
+.RS 4
+NIS RPC is used for setting new passwords\.
+.RE
+.PP
+\fBremember=\fR\fB\fIn\fR\fR
+.RS 4
+The last
+\fIn\fR
+passwords for each user are saved in
+\fI/etc/security/opasswd\fR
+in order to force password change history and keep the user from alternating between the same password too frequently\.
+.RE
+.PP
+\fBshadow\fR
+.RS 4
+Try to maintain a shadow based system\.
+.RE
+.PP
+\fBmd5\fR
+.RS 4
+When a user changes their password next, encrypt it with the MD5 algorithm\.
+.RE
+.PP
+\fBbigcrypt\fR
+.RS 4
+When a user changes their password next, encrypt it with the DEC C2 algorithm\.
+.RE
+.PP
+\fBsha256\fR
+.RS 4
+When a user changes their password next, encrypt it with the SHA256 algorithm\. If the SHA256 algorithm is not known to the libcrypt, fall back to MD5\.
+.RE
+.PP
+\fBsha512\fR
+.RS 4
+When a user changes their password next, encrypt it with the SHA512 algorithm\. If the SHA512 algorithm is not known to the libcrypt, fall back to MD5\.
+.RE
+.PP
+\fBrounds=\fR\fB\fIn\fR\fR
+.RS 4
+Set the optional number of rounds of the SHA256 and SHA512 password hashing algorithms to
+\fIn\fR\.
+.RE
+.PP
+\fBbroken_shadow\fR
+.RS 4
+Ignore errors reading shadow inforation for users in the account management module\.
+.RE
+.PP
+Invalid arguments are logged with
+\fBsyslog\fR(3)\.
+.SH "MODULE SERVICES PROVIDED"
+.PP
+All service are supported\.
+.SH "RETURN VALUES"
+.PP
+PAM_IGNORE
+.RS 4
+Ignore this module\.
+.RE
+.SH "EXAMPLES"
+.PP
+An example usage for
+\fI/etc/pam\.d/login\fR
+would be:
+.sp
+.RS 4
+.nf
+# Authenticate the user
+auth       required   pam_unix\.so
+# Ensure users account and password are still active
+account    required   pam_unix\.so
+# Change the users password, but at first check the strength
+# with pam_cracklib(8)
+password   required   pam_cracklib\.so retry=3 minlen=6 difok=3
+password   required   pam_unix\.so use_authtok nullok md5
+session    required   pam_unix\.so
+      
+.fi
+.RE
+.sp
+.SH "SEE ALSO"
+.PP
+
+\fBpam.conf\fR(5),
+\fBpam.d\fR(8),
+\fBpam\fR(8)
+.SH "AUTHOR"
+.PP
+pam_unix was written by various people\.
diff --git a/modules/pam_unix/pam_unix.8.xml b/modules/pam_unix/pam_unix.8.xml
new file mode 100644
index 00000000..290cb2b9
--- /dev/null
+++ b/modules/pam_unix/pam_unix.8.xml
@@ -0,0 +1,379 @@
+<?xml version="1.0" encoding='UTF-8'?>
+<!DOCTYPE refentry PUBLIC "-//OASIS//DTD DocBook XML V4.3//EN"
+	"http://www.oasis-open.org/docbook/xml/4.3/docbookx.dtd">
+
+<refentry id="pam_unix">
+
+  <refmeta>
+    <refentrytitle>pam_unix</refentrytitle>
+    <manvolnum>8</manvolnum>
+    <refmiscinfo class="sectdesc">Linux-PAM Manual</refmiscinfo>
+  </refmeta>
+
+  <refnamediv id="pam_unix-name">
+    <refname>pam_unix</refname>
+    <refpurpose>Module for traditional password authentication</refpurpose>
+  </refnamediv>
+
+  <refsynopsisdiv>
+    <cmdsynopsis id="pam_unix-cmdsynopsis">
+      <command>pam_unix.so</command>
+      <arg choice="opt">
+        ...
+      </arg>
+    </cmdsynopsis>
+  </refsynopsisdiv>
+
+  <refsect1 id="pam_unix-description">
+
+    <title>DESCRIPTION</title>
+
+    <para>
+      This is the standard Unix authentication module. It uses standard
+      calls from the system's libraries to retrieve and set account
+      information as well as authentication. Usually this is obtained
+      from the /etc/passwd and the /etc/shadow file as well if shadow is
+      enabled.
+    </para>
+
+    <para>
+      The account component performs the task of establishing the status
+      of the user's account and password based on the following
+      <emphasis>shadow</emphasis> elements: expire, last_change, max_change,
+      min_change, warn_change. In the case of the latter, it may offer advice
+      to the user on changing their password or, through the
+      <emphasis remap='B'>PAM_AUTHTOKEN_REQD</emphasis> return, delay
+      giving service to the user until they have established a new password.
+      The entries listed above are documented in the <citerefentry>
+      <refentrytitle>shadow</refentrytitle><manvolnum>5</manvolnum>
+      </citerefentry> manual page. Should the user's record not contain
+      one or more of these entries, the corresponding
+      <emphasis>shadow</emphasis> check is not performed.
+    </para>
+
+    <para>
+      The authentication component performs the task of checking the
+      users credentials (password). The default action of this module
+      is to not permit the user access to a service if their official
+      password is blank.
+    </para>
+
+    <para>
+      A helper binary, <citerefentry>
+      <refentrytitle>unix_chkpwd</refentrytitle><manvolnum>8</manvolnum>
+      </citerefentry>, is provided
+      to check the user's password when it is stored in a read
+      protected database. This binary is very simple and will only
+      check the password of the user invoking it. It is called
+      transparently on behalf of the user by the authenticating
+      component of this module. In this way it is possible
+      for applications like <citerefentry>
+      <refentrytitle>xlock</refentrytitle><manvolnum>1</manvolnum>
+      </citerefentry> to work without
+      being setuid-root. The module, by default, will temporarily turn
+      off SIGCHLD handling for the duration of execution of the helper
+      binary. This is generally the right thing to do, as many applications
+      are not prepared to handle this signal from a child they didn't know
+      was <function>fork()</function>d. The <option>noreap</option> module
+      argument can be used to suppress this temporary shielding and may be
+      needed for use with certain applications.
+    </para>
+
+    <para>
+      The password component of this module performs the task of updating
+      the user's password.
+    </para>
+
+    <para>
+      The session component of this module logs when a user logins 
+      or leave the system.
+    </para>
+
+    <para>
+      Remaining arguments, supported by others functions of this
+      module, are silently ignored. Other arguments are logged as
+      errors through <citerefentry>
+      <refentrytitle>syslog</refentrytitle><manvolnum>3</manvolnum>
+      </citerefentry>.
+    </para>
+  </refsect1>
+
+  <refsect1 id="pam_unix-options">
+
+    <title>OPTIONS</title>
+    <variablelist>
+      <varlistentry>
+        <term>
+          <option>debug</option>
+        </term>
+        <listitem>
+          <para>
+	    Turns on debugging via
+            <citerefentry>
+              <refentrytitle>syslog</refentrytitle><manvolnum>3</manvolnum>
+            </citerefentry>.
+          </para>
+        </listitem>
+      </varlistentry>
+
+      <varlistentry>
+        <term>
+          <option>audit</option>
+        </term>
+        <listitem>
+          <para>
+            A little more extreme than debug.
+          </para>
+        </listitem>
+      </varlistentry>
+
+      <varlistentry>
+        <term>
+          <option>nullok</option>
+        </term>
+        <listitem>
+          <para>
+            The default action of this module is to not permit the
+            user access to a service if their official password is blank.
+            The <option>nullok</option> argument overrides this default.
+          </para>
+        </listitem>
+      </varlistentry>
+      <varlistentry>
+        <term>
+          <option>try_first_pass</option>
+        </term>
+        <listitem>
+          <para>
+            Before prompting the user for their password, the module first
+            tries the previous stacked module's password in case that
+            satisfies this module as well.
+          </para>
+        </listitem>
+      </varlistentry>
+      <varlistentry>
+        <term>
+          <option>use_first_pass</option>
+        </term>
+        <listitem>
+          <para>
+            The argument <option>use_first_pass</option> forces the module
+            to use a previous stacked modules password and will never prompt
+            the user - if no password is available or the password is not
+            appropriate, the user will be denied access.
+          </para>
+        </listitem>
+      </varlistentry>
+      <varlistentry>
+        <term>
+          <option>nodelay</option>
+        </term>
+        <listitem>
+          <para>
+            This argument can be used to discourage the authentication
+            component from requesting a delay should the authentication
+            as a whole fail. The default action is for the module to
+            request a delay-on-failure of the order of two second.
+          </para>
+        </listitem>
+      </varlistentry>
+      <varlistentry>
+        <term>
+          <option>use_authtok</option>
+        </term>
+        <listitem>
+          <para>
+            When password changing enforce the module to set the new
+            password to the one provided by a previously stacked
+            <option>password</option> module (this is used in the
+            example of the stacking of the <command>pam_cracklib</command>
+            module documented above).
+          </para>
+        </listitem>
+      </varlistentry>
+      <varlistentry>
+        <term>
+          <option>not_set_pass</option>
+        </term>
+        <listitem>
+          <para>
+            This argument is used to inform the module that it is not to
+            pay attention to/make available the old or new passwords from/to
+            other (stacked) password modules.
+          </para>
+        </listitem>
+      </varlistentry>
+      <varlistentry>
+        <term>
+          <option>nis</option>
+        </term>
+        <listitem>
+          <para>
+            NIS RPC is used for setting new passwords.
+          </para>
+        </listitem>
+      </varlistentry>
+      <varlistentry>
+        <term>
+          <option>remember=<replaceable>n</replaceable></option>
+        </term>
+        <listitem>
+          <para>
+            The last <replaceable>n</replaceable> passwords for each
+            user are saved in <filename>/etc/security/opasswd</filename>
+            in order to force password change history and keep the user
+            from alternating between the same password too frequently.
+          </para>
+        </listitem>
+      </varlistentry>
+      <varlistentry>
+        <term>
+          <option>shadow</option>
+        </term>
+        <listitem>
+          <para>
+            Try to maintain a shadow based system.
+          </para>
+        </listitem>
+      </varlistentry>
+      <varlistentry>
+        <term>
+          <option>md5</option>
+        </term>
+        <listitem>
+          <para>
+            When a user changes their password next, encrypt
+            it with the MD5 algorithm.
+          </para>
+        </listitem>
+      </varlistentry>
+      <varlistentry>
+        <term>
+          <option>bigcrypt</option>
+        </term>
+        <listitem>
+          <para>
+            When a user changes their password next,
+            encrypt it with the DEC C2 algorithm.
+          </para>
+        </listitem>
+      </varlistentry>
+      <varlistentry>
+        <term>
+          <option>sha256</option>
+        </term>
+        <listitem>
+          <para>
+            When a user changes their password next,
+            encrypt it with the SHA256 algorithm. If the
+            SHA256 algorithm is not known to the libcrypt,
+            fall back to MD5.
+          </para>
+        </listitem>
+      </varlistentry>
+      <varlistentry>
+        <term>
+          <option>sha512</option>
+        </term>
+        <listitem>
+          <para>
+            When a user changes their password next,
+            encrypt it with the SHA512 algorithm. If the
+            SHA512 algorithm is not known to the libcrypt,
+            fall back to MD5.
+          </para>
+        </listitem>
+      </varlistentry>
+      <varlistentry>
+        <term>
+          <option>rounds=<replaceable>n</replaceable></option>
+        </term>
+        <listitem>
+          <para>
+            Set the optional number of rounds of the SHA256 and SHA512
+            password hashing algorithms to <replaceable>n</replaceable>.
+          </para>
+        </listitem>
+      </varlistentry>
+      <varlistentry>
+        <term>
+          <option>broken_shadow</option>
+        </term>
+        <listitem>
+          <para>
+            Ignore errors reading shadow inforation for
+            users in the account management module.
+          </para>
+        </listitem>
+      </varlistentry>
+    </variablelist>
+    <para>
+      Invalid arguments are logged with  <citerefentry>
+      <refentrytitle>syslog</refentrytitle><manvolnum>3</manvolnum>
+      </citerefentry>.
+    </para>
+  </refsect1>
+
+  <refsect1 id="pam_unix-services">
+    <title>MODULE SERVICES PROVIDED</title>
+    <para>
+      All service are supported.
+    </para>
+  </refsect1>
+
+  <refsect1 id='pam_unix-return_values'>
+    <title>RETURN VALUES</title>
+    <variablelist>
+      <varlistentry>
+        <term>PAM_IGNORE</term>
+        <listitem>
+          <para>
+            Ignore this module.
+          </para>
+        </listitem>
+      </varlistentry>
+    </variablelist>
+     </refsect1>
+
+  <refsect1 id='pam_unix-examples'>
+    <title>EXAMPLES</title>
+    <para>
+      An example usage for <filename>/etc/pam.d/login</filename>
+      would be:
+      <programlisting>
+# Authenticate the user
+auth       required   pam_unix.so
+# Ensure users account and password are still active
+account    required   pam_unix.so
+# Change the users password, but at first check the strength
+# with pam_cracklib(8)
+password   required   pam_cracklib.so retry=3 minlen=6 difok=3
+password   required   pam_unix.so use_authtok nullok md5
+session    required   pam_unix.so
+      </programlisting>
+    </para>
+  </refsect1>
+
+  <refsect1 id='pam_unix-see_also'>
+    <title>SEE ALSO</title>
+    <para>
+      <citerefentry>
+	<refentrytitle>pam.conf</refentrytitle><manvolnum>5</manvolnum>
+      </citerefentry>,
+      <citerefentry>
+	<refentrytitle>pam.d</refentrytitle><manvolnum>8</manvolnum>
+      </citerefentry>,
+      <citerefentry>
+	<refentrytitle>pam</refentrytitle><manvolnum>8</manvolnum>
+      </citerefentry>
+    </para>
+  </refsect1>
+
+  <refsect1 id='pam_unix-author'>
+    <title>AUTHOR</title>
+      <para>
+        pam_unix was written by various people.
+      </para>
+  </refsect1>
+
+</refentry>
diff --git a/modules/pam_unix/pam_unix_acct.c b/modules/pam_unix/pam_unix_acct.c
new file mode 100644
index 00000000..c09bc175
--- /dev/null
+++ b/modules/pam_unix/pam_unix_acct.c
@@ -0,0 +1,297 @@
+/*
+ * Copyright Elliot Lee, 1996.  All rights reserved.
+ * Copyright Jan R�korajski, 1999.  All rights reserved.
+ *
+ * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
+ * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
+ * are met:
+ * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
+ *    notice, and the entire permission notice in its entirety,
+ *    including the disclaimer of warranties.
+ * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
+ *    notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
+ *    documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
+ * 3. The name of the author may not be used to endorse or promote
+ *    products derived from this software without specific prior
+ *    written permission.
+ *
+ * ALTERNATIVELY, this product may be distributed under the terms of
+ * the GNU Public License, in which case the provisions of the GPL are
+ * required INSTEAD OF the above restrictions.  (This clause is
+ * necessary due to a potential bad interaction between the GPL and
+ * the restrictions contained in a BSD-style copyright.)
+ *
+ * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED ``AS IS'' AND ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED
+ * WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES
+ * OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE ARE
+ * DISCLAIMED.  IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT,
+ * INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES
+ * (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR
+ * SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION)
+ * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT,
+ * STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE)
+ * ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED
+ * OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.
+ */
+
+#include "config.h"
+
+#include <stdlib.h>
+#include <stdio.h>
+#include <string.h>
+#include <unistd.h>
+#include <sys/types.h>
+#include <syslog.h>
+#include <pwd.h>
+#include <shadow.h>
+#include <time.h>		/* for time() */
+#include <errno.h>
+#include <sys/wait.h>
+
+#include <security/_pam_macros.h>
+
+/* indicate that the following groups are defined */
+
+#define PAM_SM_ACCOUNT
+
+#include <security/pam_modules.h>
+#include <security/pam_ext.h>
+#include <security/pam_modutil.h>
+
+#include "support.h"
+#include "passverify.h"
+
+int _unix_run_verify_binary(pam_handle_t *pamh, unsigned int ctrl,
+	const char *user, int *daysleft)
+{
+  int retval=0, child, fds[2];
+  void (*sighandler)(int) = NULL;
+  D(("running verify_binary"));
+
+  /* create a pipe for the messages */
+  if (pipe(fds) != 0) {
+    D(("could not make pipe"));
+    pam_syslog(pamh, LOG_ERR, "Could not make pipe: %m");
+    return PAM_AUTH_ERR;
+  }
+  D(("called."));
+
+  if (off(UNIX_NOREAP, ctrl)) {
+    /*
+     * This code arranges that the demise of the child does not cause
+     * the application to receive a signal it is not expecting - which
+     * may kill the application or worse.
+     *
+     * The "noreap" module argument is provided so that the admin can
+     * override this behavior.
+     */
+    sighandler = signal(SIGCHLD, SIG_DFL);
+  }
+
+  /* fork */
+  child = fork();
+  if (child == 0) {
+    size_t i=0;
+    struct rlimit rlim;
+    static char *envp[] = { NULL };
+    char *args[] = { NULL, NULL, NULL, NULL };
+
+    close(0); close(1);
+    /* reopen stdin as pipe */
+    close(fds[0]);
+    dup2(fds[1], STDOUT_FILENO);
+
+    /* XXX - should really tidy up PAM here too */
+
+    if (getrlimit(RLIMIT_NOFILE,&rlim)==0) {
+      for (i=2; i < rlim.rlim_max; i++) {
+	if ((unsigned int)fds[1] != i) {
+	  close(i);
+	}
+      }
+    }
+
+    if (geteuid() == 0) {
+      /* must set the real uid to 0 so the helper will not error
+         out if pam is called from setuid binary (su, sudo...) */
+      setuid(0);
+    }
+
+    /* exec binary helper */
+    args[0] = x_strdup(CHKPWD_HELPER);
+    args[1] = x_strdup(user);
+    args[2] = x_strdup("chkexpiry");
+
+    execve(CHKPWD_HELPER, args, envp);
+
+    pam_syslog(pamh, LOG_ERR, "helper binary execve failed: %m");
+    /* should not get here: exit with error */
+    close (fds[1]);
+    D(("helper binary is not available"));
+    printf("-1\n");
+    exit(PAM_AUTHINFO_UNAVAIL);
+  } else {
+    close(fds[1]);
+    if (child > 0) {
+      char buf[32];
+      int rc=0;
+      rc=waitpid(child, &retval, 0);  /* wait for helper to complete */
+      if (rc<0) {
+	pam_syslog(pamh, LOG_ERR, "unix_chkpwd waitpid returned %d: %m", rc);
+	retval = PAM_AUTH_ERR;
+      } else {
+	retval = WEXITSTATUS(retval);
+        rc = pam_modutil_read(fds[0], buf, sizeof(buf) - 1);
+	if(rc > 0) {
+	      buf[rc] = '\0';
+	      if (sscanf(buf,"%d", daysleft) != 1 )
+	        retval = PAM_AUTH_ERR;
+	    }
+	else {
+	    pam_syslog(pamh, LOG_ERR, "read unix_chkpwd output error %d: %m", rc);
+	    retval = PAM_AUTH_ERR;
+	  }
+      }
+    } else {
+      pam_syslog(pamh, LOG_ERR, "Fork failed: %m");
+      D(("fork failed"));
+      retval = PAM_AUTH_ERR;
+    }
+    close(fds[0]);
+  }
+  if (sighandler != SIG_ERR) {
+    (void) signal(SIGCHLD, sighandler);   /* restore old signal handler */
+  }
+  D(("Returning %d",retval));
+  return retval;
+}
+
+/*
+ * PAM framework looks for this entry-point to pass control to the
+ * account management module.
+ */
+
+PAM_EXTERN int pam_sm_acct_mgmt(pam_handle_t * pamh, int flags,
+				int argc, const char **argv)
+{
+	unsigned int ctrl;
+	const void *void_uname;
+	const char *uname;
+	int retval, daysleft;
+	struct spwd *spent;
+	struct passwd *pwent;
+	char buf[256];
+
+	D(("called."));
+
+	ctrl = _set_ctrl(pamh, flags, NULL, NULL, argc, argv);
+
+	retval = pam_get_item(pamh, PAM_USER, &void_uname);
+	uname = void_uname;
+	D(("user = `%s'", uname));
+	if (retval != PAM_SUCCESS || uname == NULL) {
+		pam_syslog(pamh, LOG_ALERT,
+			 "could not identify user (from uid=%lu)",
+			 (unsigned long int)getuid());
+		return PAM_USER_UNKNOWN;
+	}
+
+	retval = get_account_info(pamh, uname, &pwent, &spent);
+	if (retval == PAM_USER_UNKNOWN) {
+		pam_syslog(pamh, LOG_ALERT,
+			 "could not identify user (from getpwnam(%s))",
+			 uname);
+		return retval;
+	}
+
+	if (retval == PAM_SUCCESS && spent == NULL)
+		return PAM_SUCCESS;
+
+	if (retval == PAM_UNIX_RUN_HELPER) {
+		retval = _unix_run_verify_binary(pamh, ctrl, uname, &daysleft);
+		if (retval == PAM_AUTHINFO_UNAVAIL &&
+			on(UNIX_BROKEN_SHADOW, ctrl))
+			return PAM_SUCCESS;
+	} else if (retval != PAM_SUCCESS) {
+		if (on(UNIX_BROKEN_SHADOW,ctrl))
+			return PAM_SUCCESS;
+		else
+			return retval;
+	} else
+		retval = check_shadow_expiry(pamh, spent, &daysleft);
+
+	switch (retval) {
+	case PAM_ACCT_EXPIRED:
+		pam_syslog(pamh, LOG_NOTICE,
+			"account %s has expired (account expired)",
+			uname);
+		_make_remark(pamh, ctrl, PAM_ERROR_MSG,
+			_("Your account has expired; please contact your system administrator"));
+		break;
+	case PAM_NEW_AUTHTOK_REQD:
+		if (daysleft == 0) {
+			pam_syslog(pamh, LOG_NOTICE,
+				"expired password for user %s (root enforced)",
+				uname);
+			_make_remark(pamh, ctrl, PAM_ERROR_MSG,
+				_("You are required to change your password immediately (root enforced)"));
+		} else {
+			pam_syslog(pamh, LOG_DEBUG,
+				"expired password for user %s (password aged)",
+				uname);
+			_make_remark(pamh, ctrl, PAM_ERROR_MSG,
+				_("You are required to change your password immediately (password aged)"));
+		}
+		break;
+	case PAM_AUTHTOK_EXPIRED:
+		pam_syslog(pamh, LOG_NOTICE,
+			"account %s has expired (failed to change password)",
+			uname);
+		_make_remark(pamh, ctrl, PAM_ERROR_MSG,
+			_("Your account has expired; please contact your system administrator"));
+		break;
+	case PAM_SUCCESS:
+		if (daysleft >= 0) {
+			pam_syslog(pamh, LOG_DEBUG,
+				"password for user %s will expire in %d days",
+				uname, daysleft);
+#if defined HAVE_DNGETTEXT && defined ENABLE_NLS
+			snprintf (buf, sizeof (buf),
+				dngettext(PACKAGE,
+				  "Warning: your password will expire in %d day",
+				  "Warning: your password will expire in %d days",
+				  daysleft),
+				daysleft);
+#else
+			if (daysleft == 1)
+			    snprintf(buf, sizeof (buf),
+				_("Warning: your password will expire in %d day"),
+				daysleft);
+			else
+			    snprintf(buf, sizeof (buf),
+			    /* TRANSLATORS: only used if dngettext is not supported */
+				_("Warning: your password will expire in %d days"),
+				daysleft);
+#endif
+			_make_remark(pamh, ctrl, PAM_TEXT_INFO, buf);
+		}
+	}
+
+	D(("all done"));
+
+	return retval;
+}
+
+
+/* static module data */
+#ifdef PAM_STATIC
+struct pam_module _pam_unix_acct_modstruct = {
+    "pam_unix_acct",
+    NULL,
+    NULL,
+    pam_sm_acct_mgmt,
+    NULL,
+    NULL,
+    NULL,
+};
+#endif
diff --git a/modules/pam_unix/pam_unix_auth.c b/modules/pam_unix/pam_unix_auth.c
new file mode 100644
index 00000000..dfedd608
--- /dev/null
+++ b/modules/pam_unix/pam_unix_auth.c
@@ -0,0 +1,229 @@
+/*
+ * Copyright Alexander O. Yuriev, 1996.  All rights reserved.
+ * NIS+ support by Thorsten Kukuk <kukuk@weber.uni-paderborn.de>
+ * Copyright Jan R�korajski, 1999.  All rights reserved.
+ *
+ * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
+ * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
+ * are met:
+ * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
+ *    notice, and the entire permission notice in its entirety,
+ *    including the disclaimer of warranties.
+ * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
+ *    notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
+ *    documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
+ * 3. The name of the author may not be used to endorse or promote
+ *    products derived from this software without specific prior
+ *    written permission.
+ *
+ * ALTERNATIVELY, this product may be distributed under the terms of
+ * the GNU Public License, in which case the provisions of the GPL are
+ * required INSTEAD OF the above restrictions.  (This clause is
+ * necessary due to a potential bad interaction between the GPL and
+ * the restrictions contained in a BSD-style copyright.)
+ *
+ * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED ``AS IS'' AND ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED
+ * WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES
+ * OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE ARE
+ * DISCLAIMED.  IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT,
+ * INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES
+ * (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR
+ * SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION)
+ * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT,
+ * STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE)
+ * ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED
+ * OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.
+ */
+
+/* #define DEBUG */
+
+#include "config.h"
+
+#include <stdio.h>
+#include <stdlib.h>
+#include <stdarg.h>
+#include <string.h>
+#include <unistd.h>
+#include <fcntl.h>
+#include <ctype.h>
+#include <sys/types.h>
+#include <sys/stat.h>
+#include <syslog.h>
+
+/* indicate the following groups are defined */
+
+#define PAM_SM_AUTH
+
+#define _PAM_EXTERN_FUNCTIONS
+#include <security/_pam_macros.h>
+#include <security/pam_modules.h>
+#include <security/pam_ext.h>
+
+#include "support.h"
+
+/*
+ * PAM framework looks for these entry-points to pass control to the
+ * authentication module.
+ */
+
+/* Fun starts here :)
+
+ * pam_sm_authenticate() performs UNIX/shadow authentication
+ *
+ *      First, if shadow support is available, attempt to perform
+ *      authentication using shadow passwords. If shadow is not
+ *      available, or user does not have a shadow password, fallback
+ *      onto a normal UNIX authentication
+ */
+
+#define _UNIX_AUTHTOK  "-UN*X-PASS"
+
+#define AUTH_RETURN						\
+do {								\
+	if (on(UNIX_LIKE_AUTH, ctrl) && ret_data) {		\
+		D(("recording return code for next time [%d]",	\
+					retval));		\
+		*ret_data = retval;				\
+		pam_set_data(pamh, "unix_setcred_return",	\
+		             (void *) ret_data, setcred_free);	\
+	} else if (ret_data)					\
+	  free (ret_data);                                      \
+	D(("done. [%s]", pam_strerror(pamh, retval)));		\
+	return retval;						\
+} while (0)
+
+
+static void
+setcred_free (pam_handle_t *pamh UNUSED, void *ptr, int err UNUSED)
+{
+	if (ptr)
+		free (ptr);
+}
+
+
+PAM_EXTERN int pam_sm_authenticate(pam_handle_t * pamh, int flags
+				   ,int argc, const char **argv)
+{
+	unsigned int ctrl;
+	int retval, *ret_data = NULL;
+	const char *name;
+	const void *p;
+
+	D(("called."));
+
+	ctrl = _set_ctrl(pamh, flags, NULL, NULL, argc, argv);
+
+	/* Get a few bytes so we can pass our return value to
+	   pam_sm_setcred(). */
+	if (on(UNIX_LIKE_AUTH, ctrl))
+		ret_data = malloc(sizeof(int));
+
+	/* get the user'name' */
+
+	retval = pam_get_user(pamh, &name, NULL);
+	if (retval == PAM_SUCCESS) {
+		/*
+		 * Various libraries at various times have had bugs related to
+		 * '+' or '-' as the first character of a user name. Don't
+		 * allow this characters here.
+		 */
+		if (name == NULL || name[0] == '-' || name[0] == '+') {
+			pam_syslog(pamh, LOG_ERR, "bad username [%s]", name);
+			retval = PAM_USER_UNKNOWN;
+			AUTH_RETURN;
+		}
+		if (retval == PAM_SUCCESS && on(UNIX_DEBUG, ctrl))
+			D(("username [%s] obtained", name));
+	} else {
+		D(("trouble reading username"));
+		if (retval == PAM_CONV_AGAIN) {
+			D(("pam_get_user/conv() function is not ready yet"));
+			/* it is safe to resume this function so we translate this
+			 * retval to the value that indicates we're happy to resume.
+			 */
+			retval = PAM_INCOMPLETE;
+		}
+		AUTH_RETURN;
+	}
+
+	/* if this user does not have a password... */
+
+	if (_unix_blankpasswd(pamh, ctrl, name)) {
+		D(("user '%s' has blank passwd", name));
+		name = NULL;
+		retval = PAM_SUCCESS;
+		AUTH_RETURN;
+	}
+	/* get this user's authentication token */
+
+	retval = _unix_read_password(pamh, ctrl, NULL, _("Password: "), NULL
+				     ,_UNIX_AUTHTOK, &p);
+	if (retval != PAM_SUCCESS) {
+		if (retval != PAM_CONV_AGAIN) {
+			pam_syslog(pamh, LOG_CRIT,
+			    "auth could not identify password for [%s]", name);
+		} else {
+			D(("conversation function is not ready yet"));
+			/*
+			 * it is safe to resume this function so we translate this
+			 * retval to the value that indicates we're happy to resume.
+			 */
+			retval = PAM_INCOMPLETE;
+		}
+		name = NULL;
+		AUTH_RETURN;
+	}
+	D(("user=%s, password=[%s]", name, p));
+
+	/* verify the password of this user */
+	retval = _unix_verify_password(pamh, name, p, ctrl);
+	name = p = NULL;
+
+	AUTH_RETURN;
+}
+
+
+/*
+ * The only thing _pam_set_credentials_unix() does is initialization of
+ * UNIX group IDs.
+ *
+ * Well, everybody but me on linux-pam is convinced that it should not
+ * initialize group IDs, so I am not doing it but don't say that I haven't
+ * warned you. -- AOY
+ */
+
+PAM_EXTERN int
+pam_sm_setcred (pam_handle_t *pamh, int flags UNUSED,
+		int argc UNUSED, const char **argv UNUSED)
+{
+	int retval;
+	const void *pretval = NULL;
+
+	D(("called."));
+
+	retval = PAM_SUCCESS;
+
+	D(("recovering return code from auth call"));
+	/* We will only find something here if UNIX_LIKE_AUTH is set --
+	   don't worry about an explicit check of argv. */
+	if (pam_get_data(pamh, "unix_setcred_return", &pretval) == PAM_SUCCESS
+	    && pretval) {
+ 	        retval = *(const int *)pretval;
+		pam_set_data(pamh, "unix_setcred_return", NULL, NULL);
+		D(("recovered data indicates that old retval was %d", retval));
+	}
+
+	return retval;
+}
+
+#ifdef PAM_STATIC
+struct pam_module _pam_unix_auth_modstruct = {
+    "pam_unix_auth",
+    pam_sm_authenticate,
+    pam_sm_setcred,
+    NULL,
+    NULL,
+    NULL,
+    NULL,
+};
+#endif
diff --git a/modules/pam_unix/pam_unix_passwd.c b/modules/pam_unix/pam_unix_passwd.c
new file mode 100644
index 00000000..d221220f
--- /dev/null
+++ b/modules/pam_unix/pam_unix_passwd.c
@@ -0,0 +1,790 @@
+/*
+ * Main coding by Elliot Lee <sopwith@redhat.com>, Red Hat Software.
+ * Copyright (C) 1996.
+ * Copyright (c) Jan R�korajski, 1999.
+ * Copyright (c) Red Hat, Inc., 2007, 2008.
+ *
+ * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
+ * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
+ * are met:
+ * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
+ *    notice, and the entire permission notice in its entirety,
+ *    including the disclaimer of warranties.
+ * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
+ *    notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
+ *    documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
+ * 3. The name of the author may not be used to endorse or promote
+ *    products derived from this software without specific prior
+ *    written permission.
+ *
+ * ALTERNATIVELY, this product may be distributed under the terms of
+ * the GNU Public License, in which case the provisions of the GPL are
+ * required INSTEAD OF the above restrictions.  (This clause is
+ * necessary due to a potential bad interaction between the GPL and
+ * the restrictions contained in a BSD-style copyright.)
+ *
+ * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED ``AS IS'' AND ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED
+ * WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES
+ * OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE ARE
+ * DISCLAIMED.  IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT,
+ * INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES
+ * (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR
+ * SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION)
+ * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT,
+ * STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE)
+ * ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED
+ * OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.
+ */
+
+#include "config.h"
+
+#include <stdio.h>
+#include <stdlib.h>
+#include <stdarg.h>
+#include <string.h>
+#include <malloc.h>
+#include <unistd.h>
+#include <errno.h>
+#include <sys/types.h>
+#include <pwd.h>
+#include <syslog.h>
+#include <shadow.h>
+#include <time.h>		/* for time() */
+#include <fcntl.h>
+#include <ctype.h>
+#include <sys/time.h>
+#include <sys/stat.h>
+#include <rpc/rpc.h>
+#include <rpcsvc/yp_prot.h>
+#include <rpcsvc/ypclnt.h>
+
+#include <signal.h>
+#include <errno.h>
+#include <sys/wait.h>
+#ifdef WITH_SELINUX
+static int selinux_enabled=-1;
+#include <selinux/selinux.h>
+#define SELINUX_ENABLED (selinux_enabled!=-1 ? selinux_enabled : (selinux_enabled=is_selinux_enabled()>0))
+#endif
+
+#include <security/_pam_macros.h>
+
+/* indicate the following groups are defined */
+
+#define PAM_SM_PASSWORD
+
+#include <security/pam_modules.h>
+#include <security/pam_ext.h>
+#include <security/pam_modutil.h>
+
+#include "yppasswd.h"
+#include "md5.h"
+#include "support.h"
+#include "passverify.h"
+#include "bigcrypt.h"
+
+#if !((__GLIBC__ == 2) && (__GLIBC_MINOR__ >= 1))
+extern int getrpcport(const char *host, unsigned long prognum,
+		      unsigned long versnum, unsigned int proto);
+#endif				/* GNU libc 2.1 */
+
+/*
+   How it works:
+   Gets in username (has to be done) from the calling program
+   Does authentication of user (only if we are not running as root)
+   Gets new password/checks for sanity
+   Sets it.
+ */
+
+/* data tokens */
+
+#define _UNIX_OLD_AUTHTOK	"-UN*X-OLD-PASS"
+#define _UNIX_NEW_AUTHTOK	"-UN*X-NEW-PASS"
+
+#define MAX_PASSWD_TRIES	3
+
+static char *getNISserver(pam_handle_t *pamh)
+{
+	char *master;
+	char *domainname;
+	int port, err;
+
+	if ((err = yp_get_default_domain(&domainname)) != 0) {
+		pam_syslog(pamh, LOG_WARNING, "can't get local yp domain: %s",
+			 yperr_string(err));
+		return NULL;
+	}
+	if ((err = yp_master(domainname, "passwd.byname", &master)) != 0) {
+		pam_syslog(pamh, LOG_WARNING, "can't find the master ypserver: %s",
+			 yperr_string(err));
+		return NULL;
+	}
+	port = getrpcport(master, YPPASSWDPROG, YPPASSWDPROC_UPDATE, IPPROTO_UDP);
+	if (port == 0) {
+		pam_syslog(pamh, LOG_WARNING,
+		         "yppasswdd not running on NIS master host");
+		return NULL;
+	}
+	if (port >= IPPORT_RESERVED) {
+		pam_syslog(pamh, LOG_WARNING,
+		         "yppasswd daemon running on illegal port");
+		return NULL;
+	}
+	return master;
+}
+
+#ifdef WITH_SELINUX
+
+static int _unix_run_update_binary(pam_handle_t *pamh, unsigned int ctrl, const char *user,
+    const char *fromwhat, const char *towhat, int remember)
+{
+    int retval, child, fds[2];
+    void (*sighandler)(int) = NULL;
+
+    D(("called."));
+    /* create a pipe for the password */
+    if (pipe(fds) != 0) {
+	D(("could not make pipe"));
+	return PAM_AUTH_ERR;
+    }
+
+    if (off(UNIX_NOREAP, ctrl)) {
+	/*
+	 * This code arranges that the demise of the child does not cause
+	 * the application to receive a signal it is not expecting - which
+	 * may kill the application or worse.
+	 *
+	 * The "noreap" module argument is provided so that the admin can
+	 * override this behavior.
+	 */
+	sighandler = signal(SIGCHLD, SIG_DFL);
+    }
+
+    /* fork */
+    child = fork();
+    if (child == 0) {
+        size_t i=0;
+        struct rlimit rlim;
+	static char *envp[] = { NULL };
+	char *args[] = { NULL, NULL, NULL, NULL, NULL, NULL };
+        char buffer[16];
+
+	/* XXX - should really tidy up PAM here too */
+
+	close(0); close(1);
+	/* reopen stdin as pipe */
+	close(fds[1]);
+	dup2(fds[0], STDIN_FILENO);
+
+	if (getrlimit(RLIMIT_NOFILE,&rlim)==0) {
+	  for (i=2; i < rlim.rlim_max; i++) {
+	    if ((unsigned int)fds[0] != i)
+	  	   close(i);
+	  }
+	}
+
+        if (SELINUX_ENABLED && geteuid() == 0) {
+          /* must set the real uid to 0 so the helper will not error
+             out if pam is called from setuid binary (su, sudo...) */
+          setuid(0);
+        }
+
+	/* exec binary helper */
+	args[0] = x_strdup(UPDATE_HELPER);
+	args[1] = x_strdup(user);
+	args[2] = x_strdup("update");
+	if (on(UNIX_SHADOW, ctrl))
+		args[3] = x_strdup("1");
+	else
+		args[3] = x_strdup("0");
+
+        snprintf(buffer, sizeof(buffer), "%d", remember);
+        args[4] = x_strdup(buffer);
+	
+	execve(UPDATE_HELPER, args, envp);
+
+	/* should not get here: exit with error */
+	D(("helper binary is not available"));
+	exit(PAM_AUTHINFO_UNAVAIL);
+    } else if (child > 0) {
+	/* wait for child */
+	/* if the stored password is NULL */
+        int rc=0;
+	if (fromwhat)
+	  pam_modutil_write(fds[1], fromwhat, strlen(fromwhat)+1);
+	else
+	  pam_modutil_write(fds[1], "", 1);
+	if (towhat) {
+	  pam_modutil_write(fds[1], towhat, strlen(towhat)+1);
+	}
+	else
+	  pam_modutil_write(fds[1], "", 1);
+
+	close(fds[0]);       /* close here to avoid possible SIGPIPE above */
+	close(fds[1]);
+	rc=waitpid(child, &retval, 0);  /* wait for helper to complete */
+	if (rc<0) {
+	  pam_syslog(pamh, LOG_ERR, "unix_update waitpid failed: %m");
+	  retval = PAM_AUTH_ERR;
+	} else {
+	  retval = WEXITSTATUS(retval);
+	}
+    } else {
+	D(("fork failed"));
+	close(fds[0]);
+ 	close(fds[1]);
+	retval = PAM_AUTH_ERR;
+    }
+
+    if (sighandler != SIG_ERR) {
+        (void) signal(SIGCHLD, sighandler);   /* restore old signal handler */
+    }
+
+    return retval;
+}
+#endif
+
+static int check_old_password(const char *forwho, const char *newpass)
+{
+	static char buf[16384];
+	char *s_luser, *s_uid, *s_npas, *s_pas;
+	int retval = PAM_SUCCESS;
+	FILE *opwfile;
+
+	opwfile = fopen(OLD_PASSWORDS_FILE, "r");
+	if (opwfile == NULL)
+		return PAM_ABORT;
+
+	while (fgets(buf, 16380, opwfile)) {
+		if (!strncmp(buf, forwho, strlen(forwho))) {
+			char *sptr;
+			buf[strlen(buf) - 1] = '\0';
+			s_luser = strtok_r(buf, ":,", &sptr);
+			s_uid = strtok_r(NULL, ":,", &sptr);
+			s_npas = strtok_r(NULL, ":,", &sptr);
+			s_pas = strtok_r(NULL, ":,", &sptr);
+			while (s_pas != NULL) {
+				char *md5pass = Goodcrypt_md5(newpass, s_pas);
+				if (!strcmp(md5pass, s_pas)) {
+					_pam_delete(md5pass);
+					retval = PAM_AUTHTOK_ERR;
+					break;
+				}
+				s_pas = strtok_r(NULL, ":,", &sptr);
+				_pam_delete(md5pass);
+			}
+			break;
+		}
+	}
+	fclose(opwfile);
+
+	return retval;
+}
+
+static int _do_setpass(pam_handle_t* pamh, const char *forwho,
+		       const char *fromwhat,
+		       char *towhat, unsigned int ctrl, int remember)
+{
+	struct passwd *pwd = NULL;
+	int retval = 0;
+	int unlocked = 0;
+	char *master = NULL;
+
+	D(("called"));
+
+	pwd = getpwnam(forwho);
+
+	if (pwd == NULL) {
+		retval = PAM_AUTHTOK_ERR;
+		goto done;
+	}
+
+	if (on(UNIX_NIS, ctrl) && _unix_comesfromsource(pamh, forwho, 0, 1)) {
+	    if ((master=getNISserver(pamh)) != NULL) {
+		struct timeval timeout;
+		struct yppasswd yppwd;
+		CLIENT *clnt;
+		int status;
+		enum clnt_stat err;
+
+		/* Unlock passwd file to avoid deadlock */
+		unlock_pwdf();
+		unlocked = 1;
+
+		/* Initialize password information */
+		yppwd.newpw.pw_passwd = pwd->pw_passwd;
+		yppwd.newpw.pw_name = pwd->pw_name;
+		yppwd.newpw.pw_uid = pwd->pw_uid;
+		yppwd.newpw.pw_gid = pwd->pw_gid;
+		yppwd.newpw.pw_gecos = pwd->pw_gecos;
+		yppwd.newpw.pw_dir = pwd->pw_dir;
+		yppwd.newpw.pw_shell = pwd->pw_shell;
+		yppwd.oldpass = fromwhat ? strdup (fromwhat) : strdup ("");
+		yppwd.newpw.pw_passwd = towhat;
+
+		D(("Set password %s for %s", yppwd.newpw.pw_passwd, forwho));
+
+		/* The yppasswd.x file said `unix authentication required',
+		 * so I added it. This is the only reason it is in here.
+		 * My yppasswdd doesn't use it, but maybe some others out there
+		 * do.                                        --okir
+		 */
+		clnt = clnt_create(master, YPPASSWDPROG, YPPASSWDVERS, "udp");
+		clnt->cl_auth = authunix_create_default();
+		memset((char *) &status, '\0', sizeof(status));
+		timeout.tv_sec = 25;
+		timeout.tv_usec = 0;
+		err = clnt_call(clnt, YPPASSWDPROC_UPDATE,
+				(xdrproc_t) xdr_yppasswd, (char *) &yppwd,
+				(xdrproc_t) xdr_int, (char *) &status,
+				timeout);
+
+		free (yppwd.oldpass);
+
+		if (err) {
+			_make_remark(pamh, ctrl, PAM_TEXT_INFO,
+				clnt_sperrno(err));
+		} else if (status) {
+			D(("Error while changing NIS password.\n"));
+		}
+		D(("The password has%s been changed on %s.",
+		   (err || status) ? " not" : "", master));
+		pam_syslog(pamh, LOG_NOTICE, "password%s changed for %s on %s",
+			 (err || status) ? " not" : "", pwd->pw_name, master);
+
+		auth_destroy(clnt->cl_auth);
+		clnt_destroy(clnt);
+		if (err || status) {
+			_make_remark(pamh, ctrl, PAM_TEXT_INFO,
+				_("NIS password could not be changed."));
+			retval = PAM_TRY_AGAIN;
+		}
+#ifdef DEBUG
+		sleep(5);
+#endif
+	    } else {
+		    retval = PAM_TRY_AGAIN;
+	    }
+	}
+
+	if (_unix_comesfromsource(pamh, forwho, 1, 0)) {
+		if(unlocked) {
+			if (lock_pwdf() != PAM_SUCCESS) {
+				return PAM_AUTHTOK_LOCK_BUSY;
+			}
+		}
+#ifdef WITH_SELINUX
+	        if (unix_selinux_confined())
+			  return _unix_run_update_binary(pamh, ctrl, forwho, fromwhat, towhat, remember);
+#endif
+		/* first, save old password */
+		if (save_old_password(forwho, fromwhat, remember)) {
+			retval = PAM_AUTHTOK_ERR;
+			goto done;
+		}
+		if (on(UNIX_SHADOW, ctrl) || is_pwd_shadowed(pwd)) {
+			retval = unix_update_shadow(pamh, forwho, towhat);
+			if (retval == PAM_SUCCESS)
+				if (!is_pwd_shadowed(pwd))
+					retval = unix_update_passwd(pamh, forwho, "x");
+		} else {
+			retval = unix_update_passwd(pamh, forwho, towhat);
+		}
+	}
+
+
+done:
+	unlock_pwdf();
+
+	return retval;
+}
+
+static int _unix_verify_shadow(pam_handle_t *pamh, const char *user, unsigned int ctrl)
+{
+	struct passwd *pwent = NULL;	/* Password and shadow password */
+	struct spwd *spent = NULL;	/* file entries for the user */
+	int daysleft;
+	int retval;
+
+	retval = get_account_info(pamh, user, &pwent, &spent);
+	if (retval == PAM_USER_UNKNOWN) {
+		return retval;
+	}
+
+	if (retval == PAM_SUCCESS && spent == NULL)
+		return PAM_SUCCESS;
+
+	if (retval == PAM_UNIX_RUN_HELPER) {
+		retval = _unix_run_verify_binary(pamh, ctrl, user, &daysleft);
+		if (retval == PAM_AUTH_ERR || retval == PAM_USER_UNKNOWN)
+			return retval;
+	}
+	else if (retval == PAM_SUCCESS)
+		retval = check_shadow_expiry(pamh, spent, &daysleft);
+
+	if (on(UNIX__IAMROOT, ctrl) || retval == PAM_NEW_AUTHTOK_REQD)
+		return PAM_SUCCESS;
+
+	return retval;
+}
+
+static int _pam_unix_approve_pass(pam_handle_t * pamh
+				  ,unsigned int ctrl
+				  ,const char *pass_old
+				  ,const char *pass_new)
+{
+	const void *user;
+	const char *remark = NULL;
+	int retval = PAM_SUCCESS;
+
+	D(("&new=%p, &old=%p", pass_old, pass_new));
+	D(("new=[%s]", pass_new));
+	D(("old=[%s]", pass_old));
+
+	if (pass_new == NULL || (pass_old && !strcmp(pass_old, pass_new))) {
+		if (on(UNIX_DEBUG, ctrl)) {
+			pam_syslog(pamh, LOG_DEBUG, "bad authentication token");
+		}
+		_make_remark(pamh, ctrl, PAM_ERROR_MSG, pass_new == NULL ?
+			_("No password supplied") : _("Password unchanged"));
+		return PAM_AUTHTOK_ERR;
+	}
+	/*
+	 * if one wanted to hardwire authentication token strength
+	 * checking this would be the place - AGM
+	 */
+
+	retval = pam_get_item(pamh, PAM_USER, &user);
+	if (retval != PAM_SUCCESS) {
+		if (on(UNIX_DEBUG, ctrl)) {
+			pam_syslog(pamh, LOG_ERR, "Can not get username");
+			return PAM_AUTHTOK_ERR;
+		}
+	}
+	if (off(UNIX__IAMROOT, ctrl)) {
+		if (strlen(pass_new) < 6)
+		  remark = _("You must choose a longer password");
+		D(("length check [%s]", remark));
+		if (on(UNIX_REMEMBER_PASSWD, ctrl)) {
+			if ((retval = check_old_password(user, pass_new)) == PAM_AUTHTOK_ERR)
+			  remark = _("Password has been already used. Choose another.");
+			if (retval == PAM_ABORT) {
+				pam_syslog(pamh, LOG_ERR, "can't open %s file to check old passwords",
+					OLD_PASSWORDS_FILE);
+				return retval;
+			}
+		}
+	}
+	if (remark) {
+		_make_remark(pamh, ctrl, PAM_ERROR_MSG, remark);
+		retval = PAM_AUTHTOK_ERR;
+	}
+	return retval;
+}
+
+
+PAM_EXTERN int pam_sm_chauthtok(pam_handle_t * pamh, int flags,
+				int argc, const char **argv)
+{
+	unsigned int ctrl, lctrl;
+	int retval;
+	int remember = -1;
+	int rounds = -1;
+
+	/* <DO NOT free() THESE> */
+	const char *user;
+	const void *pass_old, *pass_new;
+	/* </DO NOT free() THESE> */
+
+	D(("called."));
+
+	ctrl = _set_ctrl(pamh, flags, &remember, &rounds, argc, argv);
+
+	/*
+	 * First get the name of a user
+	 */
+	retval = pam_get_user(pamh, &user, NULL);
+	if (retval == PAM_SUCCESS) {
+		/*
+		 * Various libraries at various times have had bugs related to
+		 * '+' or '-' as the first character of a user name. Don't
+		 * allow them.
+		 */
+		if (user == NULL || user[0] == '-' || user[0] == '+') {
+			pam_syslog(pamh, LOG_ERR, "bad username [%s]", user);
+			return PAM_USER_UNKNOWN;
+		}
+		if (retval == PAM_SUCCESS && on(UNIX_DEBUG, ctrl))
+			pam_syslog(pamh, LOG_DEBUG, "username [%s] obtained",
+			         user);
+	} else {
+		if (on(UNIX_DEBUG, ctrl))
+			pam_syslog(pamh, LOG_DEBUG,
+			         "password - could not identify user");
+		return retval;
+	}
+
+	D(("Got username of %s", user));
+
+	/*
+	 * Before we do anything else, check to make sure that the user's
+	 * info is in one of the databases we can modify from this module,
+	 * which currently is 'files' and 'nis'.  We have to do this because
+	 * getpwnam() doesn't tell you *where* the information it gives you
+	 * came from, nor should it.  That's our job.
+	 */
+	if (_unix_comesfromsource(pamh, user, 1, on(UNIX_NIS, ctrl)) == 0) {
+		pam_syslog(pamh, LOG_DEBUG,
+			 "user \"%s\" does not exist in /etc/passwd%s",
+			 user, on(UNIX_NIS, ctrl) ? " or NIS" : "");
+		return PAM_USER_UNKNOWN;
+	} else {
+		struct passwd *pwd;
+		_unix_getpwnam(pamh, user, 1, 1, &pwd);
+		if (pwd == NULL) {
+			pam_syslog(pamh, LOG_DEBUG,
+				"user \"%s\" has corrupted passwd entry",
+				user);
+			return PAM_USER_UNKNOWN;
+		}
+	}
+
+	/*
+	 * This is not an AUTH module!
+	 */
+	if (on(UNIX__NONULL, ctrl))
+		set(UNIX__NULLOK, ctrl);
+
+	if (on(UNIX__PRELIM, ctrl)) {
+		/*
+		 * obtain and verify the current password (OLDAUTHTOK) for
+		 * the user.
+		 */
+		char *Announce;
+
+		D(("prelim check"));
+
+		if (_unix_blankpasswd(pamh, ctrl, user)) {
+			return PAM_SUCCESS;
+		} else if (off(UNIX__IAMROOT, ctrl)) {
+			/* instruct user what is happening */
+			if (asprintf(&Announce, _("Changing password for %s."),
+				user) < 0) {
+				pam_syslog(pamh, LOG_CRIT,
+				         "password - out of memory");
+				return PAM_BUF_ERR;
+			}
+
+			lctrl = ctrl;
+			set(UNIX__OLD_PASSWD, lctrl);
+			retval = _unix_read_password(pamh, lctrl
+						     ,Announce
+					     ,_("(current) UNIX password: ")
+						     ,NULL
+						     ,_UNIX_OLD_AUTHTOK
+					     ,&pass_old);
+			free(Announce);
+
+			if (retval != PAM_SUCCESS) {
+				pam_syslog(pamh, LOG_NOTICE,
+				    "password - (old) token not obtained");
+				return retval;
+			}
+			/* verify that this is the password for this user */
+
+			retval = _unix_verify_password(pamh, user, pass_old, ctrl);
+		} else {
+			D(("process run by root so do nothing this time around"));
+			pass_old = NULL;
+			retval = PAM_SUCCESS;	/* root doesn't have too */
+		}
+
+		if (retval != PAM_SUCCESS) {
+			D(("Authentication failed"));
+			pass_old = NULL;
+			return retval;
+		}
+		retval = pam_set_item(pamh, PAM_OLDAUTHTOK, (const void *) pass_old);
+		pass_old = NULL;
+		if (retval != PAM_SUCCESS) {
+			pam_syslog(pamh, LOG_CRIT,
+			         "failed to set PAM_OLDAUTHTOK");
+		}
+		retval = _unix_verify_shadow(pamh,user, ctrl);
+		if (retval == PAM_AUTHTOK_ERR) {
+			if (off(UNIX__IAMROOT, ctrl))
+				_make_remark(pamh, ctrl, PAM_ERROR_MSG,
+					     _("You must wait longer to change your password"));
+			else
+				retval = PAM_SUCCESS;
+		}
+	} else if (on(UNIX__UPDATE, ctrl)) {
+		/*
+		 * tpass is used below to store the _pam_md() return; it
+		 * should be _pam_delete()'d.
+		 */
+
+		char *tpass = NULL;
+		int retry = 0;
+
+		/*
+		 * obtain the proposed password
+		 */
+
+		D(("do update"));
+
+		/*
+		 * get the old token back. NULL was ok only if root [at this
+		 * point we assume that this has already been enforced on a
+		 * previous call to this function].
+		 */
+
+		if (off(UNIX_NOT_SET_PASS, ctrl)) {
+			retval = pam_get_item(pamh, PAM_OLDAUTHTOK
+					      ,&pass_old);
+		} else {
+			retval = pam_get_data(pamh, _UNIX_OLD_AUTHTOK
+					      ,&pass_old);
+			if (retval == PAM_NO_MODULE_DATA) {
+				retval = PAM_SUCCESS;
+				pass_old = NULL;
+			}
+		}
+		D(("pass_old [%s]", pass_old));
+
+		if (retval != PAM_SUCCESS) {
+			pam_syslog(pamh, LOG_NOTICE, "user not authenticated");
+			return retval;
+		}
+
+		D(("get new password now"));
+
+		lctrl = ctrl;
+
+		if (on(UNIX_USE_AUTHTOK, lctrl)) {
+			set(UNIX_USE_FIRST_PASS, lctrl);
+		}
+		retry = 0;
+		retval = PAM_AUTHTOK_ERR;
+		while ((retval != PAM_SUCCESS) && (retry++ < MAX_PASSWD_TRIES)) {
+			/*
+			 * use_authtok is to force the use of a previously entered
+			 * password -- needed for pluggable password strength checking
+			 */
+
+			retval = _unix_read_password(pamh, lctrl
+						     ,NULL
+					     ,_("Enter new UNIX password: ")
+					    ,_("Retype new UNIX password: ")
+						     ,_UNIX_NEW_AUTHTOK
+					     ,&pass_new);
+
+			if (retval != PAM_SUCCESS) {
+				if (on(UNIX_DEBUG, ctrl)) {
+					pam_syslog(pamh, LOG_ALERT,
+						 "password - new password not obtained");
+				}
+				pass_old = NULL;	/* tidy up */
+				return retval;
+			}
+			D(("returned to _unix_chauthtok"));
+
+			/*
+			 * At this point we know who the user is and what they
+			 * propose as their new password. Verify that the new
+			 * password is acceptable.
+			 */
+
+			if (*(const char *)pass_new == '\0') {	/* "\0" password = NULL */
+				pass_new = NULL;
+			}
+			retval = _pam_unix_approve_pass(pamh, ctrl, pass_old, pass_new);
+		}
+
+		if (retval != PAM_SUCCESS) {
+			pam_syslog(pamh, LOG_NOTICE,
+			         "new password not acceptable");
+			pass_new = pass_old = NULL;	/* tidy up */
+			return retval;
+		}
+		if (lock_pwdf() != PAM_SUCCESS) {
+			return PAM_AUTHTOK_LOCK_BUSY;
+		}
+
+		if (pass_old) {
+			retval = _unix_verify_password(pamh, user, pass_old, ctrl);
+			if (retval != PAM_SUCCESS) {
+				pam_syslog(pamh, LOG_NOTICE, "user password changed by another process");
+				unlock_pwdf();
+				return retval;
+			}
+		}
+
+		retval = _unix_verify_shadow(pamh, user, ctrl);
+		if (retval != PAM_SUCCESS) {
+			pam_syslog(pamh, LOG_NOTICE, "user shadow entry expired");
+			unlock_pwdf();
+			return retval;
+		}
+
+		retval = _pam_unix_approve_pass(pamh, ctrl, pass_old, pass_new);
+		if (retval != PAM_SUCCESS) {
+			pam_syslog(pamh, LOG_NOTICE,
+			         "new password not acceptable 2");
+			pass_new = pass_old = NULL;	/* tidy up */
+			unlock_pwdf();
+			return retval;
+		}
+
+		/*
+		 * By reaching here we have approved the passwords and must now
+		 * rebuild the password database file.
+		 */
+
+		/*
+		 * First we encrypt the new password.
+		 */
+
+		tpass = create_password_hash(pass_new, ctrl, rounds);
+		if (tpass == NULL) {
+			pam_syslog(pamh, LOG_CRIT,
+				"out of memory for password");
+			pass_new = pass_old = NULL;	/* tidy up */
+			unlock_pwdf();
+			return PAM_BUF_ERR;
+		}
+
+		D(("password processed"));
+
+		/* update the password database(s) -- race conditions..? */
+
+		retval = _do_setpass(pamh, user, pass_old, tpass, ctrl,
+		                     remember);
+	        /* _do_setpass has called unlock_pwdf for us */
+
+		_pam_delete(tpass);
+		pass_old = pass_new = NULL;
+	} else {		/* something has broken with the module */
+		pam_syslog(pamh, LOG_ALERT,
+		         "password received unknown request");
+		retval = PAM_ABORT;
+	}
+
+	D(("retval was %d", retval));
+
+	return retval;
+}
+
+
+/* static module data */
+#ifdef PAM_STATIC
+struct pam_module _pam_unix_passwd_modstruct = {
+    "pam_unix_passwd",
+    NULL,
+    NULL,
+    NULL,
+    NULL,
+    NULL,
+    pam_sm_chauthtok,
+};
+#endif
diff --git a/modules/pam_unix/pam_unix_sess.c b/modules/pam_unix/pam_unix_sess.c
new file mode 100644
index 00000000..3379df42
--- /dev/null
+++ b/modules/pam_unix/pam_unix_sess.c
@@ -0,0 +1,143 @@
+/*
+ * $Id: pam_unix_sess.c,v 1.10 2008/01/23 15:35:13 t8m Exp $
+ *
+ * Copyright Alexander O. Yuriev, 1996.  All rights reserved.
+ * Copyright Jan R�korajski, 1999.  All rights reserved.
+ *
+ * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
+ * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
+ * are met:
+ * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
+ *    notice, and the entire permission notice in its entirety,
+ *    including the disclaimer of warranties.
+ * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
+ *    notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
+ *    documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
+ * 3. The name of the author may not be used to endorse or promote
+ *    products derived from this software without specific prior
+ *    written permission.
+ * 
+ * ALTERNATIVELY, this product may be distributed under the terms of
+ * the GNU Public License, in which case the provisions of the GPL are
+ * required INSTEAD OF the above restrictions.  (This clause is
+ * necessary due to a potential bad interaction between the GPL and
+ * the restrictions contained in a BSD-style copyright.)
+ * 
+ * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED ``AS IS'' AND ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED
+ * WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES
+ * OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE ARE
+ * DISCLAIMED.  IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT,
+ * INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES
+ * (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR
+ * SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION)
+ * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT,
+ * STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE)
+ * ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED
+ * OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.
+ */
+
+#include "config.h"
+
+#include <stdio.h>
+#include <stdlib.h>
+#include <stdarg.h>
+#include <unistd.h>
+#include <syslog.h>
+#include <fcntl.h>
+#include <sys/types.h>
+#include <sys/stat.h>
+
+/* indicate the following groups are defined */
+
+#define PAM_SM_SESSION
+
+#include <security/_pam_macros.h>
+#include <security/pam_modules.h>
+#include <security/pam_ext.h>
+#include <security/pam_modutil.h>
+
+#include "support.h"
+
+/*
+ * PAM framework looks for these entry-points to pass control to the
+ * session module.
+ */
+
+PAM_EXTERN int pam_sm_open_session(pam_handle_t * pamh, int flags,
+				   int argc, const char **argv)
+{
+	char *user_name, *service;
+	unsigned int ctrl;
+	int retval;
+    const char *login_name;
+
+	D(("called."));
+
+	ctrl = _set_ctrl(pamh, flags, NULL, NULL, argc, argv);
+
+	retval = pam_get_item(pamh, PAM_USER, (void *) &user_name);
+	if (user_name == NULL || *user_name == '\0' || retval != PAM_SUCCESS) {
+		pam_syslog(pamh, LOG_CRIT,
+		         "open_session - error recovering username");
+		return PAM_SESSION_ERR;		/* How did we get authenticated with
+						   no username?! */
+	}
+	retval = pam_get_item(pamh, PAM_SERVICE, (void *) &service);
+	if (service == NULL || *service == '\0' || retval != PAM_SUCCESS) {
+		pam_syslog(pamh, LOG_CRIT,
+		         "open_session - error recovering service");
+		return PAM_SESSION_ERR;
+	}
+	login_name = pam_modutil_getlogin(pamh);
+	if (login_name == NULL) {
+	    login_name = "";
+	}
+	pam_syslog(pamh, LOG_INFO, "session opened for user %s by %s(uid=%lu)",
+		 user_name, login_name, (unsigned long)getuid());
+
+	return PAM_SUCCESS;
+}
+
+PAM_EXTERN int pam_sm_close_session(pam_handle_t * pamh, int flags,
+				    int argc, const char **argv)
+{
+	char *user_name, *service;
+	unsigned int ctrl;
+	int retval;
+
+	D(("called."));
+
+	ctrl = _set_ctrl(pamh, flags, NULL, NULL, argc, argv);
+
+	retval = pam_get_item(pamh, PAM_USER, (void *) &user_name);
+	if (user_name == NULL || *user_name == '\0' || retval != PAM_SUCCESS) {
+		pam_syslog(pamh, LOG_CRIT,
+		         "close_session - error recovering username");
+		return PAM_SESSION_ERR;		/* How did we get authenticated with
+						   no username?! */
+	}
+	retval = pam_get_item(pamh, PAM_SERVICE, (void *) &service);
+	if (service == NULL || *service == '\0' || retval != PAM_SUCCESS) {
+		pam_syslog(pamh, LOG_CRIT,
+		         "close_session - error recovering service");
+		return PAM_SESSION_ERR;
+	}
+	pam_syslog(pamh, LOG_INFO, "session closed for user %s",
+		user_name);
+
+	return PAM_SUCCESS;
+}
+
+/* static module data */
+#ifdef PAM_STATIC
+struct pam_module _pam_unix_session_modstruct = {
+    "pam_unix_session",
+    NULL,
+    NULL,
+    NULL,
+    pam_sm_open_session,
+    pam_sm_close_session,
+    NULL,
+};
+#endif
+
diff --git a/modules/pam_unix/passverify.c b/modules/pam_unix/passverify.c
new file mode 100644
index 00000000..6d588e63
--- /dev/null
+++ b/modules/pam_unix/passverify.c
@@ -0,0 +1,1129 @@
+/*
+ * Copyright information at end of file.
+ */
+#include "config.h"
+#include <security/_pam_macros.h>
+#include <security/pam_modules.h>
+#include "support.h"
+#include <stdio.h>
+#include <string.h>
+#include <sys/types.h>
+#include <unistd.h>
+#include <pwd.h>
+#include <shadow.h>
+#include <syslog.h>
+#include <stdarg.h>
+#include <signal.h>
+#include <errno.h>
+#include <time.h>
+#include <sys/time.h>
+#include <sys/stat.h>
+#include <fcntl.h>
+#ifdef HAVE_CRYPT_H
+#include <crypt.h>
+#endif
+
+#include "md5.h"
+#include "bigcrypt.h"
+#include "passverify.h"
+
+#ifdef WITH_SELINUX
+#include <selinux/selinux.h>
+#define SELINUX_ENABLED is_selinux_enabled()>0
+#else
+#define SELINUX_ENABLED 0
+#endif
+
+#ifdef HELPER_COMPILE
+#define pam_modutil_getpwnam(h,n) getpwnam(n)
+#define pam_modutil_getspnam(h,n) getspnam(n)
+#define pam_syslog(h,a,b,c) helper_log_err(a,b,c)
+#else
+#include <security/pam_modutil.h>
+#include <security/pam_ext.h>
+#endif
+
+#if defined(USE_LCKPWDF) && !defined(HAVE_LCKPWDF)
+# include "./lckpwdf.-c"
+#endif
+
+static void
+strip_hpux_aging(char *hash)
+{
+	static const char valid[] = "ABCDEFGHIJKLMNOPQRSTUVWXYZ"
+		"abcdefghijklmnopqrstuvwxyz"
+		"0123456789./";
+	if ((*hash != '$') && (strlen(hash) > 13)) {
+		for (hash += 13; *hash != '\0'; hash++) {
+			if (strchr(valid, *hash) == NULL) {
+				*hash = '\0';
+				break;
+			}
+		}
+	}
+}
+
+int
+verify_pwd_hash(const char *p, char *hash, unsigned int nullok)
+{
+	size_t hash_len;
+	char *pp = NULL;
+	int retval;
+	D(("called"));
+
+	strip_hpux_aging(hash);
+	hash_len = strlen(hash);
+	if (!hash_len) {
+		/* the stored password is NULL */
+		if (nullok) { /* this means we've succeeded */
+			D(("user has empty password - access granted"));
+			retval = PAM_SUCCESS;
+		} else {
+			D(("user has empty password - access denied"));
+			retval = PAM_AUTH_ERR;
+		}
+	} else if (!p || *hash == '*' || *hash == '!') {
+		retval = PAM_AUTH_ERR;
+	} else {
+		if (!strncmp(hash, "$1$", 3)) {
+			pp = Goodcrypt_md5(p, hash);
+		    	if (pp && strcmp(pp, hash) != 0) {
+				_pam_delete(pp);
+				pp = Brokencrypt_md5(p, hash);
+		    	}
+		} else if (*hash != '$' && hash_len >= 13) {
+		    	pp = bigcrypt(p, hash);
+		    	if (pp && hash_len == 13 && strlen(pp) > hash_len) {
+				_pam_overwrite(pp + hash_len);
+		    	}
+		} else {
+                	/*
+			 * Ok, we don't know the crypt algorithm, but maybe
+			 * libcrypt knows about it? We should try it.
+			 */
+#ifdef HAVE_CRYPT_R
+			struct crypt_data *cdata;
+			cdata = malloc(sizeof(*cdata));
+			if (cdata != NULL) {
+				cdata->initialized = 0;
+				pp = x_strdup(crypt_r(p, hash, cdata));
+				memset(cdata, '\0', sizeof(*cdata));
+				free(cdata);
+			}
+#else
+			pp = x_strdup(crypt(p, hash));
+#endif
+		}
+		p = NULL;		/* no longer needed here */
+
+		/* the moment of truth -- do we agree with the password? */
+		D(("comparing state of pp[%s] and salt[%s]", pp, salt));
+
+		if (pp && strcmp(pp, hash) == 0) {
+			retval = PAM_SUCCESS;
+		} else {
+			retval = PAM_AUTH_ERR;
+		}
+	}
+
+	if (pp)
+		_pam_delete(pp);
+	D(("done [%d].", retval));
+
+	return retval;
+}
+
+int
+is_pwd_shadowed(const struct passwd *pwd)
+{
+	if (pwd != NULL) {
+		if (strcmp(pwd->pw_passwd, "x") == 0) {
+			return 1;
+		}
+		if ((pwd->pw_passwd[0] == '#') &&
+		    (pwd->pw_passwd[1] == '#') &&
+		    (strcmp(pwd->pw_name, pwd->pw_passwd + 2) == 0)) {
+			return 1;
+		}
+	}
+	return 0;
+}
+
+#ifdef HELPER_COMPILE
+int
+get_account_info(const char *name,
+	struct passwd **pwd, struct spwd **spwdent)
+#else
+int
+get_account_info(pam_handle_t *pamh, const char *name,
+	struct passwd **pwd,  struct spwd **spwdent)
+#endif
+{
+	/* UNIX passwords area */
+	*pwd = pam_modutil_getpwnam(pamh, name);	/* Get password file entry... */
+	*spwdent = NULL;
+
+	if (*pwd != NULL) {
+		if (strcmp((*pwd)->pw_passwd, "*NP*") == 0)
+		{ /* NIS+ */
+#ifdef HELPER_COMPILE
+			uid_t save_euid, save_uid;
+
+			save_euid = geteuid();
+			save_uid = getuid();
+			if (save_uid == (*pwd)->pw_uid)
+				setreuid(save_euid, save_uid);
+			else  {
+				setreuid(0, -1);
+				if (setreuid(-1, (*pwd)->pw_uid) == -1) {
+					setreuid(-1, 0);
+					setreuid(0, -1);
+					if(setreuid(-1, (*pwd)->pw_uid) == -1)
+						return PAM_CRED_INSUFFICIENT;
+				}
+			}
+
+			*spwdent = pam_modutil_getspnam(pamh, name);
+			if (save_uid == (*pwd)->pw_uid)
+				setreuid(save_uid, save_euid);
+			else {
+				setreuid(-1, 0);
+				setreuid(save_uid, -1);
+				setreuid(-1, save_euid);
+			}
+
+			if (*spwdent == NULL || (*spwdent)->sp_pwdp == NULL)
+				return PAM_AUTHINFO_UNAVAIL;
+#else
+			/* we must run helper for NIS+ passwords */
+			return PAM_UNIX_RUN_HELPER;
+#endif
+		} else if (is_pwd_shadowed(*pwd)) {
+			/*
+			 * ...and shadow password file entry for this user,
+			 * if shadowing is enabled
+			 */
+#ifndef HELPER_COMPILE
+			if (geteuid() || SELINUX_ENABLED)
+				return PAM_UNIX_RUN_HELPER;
+#endif
+			*spwdent = pam_modutil_getspnam(pamh, name);
+			if (*spwdent == NULL || (*spwdent)->sp_pwdp == NULL)
+				return PAM_AUTHINFO_UNAVAIL;
+		}
+	} else {
+		return PAM_USER_UNKNOWN;
+	}
+	return PAM_SUCCESS;
+}
+
+#ifdef HELPER_COMPILE
+int
+get_pwd_hash(const char *name,
+	struct passwd **pwd, char **hash)
+#else
+int
+get_pwd_hash(pam_handle_t *pamh, const char *name,
+	struct passwd **pwd, char **hash)
+#endif
+{
+	int retval;
+	struct spwd *spwdent = NULL;
+
+#ifdef HELPER_COMPILE
+	retval = get_account_info(name, pwd, &spwdent);
+#else
+	retval = get_account_info(pamh, name, pwd, &spwdent);
+#endif
+	if (retval != PAM_SUCCESS) {
+		return retval;
+	}
+
+	if (spwdent)
+		*hash = x_strdup(spwdent->sp_pwdp);
+	else
+		*hash = x_strdup((*pwd)->pw_passwd);
+	if (*hash == NULL)
+		return PAM_BUF_ERR;
+
+	return PAM_SUCCESS;
+}
+
+#ifdef HELPER_COMPILE
+int
+check_shadow_expiry(struct spwd *spent, int *daysleft)
+#else
+int
+check_shadow_expiry(pam_handle_t *pamh, struct spwd *spent, int *daysleft)
+#endif
+{
+	long int curdays;
+	*daysleft = -1;
+	curdays = (long int)(time(NULL) / (60 * 60 * 24));
+	D(("today is %d, last change %d", curdays, spent->sp_lstchg));
+	if ((curdays > spent->sp_expire) && (spent->sp_expire != -1)) {
+		D(("account expired"));
+		return PAM_ACCT_EXPIRED;
+	}
+	if (spent->sp_lstchg == 0) {
+		D(("need a new password"));
+		*daysleft = 0;
+		return PAM_NEW_AUTHTOK_REQD;
+	}
+	if (curdays < spent->sp_lstchg) {
+		pam_syslog(pamh, LOG_DEBUG,
+			 "account %s has password changed in future",
+			 spent->sp_namp);
+		return PAM_SUCCESS;
+	}
+	if ((curdays - spent->sp_lstchg > spent->sp_max)
+	    && (curdays - spent->sp_lstchg > spent->sp_inact)
+	    && (curdays - spent->sp_lstchg > spent->sp_max + spent->sp_inact)
+	    && (spent->sp_max != -1) && (spent->sp_inact != -1)) {
+		*daysleft = (int)((spent->sp_lstchg + spent->sp_max) - curdays);
+		D(("authtok expired"));
+		return PAM_AUTHTOK_EXPIRED;
+	}
+	if ((curdays - spent->sp_lstchg > spent->sp_max) && (spent->sp_max != -1)) {
+		D(("need a new password 2"));
+		return PAM_NEW_AUTHTOK_REQD;
+	}
+	if ((curdays - spent->sp_lstchg > spent->sp_max - spent->sp_warn)
+	    && (spent->sp_max != -1) && (spent->sp_warn != -1)) {
+		*daysleft = (int)((spent->sp_lstchg + spent->sp_max) - curdays);
+		D(("warn before expiry"));
+	}
+	return PAM_SUCCESS;
+
+}
+
+/* passwd/salt conversion macros */
+
+#define PW_TMPFILE              "/etc/npasswd"
+#define SH_TMPFILE              "/etc/nshadow"
+#define OPW_TMPFILE             "/etc/security/nopasswd"
+
+/*
+ * i64c - convert an integer to a radix 64 character
+ */
+static int
+i64c(int i)
+{
+        if (i < 0)
+                return ('.');
+        else if (i > 63)
+                return ('z');
+        if (i == 0)
+                return ('.');
+        if (i == 1)
+                return ('/');
+        if (i >= 2 && i <= 11)
+                return ('0' - 2 + i);
+        if (i >= 12 && i <= 37)
+                return ('A' - 12 + i);
+        if (i >= 38 && i <= 63)
+                return ('a' - 38 + i);
+        return ('\0');
+}
+
+/* <where> must point to a buffer of at least <length>+1 length */
+static void
+crypt_make_salt(char *where, int length)
+{
+        struct timeval tv;
+        MD5_CTX ctx;
+        unsigned char tmp[16];
+        unsigned char *src = (unsigned char *)where;
+        int i;
+#ifdef PAM_PATH_RANDOMDEV
+	int fd;
+	int rv;
+
+	if ((rv = fd = open(PAM_PATH_RANDOMDEV, O_RDONLY)) != -1) {
+		while ((rv = read(fd, where, length)) != length && errno == EINTR);
+		close (fd);
+	}
+	if (rv != length) {
+#endif
+        /*
+         * Code lifted from Marek Michalkiewicz's shadow suite. (CG)
+         * removed use of static variables (AGM)
+         *
+	 * will work correctly only for length <= 16 */
+	src = tmp;
+        GoodMD5Init(&ctx);
+        gettimeofday(&tv, (struct timezone *) 0);
+        GoodMD5Update(&ctx, (void *) &tv, sizeof tv);
+        i = getpid();
+        GoodMD5Update(&ctx, (void *) &i, sizeof i);
+        i = clock();
+        GoodMD5Update(&ctx, (void *) &i, sizeof i);
+        GoodMD5Update(&ctx, src, length);
+        GoodMD5Final(tmp, &ctx);
+#ifdef PAM_PATH_RANDOMDEV
+	}
+#endif
+        for (i = 0; i < length; i++)
+                *where++ = i64c(src[i] & 077);
+        *where = '\0';
+}
+
+char *
+crypt_md5_wrapper(const char *pass_new)
+{
+        unsigned char result[16];
+        char *cp = (char *) result;
+
+        cp = stpcpy(cp, "$1$");      /* magic for the MD5 */
+	crypt_make_salt(cp, 8);
+
+        /* no longer need cleartext */
+        cp = Goodcrypt_md5(pass_new, (const char *) result);
+	pass_new = NULL;
+
+        return cp;
+}
+
+char *
+create_password_hash(const char *password, unsigned int ctrl, int rounds)
+{
+	const char *algoid;
+	char salt[64]; /* contains rounds number + max 16 bytes of salt + algo id */
+	char *sp;
+
+	if (on(UNIX_MD5_PASS, ctrl)) {
+		return crypt_md5_wrapper(password);
+	}
+	if (on(UNIX_SHA256_PASS, ctrl)) {
+		algoid = "$5$";
+	} else if (on(UNIX_SHA512_PASS, ctrl)) {
+		algoid = "$6$";
+	} else { /* must be crypt/bigcrypt */
+		char tmppass[9];
+		char *crypted;
+
+		crypt_make_salt(salt, 2);
+		if (off(UNIX_BIGCRYPT, ctrl) && strlen(password) > 8) {
+			strncpy(tmppass, password, sizeof(tmppass)-1);
+			tmppass[sizeof(tmppass)-1] = '\0';
+			password = tmppass;
+		}
+		crypted = bigcrypt(password, salt);
+		memset(tmppass, '\0', sizeof(tmppass));
+		password = NULL;
+		return crypted;
+	}
+
+	sp = stpcpy(salt, algoid);
+	if (on(UNIX_ALGO_ROUNDS, ctrl)) {
+		sp += snprintf(sp, sizeof(salt) - 3, "rounds=%u$", rounds);
+	}
+	crypt_make_salt(sp, 8);
+	/* For now be conservative so the resulting hashes
+	 * are not too long. 8 bytes of salt prevents dictionary
+	 * attacks well enough. */
+	sp = crypt(password, salt);
+	if (strncmp(algoid, sp, strlen(algoid)) != 0) {
+	/* libc doesn't know the algorithm, use MD5 */
+		memset(sp, '\0', strlen(sp));
+		return crypt_md5_wrapper(password);
+	}
+
+	return x_strdup(sp);
+}
+
+#ifdef WITH_SELINUX
+int
+unix_selinux_confined(void)
+{
+    static int confined = -1;
+    int fd;
+    char tempfile[]="/etc/.pwdXXXXXX";
+
+    if (confined != -1)
+    	return confined;
+
+    /* cannot be confined without SELinux enabled */
+    if (!SELINUX_ENABLED){
+       	confined = 0;
+       	return confined;
+    }
+
+    /* let's try opening shadow read only */
+    if ((fd=open("/etc/shadow", O_RDONLY)) != -1) {
+        close(fd);
+        confined = 0;
+        return confined;
+    }
+
+    if (errno == EACCES) {
+	confined = 1;
+	return confined;
+    }
+
+    /* shadow opening failed because of other reasons let's try
+       creating a file in /etc */
+    if ((fd=mkstemp(tempfile)) != -1) {
+        unlink(tempfile);
+        close(fd);
+        confined = 0;
+        return confined;
+    }
+
+    confined = 1;
+    return confined;
+}
+
+#else
+int
+unix_selinux_confined(void)
+{
+    return 0;
+}
+#endif
+
+#ifdef USE_LCKPWDF
+int
+lock_pwdf(void)
+{
+        int i;
+        int retval;
+
+#ifndef HELPER_COMPILE
+        if (unix_selinux_confined()) {
+                return PAM_SUCCESS;
+        }
+#endif
+        /* These values for the number of attempts and the sleep time
+           are, of course, completely arbitrary.
+           My reading of the PAM docs is that, once pam_chauthtok() has been
+           called with PAM_UPDATE_AUTHTOK, we are obliged to take any
+           reasonable steps to make sure the token is updated; so retrying
+           for 1/10 sec. isn't overdoing it. */
+        i=0;
+        while((retval = lckpwdf()) != 0 && i < 100) {
+                usleep(1000);
+                i++;
+        }
+        if(retval != 0) {
+                return PAM_AUTHTOK_LOCK_BUSY;
+        }
+        return PAM_SUCCESS;
+}
+
+void
+unlock_pwdf(void)
+{
+#ifndef HELPER_COMPILE
+        if (unix_selinux_confined()) {
+                return;
+        }
+#endif
+        ulckpwdf();
+}
+#else
+int
+lock_pwdf(void)
+{
+	return PAM_SUCCESS;
+}
+
+void
+unlock_pwdf(void)
+{
+	return;
+}
+#endif
+
+int
+save_old_password(const char *forwho, const char *oldpass,
+		  int howmany)
+{
+    static char buf[16384];
+    static char nbuf[16384];
+    char *s_luser, *s_uid, *s_npas, *s_pas, *pass;
+    int npas;
+    FILE *pwfile, *opwfile;
+    int err = 0;
+    int oldmask;
+    int found = 0;
+    struct passwd *pwd = NULL;
+    struct stat st;
+#ifdef WITH_SELINUX
+    security_context_t prev_context=NULL;
+#endif
+
+    if (howmany < 0) {
+	return PAM_SUCCESS;
+    }
+
+    if (oldpass == NULL) {
+	return PAM_SUCCESS;
+    }
+
+    oldmask = umask(077);
+
+#ifdef WITH_SELINUX
+    if (SELINUX_ENABLED) {
+      security_context_t passwd_context=NULL;
+      if (getfilecon("/etc/passwd",&passwd_context)<0) {
+        return PAM_AUTHTOK_ERR;
+      };
+      if (getfscreatecon(&prev_context)<0) {
+        freecon(passwd_context);
+        return PAM_AUTHTOK_ERR;
+      }
+      if (setfscreatecon(passwd_context)) {
+        freecon(passwd_context);
+        freecon(prev_context);
+        return PAM_AUTHTOK_ERR;
+      }
+      freecon(passwd_context);
+    }
+#endif
+    pwfile = fopen(OPW_TMPFILE, "w");
+    umask(oldmask);
+    if (pwfile == NULL) {
+      err = 1;
+      goto done;
+    }
+
+    opwfile = fopen(OLD_PASSWORDS_FILE, "r");
+    if (opwfile == NULL) {
+	fclose(pwfile);
+      err = 1;
+      goto done;
+    }
+
+    if (fstat(fileno(opwfile), &st) == -1) {
+	fclose(opwfile);
+	fclose(pwfile);
+	err = 1;
+	goto done;
+    }
+
+    if (fchown(fileno(pwfile), st.st_uid, st.st_gid) == -1) {
+	fclose(opwfile);
+	fclose(pwfile);
+	err = 1;
+	goto done;
+    }
+    if (fchmod(fileno(pwfile), st.st_mode) == -1) {
+	fclose(opwfile);
+	fclose(pwfile);
+	err = 1;
+	goto done;
+    }
+
+    while (fgets(buf, 16380, opwfile)) {
+	if (!strncmp(buf, forwho, strlen(forwho))) {
+	    char *sptr = NULL;
+	    found = 1;
+	    if (howmany == 0)
+	    	continue;
+	    buf[strlen(buf) - 1] = '\0';
+	    s_luser = strtok_r(buf, ":", &sptr);
+	    s_uid = strtok_r(NULL, ":", &sptr);
+	    s_npas = strtok_r(NULL, ":", &sptr);
+	    s_pas = strtok_r(NULL, ":", &sptr);
+	    npas = strtol(s_npas, NULL, 10) + 1;
+	    while (npas > howmany) {
+		s_pas = strpbrk(s_pas, ",");
+		if (s_pas != NULL)
+		    s_pas++;
+		npas--;
+	    }
+	    pass = crypt_md5_wrapper(oldpass);
+	    if (s_pas == NULL)
+		snprintf(nbuf, sizeof(nbuf), "%s:%s:%d:%s\n",
+			 s_luser, s_uid, npas, pass);
+	    else
+		snprintf(nbuf, sizeof(nbuf),"%s:%s:%d:%s,%s\n",
+			 s_luser, s_uid, npas, s_pas, pass);
+	    _pam_delete(pass);
+	    if (fputs(nbuf, pwfile) < 0) {
+		err = 1;
+		break;
+	    }
+	} else if (fputs(buf, pwfile) < 0) {
+	    err = 1;
+	    break;
+	}
+    }
+    fclose(opwfile);
+
+    if (!found) {
+	pwd = getpwnam(forwho);
+	if (pwd == NULL) {
+	    err = 1;
+	} else {
+	    pass = crypt_md5_wrapper(oldpass);
+	    snprintf(nbuf, sizeof(nbuf), "%s:%lu:1:%s\n",
+		     forwho, (unsigned long)pwd->pw_uid, pass);
+	    _pam_delete(pass);
+	    if (fputs(nbuf, pwfile) < 0) {
+		err = 1;
+	    }
+	}
+    }
+
+    if (fclose(pwfile)) {
+	D(("error writing entries to old passwords file: %m"));
+	err = 1;
+    }
+
+done:
+    if (!err) {
+	if (rename(OPW_TMPFILE, OLD_PASSWORDS_FILE))
+	    err = 1;
+    }
+#ifdef WITH_SELINUX
+    if (SELINUX_ENABLED) {
+      if (setfscreatecon(prev_context)) {
+        err = 1;
+      }
+      if (prev_context)
+        freecon(prev_context);
+      prev_context=NULL;
+    }
+#endif
+    if (!err) {
+	return PAM_SUCCESS;
+    } else {
+	unlink(OPW_TMPFILE);
+	return PAM_AUTHTOK_ERR;
+    }
+}
+
+#ifdef HELPER_COMPILE
+int
+unix_update_passwd(const char *forwho, const char *towhat)
+#else
+int
+unix_update_passwd(pam_handle_t *pamh, const char *forwho, const char *towhat)
+#endif
+{
+    struct passwd *tmpent = NULL;
+    struct stat st;
+    FILE *pwfile, *opwfile;
+    int err = 1;
+    int oldmask;
+#ifdef WITH_SELINUX
+    security_context_t prev_context=NULL;
+#endif
+
+    oldmask = umask(077);
+#ifdef WITH_SELINUX
+    if (SELINUX_ENABLED) {
+      security_context_t passwd_context=NULL;
+      if (getfilecon("/etc/passwd",&passwd_context)<0) {
+	return PAM_AUTHTOK_ERR;
+      };
+      if (getfscreatecon(&prev_context)<0) {
+	freecon(passwd_context);
+	return PAM_AUTHTOK_ERR;
+      }
+      if (setfscreatecon(passwd_context)) {
+	freecon(passwd_context);
+	freecon(prev_context);
+	return PAM_AUTHTOK_ERR;
+      }
+      freecon(passwd_context);
+    }
+#endif
+    pwfile = fopen(PW_TMPFILE, "w");
+    umask(oldmask);
+    if (pwfile == NULL) {
+      err = 1;
+      goto done;
+    }
+
+    opwfile = fopen("/etc/passwd", "r");
+    if (opwfile == NULL) {
+	fclose(pwfile);
+	err = 1;
+	goto done;
+    }
+
+    if (fstat(fileno(opwfile), &st) == -1) {
+	fclose(opwfile);
+	fclose(pwfile);
+	err = 1;
+	goto done;
+    }
+
+    if (fchown(fileno(pwfile), st.st_uid, st.st_gid) == -1) {
+	fclose(opwfile);
+	fclose(pwfile);
+	err = 1;
+	goto done;
+    }
+    if (fchmod(fileno(pwfile), st.st_mode) == -1) {
+	fclose(opwfile);
+	fclose(pwfile);
+	err = 1;
+	goto done;
+    }
+
+    tmpent = fgetpwent(opwfile);
+    while (tmpent) {
+	if (!strcmp(tmpent->pw_name, forwho)) {
+	    /* To shut gcc up */
+	    union {
+		const char *const_charp;
+		char *charp;
+	    } assigned_passwd;
+	    assigned_passwd.const_charp = towhat;
+
+	    tmpent->pw_passwd = assigned_passwd.charp;
+	    err = 0;
+	}
+	if (putpwent(tmpent, pwfile)) {
+	    D(("error writing entry to password file: %m"));
+	    err = 1;
+	    break;
+	}
+	tmpent = fgetpwent(opwfile);
+    }
+    fclose(opwfile);
+
+    if (fclose(pwfile)) {
+	D(("error writing entries to password file: %m"));
+	err = 1;
+    }
+
+done:
+    if (!err) {
+	if (!rename(PW_TMPFILE, "/etc/passwd"))
+#ifdef HELPER_COMPILE
+	    helper_log_err(
+#else
+	    pam_syslog(pamh,
+#endif
+		LOG_NOTICE, "password changed for %s", forwho);
+	else
+	    err = 1;
+    }
+#ifdef WITH_SELINUX
+    if (SELINUX_ENABLED) {
+      if (setfscreatecon(prev_context)) {
+	err = 1;
+      }
+      if (prev_context)
+	freecon(prev_context);
+      prev_context=NULL;
+    }
+#endif
+    if (!err) {
+	return PAM_SUCCESS;
+    } else {
+	unlink(PW_TMPFILE);
+	return PAM_AUTHTOK_ERR;
+    }
+}
+
+#ifdef HELPER_COMPILE
+int
+unix_update_shadow(const char *forwho, char *towhat)
+#else
+int
+unix_update_shadow(pam_handle_t *pamh, const char *forwho, char *towhat)
+#endif
+{
+    struct spwd *spwdent = NULL, *stmpent = NULL;
+    struct stat st;
+    FILE *pwfile, *opwfile;
+    int err = 1;
+    int oldmask;
+#ifdef WITH_SELINUX
+    security_context_t prev_context=NULL;
+#endif
+
+    spwdent = getspnam(forwho);
+    if (spwdent == NULL) {
+	return PAM_USER_UNKNOWN;
+    }
+    oldmask = umask(077);
+
+#ifdef WITH_SELINUX
+    if (SELINUX_ENABLED) {
+      security_context_t shadow_context=NULL;
+      if (getfilecon("/etc/shadow",&shadow_context)<0) {
+	return PAM_AUTHTOK_ERR;
+      };
+      if (getfscreatecon(&prev_context)<0) {
+	freecon(shadow_context);
+	return PAM_AUTHTOK_ERR;
+      }
+      if (setfscreatecon(shadow_context)) {
+	freecon(shadow_context);
+	freecon(prev_context);
+	return PAM_AUTHTOK_ERR;
+      }
+      freecon(shadow_context);
+    }
+#endif
+    pwfile = fopen(SH_TMPFILE, "w");
+    umask(oldmask);
+    if (pwfile == NULL) {
+	err = 1;
+	goto done;
+    }
+
+    opwfile = fopen("/etc/shadow", "r");
+    if (opwfile == NULL) {
+	fclose(pwfile);
+	err = 1;
+	goto done;
+    }
+
+    if (fstat(fileno(opwfile), &st) == -1) {
+	fclose(opwfile);
+	fclose(pwfile);
+	err = 1;
+	goto done;
+    }
+
+    if (fchown(fileno(pwfile), st.st_uid, st.st_gid) == -1) {
+	fclose(opwfile);
+	fclose(pwfile);
+	err = 1;
+	goto done;
+    }
+    if (fchmod(fileno(pwfile), st.st_mode) == -1) {
+	fclose(opwfile);
+	fclose(pwfile);
+	err = 1;
+	goto done;
+    }
+
+    stmpent = fgetspent(opwfile);
+    while (stmpent) {
+
+	if (!strcmp(stmpent->sp_namp, forwho)) {
+	    stmpent->sp_pwdp = towhat;
+	    stmpent->sp_lstchg = time(NULL) / (60 * 60 * 24);
+	    err = 0;
+	    D(("Set password %s for %s", stmpent->sp_pwdp, forwho));
+	}
+
+	if (putspent(stmpent, pwfile)) {
+	    D(("error writing entry to shadow file: %m"));
+	    err = 1;
+	    break;
+	}
+
+	stmpent = fgetspent(opwfile);
+    }
+    fclose(opwfile);
+
+    if (fclose(pwfile)) {
+	D(("error writing entries to shadow file: %m"));
+	err = 1;
+    }
+
+ done:
+    if (!err) {
+	if (!rename(SH_TMPFILE, "/etc/shadow"))
+#ifdef HELPER_COMPILE
+	    helper_log_err(
+#else
+	    pam_syslog(pamh,
+#endif
+		LOG_NOTICE, "password changed for %s", forwho);
+	else
+	    err = 1;
+    }
+
+#ifdef WITH_SELINUX
+    if (SELINUX_ENABLED) {
+      if (setfscreatecon(prev_context)) {
+	err = 1;
+      }
+      if (prev_context)
+	freecon(prev_context);
+      prev_context=NULL;
+    }
+#endif
+
+    if (!err) {
+	return PAM_SUCCESS;
+    } else {
+	unlink(SH_TMPFILE);
+	return PAM_AUTHTOK_ERR;
+    }
+}
+
+#ifdef HELPER_COMPILE
+
+int
+helper_verify_password(const char *name, const char *p, int nullok)
+{
+	struct passwd *pwd = NULL;
+	char *salt = NULL;
+	int retval;
+
+	retval = get_pwd_hash(name, &pwd, &salt);
+
+	if (pwd == NULL || salt == NULL) {
+		helper_log_err(LOG_WARNING, "check pass; user unknown");
+		retval = PAM_USER_UNKNOWN;
+	} else {
+		retval = verify_pwd_hash(p, salt, nullok);
+	}
+
+	if (salt) {
+		_pam_overwrite(salt);
+		_pam_drop(salt);
+	}
+
+	p = NULL;		/* no longer needed here */
+
+	return retval;
+}
+
+void
+helper_log_err(int err, const char *format, ...)
+{
+	va_list args;
+
+	va_start(args, format);
+	openlog(HELPER_COMPILE, LOG_CONS | LOG_PID, LOG_AUTHPRIV);
+	vsyslog(err, format, args);
+	va_end(args);
+	closelog();
+}
+
+static void
+su_sighandler(int sig)
+{
+#ifndef SA_RESETHAND
+        /* emulate the behaviour of the SA_RESETHAND flag */
+        if ( sig == SIGILL || sig == SIGTRAP || sig == SIGBUS || sig = SIGSERV )
+                signal(sig, SIG_DFL);
+#endif
+        if (sig > 0) {
+                _exit(sig);
+        }
+}
+
+void
+setup_signals(void)
+{
+        struct sigaction action;        /* posix signal structure */
+
+        /*
+         * Setup signal handlers
+         */
+        (void) memset((void *) &action, 0, sizeof(action));
+        action.sa_handler = su_sighandler;
+#ifdef SA_RESETHAND
+        action.sa_flags = SA_RESETHAND;
+#endif
+        (void) sigaction(SIGILL, &action, NULL);
+        (void) sigaction(SIGTRAP, &action, NULL);
+        (void) sigaction(SIGBUS, &action, NULL);
+        (void) sigaction(SIGSEGV, &action, NULL);
+        action.sa_handler = SIG_IGN;
+        action.sa_flags = 0;
+        (void) sigaction(SIGTERM, &action, NULL);
+        (void) sigaction(SIGHUP, &action, NULL);
+        (void) sigaction(SIGINT, &action, NULL);
+        (void) sigaction(SIGQUIT, &action, NULL);
+}
+
+char *
+getuidname(uid_t uid)
+{
+        struct passwd *pw;
+        static char username[256];
+
+        pw = getpwuid(uid);
+        if (pw == NULL)
+                return NULL;
+
+        strncpy(username, pw->pw_name, sizeof(username));
+        username[sizeof(username) - 1] = '\0';
+
+        return username;
+}
+
+int
+read_passwords(int fd, int npass, char **passwords)
+{
+        int rbytes = 0;
+        int offset = 0;
+        int i = 0;
+        char *pptr;
+        while (npass > 0) {
+                rbytes = read(fd, passwords[i]+offset, MAXPASS-offset);
+
+                if (rbytes < 0) {
+                        if (errno == EINTR) continue;
+                        break;
+                }
+                if (rbytes == 0)
+                        break;
+
+                while (npass > 0 && (pptr=memchr(passwords[i]+offset, '\0', rbytes))
+                        != NULL) {
+                        rbytes -= pptr - (passwords[i]+offset) + 1;
+                        i++;
+                        offset = 0;
+                        npass--;
+                        if (rbytes > 0) {
+                                if (npass > 0)
+                                        memcpy(passwords[i], pptr+1, rbytes);
+                                memset(pptr+1, '\0', rbytes);
+                        }
+                }
+                offset += rbytes;
+        }
+
+        /* clear up */
+        if (offset > 0 && npass > 0) {
+                memset(passwords[i], '\0', offset);
+        }
+
+        return i;
+}
+
+#endif
+/* ****************************************************************** *
+ * Copyright (c) Jan Rêkorajski 1999.
+ * Copyright (c) Andrew G. Morgan 1996-8.
+ * Copyright (c) Alex O. Yuriev, 1996.
+ * Copyright (c) Cristian Gafton 1996.
+ * Copyright (c) Red Hat, Inc. 1996, 2007, 2008.
+ *
+ * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
+ * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
+ * are met:
+ * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
+ *    notice, and the entire permission notice in its entirety,
+ *    including the disclaimer of warranties.
+ * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
+ *    notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
+ *    documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
+ * 3. The name of the author may not be used to endorse or promote
+ *    products derived from this software without specific prior
+ *    written permission.
+ *
+ * ALTERNATIVELY, this product may be distributed under the terms of
+ * the GNU Public License, in which case the provisions of the GPL are
+ * required INSTEAD OF the above restrictions.  (This clause is
+ * necessary due to a potential bad interaction between the GPL and
+ * the restrictions contained in a BSD-style copyright.)
+ *
+ * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED ``AS IS'' AND ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED
+ * WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES
+ * OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE ARE
+ * DISCLAIMED.  IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT,
+ * INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES
+ * (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR
+ * SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION)
+ * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT,
+ * STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE)
+ * ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED
+ * OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.
+ */
diff --git a/modules/pam_unix/passverify.h b/modules/pam_unix/passverify.h
new file mode 100644
index 00000000..e8e112d0
--- /dev/null
+++ b/modules/pam_unix/passverify.h
@@ -0,0 +1,124 @@
+/*
+ * Copyright information at end of file.
+ */
+
+#include <sys/types.h>
+#include <pwd.h>
+#include <security/pam_modules.h>
+
+#define PAM_UNIX_RUN_HELPER PAM_CRED_INSUFFICIENT
+
+#define MAXPASS		200	/* the maximum length of a password */
+
+#define OLD_PASSWORDS_FILE      "/etc/security/opasswd"
+
+int
+verify_pwd_hash(const char *p, char *hash, unsigned int nullok);
+
+int
+is_pwd_shadowed(const struct passwd *pwd);
+
+char *
+crypt_md5_wrapper(const char *pass_new);
+
+char *
+create_password_hash(const char *password, unsigned int ctrl, int rounds);
+
+int
+unix_selinux_confined(void);
+
+int
+lock_pwdf(void);
+
+void
+unlock_pwdf(void);
+
+int
+save_old_password(const char *forwho, const char *oldpass,
+		  int howmany);
+
+#ifdef HELPER_COMPILE
+void
+helper_log_err(int err, const char *format,...);
+
+int
+helper_verify_password(const char *name, const char *p, int nullok);
+
+void
+setup_signals(void);
+
+char *
+getuidname(uid_t uid);
+
+int
+read_passwords(int fd, int npass, char **passwords);
+
+int
+get_account_info(const char *name,
+	struct passwd **pwd, struct spwd **spwdent);
+
+int
+get_pwd_hash(const char *name,
+	struct passwd **pwd, char **hash);
+
+int
+check_shadow_expiry(struct spwd *spent, int *daysleft);
+
+int
+unix_update_passwd(const char *forwho, const char *towhat);
+
+int
+unix_update_shadow(const char *forwho, char *towhat);
+#else
+int
+get_account_info(pam_handle_t *pamh, const char *name,
+	struct passwd **pwd,  struct spwd **spwdent);
+
+int
+get_pwd_hash(pam_handle_t *pamh, const char *name,
+	struct passwd **pwd, char **hash);
+
+int
+check_shadow_expiry(pam_handle_t *pamh, struct spwd *spent, int *daysleft);
+
+int
+unix_update_passwd(pam_handle_t *pamh, const char *forwho, const char *towhat);
+
+int
+unix_update_shadow(pam_handle_t *pamh, const char *forwho, char *towhat);
+#endif
+
+/* ****************************************************************** *
+ * Copyright (c) Red Hat, Inc. 2007.
+ *
+ * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
+ * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
+ * are met:
+ * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
+ *    notice, and the entire permission notice in its entirety,
+ *    including the disclaimer of warranties.
+ * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
+ *    notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
+ *    documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
+ * 3. The name of the author may not be used to endorse or promote
+ *    products derived from this software without specific prior
+ *    written permission.
+ *
+ * ALTERNATIVELY, this product may be distributed under the terms of
+ * the GNU Public License, in which case the provisions of the GPL are
+ * required INSTEAD OF the above restrictions.  (This clause is
+ * necessary due to a potential bad interaction between the GPL and
+ * the restrictions contained in a BSD-style copyright.)
+ *
+ * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED ``AS IS'' AND ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED
+ * WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES
+ * OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE ARE
+ * DISCLAIMED.  IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT,
+ * INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES
+ * (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR
+ * SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION)
+ * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT,
+ * STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE)
+ * ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED
+ * OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.
+ */
diff --git a/modules/pam_unix/support.c b/modules/pam_unix/support.c
new file mode 100644
index 00000000..b82cad26
--- /dev/null
+++ b/modules/pam_unix/support.c
@@ -0,0 +1,893 @@
+/*
+ * Copyright information at end of file.
+ */
+
+#include "config.h"
+
+#include <stdlib.h>
+#include <unistd.h>
+#include <stdarg.h>
+#include <stdio.h>
+#include <string.h>
+#include <malloc.h>
+#include <pwd.h>
+#include <shadow.h>
+#include <limits.h>
+#include <utmp.h>
+#include <errno.h>
+#include <signal.h>
+#include <ctype.h>
+#include <syslog.h>
+#include <sys/resource.h>
+#include <rpcsvc/ypclnt.h>
+
+#include <security/_pam_macros.h>
+#include <security/pam_modules.h>
+#include <security/pam_ext.h>
+#include <security/pam_modutil.h>
+
+#include "support.h"
+#include "passverify.h"
+#ifdef WITH_SELINUX
+#include <selinux/selinux.h>
+#define SELINUX_ENABLED is_selinux_enabled()>0
+#else
+#define SELINUX_ENABLED 0
+#endif
+
+/* this is a front-end for module-application conversations */
+
+int _make_remark(pam_handle_t * pamh, unsigned int ctrl,
+		    int type, const char *text)
+{
+	int retval = PAM_SUCCESS;
+
+	if (off(UNIX__QUIET, ctrl)) {
+		retval = pam_prompt(pamh, type, NULL, "%s", text);
+	}
+	return retval;
+}
+
+/*
+ * set the control flags for the UNIX module.
+ */
+
+int _set_ctrl(pam_handle_t *pamh, int flags, int *remember, int *rounds,
+	      int argc, const char **argv)
+{
+	unsigned int ctrl;
+
+	D(("called."));
+
+	ctrl = UNIX_DEFAULTS;	/* the default selection of options */
+
+	/* set some flags manually */
+
+	if (getuid() == 0 && !(flags & PAM_CHANGE_EXPIRED_AUTHTOK)) {
+		D(("IAMROOT"));
+		set(UNIX__IAMROOT, ctrl);
+	}
+	if (flags & PAM_UPDATE_AUTHTOK) {
+		D(("UPDATE_AUTHTOK"));
+		set(UNIX__UPDATE, ctrl);
+	}
+	if (flags & PAM_PRELIM_CHECK) {
+		D(("PRELIM_CHECK"));
+		set(UNIX__PRELIM, ctrl);
+	}
+	if (flags & PAM_SILENT) {
+		D(("SILENT"));
+		set(UNIX__QUIET, ctrl);
+	}
+	/* now parse the arguments to this module */
+
+	while (argc-- > 0) {
+		int j;
+
+		D(("pam_unix arg: %s", *argv));
+
+		for (j = 0; j < UNIX_CTRLS_; ++j) {
+			if (unix_args[j].token
+			    && !strncmp(*argv, unix_args[j].token, strlen(unix_args[j].token))) {
+				break;
+			}
+		}
+
+		if (j >= UNIX_CTRLS_) {
+			pam_syslog(pamh, LOG_ERR,
+			         "unrecognized option [%s]", *argv);
+		} else {
+			ctrl &= unix_args[j].mask;	/* for turning things off */
+			ctrl |= unix_args[j].flag;	/* for turning things on  */
+
+			if (remember != NULL) {
+				if (j == UNIX_REMEMBER_PASSWD) {
+					*remember = strtol(*argv + 9, NULL, 10);
+					if ((*remember == INT_MIN) || (*remember == INT_MAX))
+						*remember = -1;
+					if (*remember > 400)
+						*remember = 400;
+				}
+			}
+			if (rounds != NULL) {
+				if (j == UNIX_ALGO_ROUNDS) {
+					*rounds = strtol(*argv + 7, NULL, 10);
+					if ((*rounds < 1000) || (*rounds == INT_MAX))
+						/* don't care about bogus values */
+						unset(UNIX_ALGO_ROUNDS, ctrl);
+					if (*rounds >= 10000000)
+						*rounds = 9999999;
+				}
+			}
+		}
+
+		++argv;		/* step to next argument */
+	}
+
+	if (flags & PAM_DISALLOW_NULL_AUTHTOK) {
+		D(("DISALLOW_NULL_AUTHTOK"));
+		set(UNIX__NONULL, ctrl);
+	}
+
+	/* auditing is a more sensitive version of debug */
+
+	if (on(UNIX_AUDIT, ctrl)) {
+		set(UNIX_DEBUG, ctrl);
+	}
+	/* return the set of flags */
+
+	D(("done."));
+	return ctrl;
+}
+
+static void _cleanup(pam_handle_t * pamh UNUSED, void *x, int error_status UNUSED)
+{
+	_pam_delete(x);
+}
+
+/* ************************************************************** *
+ * Useful non-trivial functions                                   *
+ * ************************************************************** */
+
+  /*
+   * the following is used to keep track of the number of times a user fails
+   * to authenticate themself.
+   */
+
+#define FAIL_PREFIX                   "-UN*X-FAIL-"
+#define UNIX_MAX_RETRIES              3
+
+struct _pam_failed_auth {
+	char *user;		/* user that's failed to be authenticated */
+	char *name;		/* attempt from user with name */
+	int uid;		/* uid of calling user */
+	int euid;		/* euid of calling process */
+	int count;		/* number of failures so far */
+};
+
+#ifndef PAM_DATA_REPLACE
+#error "Need to get an updated libpam 0.52 or better"
+#endif
+
+static void _cleanup_failures(pam_handle_t * pamh, void *fl, int err)
+{
+	int quiet;
+	const void *service = NULL;
+	const void *ruser = NULL;
+	const void *rhost = NULL;
+	const void *tty = NULL;
+	struct _pam_failed_auth *failure;
+
+	D(("called"));
+
+	quiet = err & PAM_DATA_SILENT;	/* should we log something? */
+	err &= PAM_DATA_REPLACE;	/* are we just replacing data? */
+	failure = (struct _pam_failed_auth *) fl;
+
+	if (failure != NULL) {
+
+		if (!quiet && !err) {	/* under advisement from Sun,may go away */
+
+			/* log the number of authentication failures */
+			if (failure->count > 1) {
+				(void) pam_get_item(pamh, PAM_SERVICE,
+						    &service);
+				(void) pam_get_item(pamh, PAM_RUSER,
+						    &ruser);
+				(void) pam_get_item(pamh, PAM_RHOST,
+						    &rhost);
+				(void) pam_get_item(pamh, PAM_TTY,
+						    &tty);
+				pam_syslog(pamh, LOG_NOTICE,
+				         "%d more authentication failure%s; "
+				         "logname=%s uid=%d euid=%d "
+				         "tty=%s ruser=%s rhost=%s "
+				         "%s%s",
+				         failure->count - 1, failure->count == 2 ? "" : "s",
+				         failure->name, failure->uid, failure->euid,
+				         tty ? (const char *)tty : "", ruser ? (const char *)ruser : "",
+				         rhost ? (const char *)rhost : "",
+				         (failure->user && failure->user[0] != '\0')
+				          ? " user=" : "", failure->user
+				);
+
+				if (failure->count > UNIX_MAX_RETRIES) {
+					pam_syslog(pamh, LOG_ALERT,
+						 "service(%s) ignoring max retries; %d > %d",
+						 service == NULL ? "**unknown**" : (const char *)service,
+						 failure->count,
+						 UNIX_MAX_RETRIES);
+				}
+			}
+		}
+		_pam_delete(failure->user);	/* tidy up */
+		_pam_delete(failure->name);	/* tidy up */
+		free(failure);
+	}
+}
+
+/*
+ * _unix_getpwnam() searches only /etc/passwd and NIS to find user information
+ */
+static void _unix_cleanup(pam_handle_t *pamh UNUSED, void *data, int error_status UNUSED)
+{
+	free(data);
+}
+
+int _unix_getpwnam(pam_handle_t *pamh, const char *name,
+		   int files, int nis, struct passwd **ret)
+{
+	FILE *passwd;
+	char buf[16384];
+	int matched = 0, buflen;
+	char *slogin, *spasswd, *suid, *sgid, *sgecos, *shome, *sshell, *p;
+
+	memset(buf, 0, sizeof(buf));
+
+	if (!matched && files) {
+		int userlen = strlen(name);
+		passwd = fopen("/etc/passwd", "r");
+		if (passwd != NULL) {
+			while (fgets(buf, sizeof(buf), passwd) != NULL) {
+				if ((buf[userlen] == ':') &&
+				    (strncmp(name, buf, userlen) == 0)) {
+					p = buf + strlen(buf) - 1;
+					while (isspace(*p) && (p >= buf)) {
+						*p-- = '\0';
+					}
+					matched = 1;
+					break;
+				}
+			}
+			fclose(passwd);
+		}
+	}
+
+	if (!matched && nis) {
+		char *userinfo = NULL, *domain = NULL;
+		int len = 0, i;
+		len = yp_get_default_domain(&domain);
+		if (len == YPERR_SUCCESS) {
+			len = yp_bind(domain);
+		}
+		if (len == YPERR_SUCCESS) {
+			i = yp_match(domain, "passwd.byname", name,
+				     strlen(name), &userinfo, &len);
+			yp_unbind(domain);
+			if ((i == YPERR_SUCCESS) && ((size_t)len < sizeof(buf))) {
+				strncpy(buf, userinfo, sizeof(buf) - 1);
+				buf[sizeof(buf) - 1] = '\0';
+				matched = 1;
+			}
+		}
+	}
+
+	if (matched && (ret != NULL)) {
+		*ret = NULL;
+
+		slogin = buf;
+
+		spasswd = strchr(slogin, ':');
+		if (spasswd == NULL) {
+			return matched;
+		}
+		*spasswd++ = '\0';
+
+		suid = strchr(spasswd, ':');
+		if (suid == NULL) {
+			return matched;
+		}
+		*suid++ = '\0';
+
+		sgid = strchr(suid, ':');
+		if (sgid == NULL) {
+			return matched;
+		}
+		*sgid++ = '\0';
+
+		sgecos = strchr(sgid, ':');
+		if (sgecos == NULL) {
+			return matched;
+		}
+		*sgecos++ = '\0';
+
+		shome = strchr(sgecos, ':');
+		if (shome == NULL) {
+			return matched;
+		}
+		*shome++ = '\0';
+
+		sshell = strchr(shome, ':');
+		if (sshell == NULL) {
+			return matched;
+		}
+		*sshell++ = '\0';
+
+		buflen = sizeof(struct passwd) +
+			 strlen(slogin) + 1 +
+			 strlen(spasswd) + 1 +
+			 strlen(suid) + 1 +
+			 strlen(sgid) + 1 +
+			 strlen(sgecos) + 1 +
+			 strlen(shome) + 1 +
+			 strlen(sshell) + 1;
+		*ret = malloc(buflen);
+		if (*ret == NULL) {
+			return matched;
+		}
+		memset(*ret, '\0', buflen);
+
+		(*ret)->pw_uid = strtol(suid, &p, 10);
+		if ((strlen(suid) == 0) || (*p != '\0')) {
+			free(*ret);
+			*ret = NULL;
+			return matched;
+		}
+
+		(*ret)->pw_gid = strtol(sgid, &p, 10);
+		if ((strlen(sgid) == 0) || (*p != '\0')) {
+			free(*ret);
+			*ret = NULL;
+			return matched;
+		}
+
+		p = ((char*)(*ret)) + sizeof(struct passwd);
+		(*ret)->pw_name = strcpy(p, slogin);
+		p += strlen(p) + 1;
+		(*ret)->pw_passwd = strcpy(p, spasswd);
+		p += strlen(p) + 1;
+		(*ret)->pw_gecos = strcpy(p, sgecos);
+		p += strlen(p) + 1;
+		(*ret)->pw_dir = strcpy(p, shome);
+		p += strlen(p) + 1;
+		(*ret)->pw_shell = strcpy(p, sshell);
+
+		snprintf(buf, sizeof(buf), "_pam_unix_getpwnam_%s", name);
+
+		if (pam_set_data(pamh, buf,
+				 *ret, _unix_cleanup) != PAM_SUCCESS) {
+			free(*ret);
+			*ret = NULL;
+		}
+	}
+
+	return matched;
+}
+
+/*
+ * _unix_comsefromsource() is a quick check to see if information about a given
+ * user comes from a particular source (just files and nis for now)
+ *
+ */
+int _unix_comesfromsource(pam_handle_t *pamh,
+			  const char *name, int files, int nis)
+{
+	return _unix_getpwnam(pamh, name, files, nis, NULL);
+}
+
+/*
+ * verify the password of a user
+ */
+
+#include <sys/types.h>
+#include <sys/wait.h>
+
+static int _unix_run_helper_binary(pam_handle_t *pamh, const char *passwd,
+				   unsigned int ctrl, const char *user)
+{
+    int retval, child, fds[2];
+    void (*sighandler)(int) = NULL;
+
+    D(("called."));
+    /* create a pipe for the password */
+    if (pipe(fds) != 0) {
+	D(("could not make pipe"));
+	return PAM_AUTH_ERR;
+    }
+
+    if (off(UNIX_NOREAP, ctrl)) {
+	/*
+	 * This code arranges that the demise of the child does not cause
+	 * the application to receive a signal it is not expecting - which
+	 * may kill the application or worse.
+	 *
+	 * The "noreap" module argument is provided so that the admin can
+	 * override this behavior.
+	 */
+	sighandler = signal(SIGCHLD, SIG_DFL);
+    }
+
+    /* fork */
+    child = fork();
+    if (child == 0) {
+        int i=0;
+        struct rlimit rlim;
+	static char *envp[] = { NULL };
+	char *args[] = { NULL, NULL, NULL, NULL };
+
+	/* XXX - should really tidy up PAM here too */
+
+	close(0); close(1);
+	/* reopen stdin as pipe */
+	close(fds[1]);
+	dup2(fds[0], STDIN_FILENO);
+
+	if (getrlimit(RLIMIT_NOFILE,&rlim)==0) {
+	  for (i=2; i < (int)rlim.rlim_max; i++) {
+		if (fds[0] != i)
+	  	   close(i);
+	  }
+	}
+
+	if (geteuid() == 0) {
+          /* must set the real uid to 0 so the helper will not error
+	     out if pam is called from setuid binary (su, sudo...) */
+	  setuid(0);
+	}
+
+	/* exec binary helper */
+	args[0] = strdup(CHKPWD_HELPER);
+	args[1] = x_strdup(user);
+	if (off(UNIX__NONULL, ctrl)) {	/* this means we've succeeded */
+	  args[2]=strdup("nullok");
+	} else {
+	  args[2]=strdup("nonull");
+	}
+
+	execve(CHKPWD_HELPER, args, envp);
+
+	/* should not get here: exit with error */
+	D(("helper binary is not available"));
+	exit(PAM_AUTHINFO_UNAVAIL);
+    } else if (child > 0) {
+	/* wait for child */
+	/* if the stored password is NULL */
+        int rc=0;
+	if (passwd != NULL) {            /* send the password to the child */
+	    write(fds[1], passwd, strlen(passwd)+1);
+	    passwd = NULL;
+	} else {
+	    write(fds[1], "", 1);                        /* blank password */
+	}
+	close(fds[0]);       /* close here to avoid possible SIGPIPE above */
+	close(fds[1]);
+	rc=waitpid(child, &retval, 0);  /* wait for helper to complete */
+	if (rc<0) {
+	  pam_syslog(pamh, LOG_ERR, "unix_chkpwd waitpid returned %d: %m", rc);
+	  retval = PAM_AUTH_ERR;
+	} else {
+	  retval = WEXITSTATUS(retval);
+	}
+    } else {
+	D(("fork failed"));
+	close(fds[0]);
+ 	close(fds[1]);
+	retval = PAM_AUTH_ERR;
+    }
+
+    if (sighandler != SIG_ERR) {
+        (void) signal(SIGCHLD, sighandler);   /* restore old signal handler */
+    }
+
+    D(("returning %d", retval));
+    return retval;
+}
+
+/*
+ * _unix_blankpasswd() is a quick check for a blank password
+ *
+ * returns TRUE if user does not have a password
+ * - to avoid prompting for one in such cases (CG)
+ */
+
+int
+_unix_blankpasswd (pam_handle_t *pamh, unsigned int ctrl, const char *name)
+{
+	struct passwd *pwd = NULL;
+	char *salt = NULL;
+	int retval;
+
+	D(("called"));
+
+	/*
+	 * This function does not have to be too smart if something goes
+	 * wrong, return FALSE and let this case to be treated somewhere
+	 * else (CG)
+	 */
+
+	if (on(UNIX__NONULL, ctrl))
+		return 0;	/* will fail but don't let on yet */
+
+	/* UNIX passwords area */
+
+	retval = get_pwd_hash(pamh, name, &pwd, &salt);
+
+	if (retval == PAM_UNIX_RUN_HELPER) {
+		/* salt will not be set here so we can return immediately */
+		if (_unix_run_helper_binary(pamh, NULL, ctrl, name) == PAM_SUCCESS)
+			return 1;
+		else
+			return 0;
+	}
+
+	/* Does this user have a password? */
+	if (salt == NULL) {
+		retval = 0;
+	} else {
+		if (strlen(salt) == 0)
+			retval = 1;
+		else
+			retval = 0;
+	}
+
+	/* tidy up */
+
+	if (salt)
+		_pam_delete(salt);
+
+	return retval;
+}
+
+int _unix_verify_password(pam_handle_t * pamh, const char *name
+			  ,const char *p, unsigned int ctrl)
+{
+	struct passwd *pwd = NULL;
+	char *salt = NULL;
+	char *data_name;
+	int retval;
+
+
+	D(("called"));
+
+#ifdef HAVE_PAM_FAIL_DELAY
+	if (off(UNIX_NODELAY, ctrl)) {
+		D(("setting delay"));
+		(void) pam_fail_delay(pamh, 2000000);	/* 2 sec delay for on failure */
+	}
+#endif
+
+	/* locate the entry for this user */
+
+	D(("locating user's record"));
+
+	retval = get_pwd_hash(pamh, name, &pwd, &salt);
+
+	data_name = (char *) malloc(sizeof(FAIL_PREFIX) + strlen(name));
+	if (data_name == NULL) {
+		pam_syslog(pamh, LOG_CRIT, "no memory for data-name");
+	} else {
+		strcpy(data_name, FAIL_PREFIX);
+		strcpy(data_name + sizeof(FAIL_PREFIX) - 1, name);
+	}
+
+	if (retval != PAM_SUCCESS) {
+		if (retval == PAM_UNIX_RUN_HELPER) {
+			D(("running helper binary"));
+			retval = _unix_run_helper_binary(pamh, p, ctrl, name);
+		} else {
+			D(("user's record unavailable"));
+			p = NULL;
+			if (on(UNIX_AUDIT, ctrl)) {
+				/* this might be a typo and the user has given a password
+				   instead of a username. Careful with this. */
+				pam_syslog(pamh, LOG_WARNING,
+				         "check pass; user (%s) unknown", name);
+			} else {
+				name = NULL;
+				if (on(UNIX_DEBUG, ctrl) || pwd == NULL) {
+				    pam_syslog(pamh, LOG_WARNING,
+				            "check pass; user unknown");
+				} else {
+				    /* don't log failure as another pam module can succeed */
+				    goto cleanup;
+				}
+			}
+		}
+	} else {
+		retval = verify_pwd_hash(p, salt, off(UNIX__NONULL, ctrl));
+	}
+
+	if (retval == PAM_SUCCESS) {
+		if (data_name)	/* reset failures */
+			pam_set_data(pamh, data_name, NULL, _cleanup_failures);
+	} else {
+		if (data_name != NULL) {
+			struct _pam_failed_auth *new = NULL;
+			const struct _pam_failed_auth *old = NULL;
+
+			/* get a failure recorder */
+
+			new = (struct _pam_failed_auth *)
+			    malloc(sizeof(struct _pam_failed_auth));
+
+			if (new != NULL) {
+
+			    const char *login_name;
+			    const void *void_old;
+
+
+			    login_name = pam_modutil_getlogin(pamh);
+			    if (login_name == NULL) {
+				login_name = "";
+			    }
+
+			        new->user = x_strdup(name ? name : "");
+				new->uid = getuid();
+				new->euid = geteuid();
+				new->name = x_strdup(login_name);
+
+				/* any previous failures for this user ? */
+				if (pam_get_data(pamh, data_name, &void_old)
+				    == PAM_SUCCESS)
+				        old = void_old;
+				else
+				        old = NULL;
+
+				if (old != NULL) {
+					new->count = old->count + 1;
+					if (new->count >= UNIX_MAX_RETRIES) {
+						retval = PAM_MAXTRIES;
+					}
+				} else {
+					const void *service=NULL;
+					const void *ruser=NULL;
+					const void *rhost=NULL;
+					const void *tty=NULL;
+
+					(void) pam_get_item(pamh, PAM_SERVICE,
+							    &service);
+					(void) pam_get_item(pamh, PAM_RUSER,
+							    &ruser);
+					(void) pam_get_item(pamh, PAM_RHOST,
+							    &rhost);
+					(void) pam_get_item(pamh, PAM_TTY,
+							    &tty);
+
+					pam_syslog(pamh, LOG_NOTICE,
+					         "authentication failure; "
+					         "logname=%s uid=%d euid=%d "
+					         "tty=%s ruser=%s rhost=%s "
+					         "%s%s",
+					         new->name, new->uid, new->euid,
+					         tty ? (const char *)tty : "",
+					         ruser ? (const char *)ruser : "",
+					         rhost ? (const char *)rhost : "",
+					         (new->user && new->user[0] != '\0')
+					          ? " user=" : "",
+					         new->user
+					);
+					new->count = 1;
+				}
+
+				pam_set_data(pamh, data_name, new, _cleanup_failures);
+
+			} else {
+				pam_syslog(pamh, LOG_CRIT,
+				         "no memory for failure recorder");
+			}
+		}
+	}
+
+cleanup:
+	if (data_name)
+		_pam_delete(data_name);
+	if (salt)
+		_pam_delete(salt);
+
+	D(("done [%d].", retval));
+
+	return retval;
+}
+
+/*
+ * obtain a password from the user
+ */
+
+int _unix_read_password(pam_handle_t * pamh
+			,unsigned int ctrl
+			,const char *comment
+			,const char *prompt1
+			,const char *prompt2
+			,const char *data_name
+			,const void **pass)
+{
+	int authtok_flag;
+	int retval = PAM_SUCCESS;
+	char *token;
+
+	D(("called"));
+
+	/*
+	 * make sure nothing inappropriate gets returned
+	 */
+
+	*pass = token = NULL;
+
+	/*
+	 * which authentication token are we getting?
+	 */
+
+	authtok_flag = on(UNIX__OLD_PASSWD, ctrl) ? PAM_OLDAUTHTOK : PAM_AUTHTOK;
+
+	/*
+	 * should we obtain the password from a PAM item ?
+	 */
+
+	if (on(UNIX_TRY_FIRST_PASS, ctrl) || on(UNIX_USE_FIRST_PASS, ctrl)) {
+		retval = pam_get_item(pamh, authtok_flag, pass);
+		if (retval != PAM_SUCCESS) {
+			/* very strange. */
+			pam_syslog(pamh, LOG_ALERT,
+				 "pam_get_item returned error to unix-read-password"
+			    );
+			return retval;
+		} else if (*pass != NULL) {	/* we have a password! */
+			return PAM_SUCCESS;
+		} else if (on(UNIX_USE_FIRST_PASS, ctrl)) {
+			return PAM_AUTHTOK_RECOVERY_ERR;	  /* didn't work */
+		} else if (on(UNIX_USE_AUTHTOK, ctrl)
+			   && off(UNIX__OLD_PASSWD, ctrl)) {
+			return PAM_AUTHTOK_ERR;
+		}
+	}
+	/*
+	 * getting here implies we will have to get the password from the
+	 * user directly.
+	 */
+
+	{
+		int replies=1;
+		char *resp[2] = { NULL, NULL };
+
+		if (comment != NULL && off(UNIX__QUIET, ctrl)) {
+			retval = pam_info(pamh, "%s", comment);
+		}
+
+		if (retval == PAM_SUCCESS) {
+			retval = pam_prompt(pamh, PAM_PROMPT_ECHO_OFF,
+			    &resp[0], "%s", prompt1);
+
+			if (retval == PAM_SUCCESS && prompt2 != NULL) {
+				retval = pam_prompt(pamh, PAM_PROMPT_ECHO_OFF,
+				    &resp[1], "%s", prompt2);
+				++replies;
+			}
+		}
+
+		if (resp[0] != NULL && resp[replies-1] != NULL) {
+			/* interpret the response */
+
+			if (retval == PAM_SUCCESS) {	/* a good conversation */
+
+				token = resp[0];
+				if (token != NULL) {
+					if (replies == 2) {
+						/* verify that password entered correctly */
+						if (strcmp(token, resp[replies - 1])) {
+							/* mistyped */
+							retval = PAM_AUTHTOK_RECOVERY_ERR;
+							_make_remark(pamh, ctrl,
+							    PAM_ERROR_MSG, MISTYPED_PASS);
+						}
+					}
+				} else {
+					pam_syslog(pamh, LOG_NOTICE,
+						    "could not recover authentication token");
+				}
+
+			}
+
+		} else {
+			retval = (retval == PAM_SUCCESS)
+			    ? PAM_AUTHTOK_RECOVERY_ERR : retval;
+		}
+
+		resp[0] = NULL;
+		if (replies > 1)
+			_pam_delete(resp[1]);
+	}
+
+	if (retval != PAM_SUCCESS) {
+		_pam_delete(token);
+
+		if (on(UNIX_DEBUG, ctrl))
+			pam_syslog(pamh, LOG_DEBUG,
+			         "unable to obtain a password");
+		return retval;
+	}
+	/* 'token' is the entered password */
+
+	if (off(UNIX_NOT_SET_PASS, ctrl)) {
+
+		/* we store this password as an item */
+
+		retval = pam_set_item(pamh, authtok_flag, token);
+		_pam_delete(token);	/* clean it up */
+		if (retval != PAM_SUCCESS
+		    || (retval = pam_get_item(pamh, authtok_flag, pass))
+		    != PAM_SUCCESS) {
+
+			*pass = NULL;
+			pam_syslog(pamh, LOG_CRIT, "error manipulating password");
+			return retval;
+
+		}
+	} else {
+		/*
+		 * then store it as data specific to this module. pam_end()
+		 * will arrange to clean it up.
+		 */
+
+		retval = pam_set_data(pamh, data_name, (void *) token, _cleanup);
+		if (retval != PAM_SUCCESS) {
+			pam_syslog(pamh, LOG_CRIT,
+			         "error manipulating password data [%s]",
+				 pam_strerror(pamh, retval));
+			_pam_delete(token);
+			return retval;
+		}
+		*pass = token;
+		token = NULL;	/* break link to password */
+	}
+
+	return PAM_SUCCESS;
+}
+
+/* ****************************************************************** *
+ * Copyright (c) Jan R�korajski 1999.
+ * Copyright (c) Andrew G. Morgan 1996-8.
+ * Copyright (c) Alex O. Yuriev, 1996.
+ * Copyright (c) Cristian Gafton 1996.
+ * Copyright (c) Red Hat, Inc. 2007.
+ *
+ * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
+ * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
+ * are met:
+ * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
+ *    notice, and the entire permission notice in its entirety,
+ *    including the disclaimer of warranties.
+ * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
+ *    notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
+ *    documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
+ * 3. The name of the author may not be used to endorse or promote
+ *    products derived from this software without specific prior
+ *    written permission.
+ *
+ * ALTERNATIVELY, this product may be distributed under the terms of
+ * the GNU Public License, in which case the provisions of the GPL are
+ * required INSTEAD OF the above restrictions.  (This clause is
+ * necessary due to a potential bad interaction between the GPL and
+ * the restrictions contained in a BSD-style copyright.)
+ *
+ * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED ``AS IS'' AND ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED
+ * WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES
+ * OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE ARE
+ * DISCLAIMED.  IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT,
+ * INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES
+ * (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR
+ * SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION)
+ * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT,
+ * STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE)
+ * ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED
+ * OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.
+ */
diff --git a/modules/pam_unix/support.h b/modules/pam_unix/support.h
new file mode 100644
index 00000000..3ccdc5c7
--- /dev/null
+++ b/modules/pam_unix/support.h
@@ -0,0 +1,162 @@
+/*
+ * $Id: support.h,v 1.14 2008/01/23 15:35:13 t8m Exp $
+ */
+
+#ifndef _PAM_UNIX_SUPPORT_H
+#define _PAM_UNIX_SUPPORT_H
+
+#include <pwd.h>
+
+/*
+ * here is the string to inform the user that the new passwords they
+ * typed were not the same.
+ */
+
+#define MISTYPED_PASS "Sorry, passwords do not match"
+
+/* type definition for the control options */
+
+typedef struct {
+	const char *token;
+	unsigned int mask;	/* shall assume 32 bits of flags */
+	unsigned int flag;
+} UNIX_Ctrls;
+
+/*
+ * macro to determine if a given flag is on
+ */
+
+#define on(x,ctrl)  (unix_args[x].flag & ctrl)
+
+/*
+ * macro to determine that a given flag is NOT on
+ */
+
+#define off(x,ctrl) (!on(x,ctrl))
+
+/*
+ * macro to turn on/off a ctrl flag manually
+ */
+
+#define set(x,ctrl)   (ctrl = ((ctrl)&unix_args[x].mask)|unix_args[x].flag)
+#define unset(x,ctrl) (ctrl &= ~(unix_args[x].flag))
+
+/* the generic mask */
+
+#define _ALL_ON_  (~0U)
+
+/* end of macro definitions definitions for the control flags */
+
+/* ****************************************************************** *
+ * ctrl flags proper..
+ */
+
+/*
+ * here are the various options recognized by the unix module. They
+ * are enumerated here and then defined below. Internal arguments are
+ * given NULL tokens.
+ */
+
+#define UNIX__OLD_PASSWD          0	/* internal */
+#define UNIX__VERIFY_PASSWD       1	/* internal */
+#define UNIX__IAMROOT             2	/* internal */
+
+#define UNIX_AUDIT                3	/* print more things than debug..
+					   some information may be sensitive */
+#define UNIX_USE_FIRST_PASS       4
+#define UNIX_TRY_FIRST_PASS       5
+#define UNIX_NOT_SET_PASS         6	/* don't set the AUTHTOK items */
+
+#define UNIX__PRELIM              7	/* internal */
+#define UNIX__UPDATE              8	/* internal */
+#define UNIX__NONULL              9	/* internal */
+#define UNIX__QUIET              10	/* internal */
+#define UNIX_USE_AUTHTOK         11	/* insist on reading PAM_AUTHTOK */
+#define UNIX_SHADOW              12	/* signal shadow on */
+#define UNIX_MD5_PASS            13	/* force the use of MD5 passwords */
+#define UNIX__NULLOK             14	/* Null token ok */
+#define UNIX_DEBUG               15	/* send more info to syslog(3) */
+#define UNIX_NODELAY             16	/* admin does not want a fail-delay */
+#define UNIX_NIS                 17	/* wish to use NIS for pwd */
+#define UNIX_BIGCRYPT            18	/* use DEC-C2 crypt()^x function */
+#define UNIX_LIKE_AUTH           19	/* need to auth for setcred to work */
+#define UNIX_REMEMBER_PASSWD     20	/* Remember N previous passwords */
+#define UNIX_NOREAP              21     /* don't reap child process */
+#define UNIX_BROKEN_SHADOW       22     /* ignore errors reading password aging
+					 * information during acct management */
+#define UNIX_SHA256_PASS         23	/* new password hashes will use SHA256 */
+#define UNIX_SHA512_PASS         24	/* new password hashes will use SHA512 */
+#define UNIX_ALGO_ROUNDS         25	/* optional number of rounds for new 
+					   password hash algorithms */
+/* -------------- */
+#define UNIX_CTRLS_              26	/* number of ctrl arguments defined */
+
+
+static const UNIX_Ctrls unix_args[UNIX_CTRLS_] =
+{
+/* symbol                  token name          ctrl mask             ctrl     *
+ * ----------------------- ------------------- --------------------- -------- */
+
+/* UNIX__OLD_PASSWD */     {NULL,              _ALL_ON_,                  01},
+/* UNIX__VERIFY_PASSWD */  {NULL,              _ALL_ON_,                  02},
+/* UNIX__IAMROOT */        {NULL,              _ALL_ON_,                  04},
+/* UNIX_AUDIT */           {"audit",           _ALL_ON_,                 010},
+/* UNIX_USE_FIRST_PASS */  {"use_first_pass",  _ALL_ON_^(060),           020},
+/* UNIX_TRY_FIRST_PASS */  {"try_first_pass",  _ALL_ON_^(060),           040},
+/* UNIX_NOT_SET_PASS */    {"not_set_pass",    _ALL_ON_,                0100},
+/* UNIX__PRELIM */         {NULL,              _ALL_ON_^(0600),         0200},
+/* UNIX__UPDATE */         {NULL,              _ALL_ON_^(0600),         0400},
+/* UNIX__NONULL */         {NULL,              _ALL_ON_,               01000},
+/* UNIX__QUIET */          {NULL,              _ALL_ON_,               02000},
+/* UNIX_USE_AUTHTOK */     {"use_authtok",     _ALL_ON_,               04000},
+/* UNIX_SHADOW */          {"shadow",          _ALL_ON_,              010000},
+/* UNIX_MD5_PASS */        {"md5",             _ALL_ON_^(0400000),    020000},
+/* UNIX__NULLOK */         {"nullok",          _ALL_ON_^(01000),           0},
+/* UNIX_DEBUG */           {"debug",           _ALL_ON_,              040000},
+/* UNIX_NODELAY */         {"nodelay",         _ALL_ON_,             0100000},
+/* UNIX_NIS */             {"nis",             _ALL_ON_,             0200000},
+/* UNIX_BIGCRYPT */        {"bigcrypt",        _ALL_ON_^(020000),    0400000},
+/* UNIX_LIKE_AUTH */       {"likeauth",        _ALL_ON_,            01000000},
+/* UNIX_REMEMBER_PASSWD */ {"remember=",       _ALL_ON_,            02000000},
+/* UNIX_NOREAP */          {"noreap",          _ALL_ON_,            04000000},
+/* UNIX_BROKEN_SHADOW */   {"broken_shadow",   _ALL_ON_,           010000000},
+/* UNIX_SHA256_PASS */     {"sha256",        _ALL_ON_^(040420000), 020000000},
+/* UNIX_SHA512_PASS */     {"sha512",        _ALL_ON_^(020420000), 040000000},
+/* UNIX_ALGO_ROUNDS */     {"rounds=",         _ALL_ON_,          0100000000},
+};
+
+#define UNIX_DEFAULTS  (unix_args[UNIX__NONULL].flag)
+
+
+/* use this to free strings. ESPECIALLY password strings */
+
+#define _pam_delete(xx)		\
+{				\
+	_pam_overwrite(xx);	\
+	_pam_drop(xx);		\
+}
+
+extern int _make_remark(pam_handle_t * pamh, unsigned int ctrl
+		       ,int type, const char *text);
+extern int _set_ctrl(pam_handle_t * pamh, int flags, int *remember, int *rounds,
+		     int argc, const char **argv);
+extern int _unix_getpwnam (pam_handle_t *pamh,
+			   const char *name, int files, int nis,
+			   struct passwd **ret);
+extern int _unix_comesfromsource (pam_handle_t *pamh,
+				  const char *name, int files, int nis);
+extern int _unix_blankpasswd(pam_handle_t *pamh,unsigned int ctrl,
+			     const char *name);
+extern int _unix_verify_password(pam_handle_t * pamh, const char *name
+			  ,const char *p, unsigned int ctrl);
+extern int _unix_read_password(pam_handle_t * pamh
+			,unsigned int ctrl
+			,const char *comment
+			,const char *prompt1
+			,const char *prompt2
+			,const char *data_name
+			,const void **pass);
+
+extern int _unix_run_verify_binary(pam_handle_t *pamh,
+			unsigned int ctrl, const char *user, int *daysleft);
+#endif /* _PAM_UNIX_SUPPORT_H */
diff --git a/modules/pam_unix/tst-pam_unix b/modules/pam_unix/tst-pam_unix
new file mode 100755
index 00000000..22922800
--- /dev/null
+++ b/modules/pam_unix/tst-pam_unix
@@ -0,0 +1,2 @@
+#!/bin/sh
+../../tests/tst-dlopen .libs/pam_unix.so
diff --git a/modules/pam_unix/unix_chkpwd.8 b/modules/pam_unix/unix_chkpwd.8
new file mode 100644
index 00000000..07c8e781
--- /dev/null
+++ b/modules/pam_unix/unix_chkpwd.8
@@ -0,0 +1,38 @@
+.\"     Title: unix_chkpwd
+.\"    Author: 
+.\" Generator: DocBook XSL Stylesheets v1.73.1 <http://docbook.sf.net/>
+.\"      Date: 04/16/2008
+.\"    Manual: Linux-PAM Manual
+.\"    Source: Linux-PAM Manual
+.\"
+.TH "UNIX_CHKPWD" "8" "04/16/2008" "Linux-PAM Manual" "Linux\-PAM Manual"
+.\" disable hyphenation
+.nh
+.\" disable justification (adjust text to left margin only)
+.ad l
+.SH "NAME"
+unix_chkpwd - Helper binary that verifies the password of the current user
+.SH "SYNOPSIS"
+.HP 12
+\fBunix_chkpwd\fR [\.\.\.]
+.SH "DESCRIPTION"
+.PP
+
+\fIunix_chkpwd\fR
+is a helper program for the
+\fIpam_unix\fR
+module that verifies the password of the current user\. It also checks password and account expiration dates in
+\fIshadow\fR\. It is not intended to be run directly from the command line and logs a security violation if done so\.
+.PP
+It is typically installed setuid root or setgid shadow\.
+.PP
+The interface of the helper \- command line options, and input/output data format are internal to the
+\fIpam_unix\fR
+module and it should not be called directly from applications\.
+.SH "SEE ALSO"
+.PP
+
+\fBpam_unix\fR(8)
+.SH "AUTHOR"
+.PP
+Written by Andrew Morgan and other various people\.
diff --git a/modules/pam_unix/unix_chkpwd.8.xml b/modules/pam_unix/unix_chkpwd.8.xml
new file mode 100644
index 00000000..a10dbe33
--- /dev/null
+++ b/modules/pam_unix/unix_chkpwd.8.xml
@@ -0,0 +1,67 @@
+<?xml version="1.0" encoding='UTF-8'?>
+<!DOCTYPE refentry PUBLIC "-//OASIS//DTD DocBook XML V4.3//EN"
+	"http://www.oasis-open.org/docbook/xml/4.3/docbookx.dtd">
+
+<refentry id="unix_chkpwd">
+
+  <refmeta>
+    <refentrytitle>unix_chkpwd</refentrytitle>
+    <manvolnum>8</manvolnum>
+    <refmiscinfo class="sectdesc">Linux-PAM Manual</refmiscinfo>
+  </refmeta>
+
+  <refnamediv id="unix_chkpwd-name">
+    <refname>unix_chkpwd</refname>
+    <refpurpose>Helper binary that verifies the password of the current user</refpurpose>
+  </refnamediv>
+
+  <refsynopsisdiv>
+    <cmdsynopsis id="unix_chkpwd-cmdsynopsis">
+      <command>unix_chkpwd</command>
+      <arg choice="opt">
+        ...
+      </arg>
+    </cmdsynopsis>
+  </refsynopsisdiv>
+
+  <refsect1 id="unix_chkpwd-description">
+
+    <title>DESCRIPTION</title>
+
+    <para>
+      <emphasis>unix_chkpwd</emphasis> is a helper program for the
+      <emphasis>pam_unix</emphasis> module that verifies the
+      password of the current user. It also checks password and account
+      expiration dates in <emphasis>shadow</emphasis>. It is not intended to
+      be run directly from the command line and logs a security violation if
+      done so.
+    </para>
+
+    <para>
+      It is typically installed setuid root or setgid shadow.
+    </para>
+
+    <para>
+      The interface of the helper - command line options, and input/output
+      data format are internal to the <emphasis>pam_unix</emphasis>
+      module and it should not be called directly from applications.
+    </para>
+  </refsect1>
+
+  <refsect1 id='unix_chkpwd-see_also'>
+    <title>SEE ALSO</title>
+    <para>
+      <citerefentry>
+	<refentrytitle>pam_unix</refentrytitle><manvolnum>8</manvolnum>
+      </citerefentry>
+    </para>
+  </refsect1>
+
+  <refsect1 id='unix_chkpwd-author'>
+    <title>AUTHOR</title>
+      <para>
+        Written by Andrew Morgan and other various people.
+      </para>
+  </refsect1>
+
+</refentry>
diff --git a/modules/pam_unix/unix_chkpwd.c b/modules/pam_unix/unix_chkpwd.c
new file mode 100644
index 00000000..5f872d27
--- /dev/null
+++ b/modules/pam_unix/unix_chkpwd.c
@@ -0,0 +1,187 @@
+/*
+ * This program is designed to run setuid(root) or with sufficient
+ * privilege to read all of the unix password databases. It is designed
+ * to provide a mechanism for the current user (defined by this
+ * process' uid) to verify their own password.
+ *
+ * The password is read from the standard input. The exit status of
+ * this program indicates whether the user is authenticated or not.
+ *
+ * Copyright information is located at the end of the file.
+ *
+ */
+
+#include "config.h"
+
+#include <stdio.h>
+#include <stdlib.h>
+#include <string.h>
+#include <syslog.h>
+#include <unistd.h>
+#include <sys/types.h>
+#include <sys/stat.h>
+#include <pwd.h>
+#include <shadow.h>
+#include <signal.h>
+#include <time.h>
+
+#include <security/_pam_types.h>
+#include <security/_pam_macros.h>
+
+#include "passverify.h"
+
+static int _check_expiry(const char *uname)
+{
+	struct spwd *spent;
+	struct passwd *pwent;
+	int retval;
+	int daysleft;
+
+	retval = get_account_info(uname, &pwent, &spent);
+	if (retval != PAM_SUCCESS) {
+		helper_log_err(LOG_ALERT, "could not obtain user info (%s)", uname);
+		printf("-1\n");
+		return retval;
+	}
+	
+	if (spent == NULL) {
+		printf("-1\n");
+		return retval;
+	}
+
+	retval = check_shadow_expiry(spent, &daysleft);
+	printf("%d\n", daysleft);
+	return retval;
+}
+
+int main(int argc, char *argv[])
+{
+	char pass[MAXPASS + 1];
+	char *option;
+	int npass, nullok;
+	int blankpass = 0;
+	int retval = PAM_AUTH_ERR;
+	char *user;
+	char *passwords[] = { pass };
+
+	/*
+	 * Catch or ignore as many signal as possible.
+	 */
+	setup_signals();
+
+	/*
+	 * we establish that this program is running with non-tty stdin.
+	 * this is to discourage casual use. It does *NOT* prevent an
+	 * intruder from repeatadly running this program to determine the
+	 * password of the current user (brute force attack, but one for
+	 * which the attacker must already have gained access to the user's
+	 * account).
+	 */
+
+	if (isatty(STDIN_FILENO) || argc != 3 ) {
+		helper_log_err(LOG_NOTICE
+		      ,"inappropriate use of Unix helper binary [UID=%d]"
+			 ,getuid());
+		fprintf(stderr
+		 ,"This binary is not designed for running in this way\n"
+		      "-- the system administrator has been informed\n");
+		sleep(10);	/* this should discourage/annoy the user */
+		return PAM_SYSTEM_ERR;
+	}
+
+	/*
+	 * Determine what the current user's name is.
+	 * We must thus skip the check if the real uid is 0.
+	 */
+	if (getuid() == 0) {
+	  user=argv[1];
+	}
+	else {
+	  user = getuidname(getuid());
+	  /* if the caller specifies the username, verify that user
+	     matches it */
+	  if (strcmp(user, argv[1])) {
+	    user = argv[1];
+	    /* no match -> permanently change to the real user and proceed */
+	    if (setuid(getuid()) != 0)
+		return PAM_AUTH_ERR;
+	  }
+	}
+
+	option=argv[2];
+
+	if (strcmp(option, "chkexpiry") == 0)
+	  /* Check account information from the shadow file */
+	  return _check_expiry(argv[1]);	  
+	/* read the nullok/nonull option */
+	else if (strcmp(option, "nullok") == 0)
+	  nullok = 1;
+	else if (strcmp(option, "nonull") == 0)
+	  nullok = 0;
+	else
+	  return PAM_SYSTEM_ERR;
+
+	/* read the password from stdin (a pipe from the pam_unix module) */
+
+	npass = read_passwords(STDIN_FILENO, 1, passwords);
+
+	if (npass != 1) {	/* is it a valid password? */
+		helper_log_err(LOG_DEBUG, "no password supplied");
+		*pass = '\0';
+	}
+
+	if (*pass == '\0') {
+		blankpass = 1;
+	}
+
+	retval = helper_verify_password(user, pass, nullok);
+
+	memset(pass, '\0', MAXPASS);	/* clear memory of the password */
+
+	/* return pass or fail */
+
+	if (retval != PAM_SUCCESS) {
+		if (!nullok || !blankpass)
+			/* no need to log blank pass test */
+			helper_log_err(LOG_NOTICE, "password check failed for user (%s)", user);
+		return PAM_AUTH_ERR;
+	} else {
+		return PAM_SUCCESS;
+	}
+}
+
+/*
+ * Copyright (c) Andrew G. Morgan, 1996. All rights reserved
+ * Copyright (c) Red Hat, Inc., 2007,2008. All rights reserved
+ *
+ * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
+ * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
+ * are met:
+ * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
+ *    notice, and the entire permission notice in its entirety,
+ *    including the disclaimer of warranties.
+ * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
+ *    notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
+ *    documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
+ * 3. The name of the author may not be used to endorse or promote
+ *    products derived from this software without specific prior
+ *    written permission.
+ *
+ * ALTERNATIVELY, this product may be distributed under the terms of
+ * the GNU Public License, in which case the provisions of the GPL are
+ * required INSTEAD OF the above restrictions.  (This clause is
+ * necessary due to a potential bad interaction between the GPL and
+ * the restrictions contained in a BSD-style copyright.)
+ *
+ * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED ``AS IS'' AND ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED
+ * WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES
+ * OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE ARE
+ * DISCLAIMED.  IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT,
+ * INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES
+ * (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR
+ * SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION)
+ * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT,
+ * STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE)
+ * ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED
+ * OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.
+ */
diff --git a/modules/pam_unix/unix_update.8 b/modules/pam_unix/unix_update.8
new file mode 100644
index 00000000..b9f1668b
--- /dev/null
+++ b/modules/pam_unix/unix_update.8
@@ -0,0 +1,37 @@
+.\"     Title: unix_update
+.\"    Author: 
+.\" Generator: DocBook XSL Stylesheets v1.73.1 <http://docbook.sf.net/>
+.\"      Date: 04/16/2008
+.\"    Manual: Linux-PAM Manual
+.\"    Source: Linux-PAM Manual
+.\"
+.TH "UNIX_UPDATE" "8" "04/16/2008" "Linux-PAM Manual" "Linux\-PAM Manual"
+.\" disable hyphenation
+.nh
+.\" disable justification (adjust text to left margin only)
+.ad l
+.SH "NAME"
+unix_update - Helper binary that updates the password of a given user
+.SH "SYNOPSIS"
+.HP 12
+\fBunix_update\fR [\.\.\.]
+.SH "DESCRIPTION"
+.PP
+
+\fIunix_update\fR
+is a helper program for the
+\fIpam_unix\fR
+module that updates the password of a given user\. It is not intended to be run directly from the command line and logs a security violation if done so\.
+.PP
+The purpose of the helper is to enable tighter confinement of login and password changing services\. The helper is thus called only when SELinux is enabled and in the enforcing mode on the system\.
+.PP
+The interface of the helper \- command line options, and input/output data format are internal to the
+\fIpam_unix\fR
+module and it should not be called directly from applications\.
+.SH "SEE ALSO"
+.PP
+
+\fBpam_unix\fR(8)
+.SH "AUTHOR"
+.PP
+Written by Tomas Mraz and other various people\.
diff --git a/modules/pam_unix/unix_update.8.xml b/modules/pam_unix/unix_update.8.xml
new file mode 100644
index 00000000..07695951
--- /dev/null
+++ b/modules/pam_unix/unix_update.8.xml
@@ -0,0 +1,67 @@
+<?xml version="1.0" encoding='UTF-8'?>
+<!DOCTYPE refentry PUBLIC "-//OASIS//DTD DocBook XML V4.3//EN"
+	"http://www.oasis-open.org/docbook/xml/4.3/docbookx.dtd">
+
+<refentry id="unix_update">
+
+  <refmeta>
+    <refentrytitle>unix_update</refentrytitle>
+    <manvolnum>8</manvolnum>
+    <refmiscinfo class="sectdesc">Linux-PAM Manual</refmiscinfo>
+  </refmeta>
+
+  <refnamediv id="unix_update-name">
+    <refname>unix_update</refname>
+    <refpurpose>Helper binary that updates the password of a given user</refpurpose>
+  </refnamediv>
+
+  <refsynopsisdiv>
+    <cmdsynopsis id="unix_update-cmdsynopsis">
+      <command>unix_update</command>
+      <arg choice="opt">
+        ...
+      </arg>
+    </cmdsynopsis>
+  </refsynopsisdiv>
+
+  <refsect1 id="unix_update-description">
+
+    <title>DESCRIPTION</title>
+
+    <para>
+      <emphasis>unix_update</emphasis> is a helper program for the
+      <emphasis>pam_unix</emphasis> module that updates the
+      password of a given user. It is not intended to be run directly
+      from the command line and logs a security violation if done so.
+    </para>
+
+    <para>
+      The purpose of the helper is to enable tighter confinement of
+      login and password changing services. The helper is thus called only
+      when SELinux is enabled and in the enforcing mode on the system.
+    </para>
+
+    <para>
+      The interface of the helper - command line options, and input/output
+      data format are internal to the <emphasis>pam_unix</emphasis>
+      module and it should not be called directly from applications.
+    </para>
+  </refsect1>
+
+  <refsect1 id='unix_update-see_also'>
+    <title>SEE ALSO</title>
+    <para>
+      <citerefentry>
+	<refentrytitle>pam_unix</refentrytitle><manvolnum>8</manvolnum>
+      </citerefentry>
+    </para>
+  </refsect1>
+
+  <refsect1 id='unix_update-author'>
+    <title>AUTHOR</title>
+      <para>
+        Written by Tomas Mraz and other various people.
+      </para>
+  </refsect1>
+
+</refentry>
diff --git a/modules/pam_unix/unix_update.c b/modules/pam_unix/unix_update.c
new file mode 100644
index 00000000..f54a59ce
--- /dev/null
+++ b/modules/pam_unix/unix_update.c
@@ -0,0 +1,188 @@
+/*
+ * This program is designed to run with sufficient privilege
+ * to read and write all of the unix password databases.
+ * Its purpose is to allow updating the databases when
+ * SELinux confinement of the caller domain prevents them to
+ * do that themselves.
+ *
+ * The password is read from the standard input. The exit status of
+ * this program indicates whether the password was updated or not.
+ *
+ * Copyright information is located at the end of the file.
+ *
+ */
+
+#include "config.h"
+
+#include <stdarg.h>
+#include <stdio.h>
+#include <stdlib.h>
+#include <string.h>
+#include <syslog.h>
+#include <unistd.h>
+#include <sys/types.h>
+#include <sys/stat.h>
+#include <pwd.h>
+#include <shadow.h>
+#include <signal.h>
+#include <time.h>
+#include <sys/time.h>
+
+#include <security/_pam_types.h>
+#include <security/_pam_macros.h>
+
+#include "passverify.h"
+
+static int
+set_password(const char *forwho, const char *shadow, const char *remember)
+{
+    struct passwd *pwd = NULL;
+    int retval;
+    char pass[MAXPASS + 1];
+    char towhat[MAXPASS + 1];
+    int npass = 0;
+    /* we don't care about number format errors because the helper
+       should be called internally only */
+    int doshadow = atoi(shadow);
+    int nremember = atoi(remember);
+    char *passwords[] = { pass, towhat };
+
+    /* read the password from stdin (a pipe from the pam_unix module) */
+
+    npass = read_passwords(STDIN_FILENO, 2, passwords);
+
+    if (npass != 2) {	/* is it a valid password? */
+      if (npass == 1) {
+        helper_log_err(LOG_DEBUG, "no new password supplied");
+	memset(pass, '\0', MAXPASS);
+      } else {
+        helper_log_err(LOG_DEBUG, "no valid passwords supplied");
+      }
+      return PAM_AUTHTOK_ERR;
+    }
+
+    if (lock_pwdf() != PAM_SUCCESS)
+    	return PAM_AUTHTOK_LOCK_BUSY;
+
+    pwd = getpwnam(forwho);
+
+    if (pwd == NULL) {
+        retval = PAM_USER_UNKNOWN;
+        goto done;
+    }
+
+    /* does pass agree with the official one?
+       we always allow change from null pass */
+    retval = helper_verify_password(forwho, pass, 1);
+    if (retval != PAM_SUCCESS) {
+	goto done;
+    }
+
+    /* first, save old password */
+    if (save_old_password(forwho, pass, nremember)) {
+	retval = PAM_AUTHTOK_ERR;
+	goto done;
+    }
+
+    if (doshadow || is_pwd_shadowed(pwd)) {
+	retval = unix_update_shadow(forwho, towhat);
+	if (retval == PAM_SUCCESS)
+	    if (!is_pwd_shadowed(pwd))
+		retval = unix_update_passwd(forwho, "x");
+    } else {
+	retval = unix_update_passwd(forwho, towhat);
+    }
+
+done:
+    memset(pass, '\0', MAXPASS);
+    memset(towhat, '\0', MAXPASS);
+
+    unlock_pwdf();
+
+    if (retval == PAM_SUCCESS) {
+	return PAM_SUCCESS;
+    } else {
+	return PAM_AUTHTOK_ERR;
+    }
+}
+
+int main(int argc, char *argv[])
+{
+	char *option;
+
+	/*
+	 * Catch or ignore as many signal as possible.
+	 */
+	setup_signals();
+
+	/*
+	 * we establish that this program is running with non-tty stdin.
+	 * this is to discourage casual use. It does *NOT* prevent an
+	 * intruder from repeatadly running this program to determine the
+	 * password of the current user (brute force attack, but one for
+	 * which the attacker must already have gained access to the user's
+	 * account).
+	 */
+
+	if (isatty(STDIN_FILENO) || argc != 5 ) {
+		helper_log_err(LOG_NOTICE
+		      ,"inappropriate use of Unix helper binary [UID=%d]"
+			 ,getuid());
+		fprintf(stderr
+		 ,"This binary is not designed for running in this way\n"
+		      "-- the system administrator has been informed\n");
+		sleep(10);	/* this should discourage/annoy the user */
+		return PAM_SYSTEM_ERR;
+	}
+
+	/* We must be root to read/update shadow.
+	 */
+	if (geteuid() != 0) {
+	    return PAM_CRED_INSUFFICIENT;
+	}
+
+	option = argv[2];
+
+	if (strcmp(option, "update") == 0) {
+	    /* Attempting to change the password */
+	    return set_password(argv[1], argv[3], argv[4]);
+	}
+
+	return PAM_SYSTEM_ERR;
+}
+
+/*
+ * Copyright (c) Andrew G. Morgan, 1996. All rights reserved
+ * Copyright (c) Red Hat, Inc., 2007, 2008. All rights reserved
+ *
+ * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
+ * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
+ * are met:
+ * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
+ *    notice, and the entire permission notice in its entirety,
+ *    including the disclaimer of warranties.
+ * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
+ *    notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
+ *    documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
+ * 3. The name of the author may not be used to endorse or promote
+ *    products derived from this software without specific prior
+ *    written permission.
+ *
+ * ALTERNATIVELY, this product may be distributed under the terms of
+ * the GNU Public License, in which case the provisions of the GPL are
+ * required INSTEAD OF the above restrictions.  (This clause is
+ * necessary due to a potential bad interaction between the GPL and
+ * the restrictions contained in a BSD-style copyright.)
+ *
+ * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED ``AS IS'' AND ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED
+ * WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES
+ * OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE ARE
+ * DISCLAIMED.  IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT,
+ * INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES
+ * (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR
+ * SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION)
+ * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT,
+ * STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE)
+ * ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED
+ * OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.
+ */
diff --git a/modules/pam_unix/yppasswd.h b/modules/pam_unix/yppasswd.h
new file mode 100644
index 00000000..6b414be0
--- /dev/null
+++ b/modules/pam_unix/yppasswd.h
@@ -0,0 +1,51 @@
+/*
+ * yppasswdd
+ * Copyright 1994, 1995, 1996 Olaf Kirch, <okir@monad.swb.de>
+ *
+ * This program is covered by the GNU General Public License, version 2.
+ * It is provided in the hope that it is useful. However, the author
+ * disclaims ALL WARRANTIES, expressed or implied. See the GPL for details.
+ *
+ * This file was generated automatically by rpcgen from yppasswd.x, and
+ * editied manually.
+ */
+
+#ifndef _YPPASSWD_H_
+#define _YPPASSWD_H_
+
+#define YPPASSWDPROG ((u_long)100009)
+#define YPPASSWDVERS ((u_long)1)
+#define YPPASSWDPROC_UPDATE ((u_long)1)
+
+/*
+ * The password struct passed by the update call. I renamed it to
+ * xpasswd to avoid a type clash with the one defined in <pwd.h>.
+ */
+#ifndef __sgi
+typedef struct xpasswd {
+	char *pw_name;
+	char *pw_passwd;
+	int pw_uid;
+	int pw_gid;
+	char *pw_gecos;
+	char *pw_dir;
+	char *pw_shell;
+} xpasswd;
+
+#else
+#include <pwd.h>
+typedef struct xpasswd xpasswd;
+#endif
+
+/* The updated password information, plus the old password.
+ */
+typedef struct yppasswd {
+	char *oldpass;
+	xpasswd newpw;
+} yppasswd;
+
+/* XDR encoding/decoding routines */
+bool_t xdr_xpasswd(XDR * xdrs, xpasswd * objp);
+bool_t xdr_yppasswd(XDR * xdrs, yppasswd * objp);
+
+#endif	/* _YPPASSWD_H_ */
diff --git a/modules/pam_unix/yppasswd_xdr.c b/modules/pam_unix/yppasswd_xdr.c
new file mode 100644
index 00000000..bf3f2fc6
--- /dev/null
+++ b/modules/pam_unix/yppasswd_xdr.c
@@ -0,0 +1,38 @@
+/* 
+ * yppasswdd
+ * Copyright 1994, 1995, 1996 Olaf Kirch, <okir@monad.swb.de>
+ *
+ * This program is covered by the GNU General Public License, version 2.
+ * It is provided in the hope that it is useful. However, the author
+ * disclaims ALL WARRANTIES, expressed or implied. See the GPL for details.
+ * 
+ * This file was generated automatically by rpcgen from yppasswd.x, and
+ * editied manually.
+ */
+
+#include "config.h"
+
+#include <rpc/rpc.h>
+#include <rpcsvc/yp_prot.h>
+#include <rpcsvc/ypclnt.h>
+#include "yppasswd.h"
+
+bool_t
+xdr_xpasswd(XDR * xdrs, xpasswd * objp)
+{
+	return xdr_string(xdrs, &objp->pw_name, ~0)
+	    && xdr_string(xdrs, &objp->pw_passwd, ~0)
+	    && xdr_int(xdrs, &objp->pw_uid)
+	    && xdr_int(xdrs, &objp->pw_gid)
+	    && xdr_string(xdrs, &objp->pw_gecos, ~0)
+	    && xdr_string(xdrs, &objp->pw_dir, ~0)
+	    && xdr_string(xdrs, &objp->pw_shell, ~0);
+}
+
+
+bool_t
+xdr_yppasswd(XDR * xdrs, yppasswd * objp)
+{
+	return xdr_string(xdrs, &objp->oldpass, ~0)
+	    && xdr_xpasswd(xdrs, &objp->newpw);
+}