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Diffstat (limited to 'Linux-PAM/modules/pam_unix/pam_unix_passwd.c')
-rw-r--r--Linux-PAM/modules/pam_unix/pam_unix_passwd.c1030
1 files changed, 1030 insertions, 0 deletions
diff --git a/Linux-PAM/modules/pam_unix/pam_unix_passwd.c b/Linux-PAM/modules/pam_unix/pam_unix_passwd.c
new file mode 100644
index 00000000..6b51a6b2
--- /dev/null
+++ b/Linux-PAM/modules/pam_unix/pam_unix_passwd.c
@@ -0,0 +1,1030 @@
+/*
+ * Main coding by Elliot Lee <sopwith@redhat.com>, Red Hat Software.
+ * Copyright (C) 1996.
+ * Copyright (c) Jan Rêkorajski, 1999.
+ *
+ * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
+ * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
+ * are met:
+ * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
+ * notice, and the entire permission notice in its entirety,
+ * including the disclaimer of warranties.
+ * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
+ * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
+ * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
+ * 3. The name of the author may not be used to endorse or promote
+ * products derived from this software without specific prior
+ * written permission.
+ *
+ * ALTERNATIVELY, this product may be distributed under the terms of
+ * the GNU Public License, in which case the provisions of the GPL are
+ * required INSTEAD OF the above restrictions. (This clause is
+ * necessary due to a potential bad interaction between the GPL and
+ * the restrictions contained in a BSD-style copyright.)
+ *
+ * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED ``AS IS'' AND ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED
+ * WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES
+ * OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE ARE
+ * DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT,
+ * INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES
+ * (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR
+ * SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION)
+ * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT,
+ * STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE)
+ * ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED
+ * OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.
+ */
+
+#include <security/_pam_aconf.h>
+
+#include <stdio.h>
+#include <stdlib.h>
+#include <stdarg.h>
+#include <string.h>
+#include <malloc.h>
+#include <unistd.h>
+#include <errno.h>
+#include <sys/types.h>
+#include <pwd.h>
+#include <syslog.h>
+#include <shadow.h>
+#include <time.h> /* for time() */
+#include <fcntl.h>
+#include <ctype.h>
+#include <sys/time.h>
+#include <sys/stat.h>
+#include <rpc/rpc.h>
+#include <rpcsvc/yp_prot.h>
+#include <rpcsvc/ypclnt.h>
+
+#ifdef USE_CRACKLIB
+#include <crack.h>
+#endif
+
+#include <security/_pam_macros.h>
+
+/* indicate the following groups are defined */
+
+#define PAM_SM_PASSWORD
+
+#include <security/pam_modules.h>
+
+#ifndef LINUX_PAM
+#include <security/pam_appl.h>
+#endif /* LINUX_PAM */
+
+#include "yppasswd.h"
+#include "md5.h"
+#include "support.h"
+
+#if !((__GLIBC__ == 2) && (__GLIBC_MINOR__ >= 1))
+extern int getrpcport(const char *host, unsigned long prognum,
+ unsigned long versnum, unsigned int proto);
+#endif /* GNU libc 2.1 */
+
+/*
+ * PAM framework looks for these entry-points to pass control to the
+ * password changing module.
+ */
+
+#ifdef NEED_LCKPWDF
+#include "./lckpwdf.-c"
+#endif
+
+extern char *bigcrypt(const char *key, const char *salt);
+
+/*
+ How it works:
+ Gets in username (has to be done) from the calling program
+ Does authentication of user (only if we are not running as root)
+ Gets new password/checks for sanity
+ Sets it.
+ */
+
+/* passwd/salt conversion macros */
+
+#define ascii_to_bin(c) ((c)>='a'?(c-59):(c)>='A'?((c)-53):(c)-'.')
+#define bin_to_ascii(c) ((c)>=38?((c)-38+'a'):(c)>=12?((c)-12+'A'):(c)+'.')
+
+/* data tokens */
+
+#define _UNIX_OLD_AUTHTOK "-UN*X-OLD-PASS"
+#define _UNIX_NEW_AUTHTOK "-UN*X-NEW-PASS"
+
+#define MAX_PASSWD_TRIES 3
+#define PW_TMPFILE "/etc/npasswd"
+#define SH_TMPFILE "/etc/nshadow"
+#define CRACKLIB_DICTS "/usr/share/dict/cracklib_dict"
+#define OPW_TMPFILE "/etc/security/nopasswd"
+#define OLD_PASSWORDS_FILE "/etc/security/opasswd"
+
+/*
+ * i64c - convert an integer to a radix 64 character
+ */
+static int i64c(int i)
+{
+ if (i < 0)
+ return ('.');
+ else if (i > 63)
+ return ('z');
+ if (i == 0)
+ return ('.');
+ if (i == 1)
+ return ('/');
+ if (i >= 2 && i <= 11)
+ return ('0' - 2 + i);
+ if (i >= 12 && i <= 37)
+ return ('A' - 12 + i);
+ if (i >= 38 && i <= 63)
+ return ('a' - 38 + i);
+ return ('\0');
+}
+
+static char *crypt_md5_wrapper(const char *pass_new)
+{
+ /*
+ * Code lifted from Marek Michalkiewicz's shadow suite. (CG)
+ * removed use of static variables (AGM)
+ */
+
+ struct timeval tv;
+ MD5_CTX ctx;
+ unsigned char result[16];
+ char *cp = (char *) result;
+ unsigned char tmp[16];
+ int i;
+ char *x = NULL;
+
+ GoodMD5Init(&ctx);
+ gettimeofday(&tv, (struct timezone *) 0);
+ GoodMD5Update(&ctx, (void *) &tv, sizeof tv);
+ i = getpid();
+ GoodMD5Update(&ctx, (void *) &i, sizeof i);
+ i = clock();
+ GoodMD5Update(&ctx, (void *) &i, sizeof i);
+ GoodMD5Update(&ctx, result, sizeof result);
+ GoodMD5Final(tmp, &ctx);
+ strcpy(cp, "$1$"); /* magic for the MD5 */
+ cp += strlen(cp);
+ for (i = 0; i < 8; i++)
+ *cp++ = i64c(tmp[i] & 077);
+ *cp = '\0';
+
+ /* no longer need cleartext */
+ x = Goodcrypt_md5(pass_new, (const char *) result);
+
+ return x;
+}
+
+static char *getNISserver(pam_handle_t *pamh)
+{
+ char *master;
+ char *domainname;
+ int port, err;
+
+ if ((err = yp_get_default_domain(&domainname)) != 0) {
+ _log_err(LOG_WARNING, pamh, "can't get local yp domain: %s\n",
+ yperr_string(err));
+ return NULL;
+ }
+ if ((err = yp_master(domainname, "passwd.byname", &master)) != 0) {
+ _log_err(LOG_WARNING, pamh, "can't find the master ypserver: %s\n",
+ yperr_string(err));
+ return NULL;
+ }
+ port = getrpcport(master, YPPASSWDPROG, YPPASSWDPROC_UPDATE, IPPROTO_UDP);
+ if (port == 0) {
+ _log_err(LOG_WARNING, pamh,
+ "yppasswdd not running on NIS master host\n");
+ return NULL;
+ }
+ if (port >= IPPORT_RESERVED) {
+ _log_err(LOG_WARNING, pamh,
+ "yppasswd daemon running on illegal port.\n");
+ return NULL;
+ }
+ return master;
+}
+
+static int check_old_password(const char *forwho, const char *newpass)
+{
+ static char buf[16384];
+ char *s_luser, *s_uid, *s_npas, *s_pas;
+ int retval = PAM_SUCCESS;
+ FILE *opwfile;
+
+ opwfile = fopen(OLD_PASSWORDS_FILE, "r");
+ if (opwfile == NULL)
+ return PAM_AUTHTOK_ERR;
+
+ while (fgets(buf, 16380, opwfile)) {
+ if (!strncmp(buf, forwho, strlen(forwho))) {
+ buf[strlen(buf) - 1] = '\0';
+ s_luser = strtok(buf, ":,");
+ s_uid = strtok(NULL, ":,");
+ s_npas = strtok(NULL, ":,");
+ s_pas = strtok(NULL, ":,");
+ while (s_pas != NULL) {
+ char *md5pass = Goodcrypt_md5(newpass, s_pas);
+ if (!strcmp(md5pass, s_pas)) {
+ _pam_delete(md5pass);
+ retval = PAM_AUTHTOK_ERR;
+ break;
+ }
+ s_pas = strtok(NULL, ":,");
+ _pam_delete(md5pass);
+ }
+ break;
+ }
+ }
+ fclose(opwfile);
+
+ return retval;
+}
+
+static int save_old_password(const char *forwho, const char *oldpass,
+ int howmany)
+{
+ static char buf[16384];
+ static char nbuf[16384];
+ char *s_luser, *s_uid, *s_npas, *s_pas, *pass;
+ int npas;
+ FILE *pwfile, *opwfile;
+ int err = 0;
+ int oldmask;
+ int found = 0;
+ struct passwd *pwd = NULL;
+
+ if (howmany < 0) {
+ return PAM_SUCCESS;
+ }
+
+ if (oldpass == NULL) {
+ return PAM_SUCCESS;
+ }
+
+ oldmask = umask(077);
+ pwfile = fopen(OPW_TMPFILE, "w");
+ umask(oldmask);
+ if (pwfile == NULL) {
+ return PAM_AUTHTOK_ERR;
+ }
+
+ opwfile = fopen(OLD_PASSWORDS_FILE, "r");
+ if (opwfile == NULL) {
+ fclose(pwfile);
+ return PAM_AUTHTOK_ERR;
+ }
+
+ chown(OPW_TMPFILE, 0, 0);
+ chmod(OPW_TMPFILE, 0600);
+
+ while (fgets(buf, 16380, opwfile)) {
+ if (!strncmp(buf, forwho, strlen(forwho))) {
+ buf[strlen(buf) - 1] = '\0';
+ s_luser = strtok(buf, ":");
+ s_uid = strtok(NULL, ":");
+ s_npas = strtok(NULL, ":");
+ s_pas = strtok(NULL, ":");
+ npas = strtol(s_npas, NULL, 10) + 1;
+ while (npas > howmany) {
+ s_pas = strpbrk(s_pas, ",");
+ if (s_pas != NULL)
+ s_pas++;
+ npas--;
+ }
+ pass = crypt_md5_wrapper(oldpass);
+ if (s_pas == NULL)
+ snprintf(nbuf, sizeof(nbuf), "%s:%s:%d:%s\n",
+ s_luser, s_uid, npas, pass);
+ else
+ snprintf(nbuf, sizeof(nbuf),"%s:%s:%d:%s,%s\n",
+ s_luser, s_uid, npas, s_pas, pass);
+ _pam_delete(pass);
+ if (fputs(nbuf, pwfile) < 0) {
+ err = 1;
+ break;
+ }
+ found = 1;
+ } else if (fputs(buf, pwfile) < 0) {
+ err = 1;
+ break;
+ }
+ }
+ fclose(opwfile);
+
+ if (!found) {
+ pwd = getpwnam(forwho);
+ if (pwd == NULL) {
+ err = 1;
+ } else {
+ pass = crypt_md5_wrapper(oldpass);
+ snprintf(nbuf, sizeof(nbuf), "%s:%d:1:%s\n",
+ forwho, pwd->pw_uid, pass);
+ _pam_delete(pass);
+ if (fputs(nbuf, pwfile) < 0) {
+ err = 1;
+ }
+ }
+ }
+
+ if (fclose(pwfile)) {
+ D(("error writing entries to old passwords file: %s\n",
+ strerror(errno)));
+ err = 1;
+ }
+
+ if (!err) {
+ rename(OPW_TMPFILE, OLD_PASSWORDS_FILE);
+ return PAM_SUCCESS;
+ } else {
+ unlink(OPW_TMPFILE);
+ return PAM_AUTHTOK_ERR;
+ }
+}
+
+static int _update_passwd(pam_handle_t *pamh,
+ const char *forwho, const char *towhat)
+{
+ struct passwd *tmpent = NULL;
+ FILE *pwfile, *opwfile;
+ int err = 1;
+ int oldmask;
+
+ oldmask = umask(077);
+ pwfile = fopen(PW_TMPFILE, "w");
+ umask(oldmask);
+ if (pwfile == NULL) {
+ return PAM_AUTHTOK_ERR;
+ }
+
+ opwfile = fopen("/etc/passwd", "r");
+ if (opwfile == NULL) {
+ fclose(pwfile);
+ return PAM_AUTHTOK_ERR;
+ }
+
+ chown(PW_TMPFILE, 0, 0);
+ chmod(PW_TMPFILE, 0644);
+ tmpent = fgetpwent(opwfile);
+ while (tmpent) {
+ if (!strcmp(tmpent->pw_name, forwho)) {
+ /* To shut gcc up */
+ union {
+ const char *const_charp;
+ char *charp;
+ } assigned_passwd;
+ assigned_passwd.const_charp = towhat;
+
+ tmpent->pw_passwd = assigned_passwd.charp;
+ err = 0;
+ }
+ if (putpwent(tmpent, pwfile)) {
+ D(("error writing entry to password file: %s\n", strerror(errno)));
+ err = 1;
+ break;
+ }
+ tmpent = fgetpwent(opwfile);
+ }
+ fclose(opwfile);
+
+ if (fclose(pwfile)) {
+ D(("error writing entries to password file: %s\n", strerror(errno)));
+ err = 1;
+ }
+
+ if (!err) {
+ rename(PW_TMPFILE, "/etc/passwd");
+ _log_err(LOG_NOTICE, pamh, "password changed for %s", forwho);
+ return PAM_SUCCESS;
+ } else {
+ unlink(PW_TMPFILE);
+ return PAM_AUTHTOK_ERR;
+ }
+}
+
+static int _update_shadow(const char *forwho, char *towhat)
+{
+ struct spwd *spwdent = NULL, *stmpent = NULL;
+ FILE *pwfile, *opwfile;
+ int err = 1;
+ int oldmask;
+
+ spwdent = getspnam(forwho);
+ if (spwdent == NULL) {
+ return PAM_USER_UNKNOWN;
+ }
+ oldmask = umask(077);
+ pwfile = fopen(SH_TMPFILE, "w");
+ umask(oldmask);
+ if (pwfile == NULL) {
+ return PAM_AUTHTOK_ERR;
+ }
+
+ opwfile = fopen("/etc/shadow", "r");
+ if (opwfile == NULL) {
+ fclose(pwfile);
+ return PAM_AUTHTOK_ERR;
+ }
+
+ chown(SH_TMPFILE, 0, 0);
+ chmod(SH_TMPFILE, 0600);
+ stmpent = fgetspent(opwfile);
+ while (stmpent) {
+
+ if (!strcmp(stmpent->sp_namp, forwho)) {
+ stmpent->sp_pwdp = towhat;
+ stmpent->sp_lstchg = time(NULL) / (60 * 60 * 24);
+ err = 0;
+ D(("Set password %s for %s", stmpent->sp_pwdp, forwho));
+ }
+
+ if (putspent(stmpent, pwfile)) {
+ D(("error writing entry to shadow file: %s\n", strerror(errno)));
+ err = 1;
+ break;
+ }
+
+ stmpent = fgetspent(opwfile);
+ }
+ fclose(opwfile);
+
+ if (fclose(pwfile)) {
+ D(("error writing entries to shadow file: %s\n", strerror(errno)));
+ err = 1;
+ }
+
+ if (!err) {
+ rename(SH_TMPFILE, "/etc/shadow");
+ return PAM_SUCCESS;
+ } else {
+ unlink(SH_TMPFILE);
+ return PAM_AUTHTOK_ERR;
+ }
+}
+
+static int _do_setpass(pam_handle_t* pamh, const char *forwho, char *fromwhat,
+ char *towhat, unsigned int ctrl, int remember)
+{
+ struct passwd *pwd = NULL;
+ int retval = 0;
+
+ D(("called"));
+
+ setpwent();
+ pwd = getpwnam(forwho);
+ endpwent();
+
+ if (pwd == NULL)
+ return PAM_AUTHTOK_ERR;
+
+ if (on(UNIX_NIS, ctrl)) {
+ struct timeval timeout;
+ struct yppasswd yppwd;
+ CLIENT *clnt;
+ char *master;
+ int status;
+ int err = 0;
+
+ /* Make RPC call to NIS server */
+ if ((master = getNISserver(pamh)) == NULL)
+ return PAM_TRY_AGAIN;
+
+ /* Initialize password information */
+ yppwd.newpw.pw_passwd = pwd->pw_passwd;
+ yppwd.newpw.pw_name = pwd->pw_name;
+ yppwd.newpw.pw_uid = pwd->pw_uid;
+ yppwd.newpw.pw_gid = pwd->pw_gid;
+ yppwd.newpw.pw_gecos = pwd->pw_gecos;
+ yppwd.newpw.pw_dir = pwd->pw_dir;
+ yppwd.newpw.pw_shell = pwd->pw_shell;
+ yppwd.oldpass = fromwhat;
+ yppwd.newpw.pw_passwd = towhat;
+
+ D(("Set password %s for %s", yppwd.newpw.pw_passwd, forwho));
+
+ /* The yppasswd.x file said `unix authentication required',
+ * so I added it. This is the only reason it is in here.
+ * My yppasswdd doesn't use it, but maybe some others out there
+ * do. --okir
+ */
+ clnt = clnt_create(master, YPPASSWDPROG, YPPASSWDVERS, "udp");
+ clnt->cl_auth = authunix_create_default();
+ memset((char *) &status, '\0', sizeof(status));
+ timeout.tv_sec = 25;
+ timeout.tv_usec = 0;
+ err = clnt_call(clnt, YPPASSWDPROC_UPDATE,
+ (xdrproc_t) xdr_yppasswd, (char *) &yppwd,
+ (xdrproc_t) xdr_int, (char *) &status,
+ timeout);
+
+ if (err) {
+ clnt_perrno(err);
+ retval = PAM_TRY_AGAIN;
+ } else if (status) {
+ D(("Error while changing NIS password.\n"));
+ retval = PAM_TRY_AGAIN;
+ }
+ D(("The password has%s been changed on %s.",
+ (err || status) ? " not" : "", master));
+ _log_err(LOG_NOTICE, pamh, "password%s changed for %s on %s",
+ (err || status) ? " not" : "", pwd->pw_name, master);
+
+ auth_destroy(clnt->cl_auth);
+ clnt_destroy(clnt);
+ if ((err || status) != 0) {
+ retval = PAM_TRY_AGAIN;
+ }
+#ifdef DEBUG
+ sleep(5);
+#endif
+ return retval;
+ }
+ /* first, save old password */
+ if (save_old_password(forwho, fromwhat, remember)) {
+ return PAM_AUTHTOK_ERR;
+ }
+ if (on(UNIX_SHADOW, ctrl) || (strcmp(pwd->pw_passwd, "x") == 0)) {
+ retval = _update_shadow(forwho, towhat);
+ if (retval == PAM_SUCCESS)
+ retval = _update_passwd(pamh, forwho, "x");
+ } else {
+ retval = _update_passwd(pamh, forwho, towhat);
+ }
+
+ return retval;
+}
+
+static int _unix_verify_shadow(const char *user, unsigned int ctrl)
+{
+ struct passwd *pwd = NULL; /* Password and shadow password */
+ struct spwd *spwdent = NULL; /* file entries for the user */
+ time_t curdays;
+ int retval = PAM_SUCCESS;
+
+ /* UNIX passwords area */
+ setpwent();
+ pwd = getpwnam(user); /* Get password file entry... */
+ endpwent();
+ if (pwd == NULL)
+ return PAM_AUTHINFO_UNAVAIL; /* We don't need to do the rest... */
+
+ if (strcmp(pwd->pw_passwd, "x") == 0) {
+ /* ...and shadow password file entry for this user, if shadowing
+ is enabled */
+ setspent();
+ spwdent = getspnam(user);
+ endspent();
+
+ if (spwdent == NULL)
+ return PAM_AUTHINFO_UNAVAIL;
+ } else {
+ if (strcmp(pwd->pw_passwd,"*NP*") == 0) { /* NIS+ */
+ uid_t save_uid;
+
+ save_uid = geteuid();
+ seteuid (pwd->pw_uid);
+ spwdent = getspnam( user );
+ seteuid (save_uid);
+
+ if (spwdent == NULL)
+ return PAM_AUTHINFO_UNAVAIL;
+ } else
+ spwdent = NULL;
+ }
+
+ if (spwdent != NULL) {
+ /* We have the user's information, now let's check if their account
+ has expired (60 * 60 * 24 = number of seconds in a day) */
+
+ if (off(UNIX__IAMROOT, ctrl)) {
+ /* Get the current number of days since 1970 */
+ curdays = time(NULL) / (60 * 60 * 24);
+ if ((curdays < (spwdent->sp_lstchg + spwdent->sp_min))
+ && (spwdent->sp_min != -1))
+ retval = PAM_AUTHTOK_ERR;
+ else if ((curdays > (spwdent->sp_lstchg + spwdent->sp_max + spwdent->sp_inact))
+ && (spwdent->sp_max != -1) && (spwdent->sp_inact != -1)
+ && (spwdent->sp_lstchg != 0))
+ /*
+ * Their password change has been put off too long,
+ */
+ retval = PAM_ACCT_EXPIRED;
+ else if ((curdays > spwdent->sp_expire) && (spwdent->sp_expire != -1)
+ && (spwdent->sp_lstchg != 0))
+ /*
+ * OR their account has just plain expired
+ */
+ retval = PAM_ACCT_EXPIRED;
+ }
+ }
+ return retval;
+}
+
+static int _pam_unix_approve_pass(pam_handle_t * pamh
+ ,unsigned int ctrl
+ ,const char *pass_old
+ ,const char *pass_new)
+{
+ const char *user;
+ const char *remark = NULL;
+ int retval = PAM_SUCCESS;
+
+ D(("&new=%p, &old=%p", pass_old, pass_new));
+ D(("new=[%s]", pass_new));
+ D(("old=[%s]", pass_old));
+
+ if (pass_new == NULL || (pass_old && !strcmp(pass_old, pass_new))) {
+ if (on(UNIX_DEBUG, ctrl)) {
+ _log_err(LOG_DEBUG, pamh, "bad authentication token");
+ }
+ _make_remark(pamh, ctrl, PAM_ERROR_MSG, pass_new == NULL ?
+ "No password supplied" : "Password unchanged");
+ return PAM_AUTHTOK_ERR;
+ }
+ /*
+ * if one wanted to hardwire authentication token strength
+ * checking this would be the place - AGM
+ */
+
+ retval = pam_get_item(pamh, PAM_USER, (const void **) &user);
+ if (retval != PAM_SUCCESS) {
+ if (on(UNIX_DEBUG, ctrl)) {
+ _log_err(LOG_ERR, pamh, "Can not get username");
+ return PAM_AUTHTOK_ERR;
+ }
+ }
+ if (off(UNIX__IAMROOT, ctrl)) {
+#ifdef USE_CRACKLIB
+ remark = FascistCheck(pass_new, CRACKLIB_DICTS);
+ D(("called cracklib [%s]", remark));
+#else
+ if (strlen(pass_new) < 6)
+ remark = "You must choose a longer password";
+ D(("lenth check [%s]", remark));
+#endif
+ if (on(UNIX_REMEMBER_PASSWD, ctrl))
+ if ((retval = check_old_password(user, pass_new)) != PAM_SUCCESS)
+ remark = "Password has been already used. Choose another.";
+ }
+ if (remark) {
+ _make_remark(pamh, ctrl, PAM_ERROR_MSG, remark);
+ retval = PAM_AUTHTOK_ERR;
+ }
+ return retval;
+}
+
+
+PAM_EXTERN int pam_sm_chauthtok(pam_handle_t * pamh, int flags,
+ int argc, const char **argv)
+{
+ unsigned int ctrl, lctrl;
+ int retval, i;
+ int remember = -1;
+
+ /* <DO NOT free() THESE> */
+ const char *user;
+ char *pass_old, *pass_new;
+ /* </DO NOT free() THESE> */
+
+ D(("called."));
+
+#ifdef USE_LCKPWDF
+ /* our current locking system requires that we lock the
+ entire password database. This avoids both livelock
+ and deadlock. */
+ /* These values for the number of attempts and the sleep time
+ are, of course, completely arbitrary.
+ My reading of the PAM docs is that, once pam_chauthtok() has been
+ called with PAM_UPDATE_AUTHTOK, we are obliged to take any
+ reasonable steps to make sure the token is updated; so retrying
+ for 1/10 sec. isn't overdoing it.
+ The other possibility is to call lckpwdf() on the first
+ pam_chauthtok() pass, and hold the lock until released in the
+ second pass--but is this guaranteed to work? -SRL */
+ i=0;
+ while((retval = lckpwdf()) != 0 && i < 100) {
+ usleep(1000);
+ }
+ if(retval != 0) {
+ return PAM_AUTHTOK_LOCK_BUSY;
+ }
+#endif
+ ctrl = _set_ctrl(pamh, flags, &remember, argc, argv);
+
+ /*
+ * First get the name of a user
+ */
+ retval = pam_get_user(pamh, &user, "Username: ");
+ if (retval == PAM_SUCCESS) {
+ /*
+ * Various libraries at various times have had bugs related to
+ * '+' or '-' as the first character of a user name. Don't take
+ * any chances here. Require that the username starts with an
+ * alphanumeric character.
+ */
+ if (user == NULL || !isalnum(*user)) {
+ _log_err(LOG_ERR, pamh, "bad username [%s]", user);
+#ifdef USE_LCKPWDF
+ ulckpwdf();
+#endif
+ return PAM_USER_UNKNOWN;
+ }
+ if (retval == PAM_SUCCESS && on(UNIX_DEBUG, ctrl))
+ _log_err(LOG_DEBUG, pamh, "username [%s] obtained",
+ user);
+ } else {
+ if (on(UNIX_DEBUG, ctrl))
+ _log_err(LOG_DEBUG, pamh,
+ "password - could not identify user");
+#ifdef USE_LCKPWDF
+ ulckpwdf();
+#endif
+ return retval;
+ }
+
+ D(("Got username of %s", user));
+
+ /*
+ * This is not an AUTH module!
+ */
+ if (on(UNIX__NONULL, ctrl))
+ set(UNIX__NULLOK, ctrl);
+
+ if (on(UNIX__PRELIM, ctrl)) {
+ /*
+ * obtain and verify the current password (OLDAUTHTOK) for
+ * the user.
+ */
+ char *Announce;
+
+ D(("prelim check"));
+
+ if (_unix_blankpasswd(ctrl, user)) {
+#ifdef USE_LCKPWDF
+ ulckpwdf();
+#endif
+ return PAM_SUCCESS;
+ } else if (off(UNIX__IAMROOT, ctrl)) {
+
+ /* instruct user what is happening */
+#define greeting "Changing password for "
+ Announce = (char *) malloc(sizeof(greeting) + strlen(user));
+ if (Announce == NULL) {
+ _log_err(LOG_CRIT, pamh,
+ "password - out of memory");
+#ifdef USE_LCKPWDF
+ ulckpwdf();
+#endif
+ return PAM_BUF_ERR;
+ }
+ (void) strcpy(Announce, greeting);
+ (void) strcpy(Announce + sizeof(greeting) - 1, user);
+#undef greeting
+
+ lctrl = ctrl;
+ set(UNIX__OLD_PASSWD, lctrl);
+ retval = _unix_read_password(pamh, lctrl
+ ,Announce
+ ,"(current) UNIX password: "
+ ,NULL
+ ,_UNIX_OLD_AUTHTOK
+ ,(const char **) &pass_old);
+ free(Announce);
+
+ if (retval != PAM_SUCCESS) {
+ _log_err(LOG_NOTICE, pamh
+ ,"password - (old) token not obtained");
+#ifdef USE_LCKPWDF
+ ulckpwdf();
+#endif
+ return retval;
+ }
+ /* verify that this is the password for this user */
+
+ retval = _unix_verify_password(pamh, user, pass_old, ctrl);
+ } else {
+ D(("process run by root so do nothing this time around"));
+ pass_old = NULL;
+ retval = PAM_SUCCESS; /* root doesn't have too */
+ }
+
+ if (retval != PAM_SUCCESS) {
+ D(("Authentication failed"));
+ pass_old = NULL;
+#ifdef USE_LCKPWDF
+ ulckpwdf();
+#endif
+ return retval;
+ }
+ retval = pam_set_item(pamh, PAM_OLDAUTHTOK, (const void *) pass_old);
+ pass_old = NULL;
+ if (retval != PAM_SUCCESS) {
+ _log_err(LOG_CRIT, pamh,
+ "failed to set PAM_OLDAUTHTOK");
+ }
+ retval = _unix_verify_shadow(user, ctrl);
+ if (retval == PAM_AUTHTOK_ERR) {
+ if (off(UNIX__IAMROOT, ctrl))
+ _make_remark(pamh, ctrl, PAM_ERROR_MSG,
+ "You must wait longer to change your password");
+ else
+ retval = PAM_SUCCESS;
+ }
+ } else if (on(UNIX__UPDATE, ctrl)) {
+ /*
+ * tpass is used below to store the _pam_md() return; it
+ * should be _pam_delete()'d.
+ */
+
+ char *tpass = NULL;
+ int retry = 0;
+
+ /*
+ * obtain the proposed password
+ */
+
+ D(("do update"));
+
+ /*
+ * get the old token back. NULL was ok only if root [at this
+ * point we assume that this has already been enforced on a
+ * previous call to this function].
+ */
+
+ if (off(UNIX_NOT_SET_PASS, ctrl)) {
+ retval = pam_get_item(pamh, PAM_OLDAUTHTOK
+ ,(const void **) &pass_old);
+ } else {
+ retval = pam_get_data(pamh, _UNIX_OLD_AUTHTOK
+ ,(const void **) &pass_old);
+ if (retval == PAM_NO_MODULE_DATA) {
+ retval = PAM_SUCCESS;
+ pass_old = NULL;
+ }
+ }
+ D(("pass_old [%s]", pass_old));
+
+ if (retval != PAM_SUCCESS) {
+ _log_err(LOG_NOTICE, pamh, "user not authenticated");
+#ifdef USE_LCKPWDF
+ ulckpwdf();
+#endif
+ return retval;
+ }
+ retval = _unix_verify_shadow(user, ctrl);
+ if (retval != PAM_SUCCESS) {
+ _log_err(LOG_NOTICE, pamh, "user not authenticated 2");
+#ifdef USE_LCKPWDF
+ ulckpwdf();
+#endif
+ return retval;
+ }
+ D(("get new password now"));
+
+ lctrl = ctrl;
+
+ if (on(UNIX_USE_AUTHTOK, lctrl)) {
+ set(UNIX_USE_FIRST_PASS, lctrl);
+ }
+ retry = 0;
+ retval = PAM_AUTHTOK_ERR;
+ while ((retval != PAM_SUCCESS) && (retry++ < MAX_PASSWD_TRIES)) {
+ /*
+ * use_authtok is to force the use of a previously entered
+ * password -- needed for pluggable password strength checking
+ */
+
+ retval = _unix_read_password(pamh, lctrl
+ ,NULL
+ ,"Enter new UNIX password: "
+ ,"Retype new UNIX password: "
+ ,_UNIX_NEW_AUTHTOK
+ ,(const char **) &pass_new);
+
+ if (retval != PAM_SUCCESS) {
+ if (on(UNIX_DEBUG, ctrl)) {
+ _log_err(LOG_ALERT, pamh
+ ,"password - new password not obtained");
+ }
+ pass_old = NULL; /* tidy up */
+#ifdef USE_LCKPWDF
+ ulckpwdf();
+#endif
+ return retval;
+ }
+ D(("returned to _unix_chauthtok"));
+
+ /*
+ * At this point we know who the user is and what they
+ * propose as their new password. Verify that the new
+ * password is acceptable.
+ */
+
+ if (pass_new[0] == '\0') { /* "\0" password = NULL */
+ pass_new = NULL;
+ }
+ retval = _pam_unix_approve_pass(pamh, ctrl, pass_old, pass_new);
+ }
+
+ if (retval != PAM_SUCCESS) {
+ _log_err(LOG_NOTICE, pamh,
+ "new password not acceptable");
+ pass_new = pass_old = NULL; /* tidy up */
+#ifdef USE_LCKPWDF
+ ulckpwdf();
+#endif
+ return retval;
+ }
+ /*
+ * By reaching here we have approved the passwords and must now
+ * rebuild the password database file.
+ */
+
+ /*
+ * First we encrypt the new password.
+ */
+
+ if (on(UNIX_MD5_PASS, ctrl)) {
+ tpass = crypt_md5_wrapper(pass_new);
+ } else {
+ /*
+ * Salt manipulation is stolen from Rick Faith's passwd
+ * program. Sorry Rick :) -- alex
+ */
+
+ time_t tm;
+ char salt[3];
+
+ time(&tm);
+ salt[0] = bin_to_ascii(tm & 0x3f);
+ salt[1] = bin_to_ascii((tm >> 6) & 0x3f);
+ salt[2] = '\0';
+
+ if (off(UNIX_BIGCRYPT, ctrl) && strlen(pass_new) > 8) {
+ /*
+ * to avoid using the _extensions_ of the bigcrypt()
+ * function we truncate the newly entered password
+ * [Problems that followed from this are fixed as per
+ * Bug 521314.]
+ */
+ char *temp = malloc(9);
+
+ if (temp == NULL) {
+ _log_err(LOG_CRIT, pamh,
+ "out of memory for password");
+ pass_new = pass_old = NULL; /* tidy up */
+#ifdef USE_LCKPWDF
+ ulckpwdf();
+#endif
+ return PAM_BUF_ERR;
+ }
+ /* copy first 8 bytes of password */
+ strncpy(temp, pass_new, 8);
+ temp[8] = '\0';
+
+ /* no longer need cleartext */
+ tpass = bigcrypt(temp, salt);
+
+ _pam_delete(temp); /* tidy up */
+ } else {
+ tpass = bigcrypt(pass_new, salt);
+ }
+ }
+
+ D(("password processed"));
+
+ /* update the password database(s) -- race conditions..? */
+
+ retval = _do_setpass(pamh, user, pass_old, tpass, ctrl,
+ remember);
+ _pam_delete(tpass);
+ pass_old = pass_new = NULL;
+ } else { /* something has broken with the module */
+ _log_err(LOG_ALERT, pamh,
+ "password received unknown request");
+ retval = PAM_ABORT;
+ }
+
+ D(("retval was %d", retval));
+
+#ifdef USE_LCKPWDF
+ ulckpwdf();
+#endif
+ return retval;
+}
+
+
+/* static module data */
+#ifdef PAM_STATIC
+struct pam_module _pam_unix_passwd_modstruct = {
+ "pam_unix_passwd",
+ NULL,
+ NULL,
+ NULL,
+ NULL,
+ NULL,
+ pam_sm_chauthtok,
+};
+#endif
+