diff options
Diffstat (limited to 'debian/patches-applied/pam_unix_dont_trust_chkpwd_caller.patch')
| -rw-r--r-- | debian/patches-applied/pam_unix_dont_trust_chkpwd_caller.patch | 25 |
1 files changed, 25 insertions, 0 deletions
diff --git a/debian/patches-applied/pam_unix_dont_trust_chkpwd_caller.patch b/debian/patches-applied/pam_unix_dont_trust_chkpwd_caller.patch new file mode 100644 index 00000000..87336651 --- /dev/null +++ b/debian/patches-applied/pam_unix_dont_trust_chkpwd_caller.patch @@ -0,0 +1,25 @@ +Dropping suid bits is not enough to let us trust the caller; the unix_chkpwd +helper could be sgid shadow instead of suid root, as it is in Debian and +Ubuntu by default. Drop any sgid bits as well. + +Authors: Steve Langasek <vorlon@debian.org>, + Michael Spang <mspang@csclub.uwaterloo.ca> + +Upstream status: to be submitted + +Index: pam-debian/modules/pam_unix/unix_chkpwd.c +=================================================================== +--- pam-debian.orig/modules/pam_unix/unix_chkpwd.c 2011-10-10 16:22:06.270705822 -0700 ++++ pam-debian/modules/pam_unix/unix_chkpwd.c 2011-10-10 16:24:06.080224301 -0700 +@@ -137,9 +137,10 @@ + /* if the caller specifies the username, verify that user + matches it */ + if (strcmp(user, argv[1])) { ++ gid_t gid = getgid(); + user = argv[1]; + /* no match -> permanently change to the real user and proceed */ +- if (setuid(getuid()) != 0) ++ if (setresgid(gid, gid, gid) != 0 || setuid(getuid()) != 0) + return PAM_AUTH_ERR; + } + } |