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-rw-r--r--debian/patches-applied/cve-2010-4708.patch (renamed from debian/patches-applied/cve-2011-4708.patch)2
-rw-r--r--debian/patches-applied/cve-2013-7041.patch44
-rw-r--r--debian/patches-applied/cve-2014-2583.patch47
-rw-r--r--debian/patches-applied/cve-2015-3238.patch154
-rw-r--r--debian/patches-applied/make_documentation_reproducible.patch28
-rw-r--r--debian/patches-applied/pam-loginuid-in-containers52
-rw-r--r--debian/patches-applied/pam_namespace_fix_bashism.patch61
-rw-r--r--debian/patches-applied/series7
-rw-r--r--debian/patches-applied/update-motd12
9 files changed, 378 insertions, 29 deletions
diff --git a/debian/patches-applied/cve-2011-4708.patch b/debian/patches-applied/cve-2010-4708.patch
index c0fbb1ee..cf23e318 100644
--- a/debian/patches-applied/cve-2011-4708.patch
+++ b/debian/patches-applied/cve-2010-4708.patch
@@ -1,4 +1,4 @@
-Description: fix cve-2011-4708: .pam_environment privilege issue
+Description: fix cve-2010-4708: .pam_environment privilege issue
Index: pam.debian/modules/pam_env/pam_env.c
===================================================================
--- pam.debian.orig/modules/pam_env/pam_env.c
diff --git a/debian/patches-applied/cve-2013-7041.patch b/debian/patches-applied/cve-2013-7041.patch
new file mode 100644
index 00000000..dac35b25
--- /dev/null
+++ b/debian/patches-applied/cve-2013-7041.patch
@@ -0,0 +1,44 @@
+From 57a1e2b274d0a6376d92ada9926e5c5741e7da20 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: "Dmitry V. Levin" <ldv@altlinux.org>
+Date: Fri, 24 Jan 2014 22:18:32 +0000
+Subject: pam_userdb: fix password hash comparison
+
+Starting with commit Linux-PAM-0-77-28-g0b3e583 that introduced hashed
+passwords support in pam_userdb, hashes are compared case-insensitively.
+This bug leads to accepting hashes for completely different passwords in
+addition to those that should be accepted.
+
+Additionally, commit Linux-PAM-1_1_6-13-ge2a8187 that added support for
+modern password hashes with different lengths and settings, did not
+update the hash comparison accordingly, which leads to accepting
+computed hashes longer than stored hashes when the latter is a prefix
+of the former.
+
+* modules/pam_userdb/pam_userdb.c (user_lookup): Reject the computed
+hash whose length differs from the stored hash length.
+Compare computed and stored hashes case-sensitively.
+Fixes CVE-2013-7041.
+
+Bug-Debian: http://bugs.debian.org/731368
+
+--- a/modules/pam_userdb/pam_userdb.c
++++ b/modules/pam_userdb/pam_userdb.c
+@@ -222,12 +222,15 @@ user_lookup (pam_handle_t *pamh, const char *database, const char *cryptmode,
+ } else {
+ cryptpw = crypt (pass, data.dptr);
+
+- if (cryptpw) {
+- compare = strncasecmp (data.dptr, cryptpw, data.dsize);
++ if (cryptpw && strlen(cryptpw) == (size_t)data.dsize) {
++ compare = memcmp(data.dptr, cryptpw, data.dsize);
+ } else {
+ compare = -2;
+ if (ctrl & PAM_DEBUG_ARG) {
+- pam_syslog(pamh, LOG_INFO, "crypt() returned NULL");
++ if (cryptpw)
++ pam_syslog(pamh, LOG_INFO, "lengths of computed and stored hashes differ");
++ else
++ pam_syslog(pamh, LOG_INFO, "crypt() returned NULL");
+ }
+ };
+
diff --git a/debian/patches-applied/cve-2014-2583.patch b/debian/patches-applied/cve-2014-2583.patch
new file mode 100644
index 00000000..3eb91702
--- /dev/null
+++ b/debian/patches-applied/cve-2014-2583.patch
@@ -0,0 +1,47 @@
+From 9dcead87e6d7f66d34e7a56d11a30daca367dffb Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: "Dmitry V. Levin" <ldv@altlinux.org>
+Date: Wed, 26 Mar 2014 22:17:23 +0000
+Subject: pam_timestamp: fix potential directory traversal issue (ticket #27)
+
+pam_timestamp uses values of PAM_RUSER and PAM_TTY as components of
+the timestamp pathname it creates, so extra care should be taken to
+avoid potential directory traversal issues.
+
+* modules/pam_timestamp/pam_timestamp.c (check_tty): Treat
+"." and ".." tty values as invalid.
+(get_ruser): Treat "." and ".." ruser values, as well as any ruser
+value containing '/', as invalid.
+
+Fixes CVE-2014-2583.
+
+Reported-by: Sebastian Krahmer <krahmer@suse.de>
+
+--- a/modules/pam_timestamp/pam_timestamp.c
++++ b/modules/pam_timestamp/pam_timestamp.c
+@@ -158,7 +158,7 @@ check_tty(const char *tty)
+ tty = strrchr(tty, '/') + 1;
+ }
+ /* Make sure the tty wasn't actually a directory (no basename). */
+- if (strlen(tty) == 0) {
++ if (!strlen(tty) || !strcmp(tty, ".") || !strcmp(tty, "..")) {
+ return NULL;
+ }
+ return tty;
+@@ -243,6 +243,17 @@ get_ruser(pam_handle_t *pamh, char *ruserbuf, size_t ruserbuflen)
+ if (pwd != NULL) {
+ ruser = pwd->pw_name;
+ }
++ } else {
++ /*
++ * This ruser is used by format_timestamp_name as a component
++ * of constructed timestamp pathname, so ".", "..", and '/'
++ * are disallowed to avoid potential path traversal issues.
++ */
++ if (!strcmp(ruser, ".") ||
++ !strcmp(ruser, "..") ||
++ strchr(ruser, '/')) {
++ ruser = NULL;
++ }
+ }
+ if (ruser == NULL || strlen(ruser) >= ruserbuflen) {
+ *ruserbuf = '\0';
diff --git a/debian/patches-applied/cve-2015-3238.patch b/debian/patches-applied/cve-2015-3238.patch
new file mode 100644
index 00000000..7c75ee5c
--- /dev/null
+++ b/debian/patches-applied/cve-2015-3238.patch
@@ -0,0 +1,154 @@
+From e89d4c97385ff8180e6e81e84c5aa745daf28a79 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Thorsten Kukuk <kukuk@thkukuk.de>
+Date: Mon, 22 Jun 2015 14:53:01 +0200
+Subject: Release version 1.2.1
+
+Security fix: CVE-2015-3238
+
+If the process executing pam_sm_authenticate or pam_sm_chauthtok method
+of pam_unix is not privileged enough to check the password, e.g.
+if selinux is enabled, the _unix_run_helper_binary function is called.
+When a long enough password is supplied (16 pages or more, i.e. 65536+
+bytes on a system with 4K pages), this helper function hangs
+indefinitely, blocked in the write(2) call while writing to a blocking
+pipe that has a limited capacity.
+With this fix, the verifiable password length will be limited to
+PAM_MAX_RESP_SIZE bytes (i.e. 512 bytes) for pam_exec and pam_unix.
+
+diff --git a/modules/pam_exec/pam_exec.8.xml b/modules/pam_exec/pam_exec.8.xml
+index 2379366..d1b00a2 100644
+--- a/modules/pam_exec/pam_exec.8.xml
++++ b/modules/pam_exec/pam_exec.8.xml
+@@ -106,7 +106,8 @@
+ During authentication the calling command can read
+ the password from <citerefentry>
+ <refentrytitle>stdin</refentrytitle><manvolnum>3</manvolnum>
+- </citerefentry>.
++ </citerefentry>. Only first <emphasis>PAM_MAX_RESP_SIZE</emphasis>
++ bytes of a password are provided to the command.
+ </para>
+ </listitem>
+ </varlistentry>
+diff --git a/modules/pam_exec/pam_exec.c b/modules/pam_exec/pam_exec.c
+index 5ab9630..17ba6ca 100644
+--- a/modules/pam_exec/pam_exec.c
++++ b/modules/pam_exec/pam_exec.c
+@@ -178,11 +178,11 @@ call_exec (const char *pam_type, pam_handle_t *pamh,
+ }
+
+ pam_set_item (pamh, PAM_AUTHTOK, resp);
+- authtok = strdupa (resp);
++ authtok = strndupa (resp, PAM_MAX_RESP_SIZE);
+ _pam_drop (resp);
+ }
+ else
+- authtok = void_pass;
++ authtok = strndupa (void_pass, PAM_MAX_RESP_SIZE);
+
+ if (pipe(fds) != 0)
+ {
+diff --git a/modules/pam_unix/pam_unix.8.xml b/modules/pam_unix/pam_unix.8.xml
+index 4008402..a8b64bb 100644
+--- a/modules/pam_unix/pam_unix.8.xml
++++ b/modules/pam_unix/pam_unix.8.xml
+@@ -80,6 +80,13 @@
+ </para>
+
+ <para>
++ The maximum length of a password supported by the pam_unix module
++ via the helper binary is <emphasis>PAM_MAX_RESP_SIZE</emphasis>
++ - currently 512 bytes. The rest of the password provided by the
++ conversation function to the module will be ignored.
++ </para>
++
++ <para>
+ The password component of this module performs the task of updating
+ the user's password. The default encryption hash is taken from the
+ <emphasis remap='B'>ENCRYPT_METHOD</emphasis> variable from
+diff --git a/modules/pam_unix/pam_unix_passwd.c b/modules/pam_unix/pam_unix_passwd.c
+index 2d330e5..c2e5de5 100644
+--- a/modules/pam_unix/pam_unix_passwd.c
++++ b/modules/pam_unix/pam_unix_passwd.c
+@@ -240,15 +240,22 @@ static int _unix_run_update_binary(pam_handle_t *pamh, unsigned int ctrl, const
+ /* wait for child */
+ /* if the stored password is NULL */
+ int rc=0;
+- if (fromwhat)
+- pam_modutil_write(fds[1], fromwhat, strlen(fromwhat)+1);
+- else
+- pam_modutil_write(fds[1], "", 1);
+- if (towhat) {
+- pam_modutil_write(fds[1], towhat, strlen(towhat)+1);
++ if (fromwhat) {
++ int len = strlen(fromwhat);
++
++ if (len > PAM_MAX_RESP_SIZE)
++ len = PAM_MAX_RESP_SIZE;
++ pam_modutil_write(fds[1], fromwhat, len);
+ }
+- else
+- pam_modutil_write(fds[1], "", 1);
++ pam_modutil_write(fds[1], "", 1);
++ if (towhat) {
++ int len = strlen(towhat);
++
++ if (len > PAM_MAX_RESP_SIZE)
++ len = PAM_MAX_RESP_SIZE;
++ pam_modutil_write(fds[1], towhat, len);
++ }
++ pam_modutil_write(fds[1], "", 1);
+
+ close(fds[0]); /* close here to avoid possible SIGPIPE above */
+ close(fds[1]);
+diff --git a/modules/pam_unix/passverify.c b/modules/pam_unix/passverify.c
+index b325602..e79b55e 100644
+--- a/modules/pam_unix/passverify.c
++++ b/modules/pam_unix/passverify.c
+@@ -1115,12 +1115,15 @@ getuidname(uid_t uid)
+ int
+ read_passwords(int fd, int npass, char **passwords)
+ {
++ /* The passwords array must contain npass preallocated
++ * buffers of length MAXPASS + 1
++ */
+ int rbytes = 0;
+ int offset = 0;
+ int i = 0;
+ char *pptr;
+ while (npass > 0) {
+- rbytes = read(fd, passwords[i]+offset, MAXPASS-offset);
++ rbytes = read(fd, passwords[i]+offset, MAXPASS+1-offset);
+
+ if (rbytes < 0) {
+ if (errno == EINTR) continue;
+diff --git a/modules/pam_unix/passverify.h b/modules/pam_unix/passverify.h
+index 3de6759..caf7ae8 100644
+--- a/modules/pam_unix/passverify.h
++++ b/modules/pam_unix/passverify.h
+@@ -8,7 +8,7 @@
+
+ #define PAM_UNIX_RUN_HELPER PAM_CRED_INSUFFICIENT
+
+-#define MAXPASS 200 /* the maximum length of a password */
++#define MAXPASS PAM_MAX_RESP_SIZE /* the maximum length of a password */
+
+ #define OLD_PASSWORDS_FILE "/etc/security/opasswd"
+
+diff --git a/modules/pam_unix/support.c b/modules/pam_unix/support.c
+index fdb45c2..abccd82 100644
+--- a/modules/pam_unix/support.c
++++ b/modules/pam_unix/support.c
+@@ -609,7 +609,12 @@ static int _unix_run_helper_binary(pam_handle_t *pamh, const char *passwd,
+ /* if the stored password is NULL */
+ int rc=0;
+ if (passwd != NULL) { /* send the password to the child */
+- if (write(fds[1], passwd, strlen(passwd)+1) == -1) {
++ int len = strlen(passwd);
++
++ if (len > PAM_MAX_RESP_SIZE)
++ len = PAM_MAX_RESP_SIZE;
++ if (write(fds[1], passwd, len) == -1 ||
++ write(fds[1], "", 1) == -1) {
+ pam_syslog (pamh, LOG_ERR, "Cannot send password to helper: %m");
+ retval = PAM_AUTH_ERR;
+ }
diff --git a/debian/patches-applied/make_documentation_reproducible.patch b/debian/patches-applied/make_documentation_reproducible.patch
new file mode 100644
index 00000000..26f16503
--- /dev/null
+++ b/debian/patches-applied/make_documentation_reproducible.patch
@@ -0,0 +1,28 @@
+Description: Make documentation reproducible
+ Add LC_ALL=C to w3m to avoid changes in the output when build the
+ documentation with different locales.
+Author: Juan Picca <jumapico@gmail.com>
+Last-Update: 2015-07-11
+
+--- pam.orig/configure
++++ pam/configure
+@@ -15162,7 +15162,7 @@ fi
+
+
+ if test ! -z "$BROWSER"; then
+- BROWSER="$BROWSER -T text/html -dump"
++ BROWSER="LC_ALL=C $BROWSER -T text/html -dump"
+ else
+ enable_docu=no
+ fi
+--- pam.orig/configure.in
++++ pam/configure.in
+@@ -554,7 +554,7 @@ JH_CHECK_XML_CATALOG([http://docbook.sou
+
+ AC_PATH_PROG([BROWSER], [w3m])
+ if test ! -z "$BROWSER"; then
+- BROWSER="$BROWSER -T text/html -dump"
++ BROWSER="LC_ALL=C $BROWSER -T text/html -dump"
+ else
+ enable_docu=no
+ fi
diff --git a/debian/patches-applied/pam-loginuid-in-containers b/debian/patches-applied/pam-loginuid-in-containers
index bea1e32f..1e965b2d 100644
--- a/debian/patches-applied/pam-loginuid-in-containers
+++ b/debian/patches-applied/pam-loginuid-in-containers
@@ -29,11 +29,11 @@ Description: pam_loginuid: Ignore failure in user namespaces
Signed-off-by: Steve Langasek <vorlon@debian.org>
Signed-off-by: Dmitry V. Levin <ldv@altlinux.org>
-Index: pam.deb/modules/pam_loginuid/pam_loginuid.c
+Index: ubuntu/modules/pam_loginuid/pam_loginuid.c
===================================================================
---- pam.deb.orig/modules/pam_loginuid/pam_loginuid.c
-+++ pam.deb/modules/pam_loginuid/pam_loginuid.c
-@@ -46,25 +46,49 @@
+--- ubuntu.orig/modules/pam_loginuid/pam_loginuid.c 2014-01-31 21:07:08.665185675 +0000
++++ ubuntu/modules/pam_loginuid/pam_loginuid.c 2014-01-31 21:05:05.000000000 +0000
+@@ -47,25 +47,56 @@
/*
* This function writes the loginuid to the /proc system. It returns
@@ -50,48 +50,58 @@ Index: pam.deb/modules/pam_loginuid/pam_loginuid.c
+ char loginuid[24], buf[24];
+ static const char host_uid_map[] = " 0 0 4294967295\n";
+ char uid_map[sizeof(host_uid_map)];
++
++ /* loginuid in user namespaces currently isn't writable and in some
++ case, not even readable, so consider any failure as ignorable (but try
++ anyway, in case we hit a kernel which supports it). */
++ fd = open("/proc/self/uid_map", O_RDONLY);
++ if (fd >= 0) {
++ count = pam_modutil_read(fd, uid_map, sizeof(uid_map));
++ if (strncmp(uid_map, host_uid_map, count) != 0)
++ rc = PAM_IGNORE;
++ close(fd);
++ }
- count = snprintf(loginuid, sizeof(loginuid), "%lu", (unsigned long)uid);
+- count = snprintf(loginuid, sizeof(loginuid), "%lu", (unsigned long)uid);
- fd = open("/proc/self/loginuid", O_NOFOLLOW|O_WRONLY|O_TRUNC);
+ fd = open("/proc/self/loginuid", O_NOFOLLOW|O_RDWR);
if (fd < 0) {
- if (errno != ENOENT) {
- rc = 1;
+- pam_syslog(pamh, LOG_ERR,
+- "Cannot open /proc/self/loginuid: %m");
+ if (errno == ENOENT) {
+ rc = PAM_IGNORE;
-+ } else if (errno == EACCES) {
-+ fd = open("/proc/self/uid_map", O_RDONLY);
-+ if (fd >= 0) {
-+ count = pam_modutil_read(fd, uid_map, sizeof(uid_map));
-+ if (strncmp(uid_map, host_uid_map, count) != 0)
-+ rc = PAM_IGNORE;
-+ close(fd);
-+ }
-+ if (rc != PAM_IGNORE)
-+ errno = EACCES;
+ }
+ if (rc != PAM_IGNORE) {
- pam_syslog(pamh, LOG_ERR,
- "Cannot open /proc/self/loginuid: %m");
++ pam_syslog(pamh, LOG_ERR, "Cannot open %s: %m",
++ "/proc/self/loginuid");
}
return rc;
}
- if (pam_modutil_write(fd, loginuid, count) != count)
- rc = 1;
+
++ count = snprintf(loginuid, sizeof(loginuid), "%lu", (unsigned long)uid);
+ if (pam_modutil_read(fd, buf, sizeof(buf)) == count &&
+ memcmp(buf, loginuid, count) == 0) {
+ rc = PAM_SUCCESS;
+ goto done; /* already correct */
+ }
+ if (lseek(fd, 0, SEEK_SET) == 0 && ftruncate(fd, 0) == 0 &&
-+ pam_modutil_write(fd, loginuid, count) == count)
++ pam_modutil_write(fd, loginuid, count) == count) {
+ rc = PAM_SUCCESS;
++ } else {
++ if (rc != PAM_IGNORE) {
++ pam_syslog(pamh, LOG_ERR, "Error writing %s: %m",
++ "/proc/self/loginuid");
++ }
++ }
+ done:
close(fd);
return rc;
}
-@@ -164,6 +188,7 @@
+@@ -165,6 +196,7 @@
{
const char *user = NULL;
struct passwd *pwd;
@@ -99,7 +109,7 @@ Index: pam.deb/modules/pam_loginuid/pam_loginuid.c
#ifdef HAVE_LIBAUDIT
int require_auditd = 0;
#endif
-@@ -182,9 +207,14 @@
+@@ -183,9 +215,14 @@
return PAM_SESSION_ERR;
}
@@ -117,7 +127,7 @@ Index: pam.deb/modules/pam_loginuid/pam_loginuid.c
}
#ifdef HAVE_LIBAUDIT
-@@ -194,11 +224,12 @@
+@@ -195,11 +232,12 @@
argv++;
}
diff --git a/debian/patches-applied/pam_namespace_fix_bashism.patch b/debian/patches-applied/pam_namespace_fix_bashism.patch
new file mode 100644
index 00000000..6c6f1861
--- /dev/null
+++ b/debian/patches-applied/pam_namespace_fix_bashism.patch
@@ -0,0 +1,61 @@
+From fbc65c39d6853af268c9a093923afc876d0b138e Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Steve Langasek <vorlon@debian.org>
+Date: Tue, 14 Jan 2014 19:48:51 -0800
+Subject: pam_namespace: don't use bashisms in default namespace.init script
+
+* modules/pam_namespace/pam_namespace.c: call setuid() before execing the
+namespace init script, so that scripts run with maximum privilege regardless
+of the shell implementation.
+* modules/pam_namespace/namespace.init: drop the '-p' bashism from the
+shebang line
+
+This is not a POSIX standard option, it's a bashism. The bash manpage says
+that it's used to prevent the effective user id from being reset to the real
+user id on startup, and to ignore certain unsafe variables from the
+environment.
+
+In the case of pam_namespace, the -p is not necessary for environment
+sanitizing because the PAM module (properly) sanitizes the environment
+before execing the script.
+
+The stated reason given in CVS history for passing -p is to "preserve euid
+when called from setuid apps (su, newrole)." This should be done more
+portably, by calling setuid() before spawning the shell.
+
+Signed-off-by: Steve Langasek <vorlon@debian.org>
+Bug-Debian: http://bugs.debian.org/624842
+Bug-Ubuntu: https://bugs.launchpad.net/bugs/1081323
+---
+ modules/pam_namespace/namespace.init | 2 +-
+ modules/pam_namespace/pam_namespace.c | 5 +++++
+ 2 files changed, 6 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
+
+diff --git a/modules/pam_namespace/namespace.init b/modules/pam_namespace/namespace.init
+index 9ab5806..67d4aa2 100755
+--- a/modules/pam_namespace/namespace.init
++++ b/modules/pam_namespace/namespace.init
+@@ -1,4 +1,4 @@
+-#!/bin/sh -p
++#!/bin/sh
+ # It receives polydir path as $1, the instance path as $2,
+ # a flag whether the instance dir was newly created (0 - no, 1 - yes) in $3,
+ # and user name in $4.
+diff --git a/modules/pam_namespace/pam_namespace.c b/modules/pam_namespace/pam_namespace.c
+index e0d5e30..92883f5 100644
+--- a/modules/pam_namespace/pam_namespace.c
++++ b/modules/pam_namespace/pam_namespace.c
+@@ -1205,6 +1205,11 @@ static int inst_init(const struct polydir_s *polyptr, const char *ipath,
+ _exit(1);
+ }
+ #endif
++ /* Pass maximum privs when we exec() */
++ if (setuid(geteuid()) < 0) {
++ /* ignore failures, they don't matter */
++ }
++
+ if (execle(init_script, init_script,
+ polyptr->dir, ipath, newdir?"1":"0", idata->user, NULL, envp) < 0)
+ _exit(1);
+--
+cgit v0.12
+
diff --git a/debian/patches-applied/series b/debian/patches-applied/series
index 346e6106..51598ca8 100644
--- a/debian/patches-applied/series
+++ b/debian/patches-applied/series
@@ -15,10 +15,15 @@ hurd_no_setfsuid
045_pam_dispatch_jump_is_ignore
054_pam_security_abstract_securetty_handling
055_pam_unix_nullok_secure
-cve-2011-4708.patch
+cve-2010-4708.patch
PAM-manpage-section
update-motd
no_PATH_MAX_on_hurd
lib_security_multiarch_compat
pam-loginuid-in-containers
+cve-2013-7041.patch
+cve-2014-2583.patch
+cve-2015-3238.patch
pam-limits-nofile-fd-setsize-cap
+pam_namespace_fix_bashism.patch
+make_documentation_reproducible.patch
diff --git a/debian/patches-applied/update-motd b/debian/patches-applied/update-motd
index a89655df..6c2af5bb 100644
--- a/debian/patches-applied/update-motd
+++ b/debian/patches-applied/update-motd
@@ -86,16 +86,16 @@ Index: pam.debian/modules/pam_motd/pam_motd.c
-
- pam_info (pamh, "%s", mtmp);
- break;
-+ /* Run the update-motd dynamic motd scripts, outputting to /var/run/motd.
-+ If /etc/motd -> /var/run/motd, the displayed MOTD will be dynamic.
-+ Otherwise, the admin can force a static MOTD by breaking that symlink
-+ and publishing into an /etc/motd text file. */
++ /* Run the update-motd dynamic motd scripts, outputting to /run/motd.dynamic.
++ This will be displayed only when calling pam_motd with
++ motd=/run/motd.dynamic; current /etc/pam.d/login and /etc/pam.d/sshd
++ display both this file and /etc/motd. */
+ if (do_update && (stat("/etc/update-motd.d", &st) == 0)
+ && S_ISDIR(st.st_mode))
+ {
+ mode_t old_mask = umask(0022);
-+ if (!system("/usr/bin/env -i PATH=/usr/local/sbin:/usr/local/bin:/usr/sbin:/usr/bin:/sbin:/bin run-parts --lsbsysinit /etc/update-motd.d > /var/run/motd.new"))
-+ rename("/var/run/motd.new", "/var/run/motd");
++ if (!system("/usr/bin/env -i PATH=/usr/local/sbin:/usr/local/bin:/usr/sbin:/usr/bin:/sbin:/bin run-parts --lsbsysinit /etc/update-motd.d > /run/motd.dynamic.new"))
++ rename("/run/motd.dynamic.new", "/run/motd.dynamic");
+ umask(old_mask);
}
generated by cgit v1.2.3 (git 2.25.1) at 2024-04-18 07:50:49 +0000