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-rw-r--r--modules/pam_cracklib/pam_cracklib.c842
1 files changed, 842 insertions, 0 deletions
diff --git a/modules/pam_cracklib/pam_cracklib.c b/modules/pam_cracklib/pam_cracklib.c
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+++ b/modules/pam_cracklib/pam_cracklib.c
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+/*
+ * pam_cracklib module
+ */
+
+/*
+ * 0.9. switch to using a distance algorithm in similar()
+ * 0.86. added support for setting minimum numbers of digits, uppers,
+ * lowers, and others
+ * 0.85. added six new options to use this with long passwords.
+ * 0.8. tidied output and improved D(()) usage for debugging.
+ * 0.7. added support for more obscure checks for new passwd.
+ * 0.6. root can reset user passwd to any values (it's only warned)
+ * 0.5. supports retries - 'retry=N' argument
+ * 0.4. added argument 'type=XXX' for 'New XXX password' prompt
+ * 0.3. Added argument 'debug'
+ * 0.2. new password is feeded to cracklib for verify after typed once
+ * 0.1. First release
+ */
+
+/*
+ * Written by Cristian Gafton <gafton@redhat.com> 1996/09/10
+ * Long password support by Philip W. Dalrymple <pwd@mdtsoft.com> 1997/07/18
+ * See the end of the file for Copyright Information
+ *
+ * Modification for long password systems (>8 chars). The original
+ * module had problems when used in a md5 password system in that it
+ * allowed too short passwords but required that at least half of the
+ * bytes in the new password did not appear in the old one. this
+ * action is still the default and the changes should not break any
+ * current user. This modification adds 6 new options, one to set the
+ * number of bytes in the new password that are not in the old one,
+ * the other five to control the length checking, these are all
+ * documented (or will be before anyone else sees this code) in the PAM
+ * S.A.G. in the section on the cracklib module.
+ */
+
+#include "config.h"
+
+#include <stdio.h>
+#ifdef HAVE_CRYPT_H
+# include <crypt.h>
+#endif
+#include <unistd.h>
+#include <stdlib.h>
+#include <string.h>
+#include <syslog.h>
+#include <stdarg.h>
+#include <sys/types.h>
+#include <sys/stat.h>
+#include <ctype.h>
+#include <limits.h>
+
+#ifdef HAVE_CRACK_H
+#include <crack.h>
+#else
+extern char *FascistCheck(char *pw, const char *dictpath);
+#endif
+
+#ifndef CRACKLIB_DICTS
+#define CRACKLIB_DICTS NULL
+#endif
+
+/* For Translators: "%s%s" could be replaced with "<service> " or "". */
+#define PROMPT1 _("New %s%spassword: ")
+/* For Translators: "%s%s" could be replaced with "<service> " or "". */
+#define PROMPT2 _("Retype new %s%spassword: ")
+#define MISTYPED_PASS _("Sorry, passwords do not match.")
+
+#ifdef MIN
+#undef MIN
+#endif
+#define MIN(_a, _b) (((_a) < (_b)) ? (_a) : (_b))
+
+/*
+ * here, we make a definition for the externally accessible function
+ * in this file (this definition is required for static a module
+ * but strongly encouraged generally) it is used to instruct the
+ * modules include file to define the function prototypes.
+ */
+
+#define PAM_SM_PASSWORD
+
+#include <security/pam_modules.h>
+#include <security/_pam_macros.h>
+#include <security/pam_ext.h>
+
+/* argument parsing */
+#define PAM_DEBUG_ARG 0x0001
+
+struct cracklib_options {
+ int retry_times;
+ int diff_ok;
+ int diff_ignore;
+ int min_length;
+ int dig_credit;
+ int up_credit;
+ int low_credit;
+ int oth_credit;
+ int min_class;
+ int use_authtok;
+ char prompt_type[BUFSIZ];
+ const char *cracklib_dictpath;
+};
+
+#define CO_RETRY_TIMES 1
+#define CO_DIFF_OK 5
+#define CO_DIFF_IGNORE 23
+#define CO_MIN_LENGTH 9
+# define CO_MIN_LENGTH_BASE 5
+#define CO_DIG_CREDIT 1
+#define CO_UP_CREDIT 1
+#define CO_LOW_CREDIT 1
+#define CO_OTH_CREDIT 1
+#define CO_USE_AUTHTOK 0
+
+static int
+_pam_parse (pam_handle_t *pamh, struct cracklib_options *opt,
+ int argc, const char **argv)
+{
+ int ctrl=0;
+
+ /* step through arguments */
+ for (ctrl=0; argc-- > 0; ++argv) {
+ char *ep = NULL;
+
+ /* generic options */
+
+ if (!strcmp(*argv,"debug"))
+ ctrl |= PAM_DEBUG_ARG;
+ else if (!strncmp(*argv,"type=",5))
+ strncpy(opt->prompt_type, *argv+5, sizeof(opt->prompt_type) - 1);
+ else if (!strncmp(*argv,"retry=",6)) {
+ opt->retry_times = strtol(*argv+6,&ep,10);
+ if (!ep || (opt->retry_times < 1))
+ opt->retry_times = CO_RETRY_TIMES;
+ } else if (!strncmp(*argv,"difok=",6)) {
+ opt->diff_ok = strtol(*argv+6,&ep,10);
+ if (!ep || (opt->diff_ok < 0))
+ opt->diff_ok = CO_DIFF_OK;
+ } else if (!strncmp(*argv,"difignore=",10)) {
+ opt->diff_ignore = strtol(*argv+10,&ep,10);
+ if (!ep || (opt->diff_ignore < 0))
+ opt->diff_ignore = CO_DIFF_IGNORE;
+ } else if (!strncmp(*argv,"minlen=",7)) {
+ opt->min_length = strtol(*argv+7,&ep,10);
+ if (!ep || (opt->min_length < CO_MIN_LENGTH_BASE))
+ opt->min_length = CO_MIN_LENGTH_BASE;
+ } else if (!strncmp(*argv,"dcredit=",8)) {
+ opt->dig_credit = strtol(*argv+8,&ep,10);
+ if (!ep)
+ opt->dig_credit = 0;
+ } else if (!strncmp(*argv,"ucredit=",8)) {
+ opt->up_credit = strtol(*argv+8,&ep,10);
+ if (!ep)
+ opt->up_credit = 0;
+ } else if (!strncmp(*argv,"lcredit=",8)) {
+ opt->low_credit = strtol(*argv+8,&ep,10);
+ if (!ep)
+ opt->low_credit = 0;
+ } else if (!strncmp(*argv,"ocredit=",8)) {
+ opt->oth_credit = strtol(*argv+8,&ep,10);
+ if (!ep)
+ opt->oth_credit = 0;
+ } else if (!strncmp(*argv,"minclass=",9)) {
+ opt->min_class = strtol(*argv+9,&ep,10);
+ if (!ep)
+ opt->min_class = 0;
+ if (opt->min_class > 4)
+ opt->min_class = 4 ;
+ } else if (!strncmp(*argv,"use_authtok",11)) {
+ opt->use_authtok = 1;
+ } else if (!strncmp(*argv,"dictpath=",9)) {
+ opt->cracklib_dictpath = *argv+9;
+ if (!*(opt->cracklib_dictpath)) {
+ opt->cracklib_dictpath = CRACKLIB_DICTS;
+ }
+ } else {
+ pam_syslog(pamh,LOG_ERR,"pam_parse: unknown option; %s",*argv);
+ }
+ }
+ opt->prompt_type[sizeof(opt->prompt_type) - 1] = '\0';
+
+ return ctrl;
+}
+
+/* Helper functions */
+
+/* use this to free strings. ESPECIALLY password strings */
+static char *_pam_delete(register char *xx)
+{
+ _pam_overwrite(xx);
+ free(xx);
+ return NULL;
+}
+
+/*
+ * can't be a palindrome - like `R A D A R' or `M A D A M'
+ */
+static int palindrome(const char *new)
+{
+ int i, j;
+
+ i = strlen (new);
+
+ for (j = 0;j < i;j++)
+ if (new[i - j - 1] != new[j])
+ return 0;
+
+ return 1;
+}
+
+/*
+ * Calculate how different two strings are in terms of the number of
+ * character removals, additions, and changes needed to go from one to
+ * the other
+ */
+
+static int distdifferent(const char *old, const char *new,
+ size_t i, size_t j)
+{
+ char c, d;
+
+ if ((i == 0) || (strlen(old) < i)) {
+ c = 0;
+ } else {
+ c = old[i - 1];
+ }
+ if ((j == 0) || (strlen(new) < j)) {
+ d = 0;
+ } else {
+ d = new[j - 1];
+ }
+ return (c != d);
+}
+
+static int distcalculate(int **distances, const char *old, const char *new,
+ size_t i, size_t j)
+{
+ int tmp = 0;
+
+ if (distances[i][j] != -1) {
+ return distances[i][j];
+ }
+
+ tmp = distcalculate(distances, old, new, i - 1, j - 1);
+ tmp = MIN(tmp, distcalculate(distances, old, new, i, j - 1));
+ tmp = MIN(tmp, distcalculate(distances, old, new, i - 1, j));
+ tmp += distdifferent(old, new, i, j);
+
+ distances[i][j] = tmp;
+
+ return tmp;
+}
+
+static int distance(const char *old, const char *new)
+{
+ int **distances = NULL;
+ size_t m, n, i, j, r;
+
+ m = strlen(old);
+ n = strlen(new);
+ distances = malloc(sizeof(int*) * (m + 1));
+
+ for (i = 0; i <= m; i++) {
+ distances[i] = malloc(sizeof(int) * (n + 1));
+ for(j = 0; j <= n; j++) {
+ distances[i][j] = -1;
+ }
+ }
+ for (i = 0; i <= m; i++) {
+ distances[i][0] = i;
+ }
+ for (j = 0; j <= n; j++) {
+ distances[0][j] = j;
+ }
+ distances[0][0] = 0;
+
+ r = distcalculate(distances, old, new, m, n);
+
+ for (i = 0; i <= m; i++) {
+ memset(distances[i], 0, sizeof(int) * (n + 1));
+ free(distances[i]);
+ }
+ free(distances);
+
+ return r;
+}
+
+static int similar(struct cracklib_options *opt,
+ const char *old, const char *new)
+{
+ if (distance(old, new) >= opt->diff_ok) {
+ return 0;
+ }
+
+ if (strlen(new) >= (strlen(old) * 2)) {
+ return 0;
+ }
+
+ /* passwords are too similar */
+ return 1;
+}
+
+/*
+ * enough classes of charecters
+ */
+
+static int minclass (struct cracklib_options *opt,
+ const char *new)
+{
+ int digits = 0;
+ int uppers = 0;
+ int lowers = 0;
+ int others = 0;
+ int total_class;
+ int i;
+ int retval;
+
+ D(( "called" ));
+ for (i = 0; new[i]; i++)
+ {
+ if (isdigit (new[i]))
+ digits = 1;
+ else if (isupper (new[i]))
+ uppers = 1;
+ else if (islower (new[i]))
+ lowers = 1;
+ else
+ others = 1;
+ }
+
+ total_class = digits + uppers + lowers + others;
+
+ D (("total class: %d\tmin_class: %d", total_class, opt->min_class));
+
+ if (total_class >= opt->min_class)
+ retval = 0;
+ else
+ retval = 1;
+
+ return retval;
+}
+
+
+/*
+ * a nice mix of characters.
+ */
+static int simple(struct cracklib_options *opt, const char *new)
+{
+ int digits = 0;
+ int uppers = 0;
+ int lowers = 0;
+ int others = 0;
+ int size;
+ int i;
+
+ for (i = 0;new[i];i++) {
+ if (isdigit (new[i]))
+ digits++;
+ else if (isupper (new[i]))
+ uppers++;
+ else if (islower (new[i]))
+ lowers++;
+ else
+ others++;
+ }
+
+ /*
+ * The scam was this - a password of only one character type
+ * must be 8 letters long. Two types, 7, and so on.
+ * This is now changed, the base size and the credits or defaults
+ * see the docs on the module for info on these parameters, the
+ * defaults cause the effect to be the same as before the change
+ */
+
+ if ((opt->dig_credit >= 0) && (digits > opt->dig_credit))
+ digits = opt->dig_credit;
+
+ if ((opt->up_credit >= 0) && (uppers > opt->up_credit))
+ uppers = opt->up_credit;
+
+ if ((opt->low_credit >= 0) && (lowers > opt->low_credit))
+ lowers = opt->low_credit;
+
+ if ((opt->oth_credit >= 0) && (others > opt->oth_credit))
+ others = opt->oth_credit;
+
+ size = opt->min_length;
+
+ if (opt->dig_credit >= 0)
+ size -= digits;
+ else if (digits < opt->dig_credit * -1)
+ return 1;
+
+ if (opt->up_credit >= 0)
+ size -= uppers;
+ else if (uppers < opt->up_credit * -1)
+ return 1;
+
+ if (opt->low_credit >= 0)
+ size -= lowers;
+ else if (lowers < opt->low_credit * -1)
+ return 1;
+
+ if (opt->oth_credit >= 0)
+ size -= others;
+ else if (others < opt->oth_credit * -1)
+ return 1;
+
+ if (size <= i)
+ return 0;
+
+ return 1;
+}
+
+static char * str_lower(char *string)
+{
+ char *cp;
+
+ for (cp = string; *cp; cp++)
+ *cp = tolower(*cp);
+ return string;
+}
+
+static const char *password_check(struct cracklib_options *opt,
+ const char *old, const char *new)
+{
+ const char *msg = NULL;
+ char *oldmono = NULL, *newmono, *wrapped = NULL;
+
+ if (old && strcmp(new, old) == 0) {
+ msg = _("is the same as the old one");
+ return msg;
+ }
+
+ newmono = str_lower(x_strdup(new));
+ if (old) {
+ oldmono = str_lower(x_strdup(old));
+ wrapped = malloc(strlen(oldmono) * 2 + 1);
+ strcpy (wrapped, oldmono);
+ strcat (wrapped, oldmono);
+ }
+
+ if (palindrome(newmono))
+ msg = _("is a palindrome");
+
+ if (!msg && oldmono && strcmp(oldmono, newmono) == 0)
+ msg = _("case changes only");
+
+ if (!msg && oldmono && similar(opt, oldmono, newmono))
+ msg = _("is too similar to the old one");
+
+ if (!msg && simple(opt, new))
+ msg = _("is too simple");
+
+ if (!msg && wrapped && strstr(wrapped, newmono))
+ msg = _("is rotated");
+
+ if (!msg && minclass (opt, new))
+ msg = _("not enough character classes");
+
+ memset(newmono, 0, strlen(newmono));
+ free(newmono);
+ if (old) {
+ memset(oldmono, 0, strlen(oldmono));
+ memset(wrapped, 0, strlen(wrapped));
+ free(oldmono);
+ free(wrapped);
+ }
+
+ return msg;
+}
+
+
+#define OLD_PASSWORDS_FILE "/etc/security/opasswd"
+
+static const char * check_old_password(const char *forwho, const char *newpass)
+{
+ static char buf[16384];
+ char *s_luser, *s_uid, *s_npas, *s_pas;
+ const char *msg = NULL;
+ FILE *opwfile;
+
+ opwfile = fopen(OLD_PASSWORDS_FILE, "r");
+ if (opwfile == NULL)
+ return NULL;
+
+ while (fgets(buf, 16380, opwfile)) {
+ if (!strncmp(buf, forwho, strlen(forwho))) {
+ char *sptr;
+ buf[strlen(buf)-1] = '\0';
+ s_luser = strtok_r(buf, ":,", &sptr);
+ s_uid = strtok_r(NULL, ":,", &sptr);
+ s_npas = strtok_r(NULL, ":,", &sptr);
+ s_pas = strtok_r(NULL, ":,", &sptr);
+ while (s_pas != NULL) {
+ if (!strcmp(crypt(newpass, s_pas), s_pas)) {
+ msg = _("has been already used");
+ break;
+ }
+ s_pas = strtok_r(NULL, ":,", &sptr);
+ }
+ break;
+ }
+ }
+ fclose(opwfile);
+
+ return msg;
+}
+
+
+static int _pam_unix_approve_pass(pam_handle_t *pamh,
+ unsigned int ctrl,
+ struct cracklib_options *opt,
+ const char *pass_old,
+ const char *pass_new)
+{
+ const char *msg = NULL;
+ const void *user;
+ int retval;
+
+ if (pass_new == NULL || (pass_old && !strcmp(pass_old,pass_new))) {
+ if (ctrl & PAM_DEBUG_ARG)
+ pam_syslog(pamh, LOG_DEBUG, "bad authentication token");
+ pam_error(pamh, "%s", pass_new == NULL ?
+ _("No password supplied"):_("Password unchanged"));
+ return PAM_AUTHTOK_ERR;
+ }
+
+ /*
+ * if one wanted to hardwire authentication token strength
+ * checking this would be the place
+ */
+ msg = password_check(opt, pass_old, pass_new);
+ if (!msg) {
+ retval = pam_get_item(pamh, PAM_USER, &user);
+ if (retval != PAM_SUCCESS || user == NULL) {
+ if (ctrl & PAM_DEBUG_ARG)
+ pam_syslog(pamh,LOG_ERR,"Can not get username");
+ return PAM_AUTHTOK_ERR;
+ }
+ msg = check_old_password(user, pass_new);
+ }
+
+ if (msg) {
+ if (ctrl & PAM_DEBUG_ARG)
+ pam_syslog(pamh, LOG_NOTICE,
+ "new passwd fails strength check: %s", msg);
+ pam_error(pamh, _("BAD PASSWORD: %s"), msg);
+ return PAM_AUTHTOK_ERR;
+ };
+ return PAM_SUCCESS;
+
+}
+
+/* The Main Thing (by Cristian Gafton, CEO at this module :-)
+ * (stolen from http://home.netscape.com)
+ */
+PAM_EXTERN int pam_sm_chauthtok(pam_handle_t *pamh, int flags,
+ int argc, const char **argv)
+{
+ unsigned int ctrl;
+ struct cracklib_options options;
+
+ D(("called."));
+
+ memset(&options, 0, sizeof(options));
+ options.retry_times = CO_RETRY_TIMES;
+ options.diff_ok = CO_DIFF_OK;
+ options.diff_ignore = CO_DIFF_IGNORE;
+ options.min_length = CO_MIN_LENGTH;
+ options.dig_credit = CO_DIG_CREDIT;
+ options.up_credit = CO_UP_CREDIT;
+ options.low_credit = CO_LOW_CREDIT;
+ options.oth_credit = CO_OTH_CREDIT;
+ options.use_authtok = CO_USE_AUTHTOK;
+ memset(options.prompt_type, 0, BUFSIZ);
+ strcpy(options.prompt_type,"UNIX");
+ options.cracklib_dictpath = CRACKLIB_DICTS;
+
+ ctrl = _pam_parse(pamh, &options, argc, argv);
+
+ if (flags & PAM_PRELIM_CHECK) {
+ /* Check for passwd dictionary */
+ /* We cannot do that, since the original path is compiled
+ into the cracklib library and we don't know it. */
+ return PAM_SUCCESS;
+ } else if (flags & PAM_UPDATE_AUTHTOK) {
+ int retval;
+ char *token1, *token2, *resp;
+ const void *oldtoken;
+
+ D(("do update"));
+ retval = pam_get_item(pamh, PAM_OLDAUTHTOK, &oldtoken);
+ if (retval != PAM_SUCCESS) {
+ if (ctrl & PAM_DEBUG_ARG)
+ pam_syslog(pamh,LOG_ERR,"Can not get old passwd");
+ oldtoken=NULL;
+ retval = PAM_SUCCESS;
+ }
+
+ do {
+ /*
+ * make sure nothing inappropriate gets returned
+ */
+ token1 = token2 = NULL;
+
+ if (!options.retry_times) {
+ D(("returning %s because maxtries reached",
+ pam_strerror(pamh, retval)));
+ return retval;
+ }
+
+ /* Planned modus operandi:
+ * Get a passwd.
+ * Verify it against cracklib.
+ * If okay get it a second time.
+ * Check to be the same with the first one.
+ * set PAM_AUTHTOK and return
+ */
+
+ if (options.use_authtok == 1) {
+ const void *item = NULL;
+
+ retval = pam_get_item(pamh, PAM_AUTHTOK, &item);
+ if (retval != PAM_SUCCESS) {
+ /* very strange. */
+ pam_syslog(pamh, LOG_ALERT,
+ "pam_get_item returned error to pam_cracklib");
+ } else if (item != NULL) { /* we have a password! */
+ token1 = x_strdup(item);
+ item = NULL;
+ } else {
+ retval = PAM_AUTHTOK_RECOVERY_ERR; /* didn't work */
+ }
+
+ } else {
+ /* Prepare to ask the user for the first time */
+ resp = NULL;
+ retval = pam_prompt (pamh, PAM_PROMPT_ECHO_OFF, &resp,
+ PROMPT1, options.prompt_type,
+ options.prompt_type[0]?" ":"");
+
+ if (retval == PAM_SUCCESS) { /* a good conversation */
+ token1 = resp;
+ if (token1 == NULL) {
+ pam_syslog(pamh, LOG_NOTICE,
+ "could not recover authentication token 1");
+ retval = PAM_AUTHTOK_RECOVERY_ERR;
+ }
+ } else {
+ retval = (retval == PAM_SUCCESS) ?
+ PAM_AUTHTOK_RECOVERY_ERR:retval ;
+ }
+ }
+
+ if (retval != PAM_SUCCESS) {
+ if (ctrl & PAM_DEBUG_ARG)
+ pam_syslog(pamh,LOG_DEBUG,"unable to obtain a password");
+ continue;
+ }
+
+ D(("testing password, retval = %s", pam_strerror(pamh, retval)));
+ /* now test this passwd against cracklib */
+ {
+ const char *crack_msg;
+
+ D(("against cracklib"));
+ if ((crack_msg = FascistCheck(token1,options.cracklib_dictpath))) {
+ if (ctrl & PAM_DEBUG_ARG)
+ pam_syslog(pamh,LOG_DEBUG,"bad password: %s",crack_msg);
+ pam_error(pamh, _("BAD PASSWORD: %s"), crack_msg);
+ if (getuid() || (flags & PAM_CHANGE_EXPIRED_AUTHTOK))
+ retval = PAM_AUTHTOK_ERR;
+ else
+ retval = PAM_SUCCESS;
+ } else {
+ /* check it for strength too... */
+ D(("for strength"));
+ retval = _pam_unix_approve_pass (pamh, ctrl, &options,
+ oldtoken, token1);
+ if (retval != PAM_SUCCESS) {
+ if (getuid() || (flags & PAM_CHANGE_EXPIRED_AUTHTOK))
+ retval = PAM_AUTHTOK_ERR;
+ else
+ retval = PAM_SUCCESS;
+ }
+ }
+ }
+
+ D(("after testing: retval = %s", pam_strerror(pamh, retval)));
+ /* if cracklib/strength check said it is a bad passwd... */
+ if ((retval != PAM_SUCCESS) && (retval != PAM_IGNORE)) {
+ int temp_unused;
+
+ temp_unused = pam_set_item(pamh, PAM_AUTHTOK, NULL);
+ token1 = _pam_delete(token1);
+ continue;
+ }
+
+ /* Now we have a good passwd. Ask for it once again */
+
+ if (options.use_authtok == 0) {
+ resp = NULL;
+ retval = pam_prompt (pamh, PAM_PROMPT_ECHO_OFF, &resp,
+ PROMPT2, options.prompt_type,
+ options.prompt_type[0]?" ":"");
+ if (retval == PAM_SUCCESS) { /* a good conversation */
+ token2 = resp;
+ if (token2 == NULL) {
+ pam_syslog(pamh,LOG_NOTICE,
+ "could not recover authentication token 2");
+ retval = PAM_AUTHTOK_RECOVERY_ERR;
+ }
+ }
+
+ /* No else, the a retval == PAM_SUCCESS path can change retval
+ to a failure code. */
+ if (retval != PAM_SUCCESS) {
+ if (ctrl & PAM_DEBUG_ARG)
+ pam_syslog(pamh,LOG_DEBUG,"unable to obtain retyped password");
+ continue;
+ }
+
+ /* Hopefully now token1 and token2 the same password ... */
+ if (strcmp(token1,token2) != 0) {
+ /* tell the user */
+ pam_error(pamh, "%s", MISTYPED_PASS);
+ token1 = _pam_delete(token1);
+ token2 = _pam_delete(token2);
+ pam_set_item(pamh, PAM_AUTHTOK, NULL);
+ if (ctrl & PAM_DEBUG_ARG)
+ pam_syslog(pamh,LOG_NOTICE,"Password mistyped");
+ retval = PAM_AUTHTOK_RECOVERY_ERR;
+ continue;
+ }
+
+ /* Yes, the password was typed correct twice
+ * we store this password as an item
+ */
+
+ {
+ const void *item = NULL;
+
+ retval = pam_set_item(pamh, PAM_AUTHTOK, token1);
+
+ /* clean up */
+ token1 = _pam_delete(token1);
+ token2 = _pam_delete(token2);
+
+ if ( (retval != PAM_SUCCESS) ||
+ ((retval = pam_get_item(pamh, PAM_AUTHTOK, &item)
+ ) != PAM_SUCCESS) ) {
+ pam_syslog(pamh, LOG_CRIT, "error manipulating password");
+ continue;
+ }
+ item = NULL; /* break link to password */
+ return PAM_SUCCESS;
+ }
+ }
+
+ } while (options.retry_times--);
+
+ } else {
+ if (ctrl & PAM_DEBUG_ARG)
+ pam_syslog(pamh, LOG_NOTICE, "UNKNOWN flags setting %02X",flags);
+ return PAM_SERVICE_ERR;
+ }
+
+ /* Not reached */
+ return PAM_SERVICE_ERR;
+}
+
+
+
+#ifdef PAM_STATIC
+/* static module data */
+struct pam_module _pam_cracklib_modstruct = {
+ "pam_cracklib",
+ NULL,
+ NULL,
+ NULL,
+ NULL,
+ NULL,
+ pam_sm_chauthtok
+};
+#endif
+
+/*
+ * Copyright (c) Cristian Gafton <gafton@redhat.com>, 1996.
+ * All rights reserved
+ *
+ * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
+ * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
+ * are met:
+ * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
+ * notice, and the entire permission notice in its entirety,
+ * including the disclaimer of warranties.
+ * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
+ * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
+ * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
+ * 3. The name of the author may not be used to endorse or promote
+ * products derived from this software without specific prior
+ * written permission.
+ *
+ * ALTERNATIVELY, this product may be distributed under the terms of
+ * the GNU Public License, in which case the provisions of the GPL are
+ * required INSTEAD OF the above restrictions. (This clause is
+ * necessary due to a potential bad interaction between the GPL and
+ * the restrictions contained in a BSD-style copyright.)
+ *
+ * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED `AS IS'' AND ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED
+ * WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES
+ * OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE ARE
+ * DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT,
+ * INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES
+ * (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR
+ * SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION)
+ * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT,
+ * STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE)
+ * ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED
+ * OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.
+ *
+ * The following copyright was appended for the long password support
+ * added with the libpam 0.58 release:
+ *
+ * Modificaton Copyright (c) Philip W. Dalrymple III <pwd@mdtsoft.com>
+ * 1997. All rights reserved
+ *
+ * THE MODIFICATION THAT PROVIDES SUPPORT FOR LONG PASSWORD TYPE CHECKING TO
+ * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED `AS IS'' AND ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED
+ * WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES
+ * OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE ARE
+ * DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT,
+ * INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES
+ * (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR
+ * SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION)
+ * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT,
+ * STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE)
+ * ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED
+ * OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.
+ */