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-rw-r--r--modules/pam_rhosts/pam_rhosts_auth.c829
1 files changed, 829 insertions, 0 deletions
diff --git a/modules/pam_rhosts/pam_rhosts_auth.c b/modules/pam_rhosts/pam_rhosts_auth.c
new file mode 100644
index 00000000..f9707cfc
--- /dev/null
+++ b/modules/pam_rhosts/pam_rhosts_auth.c
@@ -0,0 +1,829 @@
+/*----------------------------------------------------------------------
+ * Modified for Linux-PAM by Al Longyear <longyear@netcom.com> 96/5/5
+ * Modifications, Cristian Gafton 97/2/8
+ * Modifications, Peter Allgeyer 97/3
+ * Modifications (netgroups and fixes), Nicolai Langfeldt 97/3/21
+ * Security fix: 97/10/2 - gethostbyname called repeatedly without care
+ * Modification (added privategroup option) Andrew <morgan@transmeta.com>
+ *----------------------------------------------------------------------
+ * Copyright (c) 1983, 1993, 1994
+ * The Regents of the University of California. All rights reserved.
+ *
+ * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
+ * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
+ * are met:
+ * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
+ * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
+ * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
+ * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
+ * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
+ * 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this software
+ * must display the following acknowledgement:
+ * This product includes software developed by the University of
+ * California, Berkeley and its contributors.
+ * 4. Neither the name of the University nor the names of its contributors
+ * may be used to endorse or promote products derived from this software
+ * without specific prior written permission.
+ *
+ * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE REGENTS AND CONTRIBUTORS ``AS IS'' AND
+ * ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE
+ * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE
+ * ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE REGENTS OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE
+ * FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL
+ * DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS
+ * OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION)
+ * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT
+ * LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY
+ * OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF
+ * SUCH DAMAGE.
+ */
+
+#define _BSD_SOURCE
+
+#define USER_RHOSTS_FILE "/.rhosts" /* prefixed by user's home dir */
+
+#ifdef linux
+#include <endian.h>
+#endif
+
+#ifdef NEED_FSUID_H
+#include <sys/fsuid.h>
+#endif /* NEED_FSUID_H */
+
+#include <sys/types.h>
+#include <sys/uio.h>
+#include <string.h>
+#include <unistd.h>
+#include <stdlib.h>
+#include <sys/param.h>
+#include <sys/socket.h>
+#include <netinet/in.h>
+#include <netdb.h> /* This is supposed(?) to contain the following */
+int innetgr(const char *, const char *, const char *,const char *);
+
+#include <stdio.h>
+#include <errno.h>
+#include <sys/time.h>
+#include <arpa/inet.h>
+
+#ifndef MAXDNAME
+#define MAXDNAME 256
+#endif
+
+#include <stdarg.h>
+#include <ctype.h>
+
+#include <net/if.h>
+#ifdef linux
+# include <linux/sockios.h>
+# ifndef __USE_MISC
+# define __USE_MISC
+# include <sys/fsuid.h>
+# endif /* __USE_MISC */
+#endif
+
+#include <pwd.h>
+#include <grp.h>
+#include <sys/file.h>
+#include <sys/signal.h>
+#include <sys/stat.h>
+#include <syslog.h>
+#ifndef _PATH_HEQUIV
+#define _PATH_HEQUIV "/etc/hosts.equiv"
+#endif /* _PATH_HEQUIV */
+
+#define PAM_SM_AUTH /* only defines this management group */
+
+#include <security/pam_modules.h>
+#include <security/_pam_macros.h>
+
+/* to the best of my knowledge, all modern UNIX boxes have 32 bit integers */
+#define U32 unsigned int
+
+
+/*
+ * Options for this module
+ */
+
+struct _options {
+ int opt_no_hosts_equiv;
+ int opt_hosts_equiv_rootok;
+ int opt_no_rhosts;
+ int opt_debug;
+ int opt_nowarn;
+ int opt_disallow_null_authtok;
+ int opt_silent;
+ int opt_promiscuous;
+ int opt_suppress;
+ int opt_private_group;
+ int opt_no_uid_check;
+ const char *superuser;
+ const char *last_error;
+};
+
+/* logging */
+static void _pam_log(int err, const char *format, ...)
+{
+ va_list args;
+
+ va_start(args, format);
+ openlog("pam_rhosts_auth", LOG_CONS|LOG_PID, LOG_AUTH);
+ vsyslog(err, format, args);
+ va_end(args);
+ closelog();
+}
+
+static void set_option (struct _options *opts, const char *arg)
+{
+ if (strcmp(arg, "no_hosts_equiv") == 0) {
+ opts->opt_no_hosts_equiv = 1;
+ return;
+ }
+
+ if (strcmp(arg, "hosts_equiv_rootok") == 0) {
+ opts->opt_hosts_equiv_rootok = 1;
+ return;
+ }
+
+ if (strcmp(arg, "no_rhosts") == 0) {
+ opts->opt_no_rhosts = 1;
+ return;
+ }
+
+ if (strcmp(arg, "debug") == 0) {
+ D(("debugging enabled"));
+ opts->opt_debug = 1;
+ return;
+ }
+
+ if (strcmp(arg, "no_warn") == 0) {
+ opts->opt_nowarn = 1;
+ return;
+ }
+
+ if (strcmp(arg, "promiscuous") == 0) {
+ opts->opt_promiscuous = 1; /* used to permit '+' in ...hosts file */
+ return;
+ }
+
+ if (strcmp(arg, "suppress") == 0) {
+ opts->opt_suppress = 1; /* used to suppress failure warning message */
+ return;
+ }
+
+ if (strcmp(arg, "privategroup") == 0) {
+ opts->opt_private_group = 1; /* used to permit group write on .rhosts
+ file if group has same name as owner */
+ return;
+ }
+
+ if (strcmp(arg, "no_uid_check") == 0) {
+ opts->opt_no_uid_check = 1; /* NIS optimization */
+ return;
+ }
+
+ if (strcmp(arg, "superuser=") == 0) {
+ opts->superuser = arg+sizeof("superuser=")-1;
+ return;
+ }
+ /*
+ * All other options are ignored at the present time.
+ */
+ _pam_log(LOG_WARNING, "unrecognized option '%s'", arg);
+}
+
+static void set_parameters (struct _options *opts, int flags,
+ int argc, const char **argv)
+{
+ opts->opt_silent = flags & PAM_SILENT;
+ opts->opt_disallow_null_authtok = flags & PAM_DISALLOW_NULL_AUTHTOK;
+
+ while (argc-- > 0) {
+ set_option (opts, *argv);
+ ++argv;
+ }
+}
+
+/*
+ * Obtain the name of the remote host. Currently, this is simply by
+ * requesting the contents of the PAM_RHOST item.
+ */
+
+static int pam_get_rhost(pam_handle_t *pamh, const char **rhost
+ , const char *prompt)
+{
+ int retval;
+ const char *current;
+
+ retval = pam_get_item (pamh, PAM_RHOST, (const void **)&current);
+ if (retval != PAM_SUCCESS)
+ return retval;
+
+ if (current == NULL) {
+ return PAM_AUTH_ERR;
+ }
+ *rhost = current;
+
+ return retval; /* pass on any error from conversation */
+}
+
+/*
+ * Obtain the name of the remote user. Currently, this is simply by
+ * requesting the contents of the PAM_RUSER item.
+ */
+
+static int pam_get_ruser(pam_handle_t *pamh, const char **ruser
+ , const char *prompt)
+{
+ int retval;
+ const char *current;
+
+ retval = pam_get_item (pamh, PAM_RUSER, (const void **)&current);
+ if (retval != PAM_SUCCESS)
+ return retval;
+
+ if (current == NULL) {
+ return PAM_AUTH_ERR;
+ }
+ *ruser = current;
+
+ return retval; /* pass on any error from conversation */
+}
+
+/*
+ * Returns 1 if positive match, 0 if no match, -1 if negative match.
+ */
+
+static int
+__icheckhost (pam_handle_t *pamh, struct _options *opts, U32 raddr
+ , register char *lhost, const char *rhost)
+{
+ struct hostent *hp;
+ U32 laddr;
+ int negate=1; /* Multiply return with this to get -1 instead of 1 */
+ char **pp, *user;
+
+ /* Check nis netgroup. We assume that pam has done all needed
+ paranoia checking before we are handed the rhost */
+ if (strncmp("+@",lhost,2) == 0)
+ return(innetgr(&lhost[2],rhost,NULL,NULL));
+
+ if (strncmp("-@",lhost,2) == 0)
+ return(-innetgr(&lhost[2],rhost,NULL,NULL));
+
+ /* -host */
+ if (strncmp("-",lhost,1) == 0) {
+ negate=-1;
+ lhost++;
+ } else if (strcmp("+",lhost) == 0) {
+ (void) pam_get_item(pamh, PAM_USER, (const void **)&user);
+ D(("user %s has a `+' host entry", user));
+ if (opts->opt_promiscuous)
+ return (1); /* asking for trouble, but ok.. */
+ /* If not promiscuous: handle as negative */
+ return (-1);
+ }
+
+ /* Try for raw ip address first. */
+ if (isdigit(*lhost) && (long)(laddr = inet_addr(lhost)) != -1)
+ return (negate*(! (raddr ^ laddr)));
+
+ /* Better be a hostname. */
+ hp = gethostbyname(lhost);
+ if (hp == NULL)
+ return (0);
+
+ /* Spin through ip addresses. */
+ for (pp = hp->h_addr_list; *pp; ++pp)
+ if (!memcmp (&raddr, *pp, sizeof (U32)))
+ return (negate);
+
+ /* No match. */
+ return (0);
+}
+
+/* Returns 1 on positive match, 0 on no match, -1 on negative match */
+
+static int __icheckuser(pam_handle_t *pamh, struct _options *opts
+ , const char *luser, const char *ruser
+ , const char *rhost)
+{
+ /*
+ luser is user entry from .rhosts/hosts.equiv file
+ ruser is user id on remote host
+ rhost is the remote host name
+ */
+ char *user;
+
+ /* [-+]@netgroup */
+ if (strncmp("+@",luser,2) == 0)
+ return (innetgr(&luser[2],NULL,ruser,NULL));
+
+ if (strncmp("-@",luser,2) == 0)
+ return (-innetgr(&luser[2],NULL,ruser,NULL));
+
+ /* -user */
+ if (strncmp("-",luser,1) == 0)
+ return(-(strcmp(&luser[1],ruser) == 0));
+
+ /* + */
+ if (strcmp("+",luser) == 0) {
+ (void) pam_get_item(pamh, PAM_USER, (const void **)&user);
+ _pam_log(LOG_WARNING, "user %s has a `+' user entry", user);
+ if (opts->opt_promiscuous)
+ return(1);
+ /* If not promiscuous we handle it as a negative match */
+ return(-1);
+ }
+
+ /* simple string match */
+ return (strcmp(ruser, luser) == 0);
+}
+
+/*
+ * Returns 1 for blank lines (or only comment lines) and 0 otherwise
+ */
+
+static int __isempty(char *p)
+{
+ while (*p && isspace(*p)) {
+ ++p;
+ }
+
+ return (*p == '\0' || *p == '#') ? 1:0 ;
+}
+
+/*
+ * Returns 0 if positive match, 1 if _not_ ok.
+ */
+
+static int
+__ivaliduser (pam_handle_t *pamh, struct _options *opts,
+ FILE *hostf, U32 raddr,
+ const char *luser, const char *ruser, const char *rhost)
+{
+ register const char *user;
+ register char *p;
+ int hcheck, ucheck;
+ char buf[MAXHOSTNAMELEN + 128]; /* host + login */
+
+ buf[sizeof (buf)-1] = '\0'; /* terminate line */
+
+ while (fgets(buf, sizeof(buf), hostf) != NULL) { /* hostf file line */
+ p = buf; /* from beginning of file.. */
+
+ /* Skip empty or comment lines */
+ if (__isempty(p)) {
+ continue;
+ }
+
+ /* Skip lines that are too long. */
+ if (strchr(p, '\n') == NULL) {
+ int ch = getc(hostf);
+
+ while (ch != '\n' && ch != EOF)
+ ch = getc(hostf);
+ continue;
+ }
+
+ /*
+ * If there is a hostname at the start of the line. Set it to
+ * lower case. A leading ' ' or '\t' indicates no hostname
+ */
+
+ for (;*p && !isspace(*p); ++p) {
+ *p = tolower(*p);
+ }
+
+ /*
+ * next we want to find the permitted name for the remote user
+ */
+
+ if (*p == ' ' || *p == '\t') {
+
+ /* <nul> terminate hostname and skip spaces */
+ for (*p++='\0'; *p && isspace(*p); ++p);
+
+ user = p; /* this is the user's name */
+ while (*p && !isspace(*p))
+ ++p; /* find end of user's name */
+ } else
+ user = p;
+
+ *p = '\0'; /* <nul> terminate username (+host?) */
+
+ /* buf -> host(?) ; user -> username(?) */
+
+ /* First check host part */
+ hcheck=__icheckhost(pamh, opts, raddr, buf, rhost);
+
+ if (hcheck<0)
+ return(1);
+
+ if (hcheck) {
+ /* Then check user part */
+ if (! (*user))
+ user = luser;
+
+ ucheck=__icheckuser(pamh, opts, user, ruser, rhost);
+
+ /* Positive 'host user' match? */
+ if (ucheck>0)
+ return(0);
+
+ /* Negative 'host -user' match? */
+ if (ucheck<0)
+ return(1);
+
+ /* Neither, go on looking for match */
+ }
+ }
+
+ return (1);
+}
+
+/*
+ * New .rhosts strategy: We are passed an ip address. We spin through
+ * hosts.equiv and .rhosts looking for a match. When the .rhosts only
+ * has ip addresses, we don't have to trust a nameserver. When it
+ * contains hostnames, we spin through the list of addresses the nameserver
+ * gives us and look for a match.
+ *
+ * Returns 0 if ok, -1 if not ok.
+ */
+
+static int
+pam_iruserok(pam_handle_t *pamh,
+ struct _options *opts, U32 raddr, int superuser,
+ const char *ruser, const char *luser, const char *rhost)
+{
+ const char *cp;
+ struct stat sbuf;
+ struct passwd *pwd;
+ FILE *hostf;
+ uid_t uid;
+ int answer;
+ char pbuf[MAXPATHLEN]; /* potential buffer overrun */
+
+ if ((!superuser||opts->opt_hosts_equiv_rootok) && !opts->opt_no_hosts_equiv ) {
+
+ /* try to open system hosts.equiv file */
+ hostf = fopen (_PATH_HEQUIV, "r");
+ if (hostf) {
+ answer = __ivaliduser(pamh, opts, hostf, raddr, luser
+ , ruser, rhost);
+ (void) fclose(hostf);
+ if (answer == 0)
+ return 0; /* remote host is equivalent to localhost */
+ } /* else {
+ No hosts.equiv file on system.
+ } */
+ }
+
+ if ( opts->opt_no_rhosts )
+ return 1;
+
+ /*
+ * Identify user's local .rhosts file
+ */
+
+ pwd = getpwnam(luser);
+ if (pwd == NULL) {
+ /*
+ * luser is assumed to be valid because of an earlier check for uid = 0
+ * we don't log this error twice. However, this shouldn't happen !
+ * --cristiang
+ */
+ return(1);
+ }
+
+ /* check for buffer overrun */
+ if (strlen(pwd->pw_dir) + sizeof(USER_RHOSTS_FILE) + 2 >= MAXPATHLEN) {
+ if (opts->opt_debug)
+ _pam_log(LOG_DEBUG,"home directory for `%s' is too long", luser);
+ return 1; /* to dangerous to try */
+ }
+
+ (void) strcpy(pbuf, pwd->pw_dir);
+ (void) strcat(pbuf, USER_RHOSTS_FILE);
+
+ /*
+ * Change effective uid while _reading_ .rhosts. (not just
+ * opening). If root and reading an NFS mounted file system,
+ * can't read files that are 0600 as .rhosts files should be.
+ */
+
+ /* We are root, this will not fail */
+#ifdef linux
+ /* If we are on linux the better way is setfsuid */
+ uid = setfsuid(pwd->pw_uid);
+ hostf = fopen(pbuf, "r");
+#else
+ uid = geteuid();
+ (void) seteuid(pwd->pw_uid);
+ hostf = fopen(pbuf, "r");
+#endif
+
+ if (hostf == NULL) {
+ if (opts->opt_debug)
+ _pam_log(LOG_DEBUG,"Could not open %s file",pbuf);
+ answer = 1;
+ goto exit_function;
+ }
+
+ /*
+ * If not a regular file, or is owned by someone other than
+ * user or root or if writeable by anyone but the owner, quit.
+ */
+
+ cp = NULL;
+ if (lstat(pbuf, &sbuf) < 0 || !S_ISREG(sbuf.st_mode))
+ cp = ".rhosts not regular file";
+ else if (fstat(fileno(hostf), &sbuf) < 0)
+ cp = ".rhosts fstat failed";
+ else if (sbuf.st_uid && sbuf.st_uid != pwd->pw_uid)
+ cp = "bad .rhosts owner";
+ else if (sbuf.st_mode & S_IWOTH)
+ cp = ".rhosts writable by other!";
+ else if (sbuf.st_mode & S_IWGRP) {
+
+ /* private group caveat */
+ if (opts->opt_private_group) {
+ struct group *grp = getgrgid(sbuf.st_gid);
+
+ if (NULL == grp || NULL == grp->gr_name
+ || strcmp(luser,grp->gr_name)) {
+ cp = ".rhosts writable by public group";
+ } else if (grp->gr_mem) {
+ int gcount;
+
+ /* require at most one member (luser) of this group */
+ for (gcount=0; grp->gr_mem[gcount]; ++gcount) {
+ if (strcmp(grp->gr_mem[gcount], luser)) {
+ gcount = -1;
+ break;
+ }
+ }
+ if (gcount < 0) {
+ cp = ".rhosts writable by other members of group";
+ }
+ }
+ } else {
+ cp = ".rhosts writable by group";
+ }
+
+ } /* It is _NOT_ safe to append an else here... Do so prior to
+ * S_IWGRP check */
+
+ /* If there were any problems, quit. */
+ if (cp) {
+ opts->last_error = cp;
+ answer = 1;
+ goto exit_function;
+ }
+
+ answer = __ivaliduser (pamh, opts, hostf, raddr, luser, ruser, rhost);
+
+exit_function:
+ /*
+ * Go here to exit after the fsuid/euid has been adjusted so that
+ * they are reset before we exit.
+ */
+
+#ifdef linux
+ setfsuid(uid);
+#else
+ (void)seteuid(uid);
+#endif
+
+ if (hostf != NULL)
+ (void) fclose(hostf);
+
+ return answer;
+}
+
+static int
+pam_ruserok (pam_handle_t *pamh,
+ struct _options *opts, const char *rhost, int superuser,
+ const char *ruser, const char *luser)
+{
+ struct hostent *hp;
+ int answer = 1; /* default to failure */
+ U32 *addrs;
+ int n, i;
+
+ opts->last_error = (char *) 0;
+ hp = gethostbyname(rhost); /* identify host */
+
+ if (hp != NULL) {
+ /* First of all check the address length */
+ if (hp->h_length != 4) {
+ _pam_log(LOG_ALERT, "pam_rhosts module can't work with not IPv4 "
+ "addresses");
+ return 1; /* not allowed */
+ }
+
+ /* loop though address list */
+ for (n = 0; hp->h_addr_list[n]; n++);
+ D(("rhosts: %d addresses", n));
+
+ if (n) {
+ addrs = calloc (n, hp->h_length);
+ for (i = 0; i < n; i++)
+ memcpy (addrs+i, hp->h_addr_list[i], hp->h_length);
+
+ for (i = 0; i < n && answer; i++) {
+ D(("rhosts: address %d is %04x", i, addrs[i]));
+ answer = pam_iruserok(pamh, opts, addrs[i], superuser,
+ ruser, luser, rhost);
+ /* answer == 0 means success */
+ }
+
+ free (addrs);
+ }
+ }
+
+ return answer;
+}
+
+/*
+ * Internal function to do authentication
+ */
+
+static int _pam_auth_rhosts (pam_handle_t *pamh,
+ int flags,
+ int argc,
+ const char **argv)
+{
+ int retval;
+ const char *luser;
+ const char *ruser,*rhost;
+ struct _options opts;
+ int as_root = 0;
+ /*
+ * Look at the options and set the flags accordingly.
+ */
+ memset (&opts, 0, sizeof (opts));
+ set_parameters (&opts, flags, argc, argv);
+ /*
+ * Obtain the parameters for the various items
+ */
+ for (;;) { /* abuse loop to avoid goto */
+
+ /* get the remotehost */
+ retval = pam_get_rhost(pamh, &rhost, NULL);
+ (void) pam_set_item(pamh, PAM_RHOST, rhost);
+ if (retval != PAM_SUCCESS) {
+ if (opts.opt_debug) {
+ _pam_log(LOG_DEBUG, "could not get the remote host name");
+ }
+ break;
+ }
+
+ /* get the remote user */
+ retval = pam_get_ruser(pamh, &ruser, NULL);
+ (void) pam_set_item(pamh, PAM_RUSER, ruser);
+ if (retval != PAM_SUCCESS) {
+ if (opts.opt_debug)
+ _pam_log(LOG_DEBUG, "could not get the remote username");
+ break;
+ }
+
+ /* get the local user */
+ retval = pam_get_user(pamh, &luser, NULL);
+
+ if (retval != PAM_SUCCESS) {
+ if (opts.opt_debug)
+ _pam_log(LOG_DEBUG, "could not determine name of local user");
+ break;
+ }
+
+ if (opts.superuser && !strcmp(opts.superuser, luser)) {
+ as_root = 1;
+ }
+
+ /* check if the luser uid == 0... --cristiang */
+ if (! opts.opt_no_uid_check) {
+ struct passwd *luser_pwd;
+
+ luser_pwd = getpwnam(luser);
+ if (luser_pwd == NULL) {
+ if (opts.opt_debug)
+ _pam_log(LOG_DEBUG, "user '%s' unknown to this system",
+ luser);
+ retval = PAM_AUTH_ERR;
+ break;
+ }
+ if (luser_pwd->pw_uid == 0)
+ as_root = 1;
+ luser_pwd = NULL; /* forget */
+ }
+/*
+ * Validate the account information.
+ */
+ if (pam_ruserok (pamh, &opts, rhost, as_root, ruser, luser) != 0) {
+ if ( !opts.opt_suppress ) {
+ _pam_log(LOG_WARNING, "denied to %s@%s as %s: %s",
+ ruser, rhost, luser, (opts.last_error==NULL) ?
+ "access not allowed":opts.last_error);
+ }
+ retval = PAM_AUTH_ERR;
+ } else {
+ _pam_log(LOG_NOTICE, "allowed to %s@%s as %s",
+ ruser, rhost, luser);
+ }
+ break;
+ }
+
+ return retval;
+}
+
+/* --- authentication management functions --- */
+
+PAM_EXTERN
+int pam_sm_authenticate (pam_handle_t *pamh,
+ int flags,
+ int argc,
+ const char **argv)
+{
+ int retval;
+
+ if (sizeof(U32) != 4) {
+ _pam_log (LOG_ALERT, "pam_rhosts module can\'t work on this hardware "
+ "(yet)");
+ return PAM_AUTH_ERR;
+ }
+ sethostent(1);
+ retval = _pam_auth_rhosts (pamh, flags, argc, argv);
+ endhostent();
+ return retval;
+}
+
+PAM_EXTERN
+int pam_sm_setcred(pam_handle_t *pamh,int flags,int argc,
+ const char **argv)
+{
+ return PAM_SUCCESS;
+}
+
+/* end of module definition */
+
+
+#ifdef PAM_STATIC
+
+/* static module data */
+
+struct pam_module _pam_rhosts_auth_modstruct = {
+ "pam_rhosts_auth",
+ pam_sm_authenticate,
+ pam_sm_setcred,
+ NULL,
+ NULL,
+ NULL,
+ NULL,
+};
+
+#endif
+
+/*
+ * $Log$
+ * Revision 1.1 2000/06/20 22:11:56 agmorgan
+ * Initial revision
+ *
+ * Revision 1.4 1999/11/08 05:46:58 morgan
+ * fixes for .71
+ *
+ * Revision 1.3 1999/10/09 05:12:49 morgan
+ * added hosts_equiv_rootok support
+ *
+ * Revision 1.2 1998/12/14 05:47:58 morgan
+ * added a couple of options: specify the name of root, and don't do the
+ * user-known check.
+ *
+ * Revision 1.1.1.1 1998/07/12 05:17:16 morgan
+ * Linux PAM sources pre-0.66
+ *
+ * Revision 1.12 1997/09/27 14:34:01 morgan
+ * fixed comment and renamed iruserok to pam_iruserok.
+ *
+ * Revision 1.11 1997/04/05 06:26:39 morgan
+ * fairly major fixes and enhancements (see CHANGELOG for 0.57 release)
+ *
+ * Revision 1.10 1997/02/09 02:09:30 morgan
+ * - implementation of 'debug' argument (Cristian Gafton)
+ * - we check for uid=0 accounts instead of hardcoded 'root' (Cristian Gafton)
+ *
+ * Revision 1.9 1996/12/01 03:09:47 morgan
+ * *** empty log message ***
+ *
+ * Revision 1.8 1996/11/12 06:08:59 morgan
+ * Oliver Crow's "rootok" patch plus a little clean up of set_option
+ * (AGM)
+ *
+ * Revision 1.7 1996/11/10 20:15:56 morgan
+ * cross platform support
+ *
+ * Revision 1.6 1996/08/09 05:46:29 morgan
+ * removed code for manually setting the remote username etc..
+ *
+ */