From ea488580c42e8918445a945484de3c8a5addc761 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: "Andrew G. Morgan" Date: Tue, 20 Jun 2000 22:10:38 +0000 Subject: Initial revision --- libpamc/include/security/pam_client.h | 186 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++ 1 file changed, 186 insertions(+) create mode 100644 libpamc/include/security/pam_client.h (limited to 'libpamc/include') diff --git a/libpamc/include/security/pam_client.h b/libpamc/include/security/pam_client.h new file mode 100644 index 00000000..4995e667 --- /dev/null +++ b/libpamc/include/security/pam_client.h @@ -0,0 +1,186 @@ +/* + * $Id$ + * + * Copyright (c) 1999 Andrew G. Morgan + * + * This header file provides the prototypes for the PAM client API + */ + +#ifndef PAM_CLIENT_H +#define PAM_CLIENT_H + +#include +#include +#include + +/* opaque agent handling structure */ + +typedef struct pamc_handle_s *pamc_handle_t; + +/* binary prompt structure pointer */ +#ifndef __u32 +# define __u32 unsigned int +#endif +#ifndef __u8 +# define __u8 unsigned char +#endif +typedef struct { __u32 length; __u8 control; } *pamc_bp_t; + +/* + * functions provided by libpamc + */ + +/* + * Initialize the agent abstraction library + */ + +pamc_handle_t pamc_start(void); + +/* + * Terminate the authentication process + */ + +int pamc_end(pamc_handle_t *pch); + +/* + * force the loading of a specified agent + */ + +int pamc_load(pamc_handle_t pch, const char *agent_id); + +/* + * Single conversation interface for binary prompts + */ + +int pamc_converse(pamc_handle_t pch, pamc_bp_t *prompt_p); + +/* + * disable an agent + */ + +int pamc_disable(pamc_handle_t pch, const char *agent_id); + +/* + * obtain a list of available agents + */ + +char **pamc_list_agents(pamc_handle_t pch); + +/* + * PAM_BP_ MACROS for creating, destroying and manipulating binary prompts + */ + +#include +#include +#include + +#ifndef PAM_BP_ASSERT +# define PAM_BP_ASSERT(x) do { printf(__FILE__ "(%d): %s\n", \ + __LINE__, x) ; exit(1); } while (0) +#endif /* PAM_BP_ASSERT */ + +#ifndef PAM_BP_CALLOC +# define PAM_BP_CALLOC calloc +#endif /* PAM_BP_CALLOC */ + +#ifndef PAM_BP_FREE +# define PAM_BP_FREE free +#endif /* PAM_BP_FREE */ + +#define __PAM_BP_OCTET(x,y) (*((y) + (__u8 *)(x))) + +#define PAM_BP_MIN_SIZE (sizeof(__u32) + sizeof(__u8)) +#define PAM_PB_MAX_LENGTH 0x8000 /* an advisory limit */ +#define PAM_BP_CONTROL(x) (__PAM_BP_OCTET(x,4)) +#define PAM_BP_SIZE(x) ((__PAM_BP_OCTET(x,0)<<24)+ \ + (__PAM_BP_OCTET(x,1)<<16)+ \ + (__PAM_BP_OCTET(x,2)<< 8)+ \ + (__PAM_BP_OCTET(x,3) )) +#define PAM_BP_LENGTH(x) (PAM_BP_SIZE(x) - PAM_BP_MIN_SIZE) +#define PAM_BP_DATA(x) (PAM_BP_MIN_SIZE + (__u8 *) (x)) + +/* Note, this macro always '\0' terminates renewed packets */ + +#define PAM_BP_RENEW(old_p, cntrl, data_length) \ +do { \ + if (old_p) { \ + if (*(old_p)) { \ + __u32 __size = PAM_BP_SIZE(*(old_p)); \ + memset(*(old_p), 0, __size); \ + PAM_BP_FREE(*(old_p)); \ + } \ + if (cntrl) { \ + __u32 __size; \ + \ + __size = PAM_BP_MIN_SIZE + data_length; \ + if ((*(old_p) = PAM_BP_CALLOC(1, 1+__size))) { \ + __PAM_BP_OCTET(*(old_p), 3) = __size & 0xFF; \ + __PAM_BP_OCTET(*(old_p), 2) = (__size>>=8) & 0xFF; \ + __PAM_BP_OCTET(*(old_p), 1) = (__size>>=8) & 0xFF; \ + __PAM_BP_OCTET(*(old_p), 0) = (__size>>=8) & 0xFF; \ + (*(old_p))->control = cntrl; \ + } else { \ + PAM_BP_ASSERT("out of memory for binary prompt"); \ + } \ + } else { \ + *old_p = NULL; \ + } \ + } else { \ + PAM_BP_ASSERT("programming error, invalid binary prompt pointer"); \ + } \ +} while (0) + +#define PAM_BP_FILL(prmpt, offset, length, data) \ +do { \ + int bp_length; \ + __u8 *prompt = (__u8 *) (prmpt); \ + bp_length = PAM_BP_LENGTH(prompt); \ + if (bp_length < ((length)+(offset))) { \ + PAM_BP_ASSERT("attempt to write over end of prompt"); \ + } \ + memcpy((offset) + PAM_BP_DATA(prompt), (data), (length)); \ +} while (0) + +#define PAM_BP_EXTRACT(prmpt, offset, length, data) \ +do { \ + int bp_length; \ + __u8 *prompt = (__u8 *) (prmpt); \ + bp_length = PAM_BP_LENGTH(prompt); \ + if (((offset) < 0) || bp_length < ((length)+(offset)) \ + || (length) < 0) { \ + PAM_BP_ASSERT("invalid extraction from prompt"); \ + } \ + memcpy((data), (offset) + PAM_BP_DATA(prompt), (length)); \ +} while (0) + + +/* Control types */ + +#define PAM_BPC_FALSE 0 +#define PAM_BPC_TRUE 1 + +#define PAM_BPC_OK 0x01 /* continuation packet */ +#define PAM_BPC_SELECT 0x02 /* initialization packet */ +#define PAM_BPC_DONE 0x03 /* termination packet */ +#define PAM_BPC_FAIL 0x04 /* unable to execute */ + +/* The following control characters are only legal for echanges + between an agent and a client (it is the responsibility of the + client to enforce this rule in the face of a rogue server): */ + +#define PAM_BPC_GETENV 0x41 /* obtain client env.var */ +#define PAM_BPC_PUTENV 0x42 /* set client env.var */ +#define PAM_BPC_TEXT 0x43 /* display message */ +#define PAM_BPC_ERROR 0x44 /* display error message */ +#define PAM_BPC_PROMPT 0x45 /* echo'd text prompt */ +#define PAM_BPC_PASS 0x46 /* non-echo'd text prompt*/ + +/* quick check for prompts that are legal for the client (by + implication the server too) to send to libpamc */ + +#define PAM_BPC_FOR_CLIENT(/* pamc_bp_t */ prompt) \ + (((prompt)->control <= PAM_BPC_FAIL && (prompt)->control >= PAM_BPC_OK) \ + ? PAM_BPC_TRUE:PAM_BPC_FALSE) + + +#endif /* PAM_CLIENT_H */ -- cgit v1.2.3