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Diffstat (limited to 'network/socks/socks.cstc.4.2/What_are_the_risks')
| -rw-r--r-- | network/socks/socks.cstc.4.2/What_are_the_risks | 70 |
1 files changed, 0 insertions, 70 deletions
diff --git a/network/socks/socks.cstc.4.2/What_are_the_risks b/network/socks/socks.cstc.4.2/What_are_the_risks deleted file mode 100644 index e8bd387d..00000000 --- a/network/socks/socks.cstc.4.2/What_are_the_risks +++ /dev/null @@ -1,70 +0,0 @@ ->From daemon@inoc.dl.nec.com Wed Dec 1 17:44:07 1993 -Date: Wed, 1 Dec 93 17:42:55 CST -From: ylee@syl.dl.nec.com (Ying-Da Lee) -Message-Id: <9312012342.AA26065@florida.syl.dl.nec.com> -To: socks@inoc.dl.nec.com, zz5@dswpa.dsdoe.ornl.gov -Subject: Re: Comparing firewall packages... -Cc: ylee@syl.dl.nec.com -X-Mailing-List: socks@syl.dl.nec.com (SOCKS discussion list) -Status: RO - ->I will be working with SOCKS now. Any information would be ->appreciated. I just want to know how secure SOCKS is, and what ->guarantees can be made about it... Thanks. - -I don't know about guarantees. Should we start with 'as far as I -know, there is no way...' and see where it ends? - -As far as I know, there is no way to initiate an attack into your -firewalled internal network through SOCKS if your SOCKS server is -properly configured. For example, if your internal network is -200.100.50 and you put the line - -deny 0.0.0.0 0.0.0.0 200.100.50.0 255.255.255.0 - -at the top of your sockd.conf, the SOCKS server will fend off -all attempts to go through it to reach your inside hosts. No -routing tricks or IP address spoofing will make any difference. - -This is not to say that you are not incurring some risks by -running SOCKS. You are, but these are the risks/vulnerabilities -accompanying the applications you allow to run on top of SOCKS, -not with SOCKS itself. For example, doing any network communication -without encryption runs the risk of having your password or other -confidential information stolen, whether you use SOCKS or not. -Blindly "displaying" a postscript file can end in a disaster -regardless of whether you retrieved the file through SOCKS or -not. SOCKS doesn't add more on top of these risks, but it doesn't -help you deal with them either. - -Should it? - -It really can't if SOCKS is to remain a general purpose TCP relayer -without delving into the specific application protocols. This accounts -for the server's high effficiency. This independence of the application -protocol also makes it easy to convert an application program into a -SOCKS client. In addition, SOCKS probably will have a fairly easy time -accommodating security devices in the application protocols if and when -they are used. - -So, if on balance you find the security risks of existing telnet, ftp, -Mosaic, etc. outweigh their usefulness to you and you are unable or -unwilling to develop a more secure version, then SOCKS is not for you. -If the balance tilts the other way, welcome to SOCKS. - -I hope that's enough for a start. - - Ying-Da Lee (214)518-3490 (214)518-3552 (FAX) - Principal Member, Technical Staff - NEC Systems Laboratory, C&C Software Technology Center / - NEC USA, Corporate Network Administration Division - ylee@syl.dl.nec.com - -************** -The rest of this message was automatically appended by the socks list -mail munger. To send a message to the entire list, address it to: -socks@inoc.dl.nec.com. However, if you want to get off the list or -change your address, please send a message to socks-request@inoc.dl.nec.com, -and NOT the entire list. Thank you. -************** - |