diff options
| author | Andrew G. Morgan <morgan@kernel.org> | 2001-02-11 06:33:53 +0000 |
|---|---|---|
| committer | Andrew G. Morgan <morgan@kernel.org> | 2001-02-11 06:33:53 +0000 |
| commit | 4e4d6bb78e3bd6430838d854832c58f104d5f559 (patch) | |
| tree | 9f3223c9b38717da4db165ad13720367c76b6fbf /modules/pam_unix/support.c | |
| parent | 25188cef4bd88edeb68c1bd3c7b54c38e18ad151 (diff) | |
Relevant BUGIDs: 112540
Purpose of commit: minor security bugfix
Commit summary:
---------------
Fixes for the password helper binaries.
Before, there was no check that the password entered was actually that
of the intended user being authenticated. Instead, the password was
checked for the requesting user. While this disstinction sounds like a
security hole, its actually not been a problem in practice. The helper
binaries have only been used in the case that the application is not
setuid-0 and as such even if an improper authentication succeeded, the
application could not change its uid from that of the requesting user.
Diffstat (limited to 'modules/pam_unix/support.c')
| -rw-r--r-- | modules/pam_unix/support.c | 9 |
1 files changed, 6 insertions, 3 deletions
diff --git a/modules/pam_unix/support.c b/modules/pam_unix/support.c index 87a5d938..69071408 100644 --- a/modules/pam_unix/support.c +++ b/modules/pam_unix/support.c @@ -394,7 +394,8 @@ int _unix_blankpasswd(unsigned int ctrl, const char *name) #include <sys/types.h> #include <sys/wait.h> -static int _unix_run_helper_binary(pam_handle_t *pamh, const char *passwd, unsigned int ctrl) +static int _unix_run_helper_binary(pam_handle_t *pamh, const char *passwd, + unsigned int ctrl, const char *user) { int retval, child, fds[2]; @@ -408,8 +409,8 @@ static int _unix_run_helper_binary(pam_handle_t *pamh, const char *passwd, unsig /* fork */ child = fork(); if (child == 0) { - static char *args[] = { NULL, NULL }; static char *envp[] = { NULL }; + char *args[] = { NULL, NULL, NULL }; /* XXX - should really tidy up PAM here too */ @@ -419,6 +420,8 @@ static int _unix_run_helper_binary(pam_handle_t *pamh, const char *passwd, unsig /* exec binary helper */ args[0] = x_strdup(CHKPWD_HELPER); + args[1] = x_strdup(user); + execve(CHKPWD_HELPER, args, envp); /* should not get here: exit with error */ @@ -530,7 +533,7 @@ int _unix_verify_password(pam_handle_t * pamh, const char *name if (geteuid()) { /* we are not root perhaps this is the reason? Run helper */ D(("running helper binary")); - retval = _unix_run_helper_binary(pamh, p, ctrl); + retval = _unix_run_helper_binary(pamh, p, ctrl, name); if (pwd == NULL && !on(UNIX_AUDIT,ctrl) && retval != PAM_SUCCESS) { |